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THE COLONIAL POLITICAL SYSTEM:

A CASE STUDY OF

POLITICAL CONFLICT IN A BRITISH COLONY

by
Archibald Wickeramaraja Singham

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Abstract

THE COLONIAL POLITICAL SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN A BRITISH COLONY

By A. W. Singham

This study attempts to identify the peculiar relationships that develop in a British colony between the three authority systems discussed by Weber: the traditional, charismatic and legal domination systems. Since each authority system is associated with a particular type of administrative staff, each system claims legitimacy on different grounds. In the colonies of the New World, because the state has played an active role in creating social institutions, i.e., the state has "preceded" the society, the claims to legitimacy by authority systems have usually resulted in conflict.

The political conflict caused by these rival claims to legitimacy cannot be resolved in a colony because of the fundamental contradictions within the colonial polity. Therefore, the political system in a colony is unstable and does not tend towards equilibrium, and the crisis phenomenon is inherent in the colonial situation. We concluded from our study that the political instability evident in the new states can therefore be traced to the colonial past, with this instability most clearly revealed in the phase of terminal colonial rule.

These theoretical propositions are examined through the experience of a colony in the British West Indies. In June, 1962, Her Majesty the Queen suspended the Constitution of Grenada and dismissed the Chief Minister on grounds that his government was maladministering the colony. The crisis phenomenon was not new to this colony, as it had undergone a severe social and economic crisis in 1951, which marked the political rise of E.M. Gairy, a central figure in the 1962 crisis. The conflict between Mr. Gairy and the colonial authorities enabled us to examine in depth some of the sources of conflict between the competing authority groups in the colony.

On the basis of the case study we arrived at the following theoretical conclusions. 1) The terms charisma and especially charismatic leadership did not adequately describe the leadership style of this type of colonial political leader, and that the term 'hero' was more appropriate. 2) The hero emerges during the stage of terminal colonial rule when the colony is granted universal adult franchise. 3) The hero has to pursue a dual strategy to maintain himself in power. On the one hand he must maintain a spontaneous mass movement that continually challenges colonial authority, while on the other hand he must build and maintain an administrative organization to sustain him electorally. To achieve the former he develops

a crowd strategy, with the major function of the political party to mobilize the crowd. The trade union performs the second function, providing funds and the organization that enable the hero to maintain his electoral position. 4) The colony is essentially a subordinate dependent system, not a sub-system. 5) We attempt to show how all the critical institutions in the society, e.g., the economy, the family and other social institutions, reinforce the tendency of colonial societies to produce personal authoritarian forms of government. The study concludes with a typology of personal governments that are likely to develop during the first phase of independence.

It is argued that the colony must be studied as an entity, as best revealed through a crisis. We therefore used a number of different methodological devices to collect data: 1) historical and documentary evidence, 2) an election survey to explore the social-psychology of the colonial voter, 3) elite interviews of the political, economic and bureaucratic elites, and 4) the use of participant observers. The usefulness and limitations of each of these methods in a small, colonial society are assessed in Appendix I.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study was originally intended to be a brief report by a team of researchers on the constitutional crisis in Grenada undertaken by Mr. A. McIntyre, Mr. G.E. Mills and the author, under the auspices of the Institute of Social and Economic Research of the University of the West Indies. The intent was to follow the type of study undertaken earlier by Smith, Augier and Nettleford on the Rastafarian cult in Jamaica[1]. It was felt that a brief report analyzing the major factors that led to the suspension of the Constitution in Grenada would be useful not only to Grenadians but also to a wider Caribbean public. However, as the research progressed we came to the conclusion that a more systematic and detailed study of the political process in a colony was needed in order to fully understand this crisis[2].

In a very real sense this study tries to deal with a number of ideas that my friends and teachers have raised with me at various stages of my intellectual development, though of course none of them can be blamed for misinterpretations of their ideas or differing conclusions I may have drawn. Robert Cohen introduced me in my undergraduate days at Wesleyan University to the world of social

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[1] M.G. Smith, Roy Augier and R. Nettleford, The Ras Tafari Movement in Kingston, Jamaica (Jamaica: University College of the West Indies, 1960).

[2] See Appendix I for a more detailed account of the genesis of this study and how its scope and emphasis evolved.

science. Robert Ward at the University of Michigan was largely responsible for my specific interest in political science and the systematic analysis of the politics of the new states, reawakening and sharpening my own interest in the politics of the third world. James Meisel and Morris Janowitz of Michigan were both responsible for my special interest in political sociology, especially the writings of Max Weber. Sam Eldersveld gave personal and intellectual encouragement to my conviction that to write about politics one must be "committed and involved", and it was through him that I was exposed to the strange and complicated world of the politician.

My colleagues and friends have no idea how dependent I have been on their ideas, their arguments and most of all their encouragement. Vern Dibble has always insisted that an intellectual must deal with "first and last things" and not with empirical trivia. Al Meyer taught me that it is not enough to write, one must also learn to teach. Brian Chapman has always insisted that politics is about choice, and that a political scientist has a moral obligation to bring reason to a community. Lloyd Best taught me the most important lesson of all, that the task of the intellectual in the third world is to live and write courageously about the issues facing the third world.

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I owe a very personal and deep-seated debt to the people of Grenada, who welcomed me into their homes and with whom I have been privileged to participate in the great debate on Grenada's future. I came to have a deep and profound respect for the two main adversaries of my study. James Lloyd and Eric Matthew Gairy were both more than generous in giving me of their time and effort. James Lloyd belongs to that class of West Indian civil servants who ably helped to cushion the transition from colonial status to Independence. Eric Gairy offered me the hospitality that is so characteristic of Grenadians. He was very frank and open with me in our discussions. He not only gave me of his time, but allowed me access to his personal files and provided details about his activities throughout this period. Both adversaries will no doubt find much to disagree with in this study. I can only hope that they are satisfied that I have tried to deal fairly with all the issues and personalities involved and that this analysis will help them and others like them to understand the nature of the political system they are involved in. In the final analysis a study like this is designed to help the civil servant, the politician and the citizen to better understand themselves and their society. I must also add a note of personal thanks to Derek Knight in Grenada who read parts of the manuscript at various stages and who was always ready to enlighten me about the nature of

Grenadian society and encourage me in this study.

Finally my thanks are due to the two institutions that provided financial support for me to carry out and complete this study. The University of the West Indies was more than generous with funds, as well as releasing me from teaching duties, while the University of Manchester permitted me to spend a most productive year in England as a Simon Research Fellow.

This study could not have been completed without the help I received from my wife. She not only typed the first drafts of the entire manuscript but was responsible for pointing out a number of methodological and theoretical contradictions in the study. My thanks are also due to Mrs. Kathleen Miles who typed the final manuscript in her characteristic conscientious fashion.

Mona,
Kingston,
Jamaica.

A.W. Singham
May 25, 1967

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INTRODUCTION

Malinowski, writing almost 30 years ago, reminded the anthropologist that he

> must relinquish his comfortable position in the long chair of the missionary compound, Government station, or planter's bungalow, where, armed with pencil and notebook and at times with a whiskey and soda, he has been accustomed to collect statements from informants, write down stories, and fill out sheets of paper with savage texts. He must go out into the villages, and see the natives at work in gardens, on the beach, in the jungle; he must sail with them to distant sandbanks and to foreign tribes, and observe them in fishing, trading and ceremonial overseas expeditions. Information must come to him full-flavoured from his own observation of native life, and not to be squeezed out of reluctant informants as a trickle of talk. [1]

His warning to anthropologists is particularly timely for modern political scientists, especially those specialising in the study of developing countries. Armed with sophisticated questionnaires and conceptual frameworks, the latter day political scientist descends on developing countries, and after a short period produces an authoritative, if not the definitive, work on the political system he has investigated. While most of these studies have added to our knowledge about these societies, an undue emphasis on "empiricism" has often distorted the political "life style" of these societies. One wishes that their authors had left the government offices and the cocktail parties given by Prime Ministers and mingled with the

[1] Max Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965).

"natives" over a period of time. A genuine involvement and mingling would undoubtedly have resulted in richer and far more interesting studies than most of those that keep appearing as each new nation joins the family of nations.

One of the real drawbacks of the contemporary interest in conceptual frameworks is that these frameworks tend to becloud the facts about the political system. These social scientists have developed a very sophisticated language that has become increasingly difficult for laymen and policy makers in these societies to understand. In a sense this is quite understandable. The analysts of developing countries have had a unique opportunity in the past two decades to test and develop various theories about growth and change as large numbers of new nations have come into existence. The largely theoretical concerns of the political scientists, however, are of little practical relevance to the practitioners of government in the new states. The latter are faced with enormous problems such as the transfer of power and changes in the social order which require studies that are directly and immediately relevant for policy purposes. In the developed countries the intellectual tradition and the resources available have allowed two traditions to co-exist, namely those of applied and pure social science. The autonomy of the universities and the presence of intellectuals in the business and government sectors have insured a steady stream of both theoretical and policy oriented studies. In traditional societies, with non-empirical intellectual traditions, this distinction between policy oriented studies and empirical studies usually did not exist. In societies which are undergoing rapid change, it becomes imperative that there

should be some fusion between these two types of studies.

It is worth noting that this need for fusion poses a particular problem or dilemma for the "native" social scientist. To begin with, he tends to be strongly attached to conceptual frameworks because of the nature of his training. On the other hand, as a "local" his view of the world is usually affected by the fundamental issues that confront his society, and he feels the need to actively participate in the process of change himself. The lack of an empirical intellectual tradition often means that many of the local intellectuals, even though university educated, can not or are not interested in translating the methods and results of social science research. However, the "native" social scientist cannot allow himself the luxury of confining himself to any research he may desire but must engage in research with practical implications. Thus he must be psychologically involved in the society, and at the same time he must maintain a certain amount of objectivity.

In other words, he has the enormous task of utilising his professional skills to sensitivise the society in which he lives as to what issues need clarification, exploration and above all understanding. This intellectual sensitivity is sadly lacking in many of the new states, or is in far too short supply. This particular lack or gap can only be filled by social scientists living and participating in these societies, and only then writing about them.

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One of the basic problems that confronts all of the small English speaking territories in the Caribbean is to make sense out of the elaborate governmental structures provided by Crown Colony government. These structures were devised for larger and different types of colonies in Africa and Asia, and were introduced with little modification into the West Indies. One such institution was the ministerial system of government. What this meant in essence was the creation of a Westminster model of government for territories the size of the Isle of Wight. It is worth pointing out that of all the British or ex-British colonies in the West Indies the largest, Jamaica, has a population of less than two million while seven of the smaller islands in the old West Indian Federation each have populations of less than one hundred thousand. Recently there have even been proposals that the British Virgin Islands, with a yet smaller population, should be granted a ministerial system of government!! Even a cursory consideration of these facts raises immediate questions of the relationship between scale on the one hand and economic and political viability on the other. One explanation for this proliferation of ministerial systems in the West Indies was that it was generally felt that the chances of success in welding a Federation depended on all the islands having similar constitutions, particularly to avoid charges of inequality by the smaller units. This system was therefore imposed irrespective of the range of governmental activity, or of the size of populations or economies. However, instead of unifying the area constitutional devices such as the ministerial system have only further divided the islands and hampered co-operation. This partially accounts for the continuing difficulties faced by West

Indian governments in achieving any significant degree of political union or economic integration.

One of the consequences of this type of constitutional order, particularly when it involves partial self-government, is that it intensifies the tension that exists between the bureaucracy and the legislature. This is by no means a problem confined only to these types of societies; but in small agrarian, colonial societies these tensions become especially acute. Our interest in analysing the conflict between these two authority systems led naturally to an investigation of the writings of Max Weber, especially his notions about authority and legitimacy. Weber distinguished between three types of authority systems and the political structures that were normally associated with these authority systems. In differentiating between tradition, charisma and legal domination Weber himself was always careful not to imply that a unilinear pattern of evolution was inevitable but rather that in some circumstances the three systems could be autonomous[1]. Some of the post-Weberians, however, have not been so careful to make this distinction.

A colonial society raises a number of problems that are unique and peculiar. Colonialism has disrupted the established pattern of societal evolution in all parts of the world. The abnormality caused by colonial conquest in other parts of the world, however, was greatly complicated in the West Indies by the fact that the resulting social

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[1] We accept this particular interpretation of Weber which is offered by R. Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Protrait (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1960) & Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed", in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.) Papers in Comparative Public Administration, (Ann Arbor, Mich: Institute of Public Administration, 1962).

structure was completely a creation of colonial conquest. Unlike the colonial territories in Africa and Asia, the conquering power in one way or another virtually exterminated the indigenous Indian populations in the West Indies. These island societies were entirely artificial creations of the colonial powers, who planned and executed the transfer of populations from Africa and Asia. After the abolition of slavery and the end of the supervised "apprentice" system in 1838, peasant communities began to arise in all the islands as the freed slaves proceeded to settle in the hillsides and outlying districts away from the sugar plantations. While the plantation system has remained dominant small scale peasant agriculture has become important in all of the islands, particularly in the island under study, Grenada, and several of the other Windward islands. In a peculiar sense, these "traditional" peasant communities were actually creations of a "legal" tradition, if we treat the Imperial bureaucracy as a legal authority system. In this sense we can say that the legal authority system preceded the traditional authority system in the West Indies. A further complication, arising during the latter part of colonial rule, was that the legal authority system created the preconditions for the rise of charismatic authority and leadership. Specifically, this was one of the by-products of the gradual movement from limited franchise to universal adult franchise. This was in keeping with colonial policy in its latter stages which called for increasing local participation in the administration of the colony and which led to the creation of a Legislative Council-Executive Council system. With the extension of franchise came the emergence of party politics and concomitantly the rise of a new kind of political leader, who possesses charisma but

whom we have designated as a hero in our study. Thus, it can be argued that directly or indirectly charismatic leadership was the "creation" of the Imperial bureaucracy.

For a number of reasons Grenada, a small, British island in the Eastern Caribbean, presents an almost unique laboratory for the political scientist to explore some of these problems. Its small size is obviously an advantage, as is the fact that it is still a colony, which has enabled us to explore some of the practical as well as the theoretical problems resulting from the more recent phases of Crown Colony Government. Among the theoretical advantages of studying a society like Grenada is that it enabled us to explore the relationship between the three authority systems already referred to. One thing that emerged clearly and unmistakably was that all three systems can co-exist at the same time, and that in the process they tend to transform one another. Of particular interest was the relationship between charismatic leadership and legal domination. In a colonial society there is genuine confusion as to which agency of government, i.e. the local charismatic leader or the representatives of the Imperial bureaucracy, enjoys ultimate legitimacy. Since the latter have historically been virtually the safe embodiment of ultimate legitimacy, they often attempt to retain their authority in the latter stages of colonialism, even though constitutionally their power has be been greatly reduced. On the other hand, the leaders of mass movements do not willingly accept this "usurpation" of what they consider to be their rightful legitimacy and hence continually question the entire structure of the government, in spite of the constitutional limitations to their powers at this stage. In Grenada the conflict

between the two was sharply defined, leading to open confrontation and a constitutional crisis in 1962.

More specifically, we were interested in exploring the distinction between charismatic leadership and institutional charisma that Weber raised. The Imperial bureaucracy has within its domain certain "offices" which possess institutional charisma. A colonial Governor, particularly, speaks in the name of Her Majesty's Government, with all the institutional charisma which is attached to the Empire and the Queen. He is the protector and defender of the Queen's people, the ultimate source of authority in a colony. This authority is reinforced by all the pomp and splendour normally associated with the Governor's office. This seems to be a good example of what Weber meant when he talked about institutional charisma. However, this institutional charisma should not be confused with personal charisma, although in some cases a Governor or high ranking colonial official may possess both. On the other hand, the local political leader who organizes a trade union or a political party claims authority or legitimacy on two grounds. Not only does he enjoy the legitimacy legally conferred upon him as the recognised leader of a major political party, but he also claims that certain special powers have been "endowed" to him by the people. This claim "to the people" carries an appeal of a higher, moral authority. Thus, when Crown Colony government reaches this stage constitutionally, there is almost bound to be a struggle for legitimacy by the actors or sets of actors representing these two authority systems.

It is necessary to point out at this stage that we did not set out to try to prove or disprove the validity of Weber's insights

for Grenada by subjecting them to rigid tests of significance. Unfortunately, Weber's writings have been introduced to the Anglo-Saxon world in bits and pieces, which has allowed scholars to isolate some of his ideas from the main body of his social theory. His notions about bureaucracy and the routinisation of charisma have suffered this fate, and for a long time there has been genuine confusion in the literature between the concepts of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership. Furthermore, although Weber was attempting to describe the evolution or rather the unique characteristics of modern, industrial societies, some scholars have assumed that Weber was positing a logical, causal and sequential relationship between the three authority systems as a general principle.

One of the grave errors of modern social science has been the attempt to resurrect partial insights of this sort and subject them to "rigorous" empiricism. In the field of political sociology Michel's Iron Law and Weber's Ideal Type provide good examples of greatly overworked concepts. It is our contention that Weber's insights, for example, can be very useful in understanding a type of colonial society like Grenada, provided the necessary historical and intellectual modifications are made. For one thing, it is necessary to distinguish between Weber's political sociology and his general sociology. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the application of any specific construct to a phenomenon different from that envisaged by its author is bound to result in considerable contradictions. While all of these problems will be explored in more detail in the chapters which follow, we must emphasize that we used Weber's insights only for the purpose of theoretical clarification of our particular case study, and not in any way for the purpose of proving or disproving his concepts.

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The study is set out in such a way as to try and serve two different needs simultaneously. On one level this study provides the student of politics with a concrete case study of the political process in one particular colonial society. The evidence is arranged so as to deal in some detail with the various levels of government and how they interact with one another. In addition throughout the study we have tried to integrate theory with practice. In the concluding chapter we shall attempt to bring together a number of the generalizations that have been advanced throughout the case study.

In recent years there has been increasing disenchantment with the case study method among political scientists. Students of comparative government have complained that case studies tend to be parochial and that the end result is non-accumulative in regards to developing a theory of political science. This has led to a large number of "theoretically-oriented", empirical, cross-cultural studies, the majority of which often say little about the actual countries they are dealing with. Further, such studies necessitate a number of gross assumptions in order to meet the requirements of uniformity and comparability. Fortunately, there is no need for an either-or solution to this problem, for case studies can lend themselves to comparative analysis to the same extent as the so-called "comparative studies". The most urgent requirement is for studies in depth, which can be used ultimately to build up a meaningful comparative theory of political development. In the West Indies we had the choice of undertaking a comparative sutdy of legislative-executive relations in various islands, or of confining ourselves to one island and analysing it in depth. In fact, the field work for this study was

originally begun for purposes of a comparative study, and questionnaires were administered to the senior civil servants of all the Leeward and Windward Islands. However, a first analysis of the data, while statistically "satisfactory", did not quite describe the real nature of the conflict and tension which was known to exist in all these islands between the legislature and the administration. In fact, we found that the data relating to values, attitudes and predispositions of the senior civil servants and the political leaders were often distortions of reality, for in questionnaire situations both groups tended to minimise the conflict in the name of the island's "national" interest. For example, a code asking the respondents to describe legislative-executive relations as satisfactory, unsatisfactory or in-between proved virtually useless.

This emphasized clearly the necessity to examine our particular problem within a broader historical and environmental context. While it is indeed possible and in some cases advantageous to compare and collate information about a variety of political systems in areas such as the Caribbean or Latin America, it is doubtful whether certain complex problems can be usefully analysed in comparative terms, at least at our present level of knowledge of these societies. After examining some of the comparative data that was originally collected, it was felt that it would be much more fruitful to study one particular island in depth to illuminate the problem of legislative-executive relations under Crown Colony government. This alternative was chosen in spite of the fact that the original comparative data was collected in an area that is very homogeneous.

This immediately raises questions as to how the boundaries

were defined for such a study. The boundary problem in the West Indies is both physical and theoretical in nature. In physical and geographical terms the British West Indies has long been a political entity, and for the period of the Federation had a common political structure. Political scientists usually have the boundary problem solved for them by the existence of the state as a reliable entity within which to examine the "authoritative allocation of values." However, in the case of Grenada and the other West Indian islands there has been a genuine problem in identifying the real or meaningful boundaries. For a time in the late 'fifties and early 'sixties Grenada was administratively a part of the Federation of the West Indies. After the Federation collapsed in 1961, Grenada appeared to have a choice of either joining the proposed federation of the remaining eight territories in the Windwards and Leewards (Jamaica and Trinidad obtaining independence on their own in 1962), or of accepting a tentative offer from Trinidad to explore the possibilities of a unitary state composed of Grenada and Trinidad. Grenada's small size seemed to preclude the possibility of independence for the island on her own. Another aspect of the boundary problem, although of lesser importance, is that Grenada herself has a few dependencies like Carriacou and Petit-Martinique. Thus, Grenadians have faced a genuine problem in discovering their political identity. They have been constantly unsure as to whether they are primarily British subjects, West Indian nationals, Grenadians or more recently citizens of Trinidad and Tobago.

The other aspect of the boundary problem was to define the boundaries of the various components within the political system,

as well as the boundary between the political system and the social and economic systems. We began by concentrating on the conflict and tension between two agencies of government; the legislative and the executive. However, it soon became clear that it would be misleading, if not inaccurate, if we confined ourselves only to these two units of government, and that the first task was to place the conflict within its constitutional setting. The constitution is basic in that it specifies the formal powers of each individual office, although it does not of course spell out the role requirements. Here we must distinguish between office and role. In politics the hierarchy of office is often elaborated in great detail by law; however, these offices are occupied by individuals, who usually both transform the office, and are themselves transformed by the office. Either way, the transformation results in conflict between the various actors occupying the offices. Whether transformed or transforming, these occupants seek legitimacy for their actions based on the particular office they occupy. The limits of the powers of the executive, legislature and the judiciary are usually only broadly defined by the constitution, therefore the peculiar interaction and conflict that emerges between these various agencies must be viewed within each community in their own historical setting. This led to an examination of the political order, especially of the role of interest groups and political parties in the community.

However, in examining the broader constitutional and political order our purpose was only to isolate those aspects that were most relevant to our specific problem. For example, we found it necessary to describe in some detail not only the structure and organisation

of the Grenada United Labour Party (G.U.L.P.) but also the political style of the party in order to understand the character of the charismatic hero, E.M. Gairy, the man who challenged the political order. In addition, we had to include a description of the opposition party, since the style and strategy of our charismatic leader was partially dependent on the character of his opposition. On the other hand we did not feel that it was necessary to include any detailed information about the other, minor parties, nor did the relationship between the two major parties and the Federal Government appear relevant for this particular study.

The problem of interaction between levels of government presents political scientists with some of their most difficult problems in political analysis. One of the most vexing problems that arises is that each level of government has a separate relationship with the socio-economic environment within which the political community is located. Thus, when describing the party system one inevitably has to take into account the class structure, while in discussing the policy making functions of the legislature it becomes necessary to talk about the nature of the economy. Not only do we have to understand the nature of the various relationships between each level of government, but also the inter-relations of each level with the social and economic systems. At this stage the scholar is vulnerable to all the temptations and dangers of reductionism. Political scientists who start off being very specific in their enquiries about the political process have been known to end up looking for the answers to their questions in child rearing practices. In this connection we were greatly helped by the writings of Easton

and Gluckman, who in their theories of political, social and economic systems helped to provide a focus that we hope has saved us from the excesses of reductionism[1]. As political scientists we now face the difficult task of understanding and integrating the social, psychological and economic variables that affect and influence our own variables. The problem of legislative-executive tensions in a colonial society could have been researched by a social psychologist or an economist, each one focusing on a different aspect of the relationship. Since we wished to isolate the political aspect of the situation and examine it intensively we had to make certain assumptions about the state and nature of the economy, the society and the psychology of members of the society. It is here that the individual discipline faces considerable difficulties since by the very nature of the problem these assumptions have to be naive, and this naivety can be misleading.

In Grenada we had to make a number of assumptions about the social structure, the economy, and the psychology of its people, based on the works of other specialists. In borrowing their conclusions we have, of course, unavoidably accepted a number of their hypotheses and assumptions about Grenadian society and their findings have influenced our hypotheses about the political system. It is very tempting at this stage for a social scientist to leave his own particular discipline and adopt the garb of his newly discovered brother social scientist. All too often this unfortunately results in political scientists writing bad sociology and sociologists writing

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[1] David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965) and Max Gluckman, editor, Closed Systems and Open Minds: The Limits of Naivety in Social Anthropology (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1964).

bad political science. In fact, one of our first tasks was to rigidly circumscribe the boundaries of the study. This circumscription was arbitrary in that we chose geographic and political boundaries, i.e. a specific part of the political system within a specific island. The study was circumscribed historically as well as spatially, dealing primarily with the period between 1951-1962.

The next task was to simplify the variables to be dealt with within the confines of the political system. Easton's notions about the political system proved quite useful here, and to this end we have adapted his input-output model for our analysis. Easton begins by distinguishing between the political community, the regime and government. He identifies a political community as "individuals bound together by a political division of labour".[1] The regime refers to a "general matrix of regularised expectations, within the limits of which political actions are usually considered authoritative, regardless of how or where these expectations may be expressed".[2] In other words, the regime represents a general agreement about the rules of the game employed by the political system. Finally, by authority he means that which is normally associated with government. However, Easton is implying much more than what is commonly meant by government, for he is concerned with all the occupants of authority roles and not necessarily just with a government in power. Any given political system, then, normally maintains itself by transforming the demands made upon it through the political system, thus

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[1] David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, op. cit., p. 177.

[2] Ibid., p. 193.

satisfying these demands. Implicit in his system is a tendency for political systems to move towards equilibrium, but this movement towards stability is absent in a dependent, colonial society. The latter can be characterised as a system with a built-in tendency to disequilibrium. Diagram 1 below is an adaptation of Easton's input-output model where the variables have been specified. Among the environmental factors influencing the political process in Grenada are the scale of the society, demographic characteristics, the nature of the economy, and finally the value system, particularly the value system in relation to the stratification of the society.

The boundary problem has already been briefly referred to, and will be explored more thoroughly in a later chapter. However, a brief discussion is in order here of the relation between scale and boundary. It has often been argued that the scale of a society or economy greatly affects the activities of the members of the community, which has been particularly stressed by economists and sociologists in the West Indies. Sociologists normally define scale as the relation between the number of people and the intensity of their relations. In this sense Grenada can be considered larger than the number of her actual inhabitants, since migration has always been so important. At all levels of the society the populace has maintained close relations with those who migrated to Trinidad or Great Britain. This has considerable political significance, for one can postulate that as the society extends its relations with other societies it tends to become less dependent on indigenous institutions, and hence less parochial and more regional in outlook. The physical nature of an island, however, places certain very marked limits on

FIGURE I. COLONIAL POLITICAL SYSTEM



this process, which affects the individual's political behaviour. No matter how wide the range of the individual's association and relationship abroad, the island provides a natural and psychological boundary. The resulting insularity is very difficult to overcome, even though a number of ties and relations exist with other political units, and even though these other units are very similar in nature to the island. This natural tendency to insularity by island peoples has been further strengthened by the colonial governments in the area, as they found the island a convenient administrative and political unit. This political specialisation among the small islands in the British Caribbean has often been associated with economic specialisation and ethnic stratification. As M.G. Smith has pointed out, this has led to peculiar status configurations in each island social structure. Within each island, small as it may be, one finds not one community but different and separate communities, which tend to be separatist in nature and are fairly isolated from each other, despite their physical proximity. This separatism has persisted despite years of exposure to universalistic metropolitan "values". M.G. Smith has explored this problem carefully and has introduced the notion of pluralism to describe these West Indian societies, which will be examined in relation to the political sphere in later chapters.

In addition to scale and demographic features, the nature of the economy has had a crucial role in influencing the political structure in Grenada, particularly the dominant influence of the plantation system and the totally dependent nature of the economy. The major economic decisions have always been taken outside the island, while the struggle for political power has been between the

local landed gentry, the middle class and the peasantry. No matter which of these groups, alone or together, obtained political power however, none of them could actually control or direct the economy. The political system, which was supposed to convert the demands of the populace into policy, was unable to do so because economic power and influence came from outside the society, as did the ultimate political power. Nonetheless, after the granting of universal adult franchise, most people had expectations that the political system could and should meet their demands. Of more direct relevance to our particular interest was our finding that even if the political system had had ample power to implement the demands of the populace, the internal contradictions between the various levels of government would have prevented it. There were too many major sources of conflict and contradiction between the demands of the constitutional order and the roles that the various occupants of offices wanted and were expected to play.

A colonial political system, then, tends to become increasingly contradictory, at some stage of which crisis conditions are very likely to arise. Under such conditions political crisis becomes the pattern, with a spiralling effect as the system becomes increasingly incapable of transforming crisis situations into conflict ones. This distinction between crisis and conflict is an essential one to make. To survive, political systems must devise ways and means by which conflict can be managed and contained. When a political system does not enjoy consensus and legitimacy, conflict is transformed into crisis, which eventually results in the breakdown of civil government.

In this study we shall attempt to analyse the factors that led

to a breakdown of constitutional government in Grenada. In June of 1962, Grenada's constitution was suspended and legislative and executive powers were placed in the hands of a colonial Administrator. The crisis phenomenon, however, was not new to Grenada. In 1951 the society was plunged into a severe social crisis which we shall examine in chapter three. However, our main concern was the 1962 crisis, since it was primarily a constitutional crisis and therefore presented us with an opportunity to isolate and analyse the political process. Easton's concepts of constitutional equilibrium were found to be quite suggestive for our analysis of the Grenadian political system. According to Easton, constitutional equilibrium results when all the contending forces have a share in the power arrangements in the community, and when there is general agreement as to how power will be distributed. This equilibrium is maintained as long as the various classes and social groups agree on the rules of the game. ... The constitution merely provides the legitimacy needed for the system to continue. Easton points out, however, that: "The constitutional aspect of the equilibrium refers to the way in which power is distributed at a particular moment; the equilibrium aspect refers to the tendency for movement to cease."[1] Constitutional equilibrium is not peculiar to democracies. It is possible, Easton goes on to say, that equilibrium can be obtained in a dictatorship or any type of political system.

The important point is that in colonial societies little effort is made to recognise the power aspirations of all the groups

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[1]David Easton, The Political System, (New York: Knopf, 1963) p. 303.

in the society. Concessions are made from time to time to recognise group aspirations in a limited way and constitutions are accordingly revised. During the period of transition there is a conscious effort to recognise local demands, and power is gradually withdrawn from the colonial representatives, and transferred to the indigenous groups. In British colonies, power has normally been handed over to elected representatives. But during the period of transition there continues to be an unequal distribution of power, with the non-elected executive branch enjoying much more power than the elected legislative branch. Since this uneven distribution of power is explicitly laid down in the constitution, we then have the pre-conditions for political instability.

Continued political instability is likely to develop into a crisis situation, which means that instead of moving towards equilibrium the political system is moving away from it. If the conditions producing instability were removed by effective and legitimate authority, and crises averted through the use of regular procedures for dealing with conflicts, then the system would tend towards equilibrium. Viable political systems, then, tend to develop mechanisms which discourage conditions of instability, and to cushion the crisis situations and transform them into conflicts. Conflict, as Lewis Coser has reminded us, can be a functional and indeed a necessary ingredient for equilibrium.[1] The crucial problem, of course, is to discern at what stage a conflict is likely to become a crisis, and to distinguish the characteristics of a crisis from those of a political conflict.

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[1] Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1956).

Every political system relies on the "supports" it has within the community. These supports are usually designated as consensus values. Easton, for example, differentiates between the values, attitudes and knowledge held by individuals about the political community, about the regime and about the government or authorities. The values associated with the community are of a consensual kind, in other words, they involve a sense of identity. The values associated with the regime relate to the character and kind of governmental system. Values in regard to the government or authorities involve a choice between the various contenders for political office. It is normal in any system for conflict to arise between individuals over the "government" or "authorities". In a number of countries the electoral system provides the mechanism for resolving these conflicts. Conflicts may arise over the type of regime, which occasionally results in civil war or revolution, but which does not necessarily threaten the community as a community. However, a political system (and indeed the whole culture of which it is a part) faces a crisis if there are serious disagreements about the very nature of the community. If sizable groups in the community are in constant disagreement about the values associated with all three (community, regime and government), then the political system faces a major crisis or series of crises which can result in the total breakdown of the state, including the splitting off and forming of new nations or states from an old one.

A colonial political system faces the constant prospect of one crisis after another, i.e. it is inherently unstable. This is partly because there is no adequate machinery for conflict management.

A colonial constitution in itself is one of the contributors to continuing conflict and crisis situations. The political experience of most colonial and ex-colonial states reveal a trained incapacity to deal with conflict, crisis and contradiction. During the period of colonial rule the complete collapse of the system is prevented by the existence (and often the use) of Imperial troops, and/or the drawing of funds from the Imperial treasury. Thus, short term equilibrium is guaranteed by Imperial authority, since it enjoys a monopoly over all the techniques of violence and persuasion. However, when independence comes these props are removed, and the society is given the "freedom" to work out for themselves all the contradictions they have inherited.

The Colonial Case: Lessons for Independence

One of the benefits of studying colonial political systems is that it greatly enhances the understanding of politics in the period following independence. The study of one small colony in microcosm can enable us to see more easily the essential nature of the problems involved. The case study method, given its detailed nature, can illuminate some of the difficult problems faced by larger and more complex states which are undertaking the arduous task of decolonisation.

The political experience during the colonial period plays a major role in determining the way in which the problems of independence will be tackled. In a sense, changes in the political system are easier to bring about than those in the social or economic system.

Some political changes can be brought about in very short time as the only real change called for is in the personnel. Unfortunately, the personnel who are responsible for the transfer of power have all been "socialised" in a colonial society. They thus normally bear all the psychological scars of colonialism and are often incapable of making the psychological adjustments necessary to undertake the difficult task of economic and social change. The colonial personality type finds genuine change psychologically upsetting. While usually recognizing that his society must first seek the political kingdom, he finds it more difficult to comprehend that genuine decolonisation involves personality changes as well as institutional changes.

Despite their espousal of egalitarian and democratic ideals a large proportion of the elites in colonial societies tend to have basically authoritarian personalities. Authoritarianism is embedded in the entire social structure and thus even those who rebel against the repression of colonialism are apt to be authoritarian when they achieve power and try to introduce change. Personalities of this type are both aggressive and submissive. When faced with authority, which they find difficult to challenge openly, they tend to become submissive. On the other hand, once they attain a position of authority they usually exercise that authority aggressively. The elite-mass relationship also assumes a different relationship in these types of societies. The elites in a colonial society tend to develop mass organisations that respond readily to authoritarianism. The elite-mass relationship which evolves during the colonial period which we have characterised as a hero-crowd relation-

ship, is carried over into independence. In many colonial societies, the middle classes form a large part of the elite, and this particular group has probably faced some of the severest psychological shocks from colonialism. They have been the buffers of change, which has made them particularly ambivalent towards both the metropolitan society and the traditional society. They try at first to identify with the aggressor, and thus come to terms with their colonial masters and themselves and their roles. This identification provides no permanent psychological satisfaction, for in a situation of inequality such an individual will always fear the aggressor and be unsure about how successful his imitation is. Further, he is often openly rebuffed by his aggressors, or more subtly made by them to feel his inferiority.

Despite rebuffs and ambivalence, colonial societies tend to produce entire elite classes of "imitators" in the areas of language, dress, social customs and political forms. No matter how high these individuals may rise, however, they are never sure whether they have made it into the club on merit. The anxiety that is induced leads some ex-colonial elites to revert to the traditional culture (from which they are alienated) in the search for security. In the West Indies, however, a return to tradition means a return to the values of the colonial master and images of slavery and indentured labour, although recently there have been growing attempts to invoke the pre-slavery past by stressing the African heritage. This creates a very special psychological dilemma for West Indian nationalists. In their attempt to establish a modern society they possess a social structure which is not resistant to change. The West Indies, after all, has

no traditional institution like caste, and further they use a modern language. While they have accepted many aspects of modernity, they still face the difficult task of creating a value system that will provide the security and sense of pride and self-reliance necessary for development. In a sense it is unfair to expect the present generation of elites to introduce political, social, psychological and economic change simultaneously, or in such a radical or fundamental way that their own futures and personalities are endangered.

In the meantime, it may be useful if we were to begin by looking at the recent past in order to know what has to be done to resolve some of the problems of the immediate future.

CHAPTER I

THE ENVIRONMENT

As political scientists in the West have become increasingly disenchanted with the older, and what they consider the too narrow concern with formal political institutions, they have come more and more to examine the social factors that determine politics. One of the effects of this new trend has been a de-emphasis of historical factors and the system of economic relations as they affect politics. In political analysis it is extremely difficult to strike a balance between the historical, economic and social phenomenon. Apart from the difficulty of achieving balance, there is the added danger that a cursory treatment of these different fields is bound to be over-simplified and naive. Despite these difficulties, it is essential to try and outline those non-political aspects of the environment that are relevant and often crucial to our understanding of the political system.

For our study of Grenada we have assumed that a number of environmental factors have been particularly significant in influencing or determining the political process in the colony. The first is the geo-political factor, i.e., the size of the community and its relationship with other territories. The second is the historical fact of Imperial rule, based in Grenada on the transplantation and enslavement of people, followed by close to one hundred years of Crown Colony rule.

In the West Indies the plantation economy still remains one of the basic determinants of the relations between members of the society. This leads us into an examination of the salient features of the present day economy and the population, culminating in a discussion of the class structure and concomitantly the interest configuration in the society. Finally, we shall attempt to explore in a preliminary fashion the value system in Grenada and its distribution within the various strata. In trying to isolate the "political" variables it is important to stress that we do not necessarily accept the view that the political system is a functional sub-system of the social system. As we have indicated in the Introduction, one of the peculiarities of societies like Grenada has been the close interdependence between the state and the society. This interaction will be seen more fully in later chapters; the purpose of this chapter is to provide as much of the relevant background data as possible in order that we may better understand the particular problem we are investigating in the political system.

Every Grenadian learns to live with the stereotype of being branded a "small island man" from the moment he leaves his island and meets a West Indian from a larger island, particularly Trinidad or Barbados. The Grenadian is always conscious of this constraint of size, and we shall see how it affects all aspects of life in the colony. When he is taught geography he learns about Grenada in relation to the larger islands in the British Caribbean, or more usually to Great Britain. He seldom hears of Latin America, although parts of it are closer to Grenada than many of the other British islands. Even the Dutch, Spanish and French Caribbean are more remote to the Grenadian

than Great Britain or America, despite their physical proximity. The map of the Caribbean in Figure 2, shows both Grenada's small size and its location in the area.

Grenada is the most southerly of the Windward Islands[1], lying approximately 90 miles north of Trinidad and 68 miles from St. Vincent. It is only an overnight's journey by boat from Trinidad to Grenada, or approximately half an hour by air from Pearl's Airport in Grenada to the capital of Trinidad, Port-of-Spain. However, it takes 40 minutes to reach the airport in Grenada from the capital, St. George's, driving over a narrow, winding mountain road. The most common means of transport between Trinidad and Grenada are schooners, which in recent years have become motorised, although the upper and middle classes usually travel by plane. The schooners are built in the small Grenadine islands close to Grenada and St. Vincent, and carry cheaper goods as well as passengers. Despite the large amount of travelling done by Grenadians, they do not conceive of themselves as a sea-faring people. The geographer David Lowenthal has admirably described this phenomenon in an essay on self-images[2]. The island for a Grenadian and most West Indians is a boundary he understands and accepts, though this is not true of some of the very small islands such as Carriacou, which is only 20 miles from Grenada. Although the Grenadian may identify himself with a unit or area larger than Grenada, as we shall see, he still feels that the sea is a barrier. Even though there are striking similarities in culture, language and

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[1]The Windward Islands include Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada.

[2]David Lowenthal "The West Indies Chooses a Capital", Geographical Review XLIV (1958) pp. 336-364.

FIGURE 2


THE WEST INDIES
0 100 300 500
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GULF OF MEXICO
Florida
Bahama Islands
Cuba
Haiti
Sto Domingo
Puerto Rico
Leeward Islands
Windward Islands
Grenada
Trinidad
Venezuela
Colombia
Jamaica
CARIBBEAN SEA
Yucatan
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
26
18
10
62
70
78
86

religion between Grenada and Trinidad, for example, the Grenadian is aware from an early age that he is different: he is a "small island man". As Lowenthal says, for the most part it is every island for itself.

In terms of size, Grenada is small not only in relation to most of the other islands of the Caribbean, but is the smallest of the four Windward Islands: 120 square miles, or 76,888 acres. At its greatest length it is approximately 21 miles long, and 12 miles across at its widest point. Although smallest in size of the Windwards, it has the largest population; 88,700 in 1960, which works out to a density of 739 people per square mile, compared to 418 per square mile in Trinidad for example. In fact, it is the most densely populated British island in the Southern Caribbean except for Barbados, which has 1,400 persons to the square mile. Its situation in relation to density per acre of cultivable land, however, is rather better than for most of the other Windward islands, working out to 0.6 acres of cropland per head of population.

Grenada, known as the Isle of Spices[1], has been described as a moderately eroded volcanic pile and is fairly mountainous, with the main mountain ridge running across the island from north to south. The highest peak is St. Catherine, 2,750 feet high; and most of the land is hilly, with only two flat areas in the island, one on the south-western coast, and the Lavera Lowlands which extend to Grenville on the north-east coast. The population is spread out fairly evenly throughout the island, with over 80% of the population classified as

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[1] In addition to nutmeg and mace, which is spice consisting of the dried outer covering of the nutmeg, small amounts of other spices such as vanilla, cinnamon and cloves are also grown.

rural. The population of the capital, St. George's, was over 7,000 in 1960. There are four other towns of lesser importance, ranging in population from 900 to 2,300; Gouyave on the west coast, Victoria in the northwest, Sauteurs in the north and Grenville in the east. Politically Grenada also includes several very tiny islands to its south and east coasts, the most important of which are the Grenadines, lying to the north-east. The largest and most populous island in this group is Carriacou, 20 miles away from Grenada and which is approximately 13 square miles in area. The population of Carriacou was close to 7,000 in 1960. Despite its proximity its economy and social structure differ sharply from that of Grenada. The only other inhabited island of the group is Petit Martinique, with a population of less than a thousand people.

The climate is tropical, the average temperature falling in the low 80's, from which there is little variation except from November to January when the weather is somewhat cooler. Rainfall varies a great deal in different parts of the island, ranging from 30 inches in the driest areas to about 200 inches per year in the centre of the island, with the normal downfall averaging between 60 and 100 inches[1]. Irrigation is very infrequent since there is liberal rainfall and a good endowment of surface water supplies in most areas except on the south coast[2]. The soils are of the red, red-brown, yellow-brown and grey varieties, reflecting their volcanic origin[3] and are not ideal

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[1]Robert C. Kingsbury, Commercial Geography of Grenada, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, Office of Naval Research Technical Report No. 3, October, 1960.

[2]However, The Grenada Five-Year Development Plan 1964-1968 (see footnote 2, page 41) said that irrigation has a key role to play in diversifying domestic agriculture.

[3]Kingsbury, op. cit., p. 2.

for agriculture, but can under careful conditions of farming produce fairly good crops. The widespread planting of tree crops for many years has saved Grenada from the excessive erosion which has plagued many other West Indian islands. Although Grenada is located just outside the hurricane zone, she has on occasions suffered from very severe hurricanes, the latest being Hurricane Janet in 1955 which killed over a hundred people and virtually destroyed the two major export crops, cocoa and nutmeg.

Grenada's economy is almost totally dependent on agricultural products and oriented to the export market. The three main export crops which dominate the economy at present are bananas, cocoa and nutmeg. Figure 3 on page 35 indicates the main distribution of these crops by area. Mixed cropping is common; it is estimated that 80% of the bananas are interplanted with cocoa, while nutmeg and cocoa are also widely interplanted. Although like all the other West Indian islands Grenada was originally a sugar colony, beginning in the 1850's nutmegs and cocoa gradually began to replace cane. Before looking in more detail at the present-day economy, however, it is useful to briefly summarise some of the more important events in the history of Grenada, particularly those related to the economy. The constitutional history of the island is discussed in some detail in chapter two.

Brief History of Grenada's Economy

Grenada was first sighted by Columbus in 1498, but the first attempt to colonise the island did not occur until 1609[1]. Partially

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[1] I have drawn heavily in this section from The Grenada Handbook and Directory, 1946 (Barbados: The Advocate Co., 1946) compiled by E. Gittens Knight, a prominent Grenadian barrister.

FIGURE 3. MAJOR COMMERCIAL CROPS OF GRENADA



From Robert Kingsbury, Commercial Geography of Grenada, op. cit.

because of the harassment of settlers by the original inhabitants of the islands, the Caribs, a permanent settlement was not established until 1650 when the Caribs "ceded" the island to the French West India Company for a few cheap baubles. In the following year the French exterminated most of the Caribs and those few remaining ceased to be a threat to European settlers. In 1674 Grenada passed under the dominion of the French crown, and the French remained in control until 1763, when the island was captured by the English under Admiral Rodney. The French recaptured Grenada again in 1779, but it was permanently ceded to England by the Treaty of Versailles in 1783. However, in 1795 the French republic made a strong attempt to regain Grenada by bringing about an insurrection of the French inhabitants and slaves. Strong antagonism had been building up between the French and English settlers, particularly after Grenada was ceded to England in 1783. The British had taken over all the French churches and church lands and given them to the Protestant churches and the Crown. By the early part of the 1790's the French Roman Catholic settlers had been practically deprived of their political rights. In 1793 Britain and France were again at war, and the French settlers were ripe for insurrection.

The French forces, under Victor Hughes, were inadequate to capture or hold all of the Windward Islands, and thus the local French planters, slaves and coloured planters were pressed into revolt under the leadership of a coloured planter, Julien Fédon. In March, 1795, Fédon and his men invaded the old town of Grenville, massacring a large number of the British as well as taking captive a number of Englishmen from the town of Gouyave. They then retreated to Fédon's

property, Belvidere where they entrenched themselves on the summit of a neighbouring mountain, now called Morne Fédon, and were joined by all the French colonists on the island. They also established three other fortified posts in the interior of the island. It was not until June of the following year, 1796, after much bloodshed, that the British forces were finally able to capture these fortifications. Fédon escaped, and was never captured, but most of the ring-leaders were sentenced to death on grounds of high treason, and their properties confiscated, while the rest were deported to Honduras, thus destroying French power in the colony. However, French influence remains to this day in the patois or dialect, the names of peoples and places. The main legacy from the period of French colonisation is the continued predominance of Roman Catholicism, still the religion of close to two-thirds of the people.

Throughout the eighteenth century the history of Grenada was the history of sugar and slavery. In 1771 a census disclosed 1,661 whites, 415 free coloured, and 26,211 slaves. The nineteenth century saw the gradual dismantling of this system, about which much has been written and which we will only deal with very briefly. After 1808 the importation of slaves into the British colonies was prohibited, and by 1832 the slave population in Grenada had fallen to 23,604. The most important event of the period was emancipation in 1834, although the slaves did not become legally free until 1838 when the apprentice system was brought to an end. Emancipation was made possible by the already declining importance of the sugar colonies to Great Britain, spurred on by the efforts of abolitionists. The final blow to sugar in Grenada was the abolition in 1846 of the mercantilist laws protecting West Indian sugar by an act of the British parliament. Thus,

the planters were faced at the same time by falling prices for sugar and a labour scarcity, as many former slaves forewent wage labour for the establishment of small farms in the uncultivated interior lands. In 1848 an attempt to reduce wages on sugar plantations due to low prices led to demonstrations by labourers in the parish of St. Patrick's which had to be quelled by troops. In the interior cocoa planting soon came to replace sugar and coffee; between 1846 and 1855 cocoa output trebled.

However, the planters tried desperately to hang on to sugar cultivation, which had become more important to them as a way of life than an economic proposition. Maltese and Portuguese labourers and liberated slaves from Africa were imported into Grenada, but not in sufficient numbers to stem the tide, and by 1856, 47 sugar estates had been abandoned, and nine others were on the verge of closing down. In 1857 the importation of East Indians began, all the other groups previously imported having proved failures as far as the planters were concerned. This last immigration allowed several abandoned estates to be reclaimed, but came too late to save the sugar industry in Grenada. Many of the abandoned sugar estates were bought cheaply by resident planters, often ex-managers or overseers, who turned to cocoa cultivation.

By 1881, for example, almost three times as much cocoa was exported as of sugar, and nutmeg cultivation had begun to be established on a large scale. The almost complete demise of the sugar industry in Grenada facilitated the emergence of an independent peasantry to an extent not equalled in any of the other West Indian islands with the possible exception of Dominica. Although a number of abandoned sugar

estates had been sold out in small lots to former slaves, so that the census of 1881 revealed that 3,000 out of the 9,000 adult males in the colony owned land in lots of from one to fifty acres, the plantation system was far from dead. However, instead of relying primarily on wage labour as under sugar cultivation, a system of "contract out" was developed on the cocoa and nutmeg estates. On these estates plots were let out to ex-slaves, who in return for the use of lands for their own cultivation were obliged to grow cocoa for the owners. These tenants also had first option on estate employment, and since they often combined wage labour with their own farming, to think of them as independent peasants in the traditional sense is misleading. Besides, a number of those owning their own plots also cultivated plots on the estates under this system. The small size of holdings of those who did own their own land was disclosed by the census of 1891, which found that 83% of all holdings were less than five acres.

The population grew apace in this period, rising from 37,684 in 1871 to 66,750 in 1911. In the latter year, while there were 143 estates exceeding 100 acres in size, the vast majority of the 13,391 holdings were found to be under five acres in size. In the early 1900's the spice industry began to challenge cocoa as the major export crop; while cocoa exports declined between 1900 and 1925 by almost a fifth, nutmeg exports increased almost fourfold. Bananas were introduced in the 1920's, but did not really become important until the 1950's. The 1920's were in general severe, but conditions worsened during the depression, when low prices coupled with an increased population resulted in widespread misery and suffering, although there were no outbreaks of violence as in many of the other territories in 1937 and

1938. During World War II Grenada benefited by a marked rise in the price of her exports, with nutmegs ousting cocoa in this period as the major earner of export income. Migration was also heavy in this period with the high level of demand for unskilled workers on the bases and oilfields in Trinidad, Aruba, and Venezuela. After the war, although conditions were better than they had been during the depression, the rising cost of living set off a spiral of wage and salary demands. Despite these changes, the economy of Grenada in the 1950's had changed very little since the latter half of the 1800's.

The Continued Dependence on Agricultural Exports

Export agriculture continues to dominate the economy, though recently tourism and a few light manufactures have come to assume some importance, particularly the former.[1] Nonetheless, in 1958 the three major export crops, now including bananas, accounted for 98% of visible exports. Both the bulk of small farms and the estates produce primarily for the export market, with a consequent neglect of domestic

[1] A number of economic surveys and studies have been undertaken on the economy of Grenada and have been used freely in this chapter, as they contain a wealth of data. A number of economists, attached either to Governments in the area or to the University of the West Indies, have provided a large body of materials on the economies of various West Indian territories, the bulk of which have been descriptive or highly technical. However, recently a number of West Indian economists have begun to provide a body of theory on these economies which are particularly relevant for the political scientist, and on which I have also drawn heavily in this chapter. In this connection I would particularly like to mention William Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965), whose book is a pioneering effort; and I am particularly indebted to my colleagues at the University of the West Indies, Alister McIntyre and Lloyd Best for their insights and for access to both published and unpublished papers.

food production. Very few farmers produce entirely for their own subsistence, and a large part of the food consumed domestically is imported.[1] Until the hurricane of 1955, cocoa and nutmegs and mace provided most of Grenada's exports. Following the virtual destruction of both crops by the hurricane, Lacatan bananas, which are immune to Panama disease, were planted as a semi-permanent crop to provide income until the long term cocoa and nutmeg trees came back into production. By 1958 close to 23% in value of total exports was derived from bananas. With three major export crops Grenada has the most diversified export agriculture in the Windwards.

Both nutmeg and cocoa are tree crops and hence well suited to the soils and hilly lands of Grenada, and are complementary in terms of utilising the labour force. Their lack of perishability allows them to be stored for long periods. On the other hand, not only do bananas bear more quickly, but since there is no seasonal pattern in their cultivation they provide more stability of income for the farmers. Weighed against these advantages are their perishability and vulnerability to high winds. Despite the advantages Grenada possesses for all of these crops, yields per acre are low, and the island is known as a high cost producer.[2]

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[1] In 1960, for example, the value of imported food was one and one-half times the value of food produced locally.

[2] For example, yields of cocoa in 1960 were 257 lbs. per acre, compared to 1,000 lbs. per acre in many countries in Central and South America. Banana yields seldom exceed three to four tons per acre, although even in the other Windward Islands yields average 8 to 10 tons per acre, while yields obtained in Ecuador, Colombia and Central America are higher yet. No yield figures are available for nutmegs. Grenada Five Year Development Plan 1964-1968, Report of Development Programme Commission, Economic Planning Division, Trinidad, 1965, pp. 6-7.

The reason Grenada has been able to survive in the export market for her products despite low productivity has been the protection afforded her by preferential agreements with Great Britain, which has not prevented her from suffering from wide price fluctuations for her exports, however. In recent years prices have fallen for both cocoa and nutmegs. The supply of larger and cheaper quantities of nutmegs from the East Indies has shifted consumer preferences to that area, and prices have declined sharply[1]. The effect of the decline in world cocoa prices in the latter part of the 1950's and the slump after 1962 has been offset to some extent by Grenada's reputation as a producer of high quality cocoa, but the industry has been badly hurt. Recently bananas from Grenada have faced increasing competition in the protected English market from Jamaican bananas[2].

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[1] Ibid., p. 81. This has been a fairly recent trend. It is interesting to note that Grenada's favoured position in the 1950's in respect to nutmeg production was such that although exports in 1957 were only 5% of 1955 exports by weight because of the hurricane, receipts were approximately 40% of those in 1955.

[2] Jamaica has traditionally been the main supplier of bananas to Great Britain. However, banana production in the four Windward islands expanded more than threefold between 1956 and 1964, by which time they were supplying slightly more bananas to the English market than Jamaica. Banana production is more efficient in the Windwards than in Jamaica and they are more dependent on bananas for export earnings than Jamaica: in 1964 bananas accounted for less than 7% of export earnings for Jamaica as contrasted to some 70% in the Windwards. The net result of this greatly increased production from the West Indies was to force prices down drastically: between October and the end of December, 1964 prices fell from some £70 a ton to just over £39 a ton. This led to the so-called "Windward-Jamaica Banana War". George Beckford, a West Indian agricultural economist, has sharply underlined that this war was really a struggle between the two giant dealers (Van Geest in the Windwards and Elders and Ffyfes in Jamaica) for dominance in the English market. The most important point was that this struggle has proved detrimental to the growers in both Jamaica and the Windwards as prices dropped. Efforts to arrive at some sort of compromise between Jamaica and the Windwards proved abortive, and Jamaica decided to increase its production and exports so as to main-

Starting in the 1950's increasing pressure has been exerted on Great Britain to abandon existing levels of protection for West Indian exports, both from advanced countries like the United States and from unprotected developing countries. Great Britain has already warned that protection for bananas will be decreased or removed by 1969.

While Grenada's extreme dependence on a few major export crops is in large part a function of her small size and limited resources, it is undeniable that the present nature of the economy is also a result of colonial policy. A West Indian economist has recently pointed out that this type of economy is due, if only in a minor degree, to the choice of economic policies[1]. Here he distinguishes between structural dependence, which is due to size and the structure of the economy that cannot be helped, and functional dependence which arises as a result of particular policies that are chosen. He points out, of course, that the two are not mutually exclusive, but can be treated as such for purposes of analysis. While the size and lack of resources of Grenada preclude her becoming primarily a manufacturing country, the neglect of domestic agriculture, and the failure to diversify agriculture all reflect deliberate colonial policy which has been to

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tain their dominance in the English market. As Beckford points out, not only did this reveal "an extremely unsympathetic approach to a problem crucial to the Windwards' economies and at the same time peripheral to the economy of Jamaica", but it was also detrimental to the interests of Jamaican growers themselves. Cf. George Beckford "Issues in the Jamaica-Windward Islands Banana War" New World Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 1, 1965, Kingston, Jamaica. At the end of 1966 a six year contract was signed providing a quota of 368,000 tons a year for Jamaica and the Windwards, of which Jamaica can provide roughly 52%, the Windwards 48%.

[1] Cf. Alister McIntyre "Some Issues of Trade Policy in the West Indies" New World Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 2, 1966, Kingston, Jamaica, pp. 1-20.

deliberately encourage Grenada and other West Indian islands to remain as "market gardens" for the metropolis through protectionism. The old mercantilist system of trade, discriminating in favour of trade within the Empire, was dismantled in 1846 when the sugar preference was abolished, only to be revived in the West Indies in 1898. The system reached its peak in the 1940's under the exigencies of war and Britain's need for assured sources of foodstuffs and raw materials. The major effects of this policy have been to discourage structural changes in the economy and as McIntyre points out, to encourage the economic balkanisation of the Caribbean. We must now turn to examine the organisation of this type of agriculture which Grenada has inherited.

The Organisation of Agriculture

Two traditions of agriculture predominate in Grenada: small peasant farming and the plantation system. While the latter is "modern" in respect to a considerable specialisation and division of labour, the small farms tend to be undercapitalised, fragmented and uneconomic sized units.[1] The pattern of land ownership in 1957 appears to have changed little from that found in the 1891 census, as the following figures on land ownership below reveal.

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[1] A recent report described the economy in 1960 as follows: "We, therefore find that in 1960 the economy of Grenada fitted very closely the classical description of an underdeveloped economy with low income levels resulting from low production and productivity, under-utilised labour and primitive methods of production. Relatively efficient estate agriculture producing for an export market operated side by side with inefficient small scale producers working at sub-sistence levels." The Report of the Economic Commission Appointed to Examine Proposals for Association Within the Framework of a Unitary State of Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago, January, 1965, p. 2. Hereafter it will be cited as The Report of the Economic Commission 1965.

TABLE 1

THE NUMBER AND ACREAGE OF FARMS IN GRENADA BY SIZE GROUP OF FARM AND PER CENT IN EACH SIZE GROUP, 1957/1958

Size Group of Farm (acres)	Number of farms	Per cent of Total	Total acres in farms	Per cent of Total
Less than 1 acre	5,243	41.4	1,861	3.0
1 to less than 5 acres	5,878	46.4	11,970	19.1
5 to less than 10 acres	946	7.5	6,130	9.8
10 to less than 50 acres	458	3.6	8,430	13.4
50 to less than 100 acres	53	0.4	3,599	5.7
100 or more acres	95	0.7	30,777	49.0
Total	12,673	100.0	62,767	100.0

The West Indies. Agricultural Statistics. Series 1, No. 4, "The Survey in Grenada", Trinidad, Ministry of Natural Resources and Agriculture", 1959, p. 16.

At the time the survey was conducted, over 95% of all farms in Grenada were less than 10 acres in size; however, they farmed only 32% of the total acreage in farms. At the other end of the scale, farms over 100 acres in size accounted for less than one per cent of the total number of farms, but controlled close to 50% of the land in farms. The average acreage of all farms in Grenada falls just under five acres, but this is a fairly meaningless figure given the nature of land distribution. Furthermore, the acreage figures understate the differences between the estate and peasant sectors, since the estates have better quality land, a point we shall

return to in discussing the relative efficiency of the two types of organisations. There are very few medium size family farms. As the table indicates, there were close to 150 estates if all farms over 50 acres are defined as estates. The average size for all these estates was about 230 acres. None of the estates are excessively large; in 1955 it was reported that only 16 estates were more than 500 acres in size.[1] There are no large corporations operating vast acreages as in many of the other territories.

The estates of Grenada are normally operated by a manager who performs the executive tasks, primarily the organising of transport and book-keeping, while foremen supervise the labourers. Most of the 40% of farm land classified as managed rather than owner-operated in the Survey in 1957/58 was found on the estates, while the small farms are almost completely owner-operated. The estates in Grenada are characterised by the use of large quantities of cheap labour, low levels of capitalisation and technology, and in many cases the wasteful and unproductive use of land. The estates therefore represent more a traditional form of economic organisation than a modern one and still retain many of the features of organisation of the slavery and post-slavery period. Thus, the estates do not perform a modernising role in the society. Even though there is a certain amount of division of labour and specialisation, these are limited, given the low level of technology employed and the heavy reliance on unskilled labour. The long years of protection for their exports by the metropolitan power and the pressure of population increase have allowed the

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[1] Grenada Report 1955 and 1956. The Colonial Office, London, H.M.S.O. 1958, p. 18.

estates to continue to rely on cheap, unskilled labour. The important fact about the estate system in the West Indies is that it preceded peasant agriculture, rather than following it as a logical response to increased specialisation and modernisation.

The small farmer works under severe handicaps, although he is often castigated for his backwardness and low productivity. We have already seen that most of the small farms are uneconomic in size. Another serious problem is that over time an increasing population and the inheritance system have combined to create a serious problem in respect of fragmentation. The overall extent of this problem is indicated by the fact that in 1957 there was an average of almost 1.7 parcels per farm for all farms in Grenada. This was much more serious for the smaller farms, as the following table discloses.

TABLE 2

EXTENT OF FRAGMENTATION ON GRENADIAN FARMS BY SIZE GROUP OF FARM, 1957/58

Size Group of Farm (acres)	Number of Farms	Number of Parcels	Average No. of Parcels per farm
Less than 1 acre	5,243	5,754	1.1
1 to less than 5 acres	5,878	11,092	1.9
5 to less than 10 acres	946	2,781	2.9
10 to less than 50 acres	458	1,474	3.2
50 to less than 100 acres	53	114	2.2
100 or more acres	95	143	1.5
All	12,673	21,358	1.7

The West Indies. Agricultural Statistics. Series 1, No. 4, op. cit., pp. 16 and 20.

There is also the problem created by the practice of renting small parcels of land for short periods, usually not more than a year, with its attendant lack of incentive for good farming. Even more than the estate owner, the small farmer suffers from a lack of capital and sources of credit. The hurricane of 1955 was particularly damaging for the small farmers. Although the United Kingdom government, under a grant from Colonial Development and Welfare funds loaned over $5,000,000 to farmers for rehabilitation, only 22% of all farmers appeared to have benefited[1], and large farmers are reputed to have benefited from the scheme more than small farmers. The question of repayment of these loans has caused some controversy, a number of people feeling that Government has been lax in not pressing delinquent borrowers for repayment, charging that the politicians were reluctant to lose votes if they did so. However, other observers have pointed out that not only was the total amount loaned under the Rehabilitation Scheme inadequate for the job, but that the repayment terms were not liberal in relation to the long term nature of the crops involved. What all observers and economists are agreed on is that there is a pressing need for a quick and large scale expansion of capital for small farmers, as well as the estates.

Another basic problem in regards to small farming is the low social and economic status attached to all forms of agricultural and manual labour as a legacy of slavery. This has produced a distaste for farming as a profession, and even more so for estate labour. The low net returns from small farming reinforce this attitude, so that agriculture is considered something to escape from if possible,

[1] The Grenada Five-Year Development Plan 1964-1968, op. cit. p.64.

rather than as a respectable occupation. Some West Indian elites speak scornfully of the small farmers, characterising them as backward and lazy, but the Five Year Plan, after listing the drawbacks of small farming concluded that

> On the positive side, it must be recorded that the peasant farmer is hardworking and has not yet developed a taste for foreign food.[1]

In his intensive study of small farming in Jamaica, David Edwards emphasised that not only were the small farmer and his family hard working, but that their methods of farming represented a rational response to their conditions, including the type and size of land they have to farm with, their lack of capital, and the fluctuations in prices of their crops both in the domestic and export markets.[2]

As we mentioned earlier, very few small farmers produce entirely for their own subsistence, and most participate in the growing of cocoa, nutmegs and bananas for the export market. Nonetheless most small farmers continue to grow some amount of the traditional food crops for their own use and to sell in St. George's. The diet of lower class Grenadians contains a preponderance of carbohydrates and a deficiency of proteins, resulting in a high incidence of kwashiakor and vitamin deficiencies which cause beri-beri. Traditionally small farmers have grown yam, sweet potato, cassava, edoes, tannia and dasheen for local consumption. Other staple elements of the diet derive from tree crops, such as breadfruit, mangoes and avocados. One of the mainstays of the diet is bluggoes, a type of banana which is eaten as a starch, and

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[1] Ibid., p. 6.

[2] David Edwards, An Economic Study of Small Farming in Jamaica (Glasgow: The University Press - Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies, 1961).

which until the advent of large scale banana cultivation was widely interplanted with cocoa. A livestock industry is virtually non-existent, but small farmers do raise pigs, sheep and goats. The only other important crops for the small farmers are coconuts, which are processed locally into copra, and sugar. The sugar-cane industry was revived in the 1930's to provide employment and was further expanded in the 1950's. Between 1950 and 1958 the output of the local factory was sufficient to meet local requirements, over half of which was produced by small farmers. By 1960 production had fallen off drastically, due apparently to the heavy emigration in those years and dissatisfaction of cane farmers on the returns they were getting. All economic advisers have advised that the industry be abandoned, but it does provide employment in the dry, south coastal area and Governments have been reluctant to abandon it. In 1961 the issue of the future of the sugar factory became a political issue when the Government led by Gairy passed a motion to nationalise the sugar factory in order to keep the industry going. It is not irrelevant that Gairy has always had strong support among the sugar farmers and workers, many of whom are located in his constituency. The plan to nationalise the factory created political tensions mainly because it was seen as a potential threat by the large estate owners producing the major export crops.

The estate form of agriculture is usually characterised as much more efficient than that of peasant agriculture. But we have already noted that the estates themselves are not particularly efficient.[1]

[1]The unproductive use of land is partially a result of very low levels of land tax, which has not penalised unproductive use of land despite the pressure on the land.

In any case, as McIntyre has pointed out, one cannot compare productivity in estate agriculture with peasant agriculture because they are using land of markedly different quality. Figure 4 shows the areas where the two types of agriculture predominate: the concentrated areas of peasant farming are both in areas of low rainfall. He then goes on to make a good case for peasant agriculture as against estate agriculture in the Caribbean on economic grounds.[1] The case for small farming as against plantation agriculture has more often been made on social grounds, since the latter continues to represent a social order which has kept the workers in servitude and poverty as in the days of slavery, and leads to severe strains in the social system.

The organisation of marketing is centred on the three main export crops, while the marketing of domestic food crops has been largely ignored. The marketing and control of both the banana and the nutmeg industry is well organised, whereas up till 1962 efforts to organise an island-wide cocoa cooperative had failed. The banana industry is the most tightly organised at all levels. With the development of the Lacatan banana, and the increasing demand for bananas in Great Britain, the Geest industries, one of two large British firms

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[1] McIntyre, op. cit., p. 11. He bases his argument on four factors, which are worth summarising here as so many economists have stressed the inefficiency of peasant farming. Two of the reasons he gives are not as relevant for Grenada as they are for the sugar islands, though they are not entirely irrelevant: the first is the wider experience of mixed cropping, thus a willingness to experiment which brings more flexibility and stability into the situation; second, a possible higher contribution to national income on a per acreage basis because there is no foreign ownership of small farms. The other two reasons he adduces in favour of peasant farming are more important in relation to Grenada: peasant farming is more labour intensive and hence better suited to a labour surplus economy; and because of differences in techniques it may bring in more net foreign exchange per acre because its import content is lower than the estate sector.

FIGURE 4



From Robert Kingsbury, Commercial Geography of Grenada, op.cit.

who control the import of bananas into Great Britain, began to show an interest in developing a banana industry in Grenada and the other Windward islands. In 1954 they signed a contract which gave them the sole right to export all bananas from Grenada to Great Britain. Following the hurricane in 1955 banana production began on a large scale in Grenada. However, Geest does not deal directly with growers, but with the Grenada Banana Co-operative Society, a statutory body which is the sole authority for the control and regulation of the industry. The dock workers are under special contract with Geest.

Late on Monday nights buses and trucks begin to arrive in St. George's heavily laden with bananas, which are then weighed at the wharf under the joint supervision of Geest and the Cooperative. Geest pays the Society, which then pays the producers. The Society operates a hurricane insurance scheme, a price assistance scheme and a fertiliser assistance scheme. The Society levies a cess on all bananas for leaf spot control and other services and administration. Recently increased competition from other Commonwealth producers, especially Jamaica, and falling prices have forced a collective policy on the part of the Windward Islands in their marketing and research, through WINBAN, the Windward Islands Banana Association.

The nutmeg industry is organised through the Grenada Cooperative Nutmeg Association, a corporate body formed in 1946, which is constituted the sole exporter of nutmegs from the colony and which undertakes the preparation, pooling and selling of all nutmegs delivered. The affairs of the Association are managed and controlled by a Board of Directors, containing 7 to 9 members. Membership in the Cooperative is not compulsory for growers and in 1960 less than one-half of the

growers were members. The Association was formed as a result of pressure from growers to get a fair price from the dealers who market the nutmeg and mace abroad, and it has a policy of stockpiling reserves in an effort to stabilise prices, which was particularly successful in the 1950's before competition from Indonesia had become so strong. The presence of reserve stocks enabled nutmeg growers to weather the immediate post hurricane period without losing all their income. Growers sell their produce to the Association, which dries them at the processing stations and stores them until they are ready for export, when they are then cracked and packaged. The Association determines the price to be paid locally. It is one of the most powerful interest groups in the Island. The Board of Directors is particularly strong, and in 1961 some growers expressed dissatisfaction with the internal working of the Board and the Association. Gairy's government appointed a select committee of the Legislative Council to examine the affairs of the industry, and the issue of the Board became a political one.

The opposition of the cocoa dealers has perpetually thwarted efforts to organise a cocoa producers cooperative. It is alleged that several large dealers who also own large cocoa estates have been mainly responsible for this. A recent study has characterised the system of processing and marketing cocoa as "chaotic and disorganized."[1] The report goes on to point out that many of the existing fermentories are operated as part of wider enterprises (stores, groceries, etc.) hence growers are often 'tied' to these dealers through the

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[1] C.Y. Thomas, "Projections of Cocoa Output in Grenada, Trinidad and Jamaica, 1960-75", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, March, 1964.

device of 'credit in kind'. The net result of a lack of central organisation, Thomas concludes, is that the Grenadian producer is at a severe disadvantage in the overseas market. This has tended to reduce the profits especially of the smaller dealers, who produced 30% of the cocoa crop in 1957. The only industry where small farmers have successfully organised themselves into smaller marketing cooperatives has been in the banana industry, where there were 14 such cooperatives in 1961. In 1961 it was estimated that small farmers produced approximately half of all bananas exported.

Apart from these marketing cooperatives for bananas, the small farmer has not been able to make his voice heard in the marketing of his crops, and feels himself at the mercy of a number of forces beyond his control. Not only are there the vicissitudes of the international market but locally he is at the mercy of the large organisations or the dealers, who are controlled by the estate farmers. He is dependent on the elites to inform him about prices in the industry, and the leadership of his organisations to set prices. The small farmer has to accept the idea that Geest or the Nutmeg Association or the large cocoa dealer all possess skills he cannot hope to possess. He therefore feels he lacks all control over his economic environment.

Some Implications of the Plantation System for Politics

Despite the important contribution to the economy made by small farmers, the plantation system has remained the dominant influence in determining both the value system and the class structure in Grenada, as well as the mode of production. The virtual disappearance of the sugar industry in the 1860's, when most of the white estate owners

left Grenada and their properties taken over by local people, has resulted in only a small amount of absentee ownership, and family rather than corporate ownership[1]. The important point in this connection, however, is that resident planters acted behaviourly as if they were absentee because "a man became a member of the elite only when he qualified as a potential absentee"[2]. Thus, in essence the estate system in Grenada was not much different from that obtaining in the sugar islands. Nonetheless, although paternalism was an essential feature of the plantation system in general the high degree of local family ownership and the prevalence of the contract out system in Grenada probably created a more paternalistic system than in many of the other territories[3]. This has been suggested as one of the reasons Grenada did not experience riots and demonstrations in the 1930's, and why estate workers were not organised into trade unions until 1951. The "benevolence" of the system in Grenada as contrasted with the other islands should not be over-emphasised, for

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[1] "One of the characteristics of Grenada is the traditional absence of a plantation system run by absentee owners. On the whole there appears to be relatively little foreign capital in Agriculture." The Grenada Five-Year Development Plan, 1964-1968, op. cit., p. 17.

[2] Douglas Hall, "Absentee-Proprietorship in the British West Indies to about 1850," Jamaica Historical Review, Vol. 4, 1964, pp. 27-29.

[3] M.G. Smith has stressed this point, concluding that the breakdown of this symbiotic relationship between the planters and the peasants, which began in the 1930's and continued through the 1940's, was largely responsible for the crisis in 1951, which we shall examine in detail in chapter three. See his "Structure and Crisis in Grenada, 1950-1954", The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965).

as Vera Rubin has pointed out "Paternalistic patterns tend to freeze into authoritarian controls"[1]. We will try to deal with the question of authoritarianism in greater depth towards the end of this chapter, but some of its consequences for political life are immediately obvious.

Wagley has delineated what he considers to be six basic features of the societies included in plantation America, which provides a useful summary for us at this stage[2]. Although Grenada is dependent on three major export crops rather than one, for practical purposes it fulfils the first of Wagley's essential features, monocrop cultivation. We have already discussed this feature of the system. He then lists four other features: rigid class lines; multi-racial societies which emphasise the social value of pheno-typical characteristics; weak community structure; and the matrifocal family, all of which we will be discussing separately at a later stage. However, here we want to discuss the other basic feature of the system, the existence of a peasantry who practise both subsistence and commercial agriculture, and who may supplement their income by wage labour on the plantations.

It seems more meaningful to characterise many of the members of the peasantry who participate simultaneously in both traditions of agriculture as agro-proletarians[3]. For example, this characterisation

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[1]Vera Rubin (ed.) Caribbean Studies: A Symposium, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies, Jamaica, in association with Program for the Study of Man in the Tropics Columbia University, New York, 1957, p. 114.

[2]Charles Wagley "Plantation America: A Culture Sphere", Caribbean Studies: A Symposium, op. cit., pp. 3-13.

[3]Vera Rubin prefers to use a typology based on a broad category of what she calls agricultural workers, including the landless labour force. Ibid., pp. 116-8.

obviously seems to apply to the 41% of small farmers in Grenada who farm less than one acre, and would probably be true for a majority of another 46% who farm one to less than five acres. (See Table 1). On one hand many of these agro-proletarians share some of the rooted conservatism of true peasants in other parts of the world because of land ownership, at the same time they are partially proletarianised and often participate in mass organisations like trade unions. This has tended to produce a particular pattern of partisan politics throughout the West Indies, including Grenada. In the latter, the party of the mass hero was effectively able to bridge these two traditions initially and collectively organise support in the rural areas. A politician in this type of situation is often able to exploit the resentment felt by the agro-proletarian on one hand as a land owner against those who have a lien on his surplus of rent or profit, to use Wolf's phrase[1], at the same time exploiting his resentment as a low paid and menial estate labourer. It is this participation in the system as a wage labourer that allows the small farmer in the West Indies to be more effectively mobilised both politically and in trade unions than if he were a true independent peasant farmer[2].

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[1]Eric R. Wolf, Peasants (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966) p. 47.

[2]There is some evidence to support this in Grenada in the decline of the political strength of agricultural trade unions in the late 1950's, when widespread banana cultivation brought an increased emphasis on self-employed peasant farmers rather than estate labour. This was the period when support for the mass hero, Gairy, reached its lowest ebb (see chapter three). However, this is only part of the explanation, as many other events were taking place in the same period, including very heavy migration.

The Over-all Structure of the Economy

Grenada presents a classic example of the dependent economy, or to put it more strongly a satellitic economy.[1] We have already seen that on the export side Grenada's foreign earnings derive almost entirely from three agricultural crops which are subject to the fluctuations and prices over which Grenadian producers have little or no control. The economy is open to an extreme degree, and provides a striking example of the two drawbacks faced by a small country in terms of economic development: highly skewed resources and a very small market[2]. Grenada has no mineral resources, such as Trinidad's oil or Jamaica's bauxite, and there are few incentives for manufacturers to set up plants in Grenada. Despite the availability of cheap labour, the size of the country and the lack of infrastructure are not enticing to manufacturers, even for the manufacture of light exports.

The dependence of the economy operates not only on the supply side but on the demand side as well. Grenada is dependent on imports for all capital goods and durable consumer goods, as well as most light

[1] William Demas, op. cit., says that whether or not a country can be classified as satellitic depends on who makes the vital economic decisions, which itself depends not only on the dependence of the economy on exports to two or three principal trading partners, but on the extent of foreign ownership of the capital stock (p. 32). In 1962, 49% of Grenada's exports went to the United Kingdom and 13% to the U.S., so that Grenada fairly well fulfils the first condition. In regards to foreign ownership of the capital stock, the lack of data makes a clear-cut judgment difficult. While the extent of foreign ownership in agriculture is considered relatively small, the Five Year Plan states that a large part of the commercial business houses are foreign owned, as is much of the best tourist land. The Grenada Five-Year Development Plan 1964-1968, op. cit., pp. 10 and 28.

[2] Ibid.

consumer goods and even a large amount of foodstuffs. In 1962, 30% of total imports consisted of food products. Manufacturing activity is primarily confined to simply processing of some of the agricultural commodities, mainly sugar, rum, citrus juices, copra products and recently a beer factory. The only other industry of any importance is the fishing industry, which supplies about two thirds of the fish consumed in the island. At the end of 1962 it was estimated that the industry employed over 1,600 people[1]. Most of the boats are small and ill equipped, confining fishermen to the waters not far from the shores of Grenada. Of the 610 boats and seines of all types operating in 1962, only 55 were powered boats[2]. Many of the fishermen also do part time farming.

Up to and including the year 1954 Grenada enjoyed a balance on her visible trade, but since that time there has been a continually increasing deficit on visible trade, not only because imports have increased faster than exports, originally because of the effects of the hurricane, but also because the terms of trade have worsened for Grenada. This deficit has been met partly by the remittances and returns sent back to families from emigrants; the return of workers in the late 1950's from Aruba, Curacao and Venezuela with substantial sums of money; tourism; and grants-in-aid. On the opposite side of the ledger is the heavy expenditure on the service account, due to the large element of non resident ownership of business whose profits accrue abroad, and the fact that Grenada has to import many specialist services, such as technical and professional services and skills[3].

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[1] Grenada, Report for the Years 1961 and 1962, London, H.M.S.O. 1964, p. 23.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Grenada Five Year Development Plan 1964-68, op. cit.

Added to this is the export of savings by banks and insurance companies.

The monetary system is also dependent and highly open, being the characteristic colonial Currency Board system which until recently required 100% banking in sterling assets for local currency. Thus the local currency is automatically convertible into sterling and vice versa at the fixed rate of exchange in unlimited amounts, and maladjustments in the balance of payments do not put pressure on the exchange rate. In this type of system exchange controls cannot be imposed against sterling, and deficit financing is not possible. Demas points out that while there are a number of advantages in maintaining open monetary and financial institutions[1] they tend to be offset by the fact that where there is a large pool of structurally unemployed (such as in Grenada) such openness may hinder the promotion of employment and the mobilisation of domestic finance. The disadvantages he discusses are particularly relevant for our discussion because of their policy implications for Governments in Grenada. The first difficulty with an open system of this sort is that even if domestic savings are fairly high much of this may be invested abroad and hence is not available locally, which is compounded by the absence of a local capital market. The more serious defect, however, as Demas points out is that:

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[1] He lists the advantages as following: it helps to keep the economy competitive by lowering production costs and by the competition of cheap imports; the facilitation of the inflow of private capital; and the possibility of a large net inflow of foreign funds through the absence of restrictions on commercial banks. Demas, op. cit., p. 63. Most of the discussion concerning the workings of the system have been taken from Demas, pp. 63-65 and 115-116.

> Such heavy reliance on overseas funds means that the government of the small country has to present the right 'image' to the foreign investor, which may further reduce the possibility of the country pursuing even slightly unorthodox policies in order to mobilise domestic financial resources. The economy becomes open in much more than a technical sense and economic policies considered 'sound' by the foreign investor are pursued, irrespective of their real merits or their adequacy to the given situation. (emphasis mine) [1]

We will see in chapter three how the question of the image presented by Grenada to foreign investors became a political issue in the crisis of 1961-62.

The commercial banks are all branches of banks with head offices overseas, and although they bring in outside funds from overseas to create credit, they also export savings abroad. In any case, there is no local control as to whether there will be a net inflow or outflow of funds from these banks.

Even at the government level, Grenada is heavily dependent; she became a grant-in-aid colony in 1958 and since then has been dependent on these grants to meet her recurrent expenditures. Two things combined to put Grenada into grant-in-aid status: the first was the loss of earnings due to the hurricane, and the second was the large increase in government spending on social and economic overheads combined with increased wages and salaries for civil servants. By 1961 grants-in-aid comprised 22% of Government revenue[2]. Along with grant-in-aid has come increased control over the budget and expenditures of the Grenada Government from outside, though during most of the period we are concerned with this control was exercised by the Federal Government.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[2] Grenada, Report for the Years 1961 and 1962, op. cit., p. 12.

Beginning in the latter part of the 1950's tourism became an important element in the economy. Grenada is considered one of the most beautiful of the West Indian islands, both by foreign tourists and other West Indians. While the relative contribution of tourism rose from about 14% of total principal exports in 1957 to 18% in 1961, the earnings from tourism in this period more than doubled[1]. While there is little doubt of the benefits this new industry has brought in regards to income, employment and the balance of payments, the industry has not been without its drawbacks. The first serious problem created has been the alienation of land and the skyrocketing prices for land. Although no figures were available the recent Five Year Plan reported that

> from casual inspection we are of the opinion that already much of the better parts of Grenada is owned by non-Grenadians ... While we can see that certain benefits accrue to Grenada if a small number of non-Grenadians own land in Grenada, we are also aware that a potential source of unrest exists in the large and growing area of land which is held in Grenada by non-West Indians... 2

The Plan goes on to note the large increases in land values following from this development, encouraged by negligible land taxation which has encouraged speculation. This problem of speculation and heavily increased land values became intertwined with politics in the 1961 crisis, as we shall see in chapter four.

Perhaps a more serious drawback to the tourist industry is that it does little to encourage the much needed transformation of

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[1] The Grenada Five-Year Development Plan 1964-1968, op. cit., p. 101.

[2] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

the economy. In the opinion of Demas, tourism does not develop the capacity to transform the economy, by which he means the inculcation of adaptability, technological dynamism and the ability to shift resources as the market demands, in the way that manufacturing activity does[1]. There are also the unfavourable racial aspects of tourism in a society where memories of slavery and the present social structure equate blackness with menial work and subservience, and most of the guests are white and well to do by Grenadian standards. On balance, it is hard to avoid the judgment that tourism in Grenada has further encouraged dependency in the society, particularly since it has been based on foreign capital and foreign know-how and management. Grenadians on the whole thus far have provided only the more menial services associated with tourism.

It is not surprising that this type of economy, with the corresponding social order it has produced, is marked by a lack of dynamism. As the Five Year Plan points out, and as we would expect even from our brief examination of the economy, there is an absence of dynamic entrepreneurial groups either in the agricultural or manufacturing sector and many remnants of feudal attitudes remain[2]. Given the constraints of size and skewed resources, the Grenadian economy under the best of circumstances will remain highly open[3], though there is some scope for import substitution in food production

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[1] Demas, op. cit., p. 60.

[2] The Grenada Five Year Development Plan, 1964-1968, op. cit., p. 32.

[3] The Plan noted that "a small island such as Grenada must inevitably specialise in the export of goods and services, whether to a metropolitan centre (such as Trinidad and Tobago) or to overseas markets". Ibid., p. 34.

and probably some light manufactures. There is probably no alternative at least in the short run to tourism as an additional source of income, though here also there is scope for increased control by Government and a chance to mitigate some of the worse aspects of the present situation such as land alienation and speculation. Nonetheless, agricultural exports are likely to continue to be the mainstay of the economy, though here again increased diversification and the development of new markets would reduce the vulnerability of the economy. There is also scope for reducing dependency in respect to monetary control, government expenditure and foreign ownership of land and capital, given the will to do so. In the final analysis, some sort of regional integration or federalism offers the only possibility for changes in the structure of the economy. As it is now, the almost total feeling of dependency leaves the Grenadian with little sense of being able to exercise control over his economic life, which places severe constraints on political development, regardless of how advanced the constitution or the political system may be 'on paper'.

Levels of Living[1]

The small, plantation oriented economy of Grenada has produced one of the lowest standards of living in the Americas, a distinction it shares with the other Windward and Leeward islands. In 1958 per capita income was estimated to be only $259, compared to $612 for

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[1]All monetary figures in this section as elsewhere throughout this study, are the British West Indian dollar. £1. 0. 0 sterling = $4.80 B.W.I., while $1.00 U.S. = $1.71 B.W.I.

Trinidad and $510 for Jamaica in 1957[1]. Structural unemployment and chronic underemployment are serious problems. In 1960, about 16% of the labour force appear to have been unemployed. Harewood points out that between 1946 and 1960 there was a slight decrease in the degree to which available man-power was utilised[2]. In 1960 only 56.8% of the total labour force worked for the full twelve month period preceding the census; however 81.6% of the labour force worked for more than half of the year.

Foreign observers of the West Indies are often surprised that in spite of high unemployment and underemployment there are constant complaints by estate owners and even small farmers of a widespread labour shartage in agriculture. As Reubens points out, this usually means scarcity at crop time, but not a year-round shortage of labour. However, all the West Indian islands have experienced an exodus from the rural areas to the urban areas regardless of whether employment is available. In Grenada the heavy migration to Trinidad and Great Britain in the latter part of the 1950's apparently did create a labour shortage in certain parts of the island. The phenomenon of high unemployment rates alongside a shortage of agricultural labour has intensified in all the West Indian territories in the 1960's.

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[1]Edwin Reubens, Migration and Development in the West Indies, Studies in Federal Economics, No. 3., Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies, Jamaica, 1961, pp. 43-44. The figure he quotes for Grenada was based on an estimate by E.R. Chang of the University. In 1960 per capita gross domestic product was $320, about a third the figure for Trinidad in that year. Cf. Grenada Five-Year Development Plan 1964-1968, op. cit., p. 19.

[2]Cf. Jack Harewood, "Employment in Grenada," Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, September, 1966, pp. 189-233. Harewood, a West Indian demographer, has carefully analysed the 1960 Census data on employment in this article, comparing the data with the 1946 census results. He concludes that there was a significant increase in the long-term unemployment rate in Grenada over the period.

Wage rates did rise in agriculture between 1951 and 1962. Over this period wage rates for male labourers rose from $1.20 to $1.80 per day and for females from $1.00 to $1.50 per day. While the cost of living index for agricultural workers rose from a base of 100 in 1957 to a figure of 121 at the end of 1962[1], wage rates in the same period for male agricultural workers rose no more than 15%. The most significant increase of wages for agricultural workers occurred in the early 1950's due to the efforts of the union formed by Gairy, which we shall discuss in detail in chapter three. A more meaningful index of relative wage levels is the comparison with those prevailing in Trinidad in this period, since this is the comparison the Grenadian himself tends to make in evaluating how well off he is. As we will see in the next section, Trinidad is the place to which he most often aspires to emigrate, and with whose conditions he is well conversant. Whereas in 1962 male agricultural workers in Grenada received $1.80 per day, in Trinidad agricultural labourers outside sugar received $3.84 per day, and $2.84 per day in sugar, while road workers in Grenada received $2.00 per day contrasted with $5.00 per day in Trinidad[2].

The level of social services is also lower in Grenada than in Trinidad, though the gap is not so wide as might be expected. The Five Year Plan found a relatively high per capita availability of social services in Grenada compared with Trinidad, although they noted the qualitative deficiencies of these services. They also found

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[1] Grenada, Report for the Years 1961 and 1962, op. cit., p. 9.

[2] Grenada Five-Year Development Plan, 1964-1968, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

Grenada not seriously deficient in roads, water supplies, electricity, port facilities, communication and transport[1]. However on the basis of a housing survey in 1960, it was estimated that 85% of the island's houses were substandard[2].

While the per capita income figure reveals the overall poverty of the society, the small proportion of people paying income tax reveals how widespread poverty is. While it is generally conceded that there is a great deal of evasion of taxation by those eligible to pay, it should not obscure the fact that low income levels exempt over 95% of the population from the tax[3]. The following table shows the number and per cent of tax payers by economic class in 1961.

TABLE 3

NUMBER AND PER CENT OF TAXPAYERS BY ECONOMIC CLASS, GRENADA, 1960

Economic Class	No. of Taxpayers	Per cent of Total No. of Taxpayers
Planters	562	16.0
Investors	165	4.7
Professions	52	1.5
Partnerships and Sole Traders	420	12.0
Employees	907	25.8
Public Officers	1,336	38.0
Companies[a]	69	2.0
Total	3,511	100.0

[a] Companies are taxed at 40% of net profits.

Grenada, Report for the Years 1961 and 1962, op. cit., p. 47.

[1] Ibid., pp. 39 and 48.

[2] Ibid., p. 112.

[3] All persons earning $600 or more per month are subject to income tax, but there are deductions for non-working wives of $500 and $250 for each child.

Using the 1960 census figures, this means that slightly less than 4% of the total population paid income tax, or close to 14% of the labour force, excluding companies. The Report of the Economic Commission did point out that Grenada's tax structure was more regressive than that of Trinidad[1].

Nonetheless, there was some improvement in living levels in the 1950's, particularly in the second half of the decade. Most of the improvement was due to a fortuitous combination of factors, without any fundamental alteration in the structure of the economy. The latter is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that in 1960 as in 1946, 43% of the population was still engaged in agriculture, and that the relative contribution to gross domestic product of the manufacturing section remained virtually static at less than 3 percent between 1954 and 1960[2]. The hurricane of 1955 proved to be a blessing in disguise for Grenadian agriculture, since it allowed for a much needed replanting of the nutmeg and cocoa crops. Government was able to introduce an extensive scheme to replant all cocoa holdings in new improved clonal types, and nutmeg trees passed their bearing peak were replaced. The other main benefit of the hurricane was the diversification in agriculture through widespread planting of bananas, which has proved to be of particular benefit to small farmers in terms of income and employment. The hurricane also generated a boom in the distribution and construction sectors[3].

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[1] The Report of the Economic Commission 1965, op. cit., p.10.

[2] Ibid., p. 4.

[3] The only significant change in the origin of the gross domestic product was the growth of the government sector, which contributed 12.5% of G.D.P. in 1954 and 18.7% in 1962. This was due to

The post hurricane reconstruction period coincided with a high outflow of migration, which further reduced the pressure on income and employment, and the growth in the tourist industry. Between 1954 and 1960 it has been estimated that real output increased between 2½% and 3% per year, while population growth was approximately 1½% per year. Thus, per capita real output grew by just over 1% per year in this period. The growth of real output by 3% contrasts with that of 9% per year in Trinidad in the same period[1] and the fact that the base was so much lower in Grenada to start with. Even this small rate of growth was probably obscured for the average Grenadian in relation to his rising expectations in this period, which was encouraged by the changes in the political system, the demonstration effects of tourism and reports from migrants of conditions elsewhere. Demas claims that one of the features of West Indian populations is "the obsessive urge for North American standards of consumption."[2]

Unfortunately, even this fortuitous combination of events in the 1950's produced only a very slight improvement in levels of living, and the 1960's presented a much bleaker picture, with the drying up of immigration outlets and the threat of the disappearance of the commonwealth preference system. Thus, the prospects for the 1960's in the absence of any significant changes in the nature of the economy are not encouraging, and Grenada may prove lucky in this decade to main-

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the growth of expenditure of social services and economic expenditure on roads, water supplies, etc., as well as large raises in pay for public servants. Grenada Five-Year Development Plan 1964-1968, op. cit., p. 21.

[1] Report of the Economic Commission 1965, op. cit., p. 2.

[2] Demas, op. cit., p. 118.

tain present levels of living, let alone to improve them. This will inevitably begin to put strains on the political system, some of which were beginning to be evident in the early 1960's.

Migration

Perhaps the best indication of the poverty and lack of opportunity in Grenada has been the widespread desire of her citizens to emigrate. Emigration has been such a crucial factor in Grenadian life that it has had profound effects not only on the economy but also in the political sphere and has ultimately affected the very image Grenadians have of themselves and their identity. Although Grenadians have emigrated in large numbers to a number of different areas, the most important links forged through emigration have been with Trinidad. Trinidad has been the metropolitan mecca for Grenadians in their desire to escape the poverty and smallness of Grenada, and to a lesser extent Great Britain in the 1950's. The question of unlimited immigration from the small islands, and particularly Grenada, was one of the most controversial issues faced by the now defunct Federation of the West Indies[1]. After the Federation collapsed in 1961, Grenadians became hopeful of joining with Trinidad in a Unitary state, which became one of the major issues of the 1962 election in Grenada. So close have the ties been between Grenada and Trinidad that in that election Grenadians voted overwhelmingly in

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[1]The Constitution of the Federation was distinguished by the fact that it did not allow unlimited freedom of movement within the West Indian nation. Although in 1957 the Standing Committee on Federation agreed to remove some of the restrictions on freedom of movement, in 1960 Trinidad tightened her restrictions on immigration on the grounds that the Federation was not strong enough and that it must include free movement of goods as well as persons.

favour of associating in a unitary state with Trinidad rather than federating with Barbados and the other Windward and Leeward Islands[1].

During the 1962 election campaign the newspapers drew repeated attention to the fact that every Grenadian had some relative or close friend living in Trinidad. More people in Grenada listen to Radio Guardian in Trinidad than they do to their own station WIBS (Windwards Islands Broadcasting Service), though this may be also due to the fact that WIBS tends to cater to the elite culture, like the BBC Third Programme, while Radio Trinidad has more popular music and programmes, and broadcasts more hours in the day. The newspaper with the highest circulation in Grenada is The Evening Mirror, a Trinidad paper, followed by The Trinidad Guardian and The Barbados Advocate. Trinidad has been the recipient of some of Grenada's best intellectual and artistic talents, of which fact Grenadians are fond of boasting. Although most of the Grenadians emigrating to Trinidad claim that it is not primarily higher wages they are seeking but that unemployment and under-employment in Grenada drives them to migrate to Trinidad, the latter has a serious problem in this respect herself, with an estimated 18-20% of her labour force structurally unemployed[2]. As some observers have pointed out, migrants are sometimes not much

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[1]The issue of Unitary State has since foundered. The 1962 election campaign, when the G.N.P. carried on a strongly anti-Federation campaign, only alienated further the other West Indian islands who were in a similar plight without succeeding in getting Trinidad committed to the Unitary State. However, subsequent events throw strong doubt on whether a Federation of the Eight, as it was known, would have been possible even if Grenada had proved more receptive. At the time of writing (1966) the implementation of Unitary State between Trinidad and Grenada appears fairly remote. This will be discussed in detail in chapter five and Appendix II.

[2]Reubens, op. cit., pp. 9 and 42.

better off in Trinidad than they were in Grenada, and in respect to housing probably worse so. The high rate of unemployment in Trinidad and the pressures put by migrants on scarce social services and housing has caused tension between the migrants and the Trinidadians, further aggravated by the reputation the Grenadian has for working harder and accepting lower paid employment than his Trinidad counterpart which has called forth opposition from the trade unions. Trinidadians, who consider themselves highly urbanised and sophisticated, characterise the immigrants as peasants or "rural hicks". None of these things have deterred Grenadians from wanting to emigrate to Trinidad: not only to seek employment opportunities, but also to obtain better educational opportunities for their children and to escape from the meagre social life of the small island[1]. In fact, the only thing now preventing Grenadians from flocking to Trinidad in large numbers has been the restrictions imposed by the Trinidad Government.

Migration to Trinidad has been the most important population outlet for Grenadians since the early 1930's[2]. However, migration has been an important feature of Grenadian life from the beginning of the twentieth century. In the first decade Panama and Brazil drew large numbers of Grenadians, a large number of whom returned in the same decade. In the decade 1911-1921, however, migration to Panama, Cuba and the U.S.A. was so heavy that there was an actual reduction in

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Cf. Jack Harewood, "Population Growth in Grenada in the Twentieth Century", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, June, 1966, pp. 61-84. We have drawn on this article for much of the data in this section.

population. Although migration fell in the latter half of the 1920's, particularly after the U.S. restricted immigration in 1925, the first two years of the depression (1932 and 1933) were the only years in which the trend of out-migration reversed itself and there was a net inflow of migrants. Migration to Trinidad became important after this period, particularly from 1939-1945 when there was a large increase in demand for workers on American military bases there. These outlets helped keep population growth in Grenada from the beginning of the century until 1946 down to less than $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1% per year[1].

Between 1946 and 1960 migration continued to keep the rate of population growth down; Harewood notes that 45% of the natural increase in this period was lost through migration. The bulk of this movement took place in the second half of the 1950's[2]. Two explanations have been offered as to why migration increased so dramatically in this period. The first was the devastation caused by the hurricane, which made economic prospects appear even dimmer for large numbers of people than before. Perhaps more important was the strong pull exerted by increased employment opportunities in Great Britain and Trinidad, especially after the relaxation of immigration restrictions by the latter in 1957 in anticipation of Federation. Between 1958 and 1960 6,600 persons emigrated from Grenada, a higher figure than for any of the other Windward or Leeward Islands or even Barbados with its much larger population: in 1959 alone 2.46% of the total population emigra-

[1] The Grenada Five-Year Development Plan 1964-1968, op. cit., p.13. The Plan estimated that from 1921-46 natural increase was about 30,000 while emigration was as high as 24,000.

[2] The migration between 1955 and 1960 represented 87% of the net movement of the population during the whole period 1946-60. The Report of the Economic Commission 1965, op. cit., p. 17.

ted. Until 1960 the bulk of this migration was to Trinidad, while from 1960-62 the majority went to Great Britain in an effort to "beat the ban" finally imposed by England in 1962. Throughout this period there were also a small number of Grenadians going to America each year under the migrant farm workers scheme, but these workers were required to return at the end of each season.

The effects of this wholesale migration, and particularly that of the late 1950's, have had a number of adverse effects on the structure and quality of the population. Emigration is highly age, sex and skill selective. The 1960 census disclosed that the sex ratio for the age groups 20-45 was consistently less than 800 males per thousand females in the population. It is worth noting that this trend has been partly redressed in recent years by the preponderance of females in the migration stream to Trinidad. Probably a more serious problem has been the high dependency ratio: in 1960 over 47% of the population was under 15, which has created serious pressures on the social services, particularly the educational system. That migration siphons off the more skilled and those with more drive is well known, although Reubens points out that if there is no opportunity for these skills to be employed this point should not be over-emphasised. Reubens has also stressed that migration siphons off capital holdings of the country, as migrants use their accumulated savings to finance their journey[1].

The overall effects of this migration on the economy are difficult to ascertain, as there have been contradictory effects. Most observers agree that the small increase in per capita income in this

[1] Reubens, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

period would probably not have taken place in the absence of migration, both because of the remittances sent back and the lessened unemployment and under-employment. Although the natural rate of increase of the population between 1955-60 was 3.5% per year, population growth was only 1½% per year between 1954-60 because of this migration.[1] However, one economist has suggested that the excessive migration between 1958 and 1960 probably had a restrictive effect on economic growth because of the loss to the effective work force[2]. On balance the Report of the Economic Commission in 1965 was unable to make a clear judgment as to whether migration had been mainly beneficial or detrimental to the economy, concluding that it was a moot point whether it had increased the level of living and reduced social problems which might have been more acute without migration, and speculating that it may have helped reduce the dependency problem in Grenada[3].

The heavy emigration of the late 1950's was highly abnormal and most unlikely to be repeated, since all the major outlets for Grenada's surplus population have now been partially or totally closed. The first countries to close their doors to migrants from the British West Indies were the Netherlands Indies and Venezuela, following reorganisation of the oil industry and increased populations of their own; by the early 1960's a net return of migrants from those areas

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[1] The Grenada Five Year Development Plan 1964-1968, op. cit., pp. 13-20.

[2] Carleen O'Loughlin, A Survey of Economic Potential and Capital Needs of the Leeward Islands, Windward Islands, and Barbados, Department of Technical Co-operation Overseas Research Publication No. 5, London, H.M.S.O. 1963, p. 171.

[3] Report of the Economic Commission, 1965, op. cit., p. 1.

was reported[1]. The second outlet which was severely restricted was Trinidad, where controls were relaxed in 1957 only to be tightened in 1960[2]. The third door to close was that of Great Britain, with the passing of the Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1962 against coloured immigration which reduced the flow of migrants from Grenada to a trickle. Thus, a major task for the political system since that time has been to try and find an outlet for the rapidly increasing population. The only small glimmer of hope in this regard is Trinidad, in the event of a Unitary State between the two territories, and even that seems to be fairly remote at present.

This emphasis on emigration has had a strong impact on the political behaviour of Grenadians, and has made it difficult to develop a notion or sense of community, particularly after the Federation collapsed. Both the political parties have relied heavily on stop-gap measures in the hopes that something will happen, rather than making an all-out effort to increase investment and strengthen the economy. This obsession with emigration as a solution to the colony's economic problems has further re-inforced the attitude bred by colonialism of finding solutions to problems outside the society. As a result, the political community is thought of as external to the island. Grenadians therefore are apt to think of themselves varyingly or sometimes simultaneously as British subjects, West Indians, potential

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[1] Ibid., p. 16.

[2] The 1960 regulations required that entrants must either possess a round trip ticket or deposit $50; and entrants were admitted only for short periods, usually 30 to 60 days, seldom more than 90. After the demise of the Federation the regulations were further restricted.

Trinidadians, Windward Islanders, and only in the last resort as Grenadians.

If the projection of population increase of 3.6% per annum between 1960 and 1975 made by a West Indian demographer proves correct[1], then by 1975 Grenada would have a population of 153,000 people. This drastic growth would result in a large number of new groups entering the polity, particularly younger voters, and making considerable demands on the political system. It can be argued that sheer demographic pressure will find the political system incapable of taking this load[2].

The Social Structure

The task of the political scientist in the West Indies has been made much easier as a result of the pioneering and pathfinding work that has been undertaken by sociologists of the area. Since 1951 the Institute of Social and Economic Research, attached to the University of the West Indies in Jamaica, has sponsored many basic studies of the social structure in different territories[3]. These empirical

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[1] G.W. Roberts, "Population Projections for the Windward and Leeward Islands to 1975" (unpublished), quoted in Harewood, "Population Growth in Grenada in the Twentieth Century", op. cit.

[2] Karl Deutsch has suggested a very provocative cybernetics model for this type of political analysis. The model has particular relevance for small societies like Grenada, where one can observe the tension-load phenomenon very clearly. Cf. his Nerves of Government (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill. 1963).

[3] The Journal published by the Institute, Social and Economic Studies, contains a number of articles of immediate relevance to our study, some of which will be cited later on and among which we should mention Lloyd Braithwaite and his periodic review of the work being undertaken in the area, e.g. "The Present State of the Social Sciences in the British Caribbean" in Caribbean Studies: A Symposium, op. cit., and others. A large number of articles and books have been written by the prolific M.G. Smith, which will be discussed in the course of

studies all reflect the strengths of social anthropological analysis for an area like the West Indies. While all the studies have been empirical, at least two different theoretical approaches to the study of West Indian societies are evident. M.G. Smith has attempted to utilise Furnival's notion of plural society in his works, while Braithwaite and R.T. Smith reflect the influence of Talcott Parsons and his theory of social-action.

It would indeed be presumptuous for a political scientist to enter into this debate, especially since the discussion has been conducted at a high level of theoretical abstraction. However, we would like to suggest that the data collected by political scientists in the area could possibly throw some light on the argument as to whether these societies can be characterised as displaying primarily "plural" features or not. The "political attitudes"[1] held by the various strata may help facilitate a general discussion about the values held in the society. We shall return to this problem in the conclusion.

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the study. R.T. Smith's work in British Guiana has added greatly to our knowledge about the family in the West Indies. He is currently engaged in a broader study of social stratification in British Guiana. Finally, there are the meticulous and detailed publications of George Roberts, who has provided the social scientists and policy makers with demographic data of immense value.

All of the studies cited here and elsewhere have involved long and continuing periods of field work in the area. Unfortunately the work in political science is sketchy and by no means as systematic and theoretical.

[1] In using this term I am following the distinction made by Katz and Eldersveld between knowledge, values and attitudes. See their "The Impact of Local Political Authority Upon the Electorate", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 35, Spring, 1961. In another context I examine certain aspects of this problem in British Guiana where I explore more fully the relevance of pluralism for an understanding of Guianese politics. See my "Race, Class and Ideology in British Guiana", forthcoming.

In this section we will be concerned only with outlining some of the more important social characteristics of the population as a prelude to our later discussion.

The breakdown of the population by socio-economic status reflects the nature of the economy.

TABLE 4

WORKING POPULATION OF GRENADA BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, 1960

Socio-Economic Status	Numbers		Per cent	
1. Agricultural	9,809		39.0	
a) Farmer		2,901		11.5
b) Agricultural worker		6,908		27.4
2. Non-Manual	4,013		15.9	
a) Professional worker		1,229		4.9
b) Manager and administrative worker		926		3.7
c) Other non-manual worker		1,858		7.4
3. Manual	9,537		37.9	
a) Personal service worker		2,673		10.6
b) Skilled worker		4,196		16.7
c) Semi-skilled worker		240		1.0
d) Unskilled worker		2,428		9.6
4. Workers not elsewhere classified	1,811	1,811	7.2	7.2
Total Working Population	25,170			100.0

Of the total working population, 15,219 were males, 9,951 females.

Derived from Tables 18-1 and 18-2, Grenada Population Census, 1960, Vol. II, Summary Tables, Central Statistical Office, Trinidad and Tobago, August, 1963.

As the large majority of those classified as farmers are small farmers, who with their families provide most of the manual labour on their holdings, over 80% of the population perform manual labour of one sort or another in order to earn their livelihood. Other points of interest are the small number, comprising less than 1%, classified as semi-skilled workers, and the large proportion of women in the personal service category (not shown in the table) who are employed as domestics and seamstresses. More surprising is the large number classified as skilled workers (including artisans, craftsmen, foremen and entertainers), which partly reflects the lack of more rigid definitions of skill prevailing in more advanced countries.

One of the most basic distinctions in the society is that of race or colour. The concept of colour in the West Indies is based on a combination of physical characteristics. M.G. Smith and others term this phenotypical colour, i.e. based on racial appearance. As we saw earlier in this chapter, most of the resident white population in Grenada during the heyday of sugar cultivation left the island in the latter part of the last century; in 1960 less than 1% of the population was classified as white, some of whom are poor whites living in an isolated community by themselves. Racially, the major split in the society is between those classified as Negro, close to 53%, and those classed as mixed, about 42%. The East Indians are mainly descended from the indentured labourers imported into Grenada in the 1860's, and make up less than 5% of the population. The mixed group is the most heterogeneous, both in terms of gradation of colour and social status. Race or colour and socio-economic status are highly correlated in Grenada, as elsewhere in the West Indies. In his study

of the Grenadian elite M.G. Smith found that differences of pigment and status correspond quite well among the elites[1] as well as between the social classes.

TABLE 5

TOTAL POPULATION BY RACE, GRENADA, 1960

Race	Number	Per cent
Negro	46,690	52.7
Mixed	37,393	42.2
East Indian	3,767	4.2
White	699	0.8
Amerindian, Carib	3	0.0
Other +	103	0.1
Not Stated	22	
Total	88,677	100.0

Derived from Tables 5-1 and 5-2, Grenada, Population Census, 1960, op. cit.

Reflecting the early colonisation of the island by the French is the adherence of close to two-thirds of the population to Roman Catholicism.

[1] M.G. Smith, Stratification in Grenada (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965).

TABLE 6

TOTAL POPULATION BY RELIGION, GRENADA, 1960

Religion	Number	Per cent
Roman Catholic	55,913	63.0
Anglican	21,926	24.7
Presbyterian	1,484	1.7
Methodist	3,539	4.0
Baptist	433	0.5
Jehovah Witness	386	0.4
Pentecostal	842	1.0
Seventh Day Adventist	2,688	3.0
Other Christian	1,272	1.4
Non Christian	35	0.1
Unknown, No Religion	159	0.2
Total	88,677	100.0

Derived from Tables 6-1 and 6-2, Grenada, Population Census, op. cit.

As with colour, there is a strong correlation between religion and socio-economic status; there are a higher proportion of Anglicans in the upper strata, while those in the lower strata tend to be predominantly Catholic. Over the last half century the proportion of Roman Catholics in the population has increased at the expense of the Anglicans[1]. Certain elements of the traditional religions have

[1] In 1891 55% of the people were Roman Catholic compared to 63% in 1960, while the proportion of Anglicans decreased in the same period from 36% to 29%. The Grenada Handbook and Directory, 1946, op. cit., p. 391 and Table 6.

been modified by African-derived elements. The two major religious groups are powerful antagonists and exert a strong political influence in the colony; education has historically been the province of the denominational groups. A shift in the religious norms has been evidenced recently by the gains made by low church groups or fundamentalist sects.

The African cult of Shango is also important, having taken on certain aspects of the earlier cult of Nation Dance as well as Roman Catholicism[1].

The marked differences between the social class in colour, religion and socio-economic status are also reflected in the family structure and the educational system, which we shall explore in the following sections.

Education

Probably the most penetrating condemnation of education in the West Indies was the prize winning calypso in Trinidad in 1963, written by the famed Calypsonian, Sparrow. The Mighty Sparrow is one of Grenada's most famous exports to Trinidad, and his calypso was undoubtedly inspired by his own early educational experiences in Grenada. The words to this famous song tell more about education in the West Indies than most learned volumes:

Dan is the Man

According to de education you get when you small
You will grow up wid true ambition and respect from one and all
But in my days in school, they teach me like a fool
The tings dey teach me a should be a block headed mule.

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[1] M.G. Smith "A Framework for Caribbean Studies" The Plural Society in the British West Indies, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

Listen what dey teach me.
Pussy has finished his work long ago and so he resting
and ting.
Solomon O'Gundy was born on a Monday,
The ass in the lion's skin.
Winken, Blinken and Nod sailed out in a wooden sloop
They say de goutie lose he tail and de aligator trying
to get monkey liver soup
And Dan is de man in the van.

De lessons and de poems dey write an' send from England
Impress me they were trying to cultivate comedians.
Comic books made more sense, you know it is fictitious
without pretense,
C.O. Cutteridge wanted to keep me in ignorance.

Tell me if this not foolishness.
Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall, Humpty Dumpty did fall
Goosey Goosey gander, where shall I wander.
Ding dong dell, Mamma pussy in the well
A rikkitikkit a say a rikkitikkitikki tikki tavi
And Dan is the man in de van.

Ah say Cutteridge was plenty more advanced than dem
scientists
I cyan believe that one man could write so much stupidness.
Aeroplanes and rockets didn't come so soon
Scientists used to make de prading baloons,
C.O. Cutteridge make a cow jump over de moon.

An den he tell me
Tom Tom de piper's son stole a pig an away he run.
Once there was a woman who lived in a shoe
She had so many children she didn't know what to do.
Dickory dickory dock, de mouse ran up de clock.
De lion and de mouse,
A woman pushing a cow to eat grass on top of a house.

How I happen to get some education my friends me eh know,
All dey teach me is about brer rabbit and rumpelstilskin-o
They wanted to keep me down indeed, they try dey best but
couldn't succeed,
You know why? Meh head was duncy and up to now ah cyah read.

Who cares about Peter Peter was a Pumpkin eater,
And de Lilliput people tie Gulliver.
When I was sick an lay a-bed, ah had two pillows at meh head
De goosie lay a golden egg.
De spider ketch de fly.
Morocoy wid wings flapping in de sky.
Dey beat me like a dog to learn dat in school
If meh head was bright ah would a be a dam fool
Wid Dan is the man in the van.

Can a pig dance a jig for a fig?
Twirly and twisty were two screws
And he stood in his shoes and he wondered
Dan is de man in the van.

Nonetheless, as the Five Year Plan points out, the statistics give a very flattering picture of the educational attainment of the population.[1]

TABLE 7

POPULATION AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, GRENADA, 1960

Educational Attainment		Numbers		Per cent
1. No Education		3,094		6.7
2. Total Primary		39,308		84.7
a. Standard not stated	352		0.8	
b. Kindergarten to Std.3	8,877		19.1	
c. Std. 4 and 5	16,353		35.2	
d. Std. 6 and 7	13,726		29.6	
3. Total Secondary		3,580		7.7
a. No School Certificate	2,492		5.4	
b. School Certificate	1,088		2.3	
4. University		236		0.9
a. No University degree	43		0.1	
b. University degree	193		0.4	
5. Educated in a foreign country		153	0.3	
6. Not Stated		39	0.1	
Total	46,410			100.0

Derived from Tables 8B-1 and 8B-2, Grenada, Population Census, 1960, op. cit.

[1] The Grenada Five Year Development Plan 1964-1968, op. cit., p. 14.

Over 93% of the adult population have had some exposure to formal education, while over 73% have completed 3 or more years of primary education. These figures are high compared to many other underdeveloped countries; but as Sparrow's calypso has warned us, the quality of the education received is another matter.

The rural child normally leaves for school after having performed some chores at home, and large numbers are absent on Fridays, when the children are needed at home to help prepare for market day on Saturday. Department of Education Reports perpetually bemoan chronic lateness and consistent absence. Overcrowding is a serious problem: in 1961 there were 23,700 pupils enrolled although there was only adequate accommodation for 19,900.[1] There is almost a complete lack of provision for technical and agricultural education, and a lack of variety in the range of the curriculum.

In his comprehensive survey of education in Grenada, Murray, the Federal Education Adviser, emphasised that probably the most serious problem facing education was the quality of the teachers. The bulk of the teaching is undertaken by student teachers who have completed only primary school themselves and who are almost totally unprepared for their responsibilities.[2] Because of their own inadequacies, and too large classes, the teachers find they must keep

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[1] Although the average number of students per teacher in Primary Schools was 32 in 1961, in many classes the numbers were very much larger. Ibid., p. 105.

[2] Murray estimated that in 1961 only 10% of the teachers were trained; while 2/3 were probationers, student teachers, and pupil teachers. Even in the secondary schools only 1/3 of the teachers were graduates. Ibid., p. 16, derived from R.N. Murray, Report on Education in Grenada, 1961 (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs: St. George's, Grenada).

the pupils busy in repetitive types of activities. The bulk of the day is spent on memorising arithmetic tables or poems; there is little or no time devoted to individual attention. Discussion is not encouraged; the students are not expected to disagree with the teacher or to stray from the syllabus. Since the whole system is geared towards passing examinations, neither the teacher nor the better students are inclined to engage in "diversions". Despite this orientation to passing exams, results are extremely poor. Murray estimated that only 6% of the original potential in the Primary schools passed the School Leaving Certificate examination[1]. In many schools corporal punishment is still the favoured disciplinary method, and children tend to view school with great trepidation.

Historically, education has been the prerogative of the various religious denominations in Grenada. In 1961, of the 56 Primary Schools on the island, 44 were denominational, although they receive government aid. While the efforts of the churches have enabled a large proportion of children in Grenada to obtain at least a rudimentary education which they would otherwise not have had, denominational control has not been without some serious drawbacks. There were only six secondary schools in the island in 1961, none of which were located in the rural areas. Four were in the capital, St. George's, the remaining two were in the next largest town, Grenville. Thus a talented rural boy lucky enough to be eligible for secondary education has had to leave his family and community, and the resulting cost of his stay in the city has often placed great

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[1] The Grenada Five-Year Development Plan 1964-1968, op. cit., p. 15.

financial burdens on his family. The sacrifice is usually made willingly, as it opens up the possibility of the boy entering the elite through admission to the civil service. However, it is still the rare exception for the poor rural child to achieve secondary education.

The colonial educational system had two main goals: the first was the education of a second-level elite class; the next goal was to produce a generation of clerks to run the lower levels of the administration. For the vast majority education was viewed as unnecessary, or at best as an institution to keep the children out of mischief. The emphasis was to inculcate the proper values of submission to their superiors and to religion. As with all the institutions in the society, the educational system is highly authoritarian, although this is less so in the secondary schools. Nonetheless, the emphasis on examinations remains the over-riding concern. Grenada Boys School is the outstanding secondary school in Grenada, and is generally considered one of the best in the Windward Islands. It has produced a number of outstanding students, Modelled after the British grammar school, it caters heavily to the sons of the middle class elites of St. George's.

It is only very recently that there have begun to be pressures, still faint, to remodel the curriculum and orient it to the environment of the students rather than a hopelessly outdated image of Great Britain. Most of the textbooks are still sadly out of date, and contain the usual negative images about colonial peoples that were standard fare in English text books until recent years. Science and mathematics are either scorned or badly neglected. Geography and

history are concerned exclusively with Europe, and the children have little or no knowledge about their own society, let alone other West Indian islands or Latin America. School children know more about the coal mines of Great Britain than they do of the banana or spice industries of Grenada. There is virtually no "civics" taught at any level, and the child's vague notions about government are derived from ancient textbooks. As the Five Year Plan concluded:

"In short, the classic West Indian pattern has obtained - an educational system lifted from the totally different environment and requirements of mid-Victorian Britain."[1]

The educational system reinforces the authoritarianism engendered by all the other institutions in the society and is itself a victim of the system. We must now turn to examine the family structure, and the early socialisation pattern where these basic attitudes and personality traits were formed and transmitted.

The Family Structure and Some of its Implications for Politics

Broadly speaking, there are three major types of family organisation in most West Indian territories, if one excludes the East Indians and other minority groups like the Chinese and Syrians. The pattern obtaining in the top strata comes closest to the nuclear family of urban middle class families in westernised societies. Middle class family life is based on legal marriage, but on one hand holds more strictly to conventional morality about marriage than the upper classes, while on the other hand they share certain features in common with lower class family structure, such as the presence of

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[1] Ibid., p. 16.

non-nuclear relatives in the household, and the less authoritative role of the father. The large lower strata has a distinct pattern of family life, which has been much written about. M.G. Smith, after examining five communities (two rural, two urban and one seafaring) in different West Indian islands, including Grenada, lists the distinctive elements of lower class family structure as:

> a plurality of parental and mating forms; an inherent diversity and instability of domestic organisation; an emphasis on collateral kinship in the domestic system; and a formal commitment to monogamy, which is modified in various ways consistent with the alternative forms of mating.[1]

From all the studies done thus far on West Indian family structure, most writers are agreed that the general patterns are roughly the same in most of the islands. For that reason, in this section we will often be speaking of West Indian family structure rather than that of Grenada specifically.

Dr. Raymond Smith, in an article on the family in the Caribbean, based primarily on his detailed study of the Negro family in British Guiana[2], has argued that it would be far more useful to talk about household groups when discussing the West Indian family, since they are easily isolated for study and most writers are agreed that the household group is the main functioning family unit in the

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[1] M.G. Smith, West Indian Family Structure (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962) p. 265. His methodology is based on the total population of a household sample rather than the constituent households, which for a number of reasons he claims is the appropriate unit of analysis of family relations, pp. 7-8.

[2] R.T. Smith "The Family in the Caribbean", Caribbean Studies: A Symposium, op. cit., pp. 67-74. He defines a household group as a group of people occupying a single dwelling and sharing a common food supply. This article is based on his careful study of British Guiana, The Negro Family in British Guiana (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1956).

Caribbean. He also points out that it allows a distinction to be made between the mode of co-activity and the group which activates it. He lists the types of activities that a household engages in: child care, sexual services, domestic services, economic support, managerial functions, and status defining functions, and then goes on to demarcate three phases in the life history of a family. In the first phase, which he says is a latent phase, the man and woman are lovers and become parents without the man living with his mate. In the second phase the partners cohabit and form a household union, while in the third phase the household becomes matrifocal, usually including members of a three generation matri-line: mother, daughter (and maybe sons) and daughters' children. He points out that the general type of family structure he has outlined is characteristically confined to the low-status sections of these societies. Throughout his works he cautions against the dangers of viewing the family or household group as an institution isolated from the rest of the society[1].

For many years the emphasis in the literature on the West Indian family stressed the origins of the system in slavery, which prohibited marriage between slaves but allowed free cohabitation consensually or extra-residential mating. M.G. Smith has pointed out, however, that not enough emphasis has been placed on the post-emancipation period, when some of the slaves withdrew from the plantation and formed a free peasantry in the hills among whom an alternative form emerged, without however replacing the traditional

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[1] Cf. especially The Negro Family in British Guiana, op. cit., pp. 191 ff.

mating forms. A number of scholars have indicated that the role of the husband-father, for example, tends to be stronger in more self-sufficient peasant communities than is the case with plantation populations. M.G. Smith also found evidence in his study of the West Indian family structure that family unions in the two rural areas he studied were more stable than in the two urban areas[1]. Nonetheless, he hypothesises that the structure of Creole society and culture are still sufficiently similar to that of the slave period for many old customs to retain their functional value[2]. Increasingly, however, the emphasis has come to be on the relation between the family structure and the contemporary social system. R.T. Smith, for example, earlier argued that it may be less profitable to simply regard slavery as the cause of the present day family structure than to examine the correspondence between the various parts of the contemporary system[3] which more recently M.G. Smith has indicated agreement with[4].

These numerous and detailed studies of the family structure in the West Indies have been useful not only because of the resultant knowledge gained about the family but because they have thrown much light on the complex nature of the West Indian social structure. Both Braithwaite and R.T. Smith have emphasised that class biases

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[1] M.G. Smith, op. cit., pp. 255-64.

[2] M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, op. cit., p. 7.

[3] R.T. Smith, "The Family in the Caribbean" op. cit., p. 74.

[4] M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, op. cit., p. 7.

have been responsible for many misconceptions about the family in these areas[1]. Although many writers stress the differences between the classes in terms of family structure, Braithwaite, among others, has stressed that all social classes share to some extent the same value system in regards to the family:

> Simply put, the situation is this: the lower class, as participants in a common social system, share to some extent the same scale of values as the rest of the population. Among the values generally accepted by the population are the upper-class values of monogamous legal marriage. That these values are considered superior and proper by the upper classes themselves is known throughout the society even if the practice of a large section of the population does not conform to these standards. Partly through the spread of Christian values, partly because of equality before the law, the society as a whole is more or less committed to a universal set of norms for all. At the moment there is a more or less universal..... acceptance of these standards of decency. People are not only aware of them as standards, but apply them to some extent as norms of judgment for their own behaviour.
>
> In practice, however, there is a wide divergence between actual behaviour and the general 'ideal' norm of the society.[2]

In his Trinidad study he points out that within the lower classes themselves there is a sharp division between families oriented towards middle class standards of 'respectability' and 'decency' and those to whom he says "these standards are in large part a tedious external necessity towards which they are forced at times to adjust".[3]

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[1] R.T. Smith in The Negro Family in British Guiana points out that "It is a part of the mythology of the West Indies that the lower-class Negro is immoral and promiscuous, and that his family life is 'loose' and 'disorganised', and unless it is clearly recognised that such myths are an integral part of the system of relationships between various groups, reflecting value judgments inherent in their status rankings, then serious bias may be introduced into objective study", p. 259.

[2] L. Braithwaite, "Sociology and Demographic Research in the British Caribbean", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, December, 1957, p. 543.

[3] L. Braithwaite "Social Stratification in Trinidad", Social and Economic Studies Vol. 2, Nos. 2 and 3, October, 1953, p. 142.

This division, as well as the differences in family patterns already noted within the lower strata should caution us against over-generalisations about the family structure within this large group.

Nonetheless, for our purposes it is important to try and arrive at some rough generalisations about the behavioural consequences of this type of family structure as it shapes the political attitudes of the child. There are two links between the family structure and the social structure that are crucial in this respect. The first is the socialisation of the child in the family, especially the role of the husband-father in the family as an authority figure. The second is the type of values engendered in the family with respect to status-defining functions, and more specifically how this relates to the conception of politics gathered in the early phase of socialisation. Braithwaite, in his pioneering study of social stratification in Trinidad has concluded that the system tends to produce personalities which are essentially authoritarian, based primarily on Maslow's definition of the authoritarian character. He discusses at some length the non-authoritative role of the father in both middle and lower class families, and the heavy reliance of the child on the mother for both affection and discipline. The resulting personality, because of this and what he terms the wounds to self-esteem resulting from the colour values of the society, tends to be mainly authoritarian.[1] R.T. Smith has concluded from his study in British Guiana that the male in both classes usually lacks managerial functions in the family; the main distinction between the middle class male and the lower class

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[1] Ibid., p. 107.

male is that the former has a status-defining function which the latter lacks.[1] This negative role of the father has great consequences in the formation of political attitudes. Braithwaite, for example, claims that the aggressive personality resulting from this general type of situation is "not suited for political responsibility"[2].

The experience of the author in living in the West Indies and the information gathered from several interviews conducted in Grenada[3] tend to bear out some of the hypotheses of the sociologists in regards to the implications of the family structure for politics.

The attitudes of the child towards the male role both in the family and the society are intertwined. Male activity is often viewed with a degree of scorn: "They always talking", while the serious business of work is associated with the female. This tends to be less true of many small farmers, who have more authority and more of an economic role in the family. From the interviews conducted it appears that the periodic visits of the father in non-cohabitational households is viewed with great scepticism by the child, for not only does the father compete with him for the mother's affection, he also tends to disrupt the household by his erratic disciplinary measures.[4]

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[1] R.T. Smith, "The Family in the Caribbean" op. cit., pp. 72-73.

[2] Braithwaite, Social Stratification in Trinidad, op. cit., p. 107.

[3] The information presented in the rest of this section was derived primarily from interviews obtained from six families, three urban, three rural. Two of the urban families supported the middle class party, the G.N.P., and one the G.U.L.P., Gairy's party. For the rural families the numbers were reversed. In the rural families there were 3, 4 and 6 children respectively, ranging in age from 3 to 16, while the urban families had 2, 3 and 4 children respectively, ranging in age from 2 to 17 years.

[4] One of the mothers said that when the father comes home, she often asks him "to beat the child for me".

Lower class women often take a strong interest in partisan politics, and tend to be more emotionally committed to parties and political personalities, a phenomenon which the author has observed in some areas in Jamaica. In one community women avoided associating with "opposition" families, though this may also reflect the different class biases of the supporters of the two main parties. In one family where both the father and mother were Gairy supporters, the woman displayed much more open enthusiasm about Mr. Gairy, while the husband was more retiring and less committed. At Gairy's campaign meetings women outnumbered the men[1] and were on the whole more vociferous in their support.

However, women very seldom hold political office, nor are they usually active organisers for the parties. This is true also of middle class women, who appear to be more disdainful of politics and politicians than lower class women. Nonetheless, the middle class women interviewed tended to be quite vocal in their opposition to Gairy, whom they obviously perceived as a threat to their way of life. One middle class family, in which both husband and wife were brown, characterised Gairy as a typical black rabble rouser who had no manners. In all the families interviewed regardless of class or urban or rural differences, the children seemed to be essentially indifferent to politics, generally accepting their parents' evaluation about the personalities of the leaders. One lower class boy remarked "Mr. Gairy is a good man and is for us black people", while a brown middle class boy of 12, parroting his mother's views about

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[1] Since women significantly outnumber men in Grenada this must be interpreted with caution.

colour and politics said "Mr. Gairy is an evil man". The nature of family life in the West Indies, both among the middle and lower classes, is not such as to encourage family discussions about politics, so that children tend to adopt the attitudes of their parents without much serious reflection.

Regardless of class, children were not encouraged to participate in adult discussion. Family discussions involving politics, if any, were generally confined to fathers and their sons over 15 years old. In all the families interviewed, either or both parent would quickly intervene if a child ventured opinions that were not in accordance with the views of the parents: "The child talking a lot of stupidness". On one occasion the child was severely beaten for being "impolite" when there were visitors in the house. There also appeared to be a marked difference between girls and boys in this respect, the boys tending to be quieter and less vocal, their opinions being less decided, while many of the girls expressed more definite opinions about the society around them.

Although there is a large body of literature concerning the social structure and the family structure in the West Indies, there is a remarkable dearth of literature on personality structure, while the few studies that have been done tend to be impressionistic and limited[1]. Our brief summary of the family structure and some of its implications for politics have only re-emphasised the urgent need for

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[1] M.G. Smith has criticised the studies in this field as a group (among whom he includes Kerr, Cohen, Simey, Metroux, Braithwaite and Campbell) on two grounds: the generality and vagueness of their various theoretical and conceptual systems, and the ambiguities in their classifications of the populations studied. The Plural Society in the British West Indies, op. cit., pp. 46-48.

a thorough examination of the personality structure that emerges from this type of family system. It is only after such studies have been undertaken that we can begin to speak authoritatively of the psychological basis of political behaviour of individuals in these societies.

Despite his critique of the studies published on personality in the West Indies, M.G. Smith concludes that it is nonetheless interesting to note the agreement in definition of West Indian personality patterns among the various writers on the subject[1]. All stress the aggressive nature of the West Indian personality, though there is some disagreement about the exact nature and form this aggression takes. That the society and the family structure tend to produce authoritarian personalities hardly seems open to question[2]. Hagen points out that the authoritarian personality develops from his childhood experiences two important impressions of the world around him which discipline his later behaviour:

> One of these is a perception of the world as arbitrary, capricious, not amenable to analysis, as consisting of an agglomeration of phenomena not related by a cause-and-effect network. The other is that the caprice of the world is not accidental but the play of wilful powers far greater than his which serve their own purposes and disregard his unless he submits his will to theirs. These perceptions, we must assume, because the experiences which gave rise to them were very painful, have been pressed down out of his conscious mind; but he retains them in his unconscious and they guide his adult behaviour.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Braithwaite concludes that female dominance in the middle class tends to produce something of the same type of personality that female dominance in the lower class produces, despite differences in family structure. He attributes the dominance of women in the middle class primarily to the factor of mobility through women inherited from slavery and perpetuated by the present social structure. Social Stratification in Trinidad, op. cit., p. 99.

[3] Everett Hagen, On The Theory of Social Change (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1962), p. 97.

Evidence for this view of the world was underlined in our interviews with rural families in Grenada, for whom such abstract issues as colonialism, independence or for that matter federation appeared to be very distant, and about which there was little discussion. Instead they expressed a generalised hostility towards the world of the white or brown man; that he has plundered the world and made life miserable for the black man[1], but making no generalised reference to the economic or political character of colonialism, for example.

The attitude towards government was strongly correlated with the attitudes towards colour. The lower-class man, while not without ambivalence about colour, is much more hostile towards both the white and brown elites, and sees in them the reason for his misery. The middle-class urban families interviewed tended to view the "white world" as modern, as something to be emulated, and were wont to make references to how much the British had done for Grenada. However, throughout the West Indies this class of brown people tend to be highly ambivalent about colour, since they have been both on the receiving and giving end of racial hostility, and since it has played such an important role in their chances for social mobility. Many of these individuals fit well into Hagen's category of ritualistic personalities, who identify with the aggressor but who are at the same time so consumed with rage against their oppressors that they

[1] Hagen points out that one result of derogation by colonial rule is the rage which lies latent, emphasising that this is not rage in general, which doesn't exist, but specifically rage at being used by some person or nation without regard for their purposes, i.e. at being treated as instruments, not human beings. Ibid., p. 429.

are unable to productively imitate the persons who threaten them[1]. This category appears similar to Braithwaite's category of compulsive conformists. He suggests that the barriers of race and the lack of mobility have encouraged two prominent psychological types in the middle class: the compulsive conformists and the radicals. The latter are nonetheless authoritarian, often manifesting extreme concerns with status and extreme ambivalence[2]. This fusion of colour and class has considerable importance in the formulation of political attitudes, which we shall return to in later chapters.

It would be misleading, however, to attribute the prevalence of authoritarian personalities in the West Indies solely to the nature of the family structure. While the peculiar nature of the family in the West Indies seems particularly prone to produce this type of personality because of the weak authority role of the male, it is not adequate as an explanation since other societies with very different types of family structures, such as the traditional societies of Asia also produce predominantly authoritarian personalities. Other factors beside the family are clearly crucial here, and in any case the family tends to reflect the larger society. Braithwaite stresses the harshness of the colour stratification system as the other main factor in producing the middle class personality. In regards to the lower class personality, as R.T. Smith points out, the plantation system robbed the male not only of his managerial functions in the family but his status-defining functions as well.

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[1] Ibid., p. 425

[2] Braithwaite, Social Stratification in Trinidad, op. cit., p.99.

He points out that this is true even for small farmers, where a minimum of labour and enterprise is expended and the focus of attention is wage labour on plantations[1], which we have already noted in our discussion of the economy. Even at present none of the economic elites appear concerned that the small farmer and estate labourer participate in or understand the system, but merely that they continue to provide the manual labour necessary to keep the system going. Hagen stresses that the elites in many underdeveloped countries today are self-centred and look on the masses with condescension and contempt, and that the people perceive that they are being exploited in the true sense of the word.[2] We shall see throughout our analysis that the same process operates in the political sphere.

Because personality attributes are bred in the individual from an early age by all the institutions surrounding him: home, church, school and the larger political and economic order, he learns to depend on the decisions of others and to respect the authority of those in power. He obtains satisfaction or relief in allowing others to make decisions for him, which makes it difficult for him to accept the views of those who challenge authority. At the same time his latent rage at being exploited and used also causes him to admire those who challenge authority, and in some circumstances to join them. This individual tends to feel unsure about his relations with others unless the status relations are clearly defined. The typical peasant is most anxious or inquisitive to know what an outsider is "doing"

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[1] R.T. Smith, "The Family in the Caribbean" op. cit., pp. 71-72.

[2] Hagen, op. cit., p. 192.

in his village and feels anxiety because the authority position is indeterminate.

Although all the institutions in the society continually act to re-inforce the authoritarianism of the others, the family still remains at the core of the problem, both because it has such a decisive role in forming the personality and also because it is probably the most difficult institution to change. For example, it is much easier to change the political system than the structure and values transmitted by the family. Hagen suggests that to produce creative personalities rather than authoritarian personalities it is crucial for the son that there be adequate male models of successful achievement[1], which leads one to a rather pessimistic conclusion in regards to the West Indies, where the lower class male lack both status-defining and managerial roles in the family. Nonetheless, as Franklin Frazier and others have pointed out, many studies of the American Negro have revealed how the male's interest and authority in the family have been built up as a result of new economic functions and the acquisition of property[2]. Clearly, a necessary, if not sufficient condition for basic changes in the West Indian personality structure would seem to be the emergence of new economic opportunities. But as we have seen, particularly in Grenada and the other Windward and Leeward Islands thus far the economy and the social structure have shown little signs of change.

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[1]Hagen, op. cit., p. 222.

[2]E. Franklin Frazier, Introduction, Caribbean Studies: A Symposium, op. cit., p. viii.

The Politics of Marginality

Political scientists have recently discovered that it is fruitful to utilise an anthropological concept that is sufficiently inclusive to describe the values, attitudes and opinions held by a populace about politics. This is the concept of political culture, which is now beginning to replace the earlier interest in system. Sidney Verba has recently defined this for politics:

> Thus the empirical beliefs we are interested in in this approach to political culture are fundamental beliefs about the nature of political systems and about the nature of other political actors. In particular it is quite important to discover what political beliefs are - to borrow a term from Milton Rokeach - primitive beliefs. Primitive political beliefs are those so implicit and generally taken for granted that each individual holds them and believes all other individuals hold them. They are the fundamental and usually unstated assumptions or postulates about politics. In this sense they are unchallengable since no opportunity exists to call them into question.[1]

M.G. Smith in applying this concept to the West Indies has pointed out that the culture concept has two distinct functions; he warns that one must be careful to distinguish between the analytic and ideological functions, and goes on to note that:

> Since anthropologists have developed a specialized concept of culture, its meaning for them differs from that generally current; but since social ideas form part of the culture which anthropologists study, they are also concerned with the content, context, and functions of cultural ideologies.[2]

The political scientist is often treading dangerous grounds when he uses the concept of political culture unless he makes clear that he

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[1] Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture" in Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 518-519.

[2] M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, op. cit., p. 2.

is indeed talking about patterning or regularising forms, or on the other hand the capacity of a system to transmit what it has learned and its relationship with the society. Smith argues that the essential distinction is between the ideological function of belief systems and belief systems as analytical constructs.

What can we conclude about political belief systems in Grenada as they relate to the stratification system? In Grenada there is no "traditional" culture like Hindu or Moslem culture that can compete with the culture of the colonialising power. It is a creole society, which contains elements of both the African and European cultures in a distinctive blend. Upon these two traditions the basis of the social stratification system has been built. The basic pattern of this creole culture, which equates white with upper, brown with middle and black with lower, has been documented too often to need elaboration here. This peculiar class-colour configuration is internalised and transmitted by individuals living in the society, and has thus become largely self-perpetuating.

The critical group in this particular context is the brown middle class, which acts as a transmitter of white values. It should be noted that, as in Grenada, a white minority need not necessarily be resident to produce this pattern of social stratification, as the influence of the white culture still predominates. In any case, until very recently the top levels of the bureaucracy have been filled with white expatriate officers. Members of the brown middle class maintain their links with the metropolitan power as well as with their own creole society. However, the black mass find it difficult, if not impossible to cross the class-colour

barrier, particularly in islands like Grenada where the class and colour lines have remained virtually frozen. In both Trinidad and Jamaica the presence of a modern sector in the economy, however small has begun to open up possibilities for social mobility for some members of the black lower class. In Grenada the black man who is more adventurous or ambitious is aware that his only chance for mobility is outside his own society, e.g. Great Britain or Trinidad. Thus political and cultural identifications are intertwined with the problem of the definition of the local community. If you ask a Grenadian who he is, his answer will depend greatly on what strata he belongs to, with the lower class individual tending to be most marginal. However, in all strata the Grenadian political culture is marked by its marginality: to Trinidad, to Great Britain, to Latin America, the West Indies - all the broader units with which its members are partially involved.

The Grenadian, like his other West Indian counterparts, except perhaps more so than the Jamaican or Trinidadian, is perhaps an extreme example of the marginal man. He constantly finds himself on the periphery of many systems, including his own, participating in them to a certain degree, and yet never sure that he belongs to any of them. This marginality enables him, for example, to make a fairly easy adaptation to British society when he emigrates[1]. In England, faced with a hostile white population, Grenadians and other West Indians for the first time were able to become unequivocally

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[1] Cf. my "Immigration and the British General Election of 1964" in D. Butler and A. King, The British General Election of 1964 (London: MacMillan and Co., 1965).

proud of being black. This is largely because for the first time, meeting Africans and gaining a knowledge of the larger world, he realises that he belongs to a culturally and numerically important group of the world's peoples. In addition, for the first time he has attained some measure of economic security and independence. One of the by-products of marginality is the capacity to accommodate to any and everybody with whom the individual comes into contact. The relatively easy manner in which the creole culture has been able to accommodate diverse non-European and non-African ethnic groups is a case in point. Although the East Indians in Grenada on the whole are relegated to a fairly low status and characterised as "coolies", they have nonetheless become highly creolised individuals. This is partly a function of their relative numerical unimportance in the society, of course, as contrasted to Trinidad and British Guiana, where they form a much larger part of the population and have remained somewhat less creolised. More recently some Grenadians of East Indian origin have made some inroads into the ranks of the upper classes, and at least one East Indian sits in the Legislative Council of Grenada as a Minister[1]. This capacity of a marginal culture to accommodate has become translated into a political ideology. West Indian elites are fond of characterising their multiracial cultures as societies that stress tolerance, forgetting that this tolerance does not often extend to the large black strata who form the majority.

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[1] R.T. Smith pointed out in his study of the family in British Guiana, op. cit., that it is often easier to accommodate the non-creole minorities because they are outside the creole status system.

This marginality reflects itself in attitudes about nationalism. Bell and his associates[1] have consistently misunderstood the character of West Indian nationalism because they have been overimpressed by the seemingly easy accommodation of the elites to Western liberal ideas. However, this accommodation is much more cynical than Bell et al suspect. The elites are willing to quickly adopt and adapt any idea of cultural form superficially, as long as it does not unleash tension and insecurity or threaten their positions. Being socialised in a marginal culture makes tension-management difficult. This is complicated in the West Indies by the scale of the societies, where people constantly come into close contact with their "enemies". This may be one of the reasons why even after the colonial power departs the political culture resorts so quickly to "constitutionalism" in the resolution of conflict. Social organisations and interest groups in these societies devote a large part of their time and efforts to constitutional and legal matters. Procedural questions often supercede those of content, such as election of personnel and votes of confidence, but this does not succeed in fundamentally resolving the frustrations and anxieties of the members. This emphasis on procedure inevitably retards the progress of the group in achieving the goals of the organisation, which creates anxieties of another kind and thus predisposes people for the appearance of a "leader" who will get things done and take responsibility. Tension management more often than not reduces to the personality

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[1] See for example Wendell Bell, Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964).

obtaining relief through reliance on the leader[1].

In the colonial situation the anxieties that are aroused in individuals are manifold, thus increasing the possibility of irrational responses to many issues. Anna Freud in her brilliant study has discussed the different types of irrational responses to anxiety[2]. However, we are mainly concerned with the aggression-defence mechanism to anxiety. The colonial personality tends either to identify with the aggressor or to withdraw. If his aggression is very high he will tend to want to destroy the aggressor. Neither the family nor the school, as we have seen, have enabled the personality to comprehend and understand the world around him rationally. In the rural areas the normal pattern of response is withdrawal, while in the urban areas where the direct contact is greater, there is a stronger tendency to either identify with the aggressor or to want to destroy him. The brown middle class in this type of social order suffers from the greatest anomie and rage. One middle class man said, when questioned about colonialism:

> I hate the b . . . . . , they raped us, then made us like them and now we don't know who the hell we are. I wish sometimes that I could leave and find a small farm and live with my people, but they probably hate my guts too.

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[1]The literature of psychology is replete with studies of this kind of problem. I am indebted to my former colleague, Milton Rokeach for his insights. Cf. particularly his The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960). I have also relied on the workd of Rollo May, particularly his The Meaning of Anxiety(New York: The Ronald Press, 1950); Adorno et al, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950); and E. Frankel Brunswick, "Intolerance and Ambiguity as an Emotional and Perceptual Personality Variable", Journal of Personality, Vol. 18, 1949, pp. 108-45.

[2]Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (New York: International Universities Press, 1946.)

Anomie, rage, compulsion, withdrawal - all make it very difficult for any meaningful achievement of tension management. We have attempted in this chapter to isolate the critical economic, social and psychological variables that affect the political culture of a colonial society like Grenada. In trying to isolate these variables we have grossly oversimplified the theoretical constructs of our sister disciplines and possibly even more dangerously have made some naive assumptions about the economy, the society, and personality determinates. We shall return to an examination of a number of the more controversial issues in regards to the social structure as they affect the policy, such as pluralism, in our conclusions. However, our main concern in the case study that follows is the nature of institutional conflict that takes place in such colonies. We have already identified two of the major institutions that are involved in this conflict as the political party and the bureaucracy. To properly understand this institutional conflict we must examine the role perception and expectations of the actors. This has involved us in trying to describe these non-political agencies that may have led to the formation of these roles, and which are most directly relevant for an understanding of the political culture. Having done this, we can now turn to our main concern, the problem of political conflict. In the following chapter we will begin by examining the limits set by the system in the management of conflict, i.e. the Constitution.

CHAPTER II

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

In their anxiety to identify the ultimate sources of authority in ex-colonial societies, some students of politics have recently come to attach little importance to constitutions and constitutional law. They cite as evidence for this view the disregard for constitutions displayed by the new political elites of Asia and Africa. Constitutions are dismissed as alien creations that do not reflect the actual power arrangements in the society. While the evidence for this point of view is quite persuasive, it would be quite misleading to overlook the pivotal role played by colonial constitutions in setting the limits within which political struggle takes place, both before and after independence. In a colonial society the constitution is the ultimate source of authority, and because it enjoys this authoritative function it does affect and transform the behaviour of the participants.

Naturally, an interdependence exists, for while the constitution affects the behaviour of the participants, they in turn transform the functions of the constitution by developing conventions and rules of procedure. Constitutional politics in a colonial society enables us to observe how this transformation takes place because it comes close to being a controlled experiment in the exercise of power in a

community. For example, if the participants overstep their boundaries, as they were charged with doing in Grenada, they are denied the right to exercise power until they agree to accept the limits of their power. Thus, the participants learn to adapt themselves to these limits, constantly demanding more and more power, but usually careful not to overstep the boundaries. The period of internal self-government is supposed to be a tutelage period, during which time an alien constitution becomes an autochthonous one. K.C. Wheare has introduced this somewhat novel and useful term into the vocabulary of constitutional law[1]. Wheare argues that the constitutions of the new nations of the British Commonwealth, in order to gain popular acceptance, must have their roots in the soil. In other words, they must be successfully transplanted in order to enjoy legitimacy. Max Weber, writing earlier, had indicated that there are many ways by which the authority systems in various societies obtain legitimacy. Although an authority system based on a colonial constitution may identify the various institutions where power is supposed to be located, it cannot function effectively unless it enjoys legitimacy. A colonial constitution has its autochthony or legitimacy constantly questioned and threatened, and after independence this questioning is usually increased. This questioning of legitimacy, however, should not lead us to automatically conclude that the constitution will be completely rejected by the colony after independence. The fact remains that many aspects of constitutional practice are retained or modified and become part of the indigenous system. The colonial politician, while rejecting the right of the metropolitan power to legislate on his behalf, will accept as

[1] K.C. Wheare, The Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1960).

legitimate after independence some or much of the previous constitutional structure, such as the electoral system or the political neutrality of the civil service. Professor Kenneth Robinson in an insightful essay summarizes the process thus:

> The legal system in the former colony has now a 'local root' in that the rule of recognition specifying the ultimate criteria of legal validity no longer refers to enactments of the legislature of another territory.[1]

This process of taking root which to some extent takes place during the period of colonial rule therefore makes it possible for an ex-colonial society to claim legitimacy for some aspects of the colonial constitution on autochthonous grounds. The colonial constitution, then, deserves a special place in our analysis.

A Crown Colony is a dependency that has been annexed by the Crown[2], and includes both colonies which were settled and colonies which were conquered. In the British West Indies there is the peculiar phenomenon of settled colonies later being treated constitutionally as conquered colonies. The distinction between these two types of colonies is extremely important because the members of a settled colony have normally enjoyed many of the privileges of the citizens of the United Kingdom, the most important of which have been established representative institutions. A conquered colony, on the other hand, has enjoyed only those limited powers specifically granted by the Imperial Government. A large variety of the different types of British colonial constitutions can be found in the West Indies. Barbados,

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[1] Kenneth Robinson, "Constitutional Autochthony and the Transfer of Power", in K. Robinson and F. Madden (eds.) Essays in Imperial Government (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), p. 251.

[2] cf. Martin Wight, British Colonial Constitutions, 1947 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952).

Bermuda and the Bahamas, for example, still maintain some aspects of the Old Representative System. The Leeward Islands and British Honduras adopted Crown Colony government through the constituent powers in their own Legislatures. Jamaica and Grenada, on the other hand, had their representative constitutions taken away from them and became Crown Colonies by Acts of the Imperial parliament. Thus, the source of the Constitution in Grenada is an Order in Council passed by the Imperial parliament.

It will be recalled from chapter one that Great Britain first captured Grenada from the French in 1762. Along with the islands of St. Vincent, Dominica and Tobago, Grenada was formally ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. In 1779 it was recaptured by a French expedition but was restored to Britain again by the Treaty of Versailles in 1783. Since then it has remained uninterruptedly a British Colony. Administratively, Grenada's history since that time, except for a period of 50 years in the late 1700's and early 1800's, has been closely linked with the other islands in the Windwards group[1]. Following the Treaty of Paris a "Government of Grenada" was formed, comprised of the colonies of Dominica, Grenada, The Grenadines, St. Vincent and Tobago, and presided over by a single Governor-in-Chief, resident in Grenada. Apart from the Grenadines, each Colony in the union had their own local Council and Assembly, although for a very short period at the beginning there was a General Assembly for the

[1]Four sources were particularly useful in this and the following sections: Coleridge Harris, "The Constitutional History of the Windwards", Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 6, Nos. 3 and 4, May 1960; the Grenada Handbook and Directory, 1946, op. cit.; Hume Wrong, Government of the West Indies (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1923); and for the later period Grenada Legislative Council Papers.

Windwards. In 1771 Dominica was separated from this group and given a separate Government. This process also took place in St. Vincent in 1776, and in 1783 Tobago was ceded to the French. For the next 50 years Grenada was administered as a separate colony, including only the dependencies of Carriacou and the Grenadines. In 1833 Grenada was included in the general Government of the Windward Islands, administered by a Governor resident in Barbados, comprised of the islands of Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, Tobago and their dependencies. From 1838 to 1842 Trinidad was part of the Windward Islands' Government, while St. Lucia was attached to this Government in 1838. The first attempt at actual federation occurred in the 1870's, on the initiative of the Home Government. However, this was violently opposed by Barbados, culminating in riots in that Island in 1876. The planters in Barbados feared that a federal system might impose on them the financial burdens of the smaller and less prosperous islands, and in addition they had a long tradition of strong local government. As a result of continuing pressure from Barbados, it was separated from the Windward Islands Group in 1885. The islands of Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Tobago were then constituted a separate Government of the Windward Islands, with a Governor-in-Chief installed in Grenada. Despite pressure from the Home Government for amalgamating the Legislatures, each island retained its own Legislature, first in a modified form of unicameral Legislatures until their abolition under pure Crown Colony Government in the latter part of the 1800's. This Government of the Windward Islands continued until 1959, when it was dissolved in accordance with integration of these islands into the West Indies Federation. During that period the only major changes in terms of

composition of the group were the secession of Tobago from the union in 1888 when it confederated with Trinidad, and the entry of Dominica into the Windwards Group in 1940, when it was separated from the Leeward Islands.

Grenada Under the Old Representative System

Immediately following the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the parliamentary system typical in colonies of British settlement, known as the Old Representative System, was granted by Royal Proclamation to Grenada. This was not a matter of right, as the Island was a conquered territory and its administration and type of constitution were at the sole discretion of the Crown. The Old Representative System was based on the British Constitution in its classical seventeenth century form, which English colonists took overseas with them as their freeborn right, particularly after the Revolution of 1688. In essence, under the Old Representative System, the Governor, representing the Crown, had control of the Executive, while a Parliament, made up of a nominated Council (including the Governor) and an Assembly, elected by freeholders, was responsible for legislation; the judiciary was made independent. The System was characterised by an emphasis on the separation of powers. While the nominated Council possessed certain executive functions, it was a purely advisory body. Since the membership of the Council was wholly nominated, the members had no responsibility to the elected Assembly. The well-known frustrations inherent in operating this type of system were very much in evidence in the West Indian colonies, as they had been earlier in the mother country. However, in England, a way out of the impasse had been found by the creation of a Ministry responsible to the Legislature. In the Carib-

bean, on the other hand, the system remained frozen in its theoretically admirable seventeenth century form, although in actual fact it resulted in an intransigent executive confronting a virtually immovable and troublesome legislature. While the Crown, through the Governor, possessed a monopoly over the Executive, the Assembly controlled finance through its sole prerogative of taxation, as in Stuart England.

Assemblies in the Caribbean had the reputation of being factious, quarrelsome and obstructive. From their inception these Assemblies in the Windwards clashed with the Governor. The first clash, involving the short-lived General Assembly of the Windwards, was over a four and a half percent duty on all exports imposed on the authority of Royal Letters Patent. (The duty was abolished in 1774 by the Chief Justice of England.) This first Grenada Assembly, meeting in 1766 was dissolved within a few weeks after it had been convened following a controversy with the Governor over a claim to adjourn without his consent. However, a new House of Assembly was convened later in the same year. In 1768 an even more serious clash occurred over the question of election to the Assembly of three of "the newly adopted French subjects of his Majesty in the Island", as a plaque in the Anglican Church in St. Georges describes them. Royal instructions had decreed that these French inhabitants were to have full rights of British subjects, including the right of three of their number to election to the Assembly, which caused a number of the more ardent Protestants to refuse to serve in the Legislature. This spirit of antagonism between the Executive and the Legislature slowed down the machinery of the Administration for years. A further difficulty was

that the Board of Trade attempted to limit the powers of the Assemblies in the ceded islands, with the result that for nearly five years after the first Assembly met the Privy Council disallowed all the laws passed in the islands. In 1772 the Governor was authorised to sign any bills for which there were precedents in the Leeward Islands[1]. The question of political rights for Roman Catholics continued to vex the Legislatures for the next twenty-five years. After the short period of reversion to French rule between 1779 and 1783 the Assembly was re-established, and the privileges of French Roman Catholics were revived. However, the Election Act of 1792 virtually abrogated the political privileges of the Catholics, and the successful ending of the Fedon rebellion in 1796 brought the end to French power in the Colony.

Crisis and conflict were the keynote of the following decades, when the weapon of control of taxation was freely, if not extravagantly, used by the Assembly, while the Governor relied heavily on Imperial disallowance of legislation. At one point in 1839 the Civil Service and the creditors of the Government were left unpaid for six months while the Assembly and Executive pursued a further instalment of their vendetta. In 1848 and again in 1849 the Assembly attempted to reduce the salaries of officers of the Service whose salaries were fixed by special Acts, but the Executive successfully resisted these attempts. By the early part of the 1850's the obvious defects in the system came under consideration by the Government. Although in 1856 the Assembly rejected Government's proposals for a general Assembly

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[1] J.H. Parry and P.M. Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1956), p. 210.

for the Windwards to replace the individual island Legislatures, Government was able to get an Act passed creating an Executive Council, for three years in the first instance. The main function of the Executive Council was to assist the Governor in the general administration of finance and to be official spokesman of the Executive in the Assembly. Both the House of Assembly and the nominated Legislative Council were represented in the Council. Although this created an opportunity for members of the Assembly to discuss difficulties with the Governor and to make compromise on controversial issues somewhat easier, the constitutional position remained the same. The Governor's will was expressly to prevail where the two sides were irreconcilable, and he was not obliged to accept the advice of the Executive Council. The bill enacting the Executive Council lapsed in 1859. Although the Assembly then voted to make the Executive Council permanent, they amended the bill to confer certain administrative powers on the Council. The Governor at this stage refused to give his assent to the bill, and the House refused to renew the Act without their amendments. Several other Colonies in the Windwards Group had similar experiences with Executive Councils during this period. After the failure of these experiments, bickering and strife continued between the two branches of Government into the next decade or so, after which more drastic modifications of the system were made, prior to the imposition of pure Crown Colony Government.

The Collapse of the Old Representative System

The final collapse of the Old Representative System, which we can see from the previous section appeared inevitable, was hastened by a number of important events which took place during this period.

First and foremost of these was emancipation, which was to make a complete mockery of the system. The Assemblies had never been representative of any group but the white planter class. In Grenada at that time less than six per cent of the population was white, and not even all of the whites were represented. The situation was much aggravated by absenteeism, and the attendant lack of whites of ability and responsibility residing in these islands. Qualifications for membership in the Assembly at that time were either the ownership of fifty acres of land in the country, or of a lot in town of an annual value of £50, while voting was open only to persons owning ten acres of land or a lot valued at £10 per annum in the country or £20 per annum in the town. In Grenada in 1837, for example, there were only 136 voters, and they elected 26 members to the Assembly, thus averaging about five electors per member. The parishes of St. Patrick's and St. Mark's returned six members, elected by eight voters, who included the six members. (This was bettered by St. Kitts in 1857 when one parish was unable to return its two representatives because the sole voter of the parish was absent from the Island, and by Tobago in 1862 when two members were elected by a single illiterate.)[1]

The first blow to the system came with the removal of all civil disabilities from free blacks and coloureds in 1832, which created a growing class of non-whites with potential voting and membership qualifications. Although membership in the Assembly was not expressly denied to non-whites, they were in fact excluded since voting rights were expressly limited to white inhabitants. The emancipation of the slaves in 1834, and particularly the abolition of the apprentice

[1]Coleridge Harris, op. cit., pp. 163-164.

system in 1838, caused the representative system to become an anachronism, as Harris points out. Under slavery, the system could at least be considered "legally" representative, the slaves being represented by their masters. After emancipation ex-slaves who acquired the necessary qualifications could and did begin to vote. The abolition of slavery led to a severe labour shortage on the sugar plantations, which coincided with a period of droughts in the 1840's and an even more serious decline in prices caused by the 1846 Act of the British Parliament equalising duties on British and foreign sugar. Since the Assembly's power rested on its control over finance, the drop in revenue caused by extremely low sugar prices greatly undermined that power. No aspect of history in the West Indies is comprehensible unless one remembers the dominance of the sugar plantation over all aspects of life. A further factor hastening the end of the system, dating from pre-emancipation days, was the growing body of opinion in Britain opposed to representative institutions in the Colonies, based in part on the latter's opposition to emancipation. This opinion was hardened by the tradition of obstructionism for which the Assemblies had gained a reputation. In the 1860's it finally became the recognised policy of the Colonial Office to turn all of the islands under the Old Representative System into Crown Colonies. This policy was carried through first in Jamaica, after the Morant Bay uprising in 1865, although in the Windwards and Leewards the process was more gradual. The first step consisted in reducing the Legislatures in these Islands to unicameral Legislatures, consisting of both nominated and elected members. In some islands this took place at a later date than for the others; in Grenada it occurred in 1875. The final step

was the total abolition of these Legislatures and the imposition of pure Crown Colony Government, which transformed the Legislative Council into an entirely nominated body. Grenada became a Crown Colony, along with St. Vincent, in 1879[1]. This was the final fate of all the Assemblies in the West Indian Colonies, with the exception of Barbados. The Crown Colony system introduced to Grenada was of the following type:

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Governor

3 officials	7 unofficials nominated by the Governor	3 other officials nominated by the Governor

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

Governor as President

3 officials	3 unofficials nominated by the Governor

The Executive was now free of the constant harassment from the Assembly, but the growing coloured and black population, which had no say in the administration, slowly began to make their voices heard. However, the electorate had vanished, and the members of the Legislative Council were drawn only from those individuals favourable to the Executive, mostly from the planter class.

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[1]This is the date listed in the Colonial Office records, and the date given by Harris, op. cit. The Grenada Handbook and Directory 1946 sets the date as 1877 (p. 49) while Morley Ayearst in his book The British West Indies (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960) gives the date as 1898 (p. 29).

The next forty years witnessed constant protests against the Crown Colony system in Grenada, but the Colonial Office paid scant attention to these protests. In 1914 a coloured Grenadian, T.A. Marryshow, organized a Representative Government Association, which petitioned the Secretary of State for representatives to be elected to the Legislative Council. At the end of the War the Colonial Office compromised, and allowed four out of the fourteen members of the Council to be elected. Marryshow went to England to protest that this was not adequate, but to no avail.[1] After the War agitation reached the stage of violence, culminating in the attempts to burn down the capital city of St. George's in 1920, which was attributed to returning servicemen and the influence of inflammatory literature from abroad.

At last Britain began to cautiously yield to these burgeoning pressures and the slow process of political evolution away from pure Crown Colony Government began. In 1922 the Honourable E.F.L. Wood, on behalf of the Secretary of State, started a tour of the West Indies. A semi-representative constitution had already been decided upon for Grenada, and his report persuaded the Colonial Office to grant St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Dominica semi-representative constitutions also. Wood was well aware that schisms might occur between the various branches of government under such a system:

> I took pains in every Colony in which the question was raised, to point out that under every type of government some machinery must exist in the event of deadlock between the different elements of the constitution. The machinery existed automatically under a system of pure Crown Colony Government, and it also existed under a system of responsible government.

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[1] Morley Ayearst, op. cit., p. 33.

> In the former case the Governor could overrule the opposition; and in the latter the Government disappears, and a new Government, which can command the necessary majority in the legislature, takes its place. I pointed out that so long as the responsibility for the administration of the Colonies rested with the Secretary of State it was essential that the Secretary of State should have this ultimate power, in order to preserve the executive from being rendered impotent. [1]

Wood's recommendations were put into effect in 1924. Wood reported that there was no general demand for responsible government in the area, despite the continual demands that had been made for responsible government especially in the preceding twenty years. In spite of the limited nature of the concessions made the semi-representative constitution was generally acclaimed in Grenada as a step in the right direction. The 1924 Constitution[2] increased the ratio of elected members in the Legislative Council, without making them a majority. The ex-officio members were made equal in number to the nominated unofficial members and the elected members combined, while the Governor, who presided at sittings, had a casting vote. Executive power was vested absolutely in the Governor, who was to be advised by an Executive Council comprised of the chief officials of government. Some of these members were ex-officio, such as the Colonial Secretary, the Colonial Treasurer and the Principal Law Officer, some were nominated officials, while the remaining one or two were prominent members of the community nominated by the Governor. The number of voters registered in 1924 was slightly over 2,100.[3]

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[1] Report by the Hon. E.F.L. Wood, M.P., on his Visit to the West Indies and British Guiana, December 1921-February 1922. Cmd. 1679, 1922, p. 27.

[2] Grenada (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 21st March, 1924.

[3] Grenada Handbook and Directory, 1946, op. cit., p. 81.

The next major occasion that revealed widespread popular demand for increased local control was the Dominica Federation Conference in 1932. Under entirely different circumstances, the Conference echoed the demands made exactly a century earlier in the 1832 Royal Commission on Closer Union in the West Indies for full representative government in the region as a whole.[1] Roseau, the capital of Dominica, was decked out with signs such as "Crown Colony Rule must go". Despite the fact that representation was the key issue of the conference, other slogans such as "The West Indies must be West Indian" revealed an underlying popular sentiment for independence and nationalism. In 1933, following representations by various Windward Islands, the Secretary of State appointed a Closer Union Commission to examine the potentials of closer union between Trinidad, the Leewards and the Windwards. Although the Secretary of State declared that the purpose of this was to lead to a further measure of constitutional development (consistent of course with the requirements of proper administration!), the Grenada Legislative Council rejected the Commission's report, in good part on the grounds that it offered no constitutional advancement. Due to the general unpopularity of the recommendations, the Secretary of State then dropped the idea of closer union, but agreed to constitutional reform by reconstituting the Legislative Council to provide for an unofficial majority. In Grenada Marryshow tried hard to get this extended toprovide an elected majority, subject only to overruling by the Secretary of State, but this was rejected. Since the Constitution of 1936 can usefully be considered the beginning of the period which we are concerned with we must examine it in some detail.

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[1] Coleridge Harris, op. cit., p. 116.

The Period from 1936 to 1951

The 1936 Constitution[1] represented the beginning of a change in emphasis under Crown Colony Government from the nominated and ex-officio element in the Legislative Council to the elected element, although control was still vested firmly in the hands of the Executive. The Legislature now consisted of the Governor, three ex-officio members (the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney General and the Colonial Treasurer), four nominated members and seven elected members. For the first time the elected members were equal in number to the ex-officio and nominated members combined. However, this was counter-balanced by giving the Governor reserved powers, which he could use to certify a bill in the Executive Council even though the Legislature had rejected it, and which were subsequently used in Grenada. In addition, the Governor retained his veto power. Nonetheless, the new Constitution was considered an improvement over the 1924 Constitution, although it was still essentially a Crown Colony system wherein the Executive remained responsible solely to the Crown. Qualifications for election to the Legislative Council were set out as the possession of a clear income of £200 per annum; or real property in the island of the value of at least five hundred pounds above all charges and encumbrances. Interestingly enough, ministers of religion were not eligible for election.

The franchise was limited to British subjects over the age of 21 who possessed one of the following qualifications: real property within the island valued at a minimum of £100, free of encumbrances; paying rent ... at the rate of at least £12 per annum; a clear income

[1]Grenada (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 27th October, 1936.

of at least £30 per annum; or being resident in the district had paid direct taxes in the previous year to an amount of at least fifteen shillings. At this time Grenada was divided into seven electoral districts: the Town of St. George, and the parishes of St. George's, St. John's, St. Mark's, St. David's and Carriacou, St. Patrick's and St. Andrew's. The Grenada Handbook and Directory of 1946[1] states that there were 4,200 registered voters in the country, which appears to refer to the year 1944 when there was a general election.

However, the advance of 1936 was still far from satisfactory to the small group of middle class West Indians who were politically conscious. In the meantime, the mass of the people in all the West Indian islands were beginning to make their protests felt against the widespread unemployment in the area resulting from the depression and their general economic impoverishment. From 1934 to 1938 there were widespread strikes in most of the islands. This marked the beginning of the trade union movement, which very quickly began to make political demands, and led to two official investigations by the British Government. The first was conducted by the Labour Adviser to the Secretary of State, who predicted further disorders on the basis of his investigation[2]. This was followed by the famous Royal Commission, better known as the Moyne Commission, which began a five month tour of the whole West Indies in 1938. Although all aspects of life in the area were investigated, our concern is the constitutional aspects of their

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[1] P. 102.

[2] Major G. St. J. Orde Browne, Labour Conditions in the West Indies H.M.S.O. Cmd. 6070, 1939.

Report. The Commission reported an overwhelming demand for representative government, and recognized that it was

> doubtful whether any schemes of social reform, however wisely conceived and efficiently conducted, would be completely successful unless they were accompanied by the largest measure of constitutional development which is thought judicious in existing circumstances. [1]

Despite this recognition they completely rejected what they termed "extreme proposals" for complete self-government based on universal suffrage, on the grounds that it would make financial control by Britain impossible. They did recommend broadening the suffrage somewhat, and held out the possibility of eventual universal adult franchise. While ruling out the possibility of increasing the power of the Governors as a retrograde step, in the final analysis they found themselves bound to recommend that

> The initiative in formulating policy should remain with the Governor in Council. [2]

Of particular importance was their recognition that the Crown Colony system virtually forced the elected element to permanently oppose the government, since they lacked any ultimate executive power or responsibility. They claimed that the weakness of the system was not that it was an autocratic system, characterising it rather as benevolent despotism, but because of the

> opposition which it engenders between Government on the one hand and, on the other, those among whom must often be counted the elected members of the Legislative Council who so vehemently criticise government in speeches and in the press. [3]

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[1] West India Royal Commission Report, London, H.M.S.O., Cmd. 6607, June 1945.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Notwithstanding their recognition of this basic opposition the Commission [illegible] came down on the side of continuing Crown Colony Government, recommending some increase in the elected element but no fundamental change in the system.

The Second World War intervened before any action could be taken on the Commission's Report, and the next five years were marked by an increase, not a decrease, in executive authority because of the war[1], and not until 1944 was attention once more allowed to return to constitutional matters. In September of that year a committee of unofficial members of the Grenada Legislative Council was appointed to continue the examination of constitutional reform begun in the previous session of the House, and in December a committee of all unofficial members was formed to study the recommendations of the Moyne Commission and the question of closer union. The Committee's Report, which was tabled in January 1945, asked for increased unofficial membership on both the Legislative Council and the Executive Council; a reduction of nominated members; and the reduction of membership qualifications from the £200 income or £500 property qualifications to £150 and £300 respectively. They also suggested that by modifying the existing income and property qualifications for voting, the franchise could be extended to all categories of workers of voting age[2]. They further recommended that an Administrator (or the Colonial Secretary) should be substituted for the Governor as Chairman of the Legislative Council, and that the Governor's reserved powers should be

[1]Morley Ayearst, op. cit., has characterised this period as one of executive dictatorship. (p. 68).

[2]Marryshow, in his Minority Report (see below) termed this "adult suffrage in disguise", but still designed to exclude domestic servants, shop hands and the like.

somewhat restricted to include only external affairs, defence and military affairs and matters affecting the financial stability of the Colony. The middle class bias of the Committee's Report is clearly revealed by their proposals. Only Marryshow dissented from this; he submitted a Minority Report in the form of two letters, proposing unqualified adult suffrage, and a two chamber system of Parliament with the Lower House fully elected, or "any parliamentary body by which all laws of the land would be made by elected representatives of the people only."[1]

It is interesting to note that the Governor of the Windwards, Sir Arthur Grimble, in an address in Grenada in 1945 again stressed the need for co-operation between the Executive and the elected element if the system were to continue working. His remarks clearly reveal that the system continued to engender tensions, although for obvious reasons he attributed this to individuals, not the system:

> It is implicit in much that I have said that good government in every Colony depends really upon the maintenance of a genial working relationship between the Official Members of the local Government team and their Unofficial colleagues. Though official majorities disappeared from the Legislative Council nine years ago, the heaven-born attitude of mind inherited from the old system is not yet entirely extinct among Public Servants; and, in the other group, there are still to be found Unofficial Members whose accession to power has not yet diminished their determination to make personal politics against officials. Happily, there are nowhere more than a few partisans of either school. Most Public Servants (whether 'imported' or West Indian) do realize nowadays that the autocratic pistol has become ridiculous, because it lacks ammunition; most Unofficial Members recognise the principle, so long accepted by the United Kingdom Parliament, and Press, that no Public Servant can give of his best in an atmosphere of invidious politics. [2]

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[1] Grenada Council Paper No. 1 of 1945, St. George's, Grenada.

[2] Grenada, Legislative Council Meeting of 19th December, 1945. Address by His Excellency the Governor, Sir Arthur Grimble, K.C.M.G. (Mimeo), pp. 4-5.

More drastic proposals for constitutional reform were forthcoming at the Windward Islands Conference held in Grenada almost immediately following the tabling of the Legislative Committee's Report in January 1945. The Conference's proposals for a federal legislature for the Windwards, adult suffrage for literates, a reduction in official voting power and an increase in elected membership were countered by a proposal from the Secretary of State for a federation of the entire Windward-Leeward group, with a federal legislature to be given an unofficial majority, not an elected one, and the continuation of the Governor's reserved powers as before[1]. The Secretary of State's plan was for a highly centralised Government based in Grenada, with the Legislature probably convening in Antigua for some of its meetings. In effect, his proposals would have reduced the functions of the individual island governments virtually to those of local government. These proposals were examined at a Conference held in St. Kitts, but the counter-proposals made by the Conference were unacceptable to the Secretary of State, particularly the advanced concessions which the island proposed. Grenada also objected strenuously to abandoning its right to set and collect customs duties and income tax.

During the next few years a gradual shift of attitudes and emphasis took place, though this was done informally and with tacit understanding between the Executive and the Legislature. Control was still firmly in the hands of the Governor, but increasing attention was paid to the wishes of the elected members and policies originating

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[1]Correspondence from Secretary of State published in Council Paper No. 1 of 1946, St. George's, Grenada.

with them were often adopted and carried out. Compromise and co-operation became the catchwords, and persuasion was much more frequently used by the Executive. By 1949 the Secretary of State had finally accepted the idea of adult suffrage, subject to a literacy test[1]. Further proposals for constitutional change came in 1950, which were embodied in the Constitution of 1951.

The 1951 Constitution

Coleridge Harris has described the year 1951 as a political milestone in the Windward Islands, when four major constitutional reforms were granted[2]. Universal adult suffrage was granted without qualification; and membership in the Legislative Council became open to all British subjects over 21 residing in the Colony with an ability to speak, read and understand English to a degree sufficient for him to take an active part in the proceedings of the Legislative Council. The latter qualification was unique to the Windward Islands, alone of the West Indies. The third major change was that for the first time since the abolition of the Old Representative System there was to be a clear majority of elected members in the Legislature. The composition of the Legislative Council was to consist of two official members, three nominated unofficial members and eight elected members, with the Administrator as President of the Legislative Council to be given a casting vote. And at last an attempt was made to deal with that long standing source of friction: the overlapping of the functions of the Legislature and the Executive. The Executive Council was re-organised

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[1] Grenada Yearbook 1964 (Barbados: The Advocate Company, Ltd.), p. 17.

[2] Coleridge Harris, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

to include the Governor or Administrator, two ex-officio unofficial members, one nominated unofficial member selected from the Legislative Council, and three of the elected members from the Council, the latter to be elected by itself and removable by a two-thirds vote.

This Constitution appeared to concede to most of the local demands, but a number of important qualifications to the above reforms granted by the Constitution lessened their effectiveness considerably. For example, the fact that it took a two-thirds vote of the Legislative Council to remove the elected members from the Executive Council tended to lessen the latter's feeling of responsibility to the Legislature. In addition, the elected members on the Executive Council were still in a minority, and could not therefore effectively control the Council without the support of at least one of the unofficial members. Probably the most severe limitation to the reforms granted was the further increase in the Governor's autocratic power. The Royal Instructions setting forth these changes added that the Governor was authorised to ignore the Executive Council "if he shall in any case consider it right to do so."[1] In such cases he was to report the matter to the Secretary of State, giving his reasons, while the Executive Council could only require their views to be recorded in the minutes. As though the Governor did not already have ample control through this clause and his reserved powers, he was given specific fiscal control as well:

> In order to secure detailed control of the finances of the Island during such time as, by virtue of receipt of financial assistance by the Island from His Majesty's Exchequer for

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[1]The Grenada (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1951. Statutory Instrument No. 1393, St. George's, Grenada.

> the purpose of balancing the annual budget or otherwise, such control rests with His Majesty's Government. [1]

The only ultimate limitations on the Governor's powers rested with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who, under Clause 28 could overrule any law despite the assent of the Governor.

By reducing somewhat the power of the Executive in relation to the Legislature, the 1951 Constitution did attempt to reduce what Moyne had recognized as an almost irreconciliable gap between the two, although it still did not come to terms with the basic weakness of the system. It is worth quoting Moyne at some length on this point, because it reveals that the Colonial Office could not have been in complete ignorance of the problems that could arise under both the 1951 Constitution, and for that matter the 1959 Constitution. Moyne had said in his Report;

> The other Colonies are still administered under what is known as 'the Crown Colony system'. This is neither an autocracy nor a democracy. It is true that, as we have shown, the Governor can impose his will in the interest of public order, public faith or other first essentials of good government and, in the last resort, the decision whether those vital needs are affected rests with him alone. In practice, however, the force of public opinion can effectively prevent arbitrary decisions and the known unpopularity of the reserve power is a safeguard against its frequent use. It should be - and, we believe, that in the West Indies it is - the aim of every administrator under the Crown Colony system to give full weight to the expressed views of all responsible sections of public opinion, the more so in that some of these may have no share in any sphere of government, and to balance carefully the claims of every interest before a decision is reached and executive action is taken. The weakness of the system, as it operates in most of the West Indian Colonies, seems to us to lie not, as is so often alleged, in the autocracy which it apparently involves but in the opposition which it engenders between Government, on the one hand, and, on the other, those, among whom must often be counted elected members of the Legislative Council, who so vehemently and constantly criticise Government in speeches

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[1] Ibid., Clause 26.

> and in the Press. Even these critics recognise that the Governor is not an autocrat, inasmuch as they will usually admit that he and his administration are open to influence; the complaint most frequently heard is, rather, that Governments are dominated by vested interests and that only the representatives of such interests are successful in exercising their influence.[1]

Despite Moyne's inability to come to terms with the question of autocracy, his insight into the contradictions of the system were apparently little heeded in the writing of the 1951 Constitution, which again resulted in a situation where the Governor could and did continue to overrule the Legislature. The granting of universal adult franchise, which resulted for the first time in the election of mass leaders like Gairy, only further widened the gap in a system which was inherently undemocratic and increased tension between the two branches of government.

The Constitution was a strange one in that it was a very cumbersome and sometimes contradictory document. Even if the participants in the government, i.e. the political leaders and the Administrator or Governor, had proved willing to co-operate in its execution, it was made difficult for them to do so. While the Constitution recognized the potential strength of mass organisations (like Gairy's trade union), it made no provision for involving such organisations in a meaningful way in the exercise of power. It had the effect of deluding the participants into believing that they had actual power, when in effect they had only titular power. The political tensions that began to build up during this period are crucial in understanding the crisis of 1961-62 and will be examined in detail in the following chapter.

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[1] West Indian Royal Commission Report, op. cit., p. 57.

Constitutional Developments Between 1951 and 1959

The period between 1951 and 1959 was a very eventful one in the constitutional development of the Island. Most of these developments were in preparation for the Federation. However, before discussing those constitutional developments directly involving Grenada in the Federation it is useful to isolate out those changes that were more or less internal even though they were initiated primarily in anticipation of Federation. Most of these changes involved the composition and scope of the Executive Council. From 1951 elected members of the Executive Council were "associated" with the work of the Government Departments on an informal basis. This was felt to have been successful, and in December, 1954 the Secretary of State announced that a ministerial system would be introduced as soon as possible. In the same month the Grenada Legislative Council adopted a motion calling for the establishment of a committee system, to "prepare" for the ministerial system. In 1955 three committees were set up: Trade and Production; Communication and Works; and Education and Social Services. The Legislative Council was divided into three, with the Chairman of each Committee to be an elected member of the Executive Council. Thus, each Committee consisted of four members, plus a senior civil servant acting as secretary. Technical officers of the civil service, i.e. Heads of Departments, could be subpoenaed by the committees. The Administrator had the right to decide which subjects were to come under the purview of each committee, while the Chairman's role in relation to the Departments was still only advisory since the Executive Council had the final say in any cases of conflict between the Committees and the Departments. Probably because everyone was

aware that this was only a temporary arrangement the committee system proved relatively successful. The Administrator himself actively participated in the deliberations of the committees.

The major constitutional developments of this period remained those connected with Federation, and entailed a number of conferences concerning the form and structure of the West Indian Federation. There was widespread agreement in Grenada that she should participate in the movement for Federation, and all the major parties shared similar ideas as to what powers should be granted to the Federal Government and which should be retained by the individual islands. In February, 1956, all the territories decided to federate. The details of the Federal Constitution that was drawn up can be found in the British Caribbean Federation Act of 1956 and the subsequent Order in Council[1]. Briefly, the proposed Federal Constitution provided for a federal Governor General presiding over a Council of State led by a federal Prime Minister. It envisaged a bicameral Legislature, with the Upper House to consist of two Senators from each participating territory except Montserrat, which was to have one, while the Lower House was to be elected by popular representation. The proposed Constitution also established three lists, which delimited the powers of the Federal Government as against the unit territories, as well as establishing those powers which were to be concurrent.

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[1]The rise and fall of the Federation has been one of the most overworked subjects in the field of West Indian Government. Two of the more valuable contributions to this body of literature are those by Hugh Springer, "Reflections on the Failure of the First West Indian Federation", Cambridge: Harvard University Centre for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 4, July, 1962; and Jesse Proctor, Jr., "Constitutional Defects and the Collapse of the West Indian Federation", Public Law, Summer, 1964.

An additional provision was made for a conference to review the Constitution after five years of operation.

One proviso that became particularly important in Grenada at a later stage was that the Federal Government was to have special powers over the control of finance in those territories that were in receipt of grant-in-aid. In 1958 Grenada became a grant-in-aid territory. In other words the Colonial Office was going to relinquish its supervisory and control functions over these Colonies to the Federal Government. The proposal read:

> It is proposed that, as from the 1st January following the establishment of the Federation, the detailed control exercised by Her Majesty's Government over the finances of the unit Governments hitherto in receipt of grants-in-aid from Her Majesty's Government should cease; that it should thereafter be the responsibility of the Federal Government to exercise proper control of the finances of those unit governments to which grants are being provided, and to maintain that control, even although no grant is required in a particular year, until such time as the Federal Government is satisfied that the finances of the unit government are sound and the likelihood of reversion to grant-in-aid assistance is removed. [1]

This was to cause considerable confusion in Grenada when the Federation was finally dissolved, as we shall see in chapter four.

Perhaps the most important repercussion of the movement towards Federation from our point of view was that it created great pressures in all the smaller islands, and particularly Grenada, for constitutional parity with the larger islands of Jamaica and Trinidad. The Jamaica Constitution of 1944, which had established a quasi-ministerial system of government in that Island, was considered the most desirable model by the smaller units. In any case, the smaller

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[1] Grenada, Council Paper No. 1 of 1956, Report by the Conference on British Caribbean Federation, February, 1956, St. George's, Grenada.

islands had already been promised a ministerial system by the Secretary of State in 1954, as we have seen, and the committee system introduced in 1955 had already served as a trial period. The politicians were becoming impatient in their desire for a system that would give them real power, rather than advisory power. Thus, by constitutional change in 1956 the Executive Council was allowed to come under increasing control by elected members. The composition of the Council was changed to include two official members (the Attorney General and the Financial Secretary), one nominated member, and four elected members, with the Governor or Administrator retaining a casting vote. The Official members were excluded at this stage from the election or removal of the elected members of the Executive Council. The Governor was empowered to name all the elected members of the Executive Council as Ministers, three to the Committees set up in 1955, while the fourth was made a Minister Without Portfolio. However, a large number of important matters were excluded from ministerial control: all matters involving finance and expenditure remained under the complete control of the Governor through the Financial Secretary; and the Law Officers and Audit Departments remained outside the system. Other matters that remained under the control of the Governor included: the Public Service, establishments, internal security and defence, police, labour, immigration and external affairs and all matters not specifically allocated to Ministers[1]. While this system for the first time allowed elected members in their capacities as Ministers some power over policy and a limited amount of patronage, the technical Heads of Departments and the Principal Secretaries still

[1] Coleridge Harris, op. cit., p. 170.

retained most of the actual power. It should be noted that to enjoy to the full the limited powers under this new Constitution required collective responsibility by all the elected members for all Executive Council decisions, ensuring that they had to abide by the policy decisions of the Council in all matters or resign[1]. The Executive Council was clearly intended to be the principal instrument of policy, while the role of the Governor was to consult and advise except for those matters specifically entrusted to him.

In reality this was a quasi-ministerial system, although both Harris and Ayearst deem it to be a ministerial system[2]. As Wiseman points out, however, Ministers did not enjoy the same status as their counterparts in the United Kingdom, for if a Head of Department disagreed with his Minister he could still submit to the Minister his own views, which would then be considered by the Executive Council, along with the Minister's views[3]. And there was still no Chief Minister. Under this new quasi-ministerial system the Ministers often found themselves in conflict with the administrative officials, but the disagreements remained of a fairly minor nature until 1961. The middle class politicians in power before that date did not really conceive of their administrative officers as opponents but rather as advisors, since on the whole they shared the same values. In fact, the mentality and predispositions of this group of politicians were virtually

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[1] H.V. Wiseman, The Cabinet in the Commonwealth (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1958), p. 62.

[2] Coleridge Harris, op. cit., p. 169; and Morley Ayearst, op. cit., p. 97.

[3] H.V. Wiseman , op. cit., p. 62.

identical to those of colonial civil servants they worked with[1]. During this period the Governor and later the Administrator continued to be the most powerful and influential official in the Colony.

The Constitution of 1959

In 1958 the long planned for Federation finally became a reality with the inauguration in April of the newly elected federal Legislature. Even at this stage a large number of constitutional questions relating to Federation were still outstanding, although we shall discuss only those matters that affected the constitutional development of Grenada. In March, 1959, a conference was held in Trinidad on constitutional reform in these small territories, followed by the Leeward and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference held in London in June. At the Trinidad Conference the participants had agreed on two major goals:

> 1. That the Territories of the Leeward and Windward Islands could not fulfil their proper role in the Federation in which they are all equal partners unless each Territory enjoyed a full measure of responsibility for managing its own affairs.
>
> 2. That without prejudice to the differences in detail demanded by the differing circumstances and individual characteristics of each Territory, the Constitution of each of the Territories of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent should be reconstituted ...[2]

They demanded a number of far reaching changes, the most important

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[1]For example one of these politicians remarked in an interview following the crisis that the Administrator should have some sort of power whereby he could keep the Ministers in check! This was not atypical.

[2]Report of the Leeward and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference, held in London in June, 1959. Government Printing Office, Trinidad, W.I. 1959. Trinidad-M, 16/59, p.18.

of which included the creation of an Executive Council controlled completely by the Legislature and the creation of the office of Premier in each Island. They were cautious, though, in their demands for powers over the police, feeling that internal security should remain in the hands of an administrative officer or Governor, who in the context of Federation would be a West Indian. They sought to control the powers of the Governor along the lines of the Jamaica Constitution of 1944.

The Trinidad Conference was attended by representatives of the Federal Government, who were asked by the delegates from the Windwards and Leewards to prepare the draft instruments to give effect to these proposals, some of which were later modified at the London Conference. At the latter conference it was agreed that the leader of the Government in the Legislative Council would be entitled Chief Minister, while the Financial Secretary, who was to eventually become the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, would attend the meetings of the Executive Council until there was a genuine transfer of powers from the Financial Secretary to the Minister of Finance. It was also agreed in London that the police should come under the Administrator, and that an integration of the various Service Commissions i.e. the Public, Police and Judicial Commissions, would be advisable. Finally,

> the Conference agreed that a general election should be held in each Territory within a reasonable time after the enactment of the legislation concerning the redistribution of constituencies, on the understanding that the interval of time involved would be consistent with the conditions prevailing in the respective Territories. [1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 17.

The London Constitutional Conference was remarkable in light of all the previous discussions about "preparedness" for independence. What was particularly surprising was that no effort was made to "cost" the proposed Constitutions. Although there was much discussion at these Conferences of the need to take into account individual island peculiarities, virtually no effort was made to do this when the various Constitutions were drawn up. In fact, the only exception that was made was for Montserrat, the smallest of all the Leeward and Windward Islands. The Colonial Office acquiesced in all the local demands in the fear that any objections that they might raise would disrupt the move towards Federation. This "magnanimity" of the Colonial Office must be understood not primarily in the context of the "winds of change" doctrine, but also on the desire of Great Britain to relieve herself of the financial burdens resulting from continued colonial control, particularly in an area that was recognized as falling in the American sphere of influence in any case. The various Island leaders seized upon this opportunity to wrest considerable power by virtually threatening Britain with a breakdown of federal negotiations. As the proceedings of the Trinidad Conference revealed, however, these leaders from the small Islands were determined to acquire for each of their Governments equality of status <u>vis a vis</u> the larger units in the Federation. Despite the fact that the Jamaica Constitution of 1944 had been devised for a territory close to twenty times as large in population as the <u>largest</u> of the small islands (Grenada), it had become the desired model for all the Islands. At that time, of course, Britain never dreamed that the Federation would collapse, and that she would thereafter remain responsible for

these islands, which by then would have all the elaborate constitutional structures which she had so willingly agreed to at the Conference. Later events were to raise strong doubts whether the structures devised would have proved feasible even within a Federal system, or in any type of arrangement that might ultimately be made for these Islands.

These proposals were embodied in the Grenada (Constitution) Order in Council, 1959, and except for the clauses dealing with the Legislature, the new Constitution came into effect on January 1st, 1960. The major innovation was the formal introduction of a full ministerial system of government, with the Administrator authorised to invite a member of the Legislative Council to become Chief Minister. The man chosen, in his judgement, was to enjoy the support of the majority of members of the Legislative Council, while the remaining four Ministers, one of them a Minister without Portfolio, were to be appointed by the Administrator on the advice of the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister was given control of the Ministry of Finance, subject of course to ultimate control by the Federal Government as long as the Colony remained in receipt of grant-in-aid and certain internal restrictions. The Financial Secretary ceased to be a member of both the Legislative and Executive Councils, and became,in effect, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance although retaining the title of Financial Secretary. The Legislative Council was enlarged to consist of ten elected members, two nominated members and one ex-officio member.

Under this new Constitution the role and functions of the Administrator were expected to become increasingly titular. The post

of Administrator was first created in Grenada in 1945 to bring it in line with the other Windward Islands, despite the fact that the Governor of the Windwards resided in Grenada. This was done to free the Governor from presiding over the Grenada Legislature so as to give more time to the other islands in the group. With the advent of Federation, the post of Governor of the Windward Islands was abolished in 1959, and the Administrator became the Queen's Representative under this new Constitution. In order to fully set the stage for the crisis of 1962 it is necessary to discuss in some detail the functions and responsibilities assigned to the Administrator under the 1959 Constitution. In addition to appointing the Chief Minister, he also was given specific power to dispose of land; to grant pardons, respites, etc.; to keep the public seal of the Colony; and, of course, control over external affairs. Apart from appointing the Chief Minister, most of these powers were of a fairly routine nature. However, he was also given specific power in three important areas: to constitute offices and make appointments; to appoint, control and discipline the Public Service; and the responsibility to maintain law and order and the efficiency of the Judiciary and Public Service, although convention made it fairly important for him to act in accordance with the advice given him by the Executive Council.

One of the most important and later most contentious powers specifically delegated to the Administrator was his authority over the Public Service. One issue that arose in this connection was how far he should delegate his authority over the Civil Service to the Public Service Commission. Section 53.(1) of the Constitution states only that:

> The Administrator acting after consultation with the Public Commission, may, by instrument under the public seal, direct that, subject to such conditions as may be specified in that instrument, power to make appointments to such offices, being offices to which this section applies, as may be specified in that instrument and power to dismiss and power to exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in those offices, or any of those powers, shall (without prejudice to the exercise of such powers by the Administrator acting after consultation with the Public Sercice Commission) be exercisable by such one or more members of the Commission or by such authority or public officer as may be so specified. [1] (emphasis mine).

The use of the word "may" in such an important clause could, and did, allow for differing interpretations. Another clause which was to lead to a dispute between the Administrator and the Chief Minister was the one relating to the appointment of the Public Service Commission itself. Section 51.(1) states that:

> The members of the Public Service Commission shall be appointed by the Administrator, acting after consultation with the Chief Minister... [2]

It appears from this clause that the Administrator was not bound to take the advice of the Chief Minister, only to consult him. Further, Section 52(a) provided that in addition to consulting the Public Service Commission

> before making an appointment to the office of any Permanent Secretary of a Ministry or Head or Deputy Head of a Department of Government on transfer from another such office carrying the same salary the Administrator shall also consult the Chief Minister. [3]

The major difficulty with these clauses relating to the Public Service Commission and Permanent Secretaries or their equivalents,

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[1] The Grenada (Constitution) Order in Council, 1959, Caribbean and North Atlantic Territories, 1959, No. 2200, p. 43.

[2] Ibid., p. 42.

[3] Ibid., p. 43.

was that both the Administrator and the Chief Minister had differing views as to what the intention of the framers of the Constitution was: they were in basic disagreement as to how binding consultation was meant to be.

The Constitution of 1959 clearly intended to make the Executive Council the major decision making agency in the Island. Section 12 states that

> (2) Subject to the provisions of this Order, the Executive Council shall have the general direction and control of the government of Grenada and shall be collectively responsible therefore to the Legislative Council.[1]

Although the Council was expected to function like a Cabinet, membership was not confined to the Chief Minister and the other four Ministers, but also included, by law, one ex-officio member from the Legislative Council, the principal law officer. They were expected to adopt the doctrine of collective responsibility and secrecy despite the presence at meetings of the law officer and the Administrator to summon the Council when he wanted it to meet, as the Administrator alone was given the authority to summon to Council.[2] Under "normal" circumstances this was expected to be only a procedural requirement. However, if relations between the Chief Minister and the Administrator became strained, as in 1961-62 in Grenada, it meant that the Executive Council was likely to be by-passed by the politicians, particularly since the Administrator was required, so far as practicable, to attend and preside at the meetings of the Council.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 30.

[2] Ibid., p. 32.

[3] Ibid., p. 32.

In such a situation the Executive Council did not function as expected, as the forum where all issues were to be clarified before presentation to the Legislative Council. The presence of "outsiders" on the Executive Council made Ministers wary of discussing any important matters there, for fear that their deliberations would be made public. Thus, the Legislative Council came to assume executive functions.

Another difficulty with the type of ministerial system devised for Grenada was that no one was completely clear as to the exact nature of the control each Minister was to have over his Departments. The announcement setting up the actual ministries in some cases listed the subjects under each Minister, and in other cases the Departments. Furthermore, with regards to finance some confusion arose as between fiscal administration on one hand and audit responsibility on the other. Four Ministries were established under the new system: Finance; Communication and Works; Commerce, Industry and Tourism; and Social Affairs. The Government Gazette of September, 1960, listed in detail the Departments and subjects under the various Ministries, which is shown in the following Chart. (See next page). While all Departments came directly under one Ministry or the other, the Heads of some Departments had a very special status. Two of the most important, the Superintendent of Agriculture and the Director of Public Works, for example, enjoyed an equal status with the Permanent Secretaries in their Ministries. This created a cumbersome, if not inefficient and confusing, relationship between the administrative branches and the technical ones. In a society the size of Grenada, where skills and resources are very limited, this distinction was extremely wasteful.

FIGURE 5. STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT ADOPTED IN GRENADA IN 1959



Grenada, Government Gazette, Vol. 79, No. 44, St. George's, Grenada, August 19, 1961.

As we noted earlier, this elaborate structure of government was granted primarily to meet the demands for constitutional parity from the small islands like Grenada in the context of Federation. It is not surprising that the expense to Government to maintain this system of Ministers, and their Permanent Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries alone was estimated to take 3.5% of the recurrent budget[1]. Further fiscal aspects of the ministerial system will be examined in chapter four. However, it should be stressed that the major weakness of the system was neither its cost nor its cumbersome nature, but rather that the Constitution contained so many contradictory clauses. Ideally, a Constitution should attempt to recognize the "demands" that are likely to be made by "interests" within a community. A colonial Constitution is not so concerned with meeting local demands as it is with balancing these demands with the needs of metropolitan control and therefore is marked by caution and satisfies none of the parties involved. This process is explained as one of "preparing" local leaders for self-government, which often does not have the expected results simply because the participants do not want to be "prepared", they want to exercise power, and therefore do not accept the legitimacy of the Constitution.

The powers of the Administrator were considerable in spite of the "advanced" nature of the Constitution, although in a number of areas his role tended to be somewhat vague or to overlap with others. One of the major difficulties of his position was that he was accountable to three bodies: the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the

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[1]W.A. Lewis, Proposals for an Eastern Caribbean Federation of Eight Territories, Published by the Government of the West Indies, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 1962.

Federal Financial officials, and the Legislature of Grenada. Nonetheless, he was still, in the words of the famous Colonial Regulation 105 "the single and supreme authority responsible to, and representative of, Her Majesty." Although the Constitution recognized that the Administrator was to act generally with the advice of the Executive Council, he could, under Clause 6 (b), disregard their advice if the matter required urgent attention or was not significant enough to warrant consultation and of course he enjoyed the normal titular powers of the Executive. For purposes of understanding the conflict our main concern is with those areas where the powers of the Administrator were not clear and led to misunderstanding and confusion, rather than those areas where he had clear and sole authority. To begin with, no bill passed by the Legislative Council[1] could become law until it had the assent of the Administrator. He could refuse to give assent to any bill that would be inconsistent with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government in relation to other states or powers, or any bill that would endanger the interests of the public or judicial service. He could also use a blanket clause to withhold support from any bill repugnant to the provisions of the Order in Council. In other words, the Constitution limited the executive power of the Executive Council, while at the same time it failed to establish the principle of legislative supremacy.

The existence of two executive offices, those of the Administrator and the Chief Minister, made co-operation virtually mandatory in a number of matters, though in some cases this was only implicit.

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[1]For procedure of Legislative Council, cf. Legislative Council Standing Orders, 1962, Grenada. Statutory Rules and Orders No. 31 of 1962.

In the case of fiscal control and responsibility, however, the Constitution specified that it was to be shared by the Chief Minister and the Administrator without making any reference as to the manner in which this was to be done. Article 64, Section 3 stated only that no moneys could be withdrawn from public funds except upon the authority of a warrant under the hand of the Administrator or the Minister responsible for finance. In contrast, Article 66 stipulated quite clearly that the Administrator, and the Administrator alone, had final audit responsibility. The question of fiscal responsibility created considerable confusion in 1961 and 1962, when the Chief Minister interpreted the Constitution as allowing him complete fiscal and financial authority, while the Administrator claimed that the Constitution clearly required collaboration and consultation between the two.

Further confusion under the new Constitution arose over the role of the Financial Secretary, the administrative officer responsible for financial matters in the Colony. This post was originally created in 1955 when the committee system was first introduced[1]. Under the ministerial system introduced in 1959 the office became equivalent to the post of Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance. The powers and responsibilities of this officer were further defined by the Administrator in Ordinance No. 2 of 1961, where it was noted that the Financial Secretary had the powers to surcharge any payment not duly vouched. This order was issued in January, eight months before Mr. Gairy assumed office as Chief Minister. Basically, under the 1959

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[1]Grenada, Financial Secretary and the Accountant General (Creation) Ordinance, 1955, Ordinance No. 6 of 1955.

Constitution the Financial Secretary was made responsible to two masters. Administratively he was responsible to the Administrator, at the same time he was also chief technical adviser to the Minister of Finance (the Chief Minister). The activities of this officer and his department became another of the major issues in the conflict between the Chief Minister and the Administrator as we shall see in chapter four.

Hardly had this new ministerial system been put into operation in anticipation of Grenada's full integration into the federal government, when Jamaica decided to leave the Federation, following the referendum held there in September, 1961. This very shortly led to the total collapse of the entire federal system of government,[1] which immediately raised a number of serious problems for Grenada, and entailed further constitutional confusion. To begin with, everyone had assumed that West Indian independence was imminent (the expected date of independence under the Federation had been set for May, 1962), at which time the Administrator expected to give up his remaining powers and the Chief Minister would become the Chief Executive. The demise of the Federation meant that neither of these two parties knew what roles were expected of them in the new circumstances. Even before the Federation collapsed the Administrator and the Chief Minister were beginning to experience considerable difficulties working with one another under the new Constitution. This situation got worse and eventually led to a complete deadlock, as a result of which the Secretary of State for the Colonies suspended the Constitution in June, 1962 and dissolved the Legislative Council and the Executive

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[1]The Federation was formally dissolved on May 31, 1962.

Council of Grenada[1], a detailed account of which will be found in chapter four. The Administrator was given full responsibility following the suspension to administer and protect the welfare of the Colony. During the period of suspensions, which lasted from June to September of 1962, Grenada was reduced to a status below that of a pure Crown Colony, since the Administrator did not even have a nominated Legislative or Executive Council to advise him.

Following new elections in September, 1962, the 1959 Constitution was restored[2]. However, it had been considerably amended to give the Administrator wider discretionary powers than before. Among the increased powers of the Administrator was the right to appoint an official as Minister of Finance if he saw fit, and the reintroduction of what had earlier been the Governor's reserved powers, abolished for the first time by the 1959 Constitution. The latter enabled the Administrator to require the Legislative Council to introduce any motion or bill he might deem necessary in the "interest of public faith, public order or good government." Further to this, he was given the power to declare such a motion carried even if the Legislative Council failed to carry the bill, although final authority in such a case rested with the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Another amendment provided that the Administrator was no longer required to consult the Chief Minister in order to prorogue the Legislative Council, or to appoint members to the Public Service Commission or high level civil servants. The final outcome of the crisis was that

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[1]The Grenada (Constitution) Order in Council, 1962, Caribbean and North Atlantic Territories 1962 No. 1244.

[2]The Grenada (Constitution) Order in Council, September, 1962.

from 1962 Grenada found herself less constitutionally advanced than the other non-self-governing territories in the Leeward and Windward Islands.

An attempt has been made in this chapter to summarise the evolution of constitutional government in Grenada, with particular emphasis on the period from 1951 through 1959. The 1959 Constitution was examined in some detail, as it created many of the preconditions for the breakdown of constitutional government in 1962. While the Constitution was internally contradictory in certain respects, the final breakdown cannot be understood without an understanding of the political order, which in the final analysis determines the success or failure of the constitutional order. Since by the political order we mean the process by which individuals influence and affect one another's political behaviour, we are led immediately to an examination of the professional politicians, and their attempts to influence one another as well as the mobilisation of public opinion. The interaction between the political elites, the economic elites and the masses within the constitutional framework of colonial government which is examined in the following chapter should help to make clear the peculiar character of the political process in a Colony like Grenada.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT - A CONSTITUTIONAL ANACHRONISM

Some students of local government have argued that a population close in size to that of Grenada's is the minimum necessary for an efficient local government unit. Maddick, for example, states that:

> The local government system has been designed with that particularly in mind. Thus the pivotal point is the district authority which is big enough to be an effective unit of government - usually having a minimum population of 60-80,000. Districts generally smaller than that will lead to executive inefficiency, and an undue proportion of expenditure on administrative expenses.[1]

The population of Grenada, it will be recalled, is only about 90,000, despite which local government has had a long history in Grenada. An Ordinance in 1886 established Parochial Boards or Councils in the six parishes of the Island and Carriacou. These Boards took over certain local functions from the central Government, including the powers to levy and spend local rates, the management of towns within their parishes, the upkeep of local roads, and similar functions. Half the members of these Boards were elected by the local ratepayers, the other half were nominated by the Governor, though in 1891 the Boards became wholly elective. Ten years after the inception of Parochial Boards a Commission began to make inquiries as to whether the town or the parish should be the unit of local administration. In 1901 Town Boards replaced the Parochial Boards, reverting to the semi-election system. Finally in 1905 the whole system of local government was changed in a far reaching manner, when a district system of

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[1] Henry Maddick, Democracy, Decentralisation and Development (London: Asia Publishing House, 1963), pp. 227-228.

municipal self-government was introduced for all districts except Carriacou. These new District Boards were again half elected and half nominated in the same fashion as the old Parochial Boards, and they were given control over the towns, their most important duties being control of water supplies, sanitation and minor roads. This was the heyday of local government in Grenada.

However, in 1931 the control over water supplies was removed from the District Boards and put into the hands of a central Water Board. Other Ordinances passed in this period, beginning in 1925, had removed both sanitation and roads from the jurisdiction of the Boards. This process left the District Boards with only very limited functions; the maintenance of the streets in the town, public lighting, scavenging, control over markets and cemeteries, and some control over poor relief. Although technically District Boards,[1] they have served primarily the six towns of Grenada and had little or no influence in the peasant communities. The power of the Boards to raise money is even more limited than their functions. Locally, the Boards raise funds from rates on town properties and market places, cemetery fees, and miscellaneous sources such as dancing houses, land rents, etc. The main sources of their funds in recent years have been grants from the central Government, for which the Boards must prepare estimates and submit them to the appropriate Minister. The following figures showing the proportion of locally derived revenue in relation to revenue from the central Government for three parishes picked at random for the year 1961 reveal their heavy dependence on central Government:

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[1] The 1960 Census disclosed that the population of these towns was: St. George's 7,303 Grenville 1,747 Sauteurs 925 Gouyove 2,356 Victoria 1,692

District Boards	Percentage of Source of Revenue for 1961	
	Revenue Collected Locally	Grant-in-aid from Central Government and Deficit
St. Andrew's	35%	65%
St. Patrick's	29%	71%
St. Mark's	20%	80%

The membership of the various District Boards in 1962 ranged from eight to fourteen, but no matter what the total size of a District Board, half are elected and half are nominated by the Administrator, who is not required to consult the Chief Minister in making these appointments. Boards are constituted for a period of three years, and qualifications for membership to these Boards are very limited. To be elected, an individual has to either: have an income of at least $250 per annum; own property worth $960; be a registered barrister, doctor, or clergyman; or a person who is in the position of attorney for any person residing outside the Island possessing real property valued at $48,000. The strong class bias of these requirements is unmistakable, thus denying the peasantry or even legitimate politicians from the "wrong" class any chance to exercise even limited power in their local communities. The irony of the situation is that the District Boards are supposed to be a training ground to develop responsible leaders at the grass roots level! Election results demonstrate beyond a doubt that these leaders have inevitably come from a very limited section of the population, the rural upper middle class. Stringent voting qualifications were also laid down in The District Boards Ordinance of 1933, limited to persons who:

(i) possesses any freehold or leasehold property within the district in respect of which property rates or taxes to the amount of not less than two dollars and forty cents are paid; or who

(ii) pays an annual rental in respect of property situated within the district of not less than fiftyseven dollars and sixty cents; or who

(iii) being resident in the district is in receipt of a clear annual income of not less than one hundred and forty-four dollars; or who

(iv) is a barrister, a solicitor, a registered medical practitioner, or a clergyman resident in the district. [1]

Administratively, each District Board is required by law to elect a chairman from the membership; in addition they appoint a Secretary from outside, who becomes the chief executive officer of the Board. They also have the power to appoint other minor officials, provided adequate provisions have been made for these posts in the estimates. The Boards have responsibility for the towns in their districts in the matters previously enumerated, and excluding, as we have seen, control over most of the more important matters. There are several exceptions to this pattern of District Boards; apart from Hillsborough in Carriacou, which has always had a different status, St. George's Town in 1961 was granted municipal status. The population of the Town in 1960 was 7,303. The Municipal Council thus created consists of eight councillors, elected by burgesses (who must possess certain rental or ownership qualifications), with approximately two councillors for each ward. From among the eight councillors the Council itself elects both a mayor and a deputy mayor, as well as four aldermen, who then cease to be councillors. Again strict membership qualifications were introduced, despite the fact

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[1] Grenada, District Boards Ordinance, Chapter 99, 1st July, 1933, St. George's, Grenada, p. 1303.

that membership to the much more powerful Legislative Council had been virtually without qualification since 1951! Membership qualifications include ownership or life tenancy of properties valued at not less than $200, or an income of not less than $1,000 per annum[1]. The chief executive officer of the Corporation is the Town Clerk, who has a staff to assist him in the administration of the city; he also has the responsibility of preparing the voter's list. The Corporation Ordinance, like the Grenada Constitution, vacillates as to questions of ultimate authority in regards to financial matters. Clause 102 states that:

> An annual contribution shall be payable to the Corporation by the Financial Secretary on the warrant of the Administrator or the Minister of Finance in respect of all premises belonging to Her Majesty situate within the borough and occupied for public purposes by the Government... [2]

On the other hand, Clause 118 gives the Administrator alone authority in another financial matter:

> The Corporation may with the sanction of the Administrator borrow, as temporary advances, such sum or sums of money as they think proper for defraying expenses included in the approved estimates payable out of the ordinary revenue of the Corporation;[3]

The town of St. George's has tended to return either independent candidates or members of the G.N.P., the primarily middle class party. Mr. Gairy's party, the G.U.L.P., which is heavily dependent on peasant support, has always found it difficult to make any inroads in these urban bodies. The income and property qualifications have increased his party's difficulties in this sphere even in the more rural

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[1] Saint George's Corporation Ordinance, 1961, Grenada, Ordinance No. 3. of 1961, p. 20.

[2] Ibid., p. 52.

[3] Ibid., p. 60.

areas. Probably because these limitations have effectively prevented any political "take over" by Mr. Gairy and his party, the election results reveal considerable apathy among those middle class individuals eligible to vote. In examining the election results of some of the District Boards it was found that in some cases less than 10% of those eligible voted. In the Parish of St. Patrick's, for example, only 135 of the 1,327 people on the voter's list voted in the 1954 election, while in 1957 there was only a slight increase, with 224 voting out of the same number on the voter's list.[1]

The two major political parties have only recently begun to take an active interest in trying to gain control of the District Boards, with the middle class party, the G.N.P., predictably having more success in these attempts. One difficulty that faced the G.U.L.P. when they were in power was to deal with District Boards controlled by the G.N.P. On the whole, it is not surprising that in interviews conducted in three District Board areas local residents revealed little interest or knowledge about their Boards. A number of members of the Boards themselves, when interviewed, complained that local government was the "poor relation", and had no real value even in the area of town administration.

Practically since the inception of local government the question of reform has been periodically raised, and a number of commissions have been appointed to investigate and recommend, but virtually no basic changes have been forthcoming. By far the most

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[1] An analysis of voting figures for several other parishes reveal a slightly higher proportion voting, with the highest percentage of those figures examined being found in the parish of St. Andrew's in the 1951 election, when 40% of those on the electoral list voted in the District Board election.

complete and thorough examination of local government was undertaken by the Committee headed by Mr. E.S. Christiani in 1947, which urged very strongly the same types of changes that had been made in British Guiana. Christiani's major recommendation was to create a central, cohesive administrative body, called a Local Government Board, to consist primarily of central government officials and representatives of all the District Boards. What is particularly remarkable about this document was that no recommendation was made by the Committee to increase the franchise, at a time when there was strong demand for a more universal franchise in relation to the central government, and no recognition was given of the problems of the peasant communities in terms of local government. Although the Committee did recommend a separation of town and rural areas, they did not specify the services or structure the rural areas should obtain. The only District Board that raised this issue was Sauteurs in St. Patrick's, in a memorandum they submitted to the Committee. They recommended "the establishment of Parochial Councils in place of District Boards, vested with jurisdiction over the whole parish instead of over the town only as now obtains."[1] The Social Welfare Officer, in a separate memorandum submitted to the Committee, pointed out the irrelevance of District Boards for the rural people, and recommended instead the creation of voluntary and unofficial Community Councils, which could eventually be enabled to obtain an official standing in the scheme of local government if they had proved viable. However, even the creation of community or village councils in a place like

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[1] "The Christiani Report on Local Government Reform", St. George's, Grenada, November, 1947 (mimeo), Appendix 11.

Grenada poses certain problems, since the village is a difficult, and in many cases almost impossible, unit to define. According to the memorandum "there are very few centres of population in Grenada large enough or concentrated enough to qualify as Villages".[1] The type of community the peasant participates in presents some difficulties of analysis, since the unit of community activity can hardly be classified as a village. While the effective community may have a shop or two it is not necessarily the same as a village where a number of specialized occupations or tradesmen may be found. When the peasant needs such services he has to go to "town", usually St. George's, for more specialized goods or services, or one of the four other towns in Grenada.

In 1956 another select committee was appointed to again look into local government reform, and legislation was prepared calling for the creation of local government councils which would be directly responsible to the Minister responsible for local Government. However, the Legislative Council did not act on the proposals. In March, 1960, a Conference was held on local government reform, and the Administrator assured the conference that the time was ripe for serious consideration of the whole question of local government. The only concrete result of the conference was the granting of municipal status to St. George's, which has already been discussed previously. On the whole local government in Grenada has not changed essentially in the past fifty years.

One of the startling features that emerges in any study of local government in the West Indies is that both students of local

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[1] Ibid., Appendix 38.

government and colonial administration have paid virtually no attention to the social structure of the rural community. M.G. Smith, in a pioneering study conducted in Jamaica in 1955, pointed out the difficulty of defining the boundaries of a village or community, as there are different and sometimes overlapping levels of participation. He concluded

> If this account is correct, rural community structure is informal in character. Formal organization of community interest and action must therefore present something of a problem, especially to those national associations committed to working through communities as units....
>
> ... It has been shown above that the village is not normally a true community, but rather a heterogeneous collection of sectors of the various communities which border upon it, [1]

Grenadian hillside communities tend to have forms of organisation similar to those in Jamaica, with no local government units effectively representing or involving them. As we have seen in Grenada the District Boards have functioned as administrative units for the rural towns. In the case of one parish, St. David's, since there is no town at all, the total farce of local government in Grenada can be seen in the extreme. With the District Boards entirely dominated by the town and large land owning elites and serving few real functions, we were prepared for the finding that few residents in the three areas we examined knew what the Boards did, although some of those we interviewed were aware of their activities in regards to poor relief. The majority could not name either the chairman or any of the members of their District Boards. For their part, those members of the Boards we interviewed tended to express keen resentment about the attitude

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[1] M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies. op. cit., p. 192.

of officials of the central Government whom they complained wanted to deny them any autonomy. They complained that until very recently they had to submit their estimates by post, which delayed matters considerably, only to finally obtain grants that had been arbitrarily determined. Their fiscal problems were even further complicated by the fact that the budget year of the central government did not coincide with the budget year of the District Board. At best the financial and administrative arrangements can only be described as chaotic.

It is quite obvious that the system of local government in Grenada in relation to its size and structure can only be considered non-functional at best and more realistically as farcical. It would be naive to believe that "reform" of the existing system along the lines usually suggested would have basically improved the condition of local government, since none of the proposals have been predicated on the assumption that the populace should be meaningfully involved in managing their own affairs. It is obvious that central Government and Local Government functions have to be fused in Grenada and that it would be far better to enlarge the Legislative Council and have it serve both functions than to continue as in the past. The parish is a meaningless administrative unit if the government is serious about integrating economic planning and popular participation. Functional economic councils are likely to prove far more advantageous. Any basic change in local government would have to recognize the fact that the Island is a community and that all governmental structures would have to be altered accordingly. An Island Assembly elected by smaller electoral units could possibly begin to involve the majority of the

people in the activities of government, and the peasantry might commence to participate in the exercise of power, for in spite of universal adult franchise they have been effectively disenfranchised under the present system.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL ORDER

When the state "precedes" the society, as in Grenada, the polity can be described as an artificial creation of the Imperial bureaucracy, in which case the traditional notions about state, society and community assume different meanings and functions. In particular, the notion of a political community, or to use Easton's words the "sense of community" is essentially an artificial creation, since it has evolved under bureaucratic tutelage and its values have been specified by the state. The polity that emerges is one which is dominated by bureaucratic or administrative values. What is particularly important for our purposes is the process by which these bureaucratic values become politically translated and transformed in the society. First, however, we must distinguish between the values held by the elites and the mass in the society. We will explore the sociological and anthropological notions of community as they affect the polity in detail in chapter six. Here we need only stress that the values held by the elite groups will not be identical or perhaps even similar to those of the rest of the community. As Lucien Pye succinctly puts it:

> ... in no society is there a single uniform political culture, and in all polities there is a fundamental distinction between the culture of the rulers or power holders and that of the masses, whether they are merely parochial subjects or participating citizens.[1]

While the Imperial state had a decisive influence in shaping the general framework of values held by the populace in Grenada the mass did not share in these values in the manner and extent to which the elites did. Our findings in Grenada revealed a fairly wide distance between the mass and the elite in values associated with the political community. M.G. Smith[2] has documented the social and cultural differences between the groups in some detail; our major concern will be the political differences. The distance between the two groups in political values became particularly apparent when we examined the pattern of political conflict.

One of the main points that emerged in the previous chapter was that the whole range of powers conferred on a colonial Head of State, whether Governor or Administrator, by Crown Colony constitutions such as Grenada has had, created an office possessing what Weber characterised as institutional charisma. Thus the Head of State in a colony is able to exercise authority on two grounds: he has ultimate legal responsibility in the colony, in addition to which he enjoys the charisma associated with the office. However, the constitutional changes that began in 1951 in Grenada created the preconditions for the growth of a political movement that could and did begin to

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[1]Lucien W. Pye, Introduction, Political Culture and Political Development, Studies in Political Development 5, ed. by Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 15.

[2]M.G. Smith, "Structure and Crisis in Grenada, 1950-1954", op. cit., pp. 276-280.

challenge that authority on both these grounds. The movement that emerged in Grenada was led by an individual who made special claims beyond those conceded to him by the Constitution as to his "historic mission to lead his people out of the wilderness into the promised land." In analysing the role of this leader we found Weber's discussion of personal charisma and charismatic leadership useful. This chapter will deal primarily with the emergence and evolution of his movement, especially his role and claims as its leaders. In the following chapter we will examine the conflict that emerged between the Administrator, having available the institutional charisma of his office, and Gairy, with his "special" claims to leadership.

In order to appreciate fully the nature of Gairy's movement, we must first examine briefly the process of political socialisation in the society. As we mentioned earlier, the colonial political system enables us to observe the phenomenon of "planned" political socialisation. Individuals who are socialised in a colonial society develop attitudes towards politics and political power that are qualitatively different from those of individuals raised in non-colonial societies. Probably the area where this difference is most marked is in the area of authority and authority relations. Parsons has defined authority as

> the institutionalization of given modes and levels of integration of the collectivity insofar as these are essential conditions of effective and legitimized collective action. It is the institutionalization of the rights of 'leaders' to expect support from the members of the collectivity.[1]

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[1] Talcott Parsons, "Authority, Legitimation, and Political Action" in Carl Friedrich, Authority (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 210.

In the colonial context, where ultimate authority resides outside the society, the relationship between the leaders and the led develops a different form since both groups will have a special understanding about authority and power relations. Even entirely indigenous social and political movements must seek legitimacy (both political and psychological) for their activities by obtaining outside supports. Protest movements, or to use the phraseology of Smelser[1], norm oriented movements, are not immune to this pressure. Even seemingly revolutionary movements tend to become routinised and gradually come to accept at least some of the stipulations and usually the basic framework established under Crown Colony government[2]. The electoral system strongly re-inforces this tendency.

In such a society the three authority systems that Weber identified undergo special transformations. Under colonialism the most authoritative institution is the bureaucracy, which determines the limits within which political conflict will be allowed to take place. The bureaucracy has its powers and privileges enshrined in the Constitution, and thus becomes the guardian and arbiter of the law and of the political process. The political leader who attempts to challenge this authority, which includes the towering figure of the Administrator or Governor at the top of the apex, must base his claim to legitimacy on his special relationship with the masses. To succeed in this challenge the political leader must have strong support from

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[1]N.J. Smelser, Theories of Collective Behaviour (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).

[2]Cf. my Race and Politics, forthcoming, Allen and Unwin, Ltd., where I discuss this particular point with reference to Dr. Jagan's P.P.P. in British Guiana and the L.S.S.P. in Ceylon.

the masses, from whom he demands total and complete loyalty. He cannot afford to become characterised as a sectional spokesman, but must maintain the image of a national spokesman. The political relationship that develops between the leader and the led is both personalistic and authoritarian. The personalism of the leader's style is dependent on his understanding of the cultural and social patterns of relations. Among the rural people there is a tendency to rely on an elder or spokesman who has "special" skills, e.g., his knowledge of colonial regulations and relationships, and/or his capacity to speak and write the Queen's English, which gains such an individual a personal following in the area. The potential leader must be able to exploit this pattern of personal relationships in building his movement. This is why school teachers and clergymen play such a pivotal role in local politics. Another requirement is that a potential leader must be capable of expressing the powerful but often inarticulate grievances of the masses on a national scale. He uses his personal charisma to claim legitimacy, couched in terms of the national interest.

It is useful in this context to differentiate between the social and political purposes served by mass movements in colonial societies on one hand, and their psychological functions on the other. The social-psychology of colonialism and decolonisation has been a much neglected subject among the students of the new states.[1] Since all mass leaders in these situations claim to be working towards the emancipation of the masses, we must examine this issue more closely.

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[1]The most important exceptions are the brilliant works of Frantz Fanon, and the pathbreaking works of Harold Lasswell, especially his Psychopathology and Politics (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1930).

Of primary importance is the distinction between the stated goals associated with this emancipation and the opportunities this type of movement offers for rapid social mobility for the leaders. One of the primary concerns of a nationalist movement is the transference of one type of symbol for another, and the rationalisation of the new symbols by the creation of new myths. The manipulators of these new symbols are often themselves very ambivalent about the actual achievement of the goals which the new symbols stand for. Partly to further their own interests, and partly because of their own authoritarian tendencies, the leadership demands submissiveness from their followers, though this is rationalized in terms of the necessity to achieve new goals and symbols. This apparent submissiveness on the part of the masses is often completely misunderstood by the colonial rulers and the local elites; they mistakenly assume by this that the masses are not hostile to them. However, there is overwhelming evidence that this excessive submissiveness only masks the deeply imbedded hostility present in the mass of people under colonialism. Part of the reason for this misunderstanding of the nature of hostility and violence in colonial societies has been explained by Frantz Fanon; who although drawing heavily on his Algerian experience in his books was born and socialised in Martinique in the West Indies and is describing a phenomenon common to many if not all colonial societies.

> The colonised man will first manifest this aggressiveness which has been deposited in his bones against his own people ... Where individuals are concerned, a positive negation of common sense is evident. While the settler or the policeman has the right the live-long day to strike the native, to insult him and to make him crawl to them, you will see the native reaching for his knife at the slightest hostile or aggressive glance cast on him by another native; for the last resort of the native is to defend his personality vis-a-vis his brother ..... Here on the level of communal organisations we clearly discern the well-known behaviour patterns of avoidance.....

> .....We have seen that this same violence, though kept very much on the surface all through the colonial period, yet turns in the void. We have also seen that it is canalised by the emotional outlets of dance and possession by spirits; we have seen how it is exhausted in fratricidal combats. [1]

The crisis which shook Grenada in 1951, which we shall examine in the following section, was strongly marked by violence which increasingly came to be directed against the planters and the authorities.[2] According to M.G. Smith, in the first stage of the crisis the violence took the form of intimidation of workers supporting the strike against those who opposed it, which supports Fanon's theories on the inward turning nature of aggression under colonialism when it is not canalised into a political or collective movement. Smith points out that violence came to be directed at the planters and the colonial government only after the leader had been removed to custody, in other words from the time when the strike began to take

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[1] Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1965), pp. 42-46.

[2] The question may be raised as to why violence did not take place in Grenada until 1951, whereas most other West Indian islands experienced violence and social disorder between 1936-38. One factor was probably the lack of dependence on sugar. For instance, in 1937 prices rose for the Colony's staples and Grenada was reported to have prospered, although a slump occurred the following year. (The Grenada Handbook and Directory, 1946, op. cit., p. 88) Nonetheless, on the whole Grenada was badly hit by the depression. Perhaps a more important factor was the more paternalistic and feudal relationship between the estate workers and/or small farmers with the estate owners in Grenada than in the sugar islands, a point which M.G. Smith has emphasised. However, it appears to us that there is also a political explanation. Throughout that period Grenada's politics were dominated by the constitutional politician, Marryshow. In 1938 Marryshow organised a non-violent, almost religious demonstration indicating the sympathy and solidarity of the people of Grenada with their brothers in the other islands, but was able to prevent any outbursts of violence. Cf. P.A. Emmanuel, "Marryshow and the Movement Towards Self-Government", M.A. Thesis, Department of Government, University of the West Indies, 1966.

on a political form. Fanon has also brilliantly described how violence quickly and devastatingly comes to be directed against the authorities once this stage has been reached. The elites, not surprisingly, were totally unprepared for and shocked by the violence of 1951, revealing their almost total ignorance of the underlying hostility of the people which needed very little to ignite it into violence. Even the mass leaders are unlikely in such cases to be fully aware of the nature and extent of hostility and can have considerable difficulties in controlling the violence and bringing it to an end. Violence and aggression in the West Indies has a class as well as a socio-psychological basis. There has always been a history of lower class aggression towards the upper classes, as well as the more "acceptable" class and racial hostility displayed by the upper classes to the peasantry and the lower classes. Braithwaite[1] notes, for example, that even the judiciary openly displays its distrust of the lower classes. Political leaders who spring from the lower classes quickly come to display this same contempt for the masses, whether consciously or unconsciously, for indeed to show this contempt is one of the attributes of achieving upper or middle class status. One of the more important aspects of West Indian politics is that it has provided one of the major avenues for social mobility in a "closed" society.

The hostility of the masses can come to be directed against the leader by his followers, particularly if they are aware of his contempt for them, or if they feel he is getting too distant. The masses often despise the newly won status of their own and laugh at

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[1]Lloyd Braithwaite, "Social Stratification in Trinidad" op. cit.

the behaviour of the new elites, especially when they imitate the white man's world. M.G. Smith attributes the deflection of some of Gairy's followers after 1951 to this factor "since the desire for higher status was interpreted as rejection of low-status folk".[1] Here again, the leader's own lack of perception means that he is often taken by surprise when individuals in the movement turn rapidly from expressions of affection towards the leader to outright hostility.

No matter how radical their stated goals may appear, the leaders are seldom emancipated enough themselves to really want to see the social structure drastically changed, and particularly the patterns of authoritarianism. They tend to be much more concerned with proving their own capabilities to run the existing system, and hence their right to membership in the elite. The process of emancipation in a meaningful sense requires a capacity on the part of both the leaders and the led to face up to the tremendous insecurities that are unleashed in the struggle for independence. It requires rational personalities that can accept and integrate change. However, colonial social structures are not by their very nature prone to produce such personalities, as we tried to indicate in our brief discussion in chapter one (see pages 95-110).

The Emergence of a Hero

It is useful to distinguish between the two types of political heroes that have emerged in the West Indies. On the one hand there has been the middle class hero, claiming that he has sacrificed his career for the sake of helping the people through politics: he often

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[1] M.G. Smith, "Structure and Crisis in Grenada, 1950-1954", op. cit., p. 302.

argues that he might have been an international lawyer or scholar of some repute. On the whole, this type of leader has tended to stress constitutional advance. On the other hand there has been the hero who comes from humble origins and bases his claims to political leadership on his role as a trade union leader. In spite of the differences in their class origins and their leadership style, however, these two types of heroes share certain similarities: they tend to develop personal organisations, and organisations which are essentially authoritarian. In Grenada, while Marryshow could be characterised as a middle class hero, the very limited franchise until 1951 prevented him from becoming the leader of a mass party as happened in some of the other islands. The leader that emerged in 1950, at a time when constitutional developments for the first time made mass political parties possible, was of the second type. His name was Eric Matthew Gairy.

"I remember as a little boy", Gairy recalled, "that when I saw an old man going to work and realised what he was working for.... I cried. I have always wanted to be in a position to help, and that is why I am in politics."[1] He also recounted how he was particularly influenced by his mother, who, he said, was a religious woman, and it was her concern for the poor that influenced his life. She was always asking her children to "Be St. Pauls". Gairy came from a poor family, but as he himself said, they were "decent poor". His father was an overseer on an estate, and suffered, like most poor black people at that time, at the hands of the employers. Gairy was born near

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[1] E.M. Gairy in a recorded interview. I am indeed grateful to Mr. Gairy for his help during my many visits to Grenada. I am particularly grateful for the materials he gave me regarding his role in the 1951 crisis, and also for his hospitality, which is a quality he shares with his fellow Grenadians.

Grenville in 1922. When he was about 1> or 20, he left Grenada for Trinidad, where his first job was with the Americans who were building a military base there. From Trinidad he went to Aruba where he was employed in the oil refineries. During this period he spent his time in two types of activities: he was an active member of litaracy classes given by the church, and later he became an active trade union organiser. It was in Aruba that he received his first political training, for as he recalls, the Dutch authorities were not kindly disposed towards labour organisers. It was also in Aruba that he met Marryshow for the first time and became interested in Grenadian affairs again. Aruba also taught him not to be afraid of the colonial authorities, a point he often returns to. In December, 1949, he returned to Grenada, and by the following March, he had begun to organise a political party, the Grenada People's Party, which was the precursor of the Grenada United Labour Party. He was soon involved in trade union organising as well, claiming that by June of 1951 he had a following of about 27,000. "I organised more people in one year than any other man in the West Indies." He still considers that this was the most important thing he has accomplished in his life.

Fortunately for us, the early period of Gairy's activities in Grenada has been carefully documented both by a sociologist and an economist.[1] Naturally, both of these scholars focussed their major attention on those aspects of the crisis they were professionally

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[1]Both Professors Smith and Rottenberg were in residence shortly after the 1951 crisis, and wrote two differing and controversial interpretations of the crisis. Smith's work has already been cited. See also Simon Rottenberg, "Labour Relations in an Underdeveloped Economy", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Chicago, December 1952.

interested in analysing. Professor Rottenberg, being a labour economist, analysed the crisis primarily in economic terms, while Professor Smith sought to emphasise the social basis of the conflict between the emergent labour movement and the planters. In our analysis of the 1951 crisis, we propose to emphasise the political aspects of the conflict.[1]

Political scientists have not often exploited the techniques employed by sociologists and social-anthropologists to describe political events. We found it very fruitful to use role analysis, which has been so effectively utilised by Merton[2] and social drama, which Turner[3] has recently employed in discussing schisms in selected African societies. Both of these approaches have been employed in this and the following chapter. Essentially, social drama is found in a situation where the violation of expected rules of behaviour by the participants results in the continuation, increase or decrease of schisms in the body politic. In Grenada, both the socio-economic upheaval of 1951 and the constitutional crisis of 1962 were situations which could be characterised as social dramas where the participants clearly violated expected rules of behaviour. Although the electoral

[1]It should be pointed out that Professor Smith delegates a secondary role to the political and bureaucratic aspects of the crisis. He classes both the economic and political manifestations as superstructural in a situation which he clearly considers the social order to be the structure.

[2]Robert K. Merton, "The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory", The British Journal of Sociology, June, 1957.

[3]V.W. Turner, Schisms and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndemby Village Life (Manchester: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1957).

system in a polity attempts to cushion conflicts and keep schisms to a minimum, in Grenada it was able to provide only partial solutions, while the deeper and more permanent contradictions in the society kept re-asserting themselves and revealing some of the underlying schisms.

When Gairy returned to Grenada at the end of 1949 he came once more face to face with a social and economic order that he deeply resented. His own early Catholic upbringing, reinforced by his experiences in Aruba and his continued exclusion by the elites increased his resentment of the Society. He had not been back in Grenada long before he found himself in the role of mediator between the official world of St. George's and the peasants of his home town of Grenville. He busied himself writing petitions on behalf of the peasants in their dealings with officialdom. His most spectacular success occurred early in 1950, when the new owner of one of the larger estates (an Englishman), after a dispute with the customary tenants of the estates, evicted them. Although the new owner was legally entitled to do this, the tenants took their grievance to Gairy, who claimed full cash compensation for them under the Tenants Compensation Ordinance. He won the case, the former owner being forced to pay. Gairy's reputation spread widely as a result of this case. He recalls that he spent a good deal of his time in those early years arguing with the government officials about the grievances that the peasants had with the government and with the estate owners. It soon became apparent to him that if he were to make any real impact in Grenada he would have to have an organisation. He says that his Aruban experience had taught him that the one institution that both government and employers respected was trade unions, and later said that after having organised against the Esso Company there, one

of the strongest international cartels in the world, he found organising trade unions against Grenadian employers much easier. According to M.G. Smith, Gairy was deported from Aruba by the Dutch authorities for his labour organising activities.[1]

Although he was continually petitioning the colonial authorities on behalf of the peasants, he did not at that time perceive of colonial government itself as the major cause of oppression in Grenada. The oppressors, he always claimed, were those in the "upper brackets" who held the majority of the people in contempt. The "upper brackets" had economic and social power, and to break this monopoly Gairy sought political power. Whether his primary motivation was to obtain social equality for himself, as has been suggested, or the economic welfare of the masses, is largely irrelevant for our analysis at this stage. The important point was his realisation that political power was the only weapon that could force the "upper brackets" to deal with him in person and as a spokesman for a social movement. Given this assessment of the situation, it is not surprising that Gairy organised both a trade union and a political party almost simultaneously. The events of 1951 reveal that what had started out as a socio-economic protest was rapidly transformed into a political one.

The first half of 1950 was a period of ferment and unrest. As Smith points out: "Economic and social conditions were ripe for labour agitation".[2] In July, 1950 Gairy registered his union, the Grenada

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[1] There is some question as to whether Gairy was formally deported or merely eased out of Aruba by other means.

[2] M.G. Smith, "Structure and Crisis in Grenada, 1950-1954", op. cit., p. 283

Manual and Mental Workers' Union (G.M.M.W.U.), and within a month had made a demand for a 50% wage increase to the Grenada Sugar Factory Ltd. After an unsatisfactory exchange of letters, Gairy, on August 24, called out the sugar workers, who numbered close to 500. Shortly after workers on eleven other estates struck in sympathy. In September the issue went to arbitration. In the meantime, Gairy made a demand for a 20% wage increase for all estate workers through the Grenada Agricultural Employers' Society. The latter, however, did not deem it necessary or expedient to deal with Gairy's union, and they negotiated instead with the Grenada Trade Union Council, a much less powerful organisation.[1] The September agreement between the Employers' Society and the G.T.U.C. linked the "statutory" wage to local changes in the price of cocoa. Gairy was more immediately successful in regards to the sugar negotiations, as the Arbitration Tribunal awarded a 25% wage increase to the sugar workers, as well as paid holidays for some categories of workers and double pay for holiday work.

In October Gairy presented the Employers' Society with a new demand, despite their continuing refusal to recognise him or his union. This time he asked for a 46.5% increase on the minimum estate wage.

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[1] The G.T.U.C. was formed in 1950 from the Grenada Workers' Union, originally registered in 1946, and the Grenada Labour Party (General Workers' Union). Until 1950 neither of these unions had made any attempt to organise estate workers. According to the Report of the Labour Department, Government of Grenada, 1951, the membership of the G.T.U.C. in 1951 was approximately 3,600. According to Smith, Gairy's union, the Grenada Mental and Manual Workers' Union, had a membershop of 2,070 within three months of its establishment. Gairy, however, disputes this figure, saying that his organisers reported at least five times that number by January, 1951. The Annual Reports of the Labour Department for 1951 and 1952 state that membership of the G.M.M.W.U. was unknown, although conceding that it was known to have increased rapidly during 1951.

This exceeded the statutory limit on wages for estate workers, which at that time was 3/5 per day for men and 2/10 for women. He also made a number of demands for sick pay, holiday pay, overtime and better working conditions, but the Employers' Association made only a minor concession to the estate workers in November on vacation pay. About this time a fall in cocoa prices led to a fall in wages, since they had been linked together in the September agreement with the G.T.U.C. The latter was forced to ask the employers in December that wages not be lowered further for fear of disturbances. This the Employers' Society refused to consider. They also had not replied to Gairy's demands. During the month of January, 1951, Gairy intensified his campaign for recognition, culminating in a strike on January 29 on the same estate on which he had obtained compensation for the tenants the previous year, and to which he had gone to speak to the workers. The following day workers on an adjoining estate went on strike, followed in two weeks by another estate. Gairy charged the employers with bad faith. The Employers' Association only reiterated their loyalty to the agreement with the G.T.U.C. On February 18th Gairy called his organisers together and they planned a general strike for the following day.

On February 19th the atmosphere in St. George's was tense. A number of merchants charged that Gairy was a tool of the Communists in Trinidad.[1] By February 20th the police had recorded an increase in

[1]The issue of Communism was raised a number of times in Parliament. As late as June, long after the strike had ended, Major Legge-Bourke, obviously having obtained his information from Grenada, asked the Secretary of State to make a further statement regarding Communist influence in Grenada. Mr. Griffiths replied: "While the position has been carefully watched, the Governor has no evidence that the recent

acts of violence and arson, and on February 21st Gairy held his famous mass demonstration outside the Legislative Council that lasted all day. Throughout the day he repeatedly kept demanding that the Acting Governor should meet him. The West Indian, one of Grenada's oldest newspapers, fortunately has provided us with a dramatic account of this demonstration. It is clear from all accounts that the protest was now taking on political dimensions. Gairy brought his supporters from the rural areas into St. George's and openly challenged the "upper brackets" who lived there. It is no accident that he chose the Legislative Council as the site of his demonstration. An eye witness account in The West Indian recorded his entry into the market square surrounded by his supporters, who had been flocking into the capital since the previous day:[1]

> Shouts went up when Mr. Gairy arrived on the scene, dressed in a mixture of sports and evening wear, bare-headed and carrying his walking stick. The big crowd followed him from the Market Square to the top of St. John's Street where they were halted by a cordon of police guarding the entrance there to Church St.

He told them "their fight was not against the police (cries of 'no') but against the employers who they will hunt out if anything happened".

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strikes in Grenada were occasioned by Communist activity. One case of Communist literature being sent to Grenada has been reported". Major Legge-Bourke then asked: "Will the Rt. Hon. Gentleman without prejudicing the present inquiries, call for answers to the following questions: First, what is the relationship between Mr. Gairy and Mr. John La Rose of Trinidad, who recently visited the island? Secondly, will he have the allegations followed up which were made at the meeting before the Governor on 7th March, attended by representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, the Tourist Board, the Employers' Association and the Planting Fraternity. Thirdly will he call for a definite answer from the Governor as to whether or not this was a strike or a revolt." Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1950-51, Vol.488 May 29th to June 15, 1951, p.1006.

[1] All of the quotes relating to this meeting are from The West Indian, St. George's Grenada, 22nd February 1951. I am also grateful to a number of persons who recalled for me their impressions of the events of that period.

He did not at this stage want to court arrest, however, as he still believed that the demonstration would result in his obtaining an audience with the Acting Governor. Throughout the day he was determined to show the employers that if they would not deal with him as the spokesman for the workers' demands and as a social equal he would force them to deal with them through the Government. This did not prevent him from also attacking the Legislative Council:

> the Leg. Co. was meeting in the morning to pass laws, to bring them back to <u>slavery</u> but 'we shall stand together; we shall die together'. These words were greeted with vociferous cheers. (emphasis mine)

It was a hot day in St. George's and from mid morning he began sending out messages for the Acting Governor to meet him. At one stage he looked at his watch and announced "I am leaving you now, don't follow me, to return at 12 o'clock. It is ten past ten now, if I don't return at twelve, <u>find me</u>! He concluded with the dramatic statement that

> Things have come to a stage when I may be arrested at any time, (murmurs of protest from the crowd), but you shall not sleep a night or do a stroke of work until I am released.

The crowds waited for him until five in the evening, while Gairy kept coming back and reporting to them that the Acting Governor was frightened and it began to seem to those who waited that the slogan "Don't study him (Governor), Gairy is Governor now" was fast becoming a reality. While the crows chanted this slogan, Gairy kept telling them "Don't work but don't sleep".

Adding to the confusion of the situation was the fact that the Governor himself was in England, forcing the Acting Governor Greene

to take the momentous decisions that could not be delayed.[1] The dilemma facing the Acting Governor was considerable. To recognise Gairy would mean to give legitimacy to a man challenging the whole social order, against the strong opposition of the planters and the entire business community, who were very indignant about what they characterised as Gairy's "strong arm" tactics. They were frightened that if he won his battle with the estate owners his next objective would be the business houses of St. George's. If up till this time the middle classes and business leaders had not been inclined to take Gairy seriously, after the events of the 21st they became firmly convinced that he was a dangerous threat. One business man later revealed to the author that he regretted the failure of the Government to imprison Gairy at an early stage, and blamed Grenada's turbulent history after this period on that failure. His views were typical of the social and economic elites, who wanted Gairy quickly and harshly dealt with. However, the Acting Governor must have been aware of the dangers of dealing too harshly with Gairy, for he did not arrest him. On the other hand he refused to accord Gairy any hint of legitimacy by meeting with him. He chose instead to whisk Gairy and his associate Blaize

[1] The Government Official Newsletter of the 9th March, found it necessary to issue the following statement, which reveals the confusion caused by the Governor's absence at the time.
"A rumour is going round to the effect that the Governor on his return from England reversed the policy of the Acting Governor. This is not true.

A statement was issued by the Acting Governor, on the advice tendered to him at a meeting of Executive Council held on 3rd March, to the effect that if the improvement in the general situation continued it would be possible to declare the state of emergency at an end within the next few days.

The Governor returned to Grenada two days later and that afternoon the declaration was taken, again in Executive Council, to declare the state of emergency at an end."

(not to be confused with the present Chief Minister of Grenada) on to a British gunboat the night of the 21st, and sent them off to the neighbouring island of Carriacou. For Gairy this was his finest hour. The armed might of the British Empire had to be used to curtail a young trade union leader in a small West Indian island.[1] If nothing else, this action finally convinced the employers and the "upper brackets" of Gairy's power.

On February 23rd violence broke out in a number of areas. The Belmont Government School was burned, as was the Governor's private beach house. The Police reported a number of fires on various estates, claiming that they had been forced to open fire in some of the sugar areas. Grenville was quite tense and a number of demonstrations and incidents were reported there. St. George's remained tense but calm. On February 27th a Roman Catholic school in Grenville was burnt to the ground, and the Police were called out in a number of areas throughout the island.[2] On the following day a telegram reached the Acting

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[1]The naval officers on board H.M.S. "Devonshire" were apparently quite civil to Gairy and his associate. He later claimed that they certainly had more respect for him and his people than they had for the brown employers of Grenada.

[2]The Secretary of State gave the following account in the Commons on February 28 of the period immediately following the beginning of the strike.
"Mr. J. Griffiths: I would refer to the statement I made on 26th February and deal more fully with certain points raised.
The widespread strikes began on 19th February. Parties from H.M.S. 'Devonshire' including marines, were landed on the 22nd in view of the internal situation. They have taken over guard duties at vital points thus freeing the police to concentrate on the essential task of restoring order. Four more cases of personal injury have occurred. There have, in addition, been numerous cases of widespread intimidation including the intimidation of witnesses.
Two persons have been detained under regulations made under an Emergency Order-in-Council to counter the threat to public safety and order. They will not be brought before the courts but will be

Governor from the Dean of the West Indian Labour Movement, Alexander Bustamante of Jamaica, condemning the victimisation of the trade union movement. In Trinidad a large crowd gathered on the same day at Woodford Square and condemned the actions of the British Government.

On the 5th March the Governor returned to Grenada, accompanied by Mr. Barltrop, the special Labour Adviser to the Secretary of State. The following day Gairy was released from custody and returned to Grenada. It now became obvious that Gairy had won a victory. The Governor and the Labour Adviser began negotiations with him, having conceded to his demand to deal only with his union. Although the employers' groups were still adamantly opposed to recognition of Gairy, the Labour Adviser had obviously decided on negotiations, and more explicitly on negotiations with Gairy. The Official Newsletter of March 13th gave details on the nature of the proposed negotiations:

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released when the emergency has passed. Nine arrests have been made for unlawful assembly; and those convicted have been fined and bound over. The stoppage originated at Belmont, La Sagesse and Hope estates. No agricultural station has been burned.

I am making arrangements for my Labour Adviser to go to Grenada within the next few days, but I wish to emphasise again that nothing can be done to deal with the underlying causes of these disorders until the disturbances have ceased and there has been a general resumption of work. When that has taken place negotiations can be started. Those who have allowed themselves to be misled into these acts of violence are doing great harm to the island and to their own interests.

Mr. Hynd: Were the disturbances started after the leaders of the strike had been arrested? Would my right hon. friend consider releasing those leaders as a possible way of getting the disturbances stopped?

Mr. Griffiths: This is a matter which I must leave to the discretion of the Governor on the spot. When I answered a question the other day I made an appeal - in which I am sure we all join - that there should be an end of the disturbances and a resumption of work, so that we can then go fully into whatever are the causes of the dispute." Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1950-51, Vol. 484, February 2 - March 2. February 28th 1951, p. 2075.

> Mr. E.W. Barltrop, Labour Adviser to the Secretary of State, yesterday met Mr. Gairy and members of the Executive of the Manual and Mental Workers' Union when the idea of forming Wage Councils was discussed and favourably received. After seeing Mr. Gairy, Mr. Barltrop saw employers and understood that they would co-operate in any wage councils created. The Government have therefore agreed to introduce a law which will enable employers and workers to meet on Councils created by the Government. The representatives on both sides will be chosen by the Government after consultation with the organisations appearing to represent employers and workers in any industry for which Councils are created. A Council will also have independent members, that is persons who do not represent employers or workers, and there independently will have the power to decide disagreements between the parties. The decisions of the Councils will have the force of law. Of course no Council could do its work while a strike was taking place. [1]

Violence continued despite the negotiations.[2] A rumour was circulating widely about that time that a Police Constable from St. Lucia had beaten a man with his rifle butt and pierced him with a bayonet. So widespread was the rumour that the Official Newsletter of March 12th deemed it necessary to issue a denial, stating that police investigations had shown there to be no truth in the matter.[3] Speculation was rife that the police were beginning to lose control of the situation, culminating in an article published in the English Daily Telegraph of March 15th that the Superintendent of Police was being dismissed for gross mishandling of the situation. This rumour had also been denied by the Official Newsletter several days earlier:

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[1] Grenada Government Official Newsletter, St. George's, Grenada, 13th March, 1951.

[2] After the strike ended the Secretary of State disclosed that during the period of the strike 98 people had been arrested for breaches of the laws of Grenada, of whom 81 were convicted. He also disclosed that 80 estates had reported damages, the total cost of which was estimated at £195,000; while the loss to Government property was estimated at £8,300 and to private property apart from estates at £9,700. Hansard, 4th April and 30th April, 1951.

[3] Grenada Government Official Newsletter, 12th March, 1951.

> There is absolutely no truth in the rumour that Colonel A.A. Donald, O.B.E., K.P.M., Superintendent of Police, has been relieved of his command and replaced by Brigadier P.J.T. Pickthall, M.C. Brigadier Pickthall has very kindly volunteered to come to Grenada to act as Second in Command to the Superintendent of Police .[1]

However, the need to bring in such high-level reinforcements for the Police only gave further evidence for the view that the Officials were worried. The strongest indication that the police were losing control of the situation was that Gairy himself finally had to use all his influence to bring the violence to an end. On March 8th he made a strong appeal for the end to violence:

> I have promised His Excellency the Governor there shall be no acts of violence again in Grenada. I have promised the Labour Adviser to the Secretary of State that there shall be no acts of violence again in Grenada because I know that the labourer's wage shall be changed. Do you trust me? (Crowd "Yes"). Well say after me now - "I swear before God and before man that I shall not commit any acts of violence, and if I know - just a minute, if there is someone near to you who does not put his hand up, let his name go to the Police - "I shall not commit any acts of violence, and if I know of anyone who commits any act of violence or acts of violence, I shall report to the Union head, before God and man - so help me God."

This first attempt of Gairy's was not notably successful, which supports our hypothesis that even mass leaders of Gairy's type can lose their control of the crowd if violence has come to be widespread. Then, on March 15th Gairy made his famous island-wide broadcast calling for a return to law and order and for co-operation with the police, this time with success.

We quote this speech in full as it reveals very clearly the extent of Gairy's power at that time and his political style.

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[1] Ibid., 13th March, 1951. In Parliament the Secretary of State had been asked whether the Superintendent was being dismissed.

Yes folks, this is your Leader, "Uncle Gairy" speaking to you.

My dear Fellow Grenadians, you know that I am deeply concerned over the present state of affairs in this our dear little Island. You too - everyone of you - are concerned one way or the other. As head of Grenada's two largest Organisations - the Grenada People's Party* and the Grenada Manual and Mental Workers' Union (the one now involved in the wage dispute), I feel obligated morally and spiritually to do something to alleviate, to stop, and when I say stop I mean stop, the burning of buildings and fields; interfering with people who are breaking your strikes (leave them alone); stop taking away things from the estates that are not belonging to you, particularly cocoa and nutmegs; I want you to stop and you must stop now every act of violence and intimidation. I am aware of the fact that it is greatly felt that most of the wrongs committed by people outside our Organisation and are connected in no way with the strike. Nevertheless, I say this: Union members and non-Union members, strikers and non-strikers - everyone has that love for "Uncle Gairy", everyone was disturbed when Blaize and myself were arrested and detained, and as a result lots of bad things happened - things that brought bad name for us all - bad name for Government, bad name for employers, bad name for workers, bad name for the Union members and bad name for everyone of us that lives in Grenada. Gairy and Blaize are out again with you therefore now is high time to stop. I told His Excellency the Governor that I have gained your respect and your implicit confidence and you will obey me without fail. Now don't let me down. I ERIC MATTHEW GAIRY, am now making this serious appeal to you to start living your normal peaceful life, take my example and be a respectful decent citizen, as I say starting now. Let me make this point, however, everyone knows that I am a serious young man and when I say 'No' I mean 'No'; and when I say 'Yes' I mean 'Yes'. Now listen to this: I am now in the search for gangsters and hooligans, I ask everyone of my people to help me, and if anyone is found setting fire to any place, breaking open or robbing in any way, interfering with people who are working, there will be nothing to save you, because the law will deal with you most severely, and 'Uncle Gairy' will turn you down completely. So join me now in saying no more violence. Come on now those of you listening, let's say no more violence three times together, 'No more violence', 'No more violence', 'No more violence' thank you.

And now we take another matter - the going back to work - when I lifted my little finger on the 19th of February and said 'strike' several thousands went on strike, that is because you have the confidence in me and you know very well that 'Uncle

* The original name of Gairy's political party, which shortly became the Grenada United Labour Party.

> Gairy* knows his whereabouts. Well you're correct, I know my onions. Listen carefully. Are you ready? This is an instruction coming from your Leader and I expect it to be carried out without failure. All workers who were on strike report to work on Monday coming, Monday, the nineteenth of March. I am going to speak to you about it at length at a series of meetings starting from tonight. Listen: (he then proceeded to list the times and places of six meetings).
>
> Thank you very much for listening, thank you (emphasis mine).[1]

The little black boy had finally proved the power he could wield. He had succeeded in bringing the island to a stand still for a whole month, and was now the only person capable of re-establishing law and order. From all the evidence available it appears almost certain that Gairy had not the faintest notion of perpetuating a revolt to topple the Government as was suggested by a number of persons at the time: he only wanted to force the "upper brackets" to deal with him. In a speech on March 15th, he told the workers that

> Grenada is a nice little island, but there is a certain class that lives in Grenada that makes Grenada a "Hell". (The crowd: Yes) I understand that the employers want to insult the Colonial Office and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Secretary of State for the Colonies has sent over a big, big man to Grenada to look into this matter, but these little ..... you understand what I mean. (he was claiming that the employers wanted to go to England to see Mr. Churchill personally.)

On their part, the workers did not make the same distinctions in their minds between the employers and the Government; they perceived both groups as their oppressors. Gairy, however, whatever his political rhetoric at times, basically was making the calculation that most colonial politicians make - that the only practical, indeed possible course from their point of view was to co-operate with the Imperial government to obtain concessions from the employers. He

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[1] Ibid., 16th March, 1951.

appeared to have complete faith in the Government and the constitutional process.[1]

Almost overnight, Gairy had changed his status from that of a small island trade union leader to a West Indian political leader. On the 22nd of March, a veteran of the West Indian trade union movement, Robert Bradshaw of St. Kitts, addressed meetings in Grenada welcoming Gairy into the ranks of West Indian leaders.[2] Butler in Trinidad and Bustamante in Jamaica sent messages to support Gairy. At the early age of 29 Gairy had become the undisputed leader of the Grenadian trade Union movement and the emergent mass political leader. Grenada now had produced two leading political figures known throughout the West Indies; the elder statesman for constitutional reform, Marryshow, and the young trade union leader, Gairy. That Gairy took this fame in his stride was nicely revealed in a speech he gave in the Market Square on March 8th, when among other things he allegedly said:

> 'Well, Bustamante behind my back; Butler there also and several other leaders with me.....I knew that some day I must have become a famous leader, but I didn't know it would come so soon. I understand one time a woman came here and said that some day a little black boy will come and liberate the people of Grenada.

Given his ability to rouse fervour among his followers, it is not surprising that the crowds often broke into song at his meetings.

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[1] In a speech on March 8th Gairy is supposed to have told the crowd "...I do not mean that you must take any matter into your hands; you have a leader in whom you have implicit confidence, and I am going to handle the matter constitutionally."

[2] Bradshaw nicely brought out the difference between the two types of political heroes in the West Indies that we discussed earlier in this chapter "I welcome Gairy to the ranks of leading Labour Leaders in the British West Indies. This island is fortunate in having the youngest Labour Leader in the West Indies and the eldest Statesman in the West Indies in the persons of Gairy and Marryshow. What one lacks in experience the other one has in a store-house. I wish I had somebody like Marryshow with whom I could join forces. I say Grenada is fortunate in having two such extremes."

One popular song went as follows:

> We shall never let our Leader fail
> We love him best of all.
> We don't want to show our might,
> But when we start we'll fight, fight, fight.
> In peace or war you hear us sing
> God save the land,
> God save Gairy to the end of the world,
> The flag unfurled, we'll never let the leader fail.

At the height of Gairy's hold over the island even the supernatural seemed to be on his side. When a tractor overturned of its own accord and blocked the Western Main road after strikers had refused to clear away a land-slide, it was widely interpreted as a sign of divine intervention on Gairy's behalf.

At the bargaining table Gairy proved not only articulate but also quite shrewd, and the agreement finally signed on April 9th included the wage increases Gairy had demanded the previous October. In addition, he obtained back pay for the workers, a conditional week of paid holiday for those working 200 days or more a year, and a reference board was set up for settlement of disputes arising from the agreement.

The Hero as a Professional Politician

The constitutional changes of 1951 now came to Gairy's aid in consolidating his power. Although the Secretary of State had originally pressed for a literacy test for voting under the new constitution, the Grenada Legislature had abandoned the literacy test in May of 1950 (later upheld by the Secretary of State), before Gairy's meteoric rise, an act they undoubtedly came to bitterly regret in 1951.[1] The granting

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[1] See pages 222-4 of this chapter for the typical reaction of the elites to universal adult franchise.

of universal adult franchise enabled Gairy to utilise his mass support to gain a seat in the much coveted Legislative Council, which until that time had been the private preserve of the Grenadian elite. Gairy now utilised the technique which had become the pattern of West Indian politics: he used his position as a trade union leader to obtain political power, then used the latter to obtain concessions from the employers to benefit the workers. In such circumstances, there is no clear demarcation between the party and the union and their roles and membership tend to considerably overlap. The members themselves do not make a clear distinction between the leader's trade union role and his political role.

The 1951 election campaign was for Gairy a continuation of his trade union struggle. The campaign was marked by the fact that no issues other than trade unions were discussed, and Gairy was careful not to distinguish between the political party and the union. He was helped by the absence of any other political party or group of men with an electoral strategy. There was a very high turnout in the election, with 69% of those eligible voting. In spite of the fact that this was the first election held under universal adult franchise, only 12% of the ballots were spoilt.

Election day was very quiet, which was attributed to the prohibition of the sale of liquor and of campaigning on that day.[1] When the ballots were counted, it was discovered that Gairy and his party had won by a landslide, having won six out of the eight seats in the Legislative Council. It will be recalled that the 1951 Constitution for the first time established the elected members as a majority in the

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[1]Grenada, Report on the Legislative Council General Elections, 1951.

Legislative Council, providing for eight elected members, with only three unofficial and official nominated members altogether. Apart from the member for Carriacou whose affiliations were doubtful,[1] the only seat not captured by Gairy's forces was in the town of St. George's, which was won by Marryshow, long the idol of the middle classes who dominate the capital. Gairy's heaviest support was in the countryside. While he obtained 71% of the votes cast in the strictly rural areas, he obtained only 52% of the votes cast in the rural towns and St. George's.[2] This pattern continued in all the following elections, although the percentages changed markedly as we shall see. On an overall basis Gairy and his party obtained 63% of the validated votes (71% if Carriacou is excluded). One interesting feature of the election was that considerably more women voted than men (13,358 women and 9,915 men). This probably reflected the excess of women over men in the population resulting from a long history of emigration to a certain extent, although; Gairy's alleged popularity among women has often been commented on.[3]

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[1]Gairy has never had much of a following in the neighbouring island of Carriacou. There was considerable doubt whether Mr. Sylvester was a Gairyite at the time of election. Since that time the seat has always been held by anti-Gairyites. From 1957 it has been held by H.A. Blaize, leader of the main opposition party, the G.N.P. and Chief Minister since 1962.

[2]To determine whether a polling division should be classified as a rural town area or a peasant farmer area we used the District Board divisions, checking it against a "panel" consisting of local government officials in the areas. Slightly less than 1/5 of the total population resided in the towns, including St. George's.

[3]For example The West Indian characterised him in the 1962 election campaign as "self-styled 'uncle' of the masses and one time darling of the female voters."

Given the importance of the electoral system in shaping politics in Grenada after 1951 we will digress from our account of Gairy at this point to describe the electoral machinery introduced in 1951. The Legislative Council (Elections) Ordinance No. 10 of 1951[1] provided for a complete change in the election procedures of Grenada and was modelled on the Trinidad Ordinance of 1946. Administrative responsibility was vested in a Supervisor of Elections, including the registration of voters and the conduct of the elections. Grenada proper was divided into seven districts following the parish boundaries, except for the parish of St. Andrew which was divided into two districts. As previously, the parishes of St. John and St. Mark comprised one district. Carriacou comprised the eighth district. 94 polling divisions were established, based on the divisions followed in the 1946 census, and after allowing the public to offer suggestions, Enumeration began on June 25 and was completed in ten days. Between June and September a large number of public lectures were conducted explaining the enumeration procedure and voting and nominating procedures. The latter included a large scale "How to Vote" campaign, including radio broadcasts and films shown throughout the Island by Mobile Cinema Unit. Explanations were given of the use of symbols, which had been sent from England, so that illiterate voters would have no trouble in voting. The symbols represented individuals, not parties, and no candidates knew until Nomination Day (21st September) what their symbols would be. However, before giving each voter a Ballot Paper the Presiding Officer had instructions to explain which sumbol stood for each Candidate. The election itself finally took

[1] Laws of Grenada, Cap. 160, pp. 2105-2908.

place on October 10th.[1]

Politically, Gairy was now riding the crest of the wave, which continued into 1952, and it appeared that he was a real power to be reckoned with. But Gairy's legislative power was more apparent than real when one recalls the strict limitations on the power of the Legislature imposed by the Constitution. Furthermore, from 1952 he began to make quite reckless demands and to act as though he were above the law, such as refusing to register his union's accounts as required by law, driving without a valid driver's licence, and calling work stoppages on individual estates. During this period, the Government began to take legal action against him in a number of cases; the police force was strengthened; the penalties against looting were made severe, and the estate owners formed themselves into a trade union, the Grenada Agriculturalists' Union. None of the elites had given him the slightest indication that they would socially accept Gairy. Late in 1952 he threatened another island-wide strike. His demands were sent to arbitration, which headed off the strike for the

[1]Some of the difficulties involved in enumeration and in making the electoral procedure meaningful were discussed in the Report on the 1954 Legislative Council Elections, (St. George's: The Government Printers, 1954). In addition to the difficulty of occupants out all day and returning very late at night, some people refused to give their names as well as those of other tenants sharing the household. Some persons refused to give in their names unless personally instructed to do so by certain candidates.

"It was very noticeable throughout the election that a good many people lacked instruction and information as to what the General Election meant and in just what way they could contribute to the successes of the Enumeration". It was also pointed out that the Enumerators themselves, although paid, did not show sufficient interest in explaining the importance of voting and the object of the Enumeration. A number of Enumeration cards were never delivered by the Post Office as the addressees were not used to receiving mail and hence did not call at the Post Office for them.

time being. The final tribunal decided against most of Gairy's demands in 1953. He then set out to organise another island-wide strike, commencing with strikes on individual estates in the summer. In November, Gairy called his island-wide strike; however, by Christmas most of the workers were back at work. In January 1954 Gairy stepped up his efforts, and was able to get about 50% of the labour force back on strike. By the end of February, most of the workers had again drifted back to work. In April, the Employers' Union granted a voluntary increase to the workers.

Gairy obviously had lost a great deal of the support he had in 1951. Throughout this period he has assumed that he did not need to extend and intensify his organisational efforts, relying instead on his own personal support. He had made no attempts to organise the urban workers, not even taking advantage of the opportunities created, for example, when the Seamen and Waterfront Workers' union severed itself from its branch membership in the Grenada Workers' Union in 1953. He never recognised the potential power of the urban workers in St. George's, ignoring the maxim that "he who rules St. George's rules Grenada."[1] Thus, the elections of September 1954 found Gairy's trade union supporters depleted and dispirited. Nonetheless, he appeared confident of victory, and did not campaign as vigorously as he had in 1951. The election was held in September, with only a slight decrease in the percentage of those eligible to vote, falling from 69% in 1951

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[1] A striking proof of this maxim was demonstrated in 1962, when Attorney Derek Knight, through his control of workers in the essential services (Allied and Technical Workers) and the transport workers, was able to virtually bring the island to a stand-still, though the numbers of workers involved were small compared to those in agriculture.

to 67% in 1954. Gairy himself maintained his large margin in his own constituency (Parish of St. George), although it is interesting to note that the percentage of those voting in his district dropped from 71% in 1951 to 58% in 1954, the latter being the lowest percentage voting in any district. Again, he and his supporters were able to win control of six of the eight seats in the Legislative Council as they had done in 1951, again losing only in the Town of St. George's and Carriacou.[1] However, the significant fact was that his popular majority was greatly reduced in 1954. He and his supporters obtained only 46% of the total accepted votes, contrasted with 63% in 1951.

Gairy's failure to develop a party organisation after 1951 was clearly beginning to hurt him. He had developed neither a coherent policy nor a group of leaders around him; there was no "inner circle" in the party. Any type of inner circle that did exist was heavily dependent on Gairy's personal support in maintaining their electoral strength. He was careful not to allow any of his supporters to

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[1]The following percentages give some idea of the occupational and class breakdown of the voting populations in the Town of St. George's, where Gairy's party never obtained the seat, and Gairy's own district, the parish of St. George, a rural district.

Percentage of voters by selected occupations, 1954.

Category	Grenada	Town of St. George's (anti-Gairy)	Parish of St. George's (Pro-Gairy)
	Per cent	Per cent	Per cent
Agricultural labourers, fishermen, domestic workers and laundry workers	41.0	16.8	39.6
Professional and civil servants	4.0	16.9	4.8

Source: Report on the 1954 Legislative Council Elections.

develop strong and viable constituency organisations; instead he always tried to maintain direct personal contact with each constituency organisation. Loyalty at the constituency level was to him, not the constituency candidate or member. He had "his men" in the villages, and "his men" may or may not have been in contact with the local candidate. Instead of organisational strength he depended heavily on meetings in which he was always the main speaker. He had two types of meetings: the first and most popular were mass meetings in the open-air markets, the second were closed meetings with his party and union supporters. At the latter his style was formal rather than dramatic, and the meetings dealt mainly with campaign strategy. (See chapter five for a fuller discussion of this point.) Gairy never appeared to recognise the importance of developing a central organisation of cadres to maintain the link with the local groups. The only link to the local groups was through himself. After the 1954 election one of his supporters, L.C.J. Thomas, who had won the seat for St. John and St. Mark, began to build up a strong constituency organisation. Gairy and Thomas entered into a long and bitter debate; the final upshot of the dispute was that Gairy threw Thomas out of the party. Unfortunately for Gairy, Thomas kept both his seat in the Legislative Council and his constituency organisation, and was able to defeat Gairy's candidate in the 1957 election.

The "defection" of Thomas from the G.U.L.P. effectively reduced Gairy's support in the Legislative Council to five of the eight elected members, and since the remaining three official and unofficial members were not likely to be sympathetic to Gairy, he could be outvoted by six to five on any issue. Further limiting his power

was the fact that the Administrator still had a casting vote. The most effective limitation on his political power was that elected members still did not control the Executive Council. Although the Committee System was introduced in 1955, it was not until 1956 that the quasi-ministerial system came into operation. Even then the system stressed "preparation" for governing, not the wielding of power, although the Executive Council now had four elected members who were called Ministers. Gairy was resentful that in spite of his mass support and electoral superiority the formal role of leader of Government was still denied to him.

Between 1954 and 1957 a number of factors contributed to a further decline in Gairy's power. Among the economic factors were the boom in the economy as bananas rapidly began to replace much of the cocoa and nutmeg. This was also the period when the heavy exodus of unskilled workers emigrating to Trinidad and Great Britain began. The growth of rival trade unions continued: from five registered in 1952 to twelve in 1957. Politically, Gairy's opposition began to consolidate itself. In the 1954 election all of Gairy's opponents had been independents. Shortly after the election, however, the first real opposition party was founded by an American trained dentist. The new Grenada National party was primarily a middle class party, which stressed organisation and constitutional reform.[1]

The election of September 1957 found Gairy at the lowest point of his career. In that election he won only two seats; the G.N.P.

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[1]It has also been suggested that Gairy lost support in this period because of alleged corruption in the administration of hurricane rehabilitation funds, and disappointment with the types of houses provided under the scheme.

won two seats; another party, the P.D.M., which proved to be short lived, won two; and independents won two. Shortly after the elections one independent and one member of the P.D.M. switched to the G.N.P. It is worth noting that two of the successful opponents of Gairy had won their 1954 seats under the G.U.L.P. label but had left the fold by 1957. The election turnout was high again in this election, 68% of those eligible voting. Despite his heavy electoral losses, his party still received close to 44% of the popular vote. Although this was less than he received in any other election, it was clear that he still had a great deal of support. In his own constituency he maintained his large margin over his opponent, and obtained the largest majority of any candidate. He was still potentially a power to be reckoned with.

There then occurred an event that probably helped Gairy more than it hurt him in the long run. On October 28th, just a month after the elections Gairy was disenfranchised for walking through an opponent's political meeting leading a steel band. He was ordered to pay a fine of $80 or serve a three months prison sentence, which automatically carried with it the loss of franchise. He appealed the conviction and lost, thus losing his franchise for five years.[1] As a consequence he lost his right to sit as a member of the Legislative Council, and until 1961 remained outside the formal corridors of government power. From 1957 to 1961 the four quasi-ministerial posts were held by members of a coalition group led by Mr. Blaize of the G.N.P. Gairy was fairly inactive during this period, and he did not

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[1]He was convicted under Section 69 of the Legislative Council Ordinance No. 10 of 1951.

actively participate in the federal elections of 1958.[1]

On January 1st, 1960 the new Constitution came into effect, predicated on the continuance of the Federation, and granting a full ministerial system of government. However, the new Constitution did not specify a date for bringing into operation that part of the Order dealing with the Legislature, and no date was set for the dissolution of the old Legislative Council. Gairy immediately demanded that the new Constitution meant new elections. There was also a demand for new elections by some of the opposition members and independents as well. Two members of the Legislative Council, L.C.J. Thomas, still strongly anti-Gairy, and H. Preudhomme, a G.U.L.P. man, resigned from the Council as a protest against the delay in calling the elections. The G.N.P. Government retaliated by holding bye-elections for these two seats, rather than dissolving the Council. It was at this stage that Gairy began his long quarrel with the Administrator, J.M. Lloyd, a Jamaican. Gairy insisted that Lloyd was deliberately delaying the election,[2] and dragging his feet on the question of recommending to Her Majesty's Government that Gairy's franchise be restored. Finally, in August, eight months after the new Constitution had come into

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[1] In 1958 federal elections were held in all the participating territories. Grenada was designated a single constituency returning two members. A Gairyite won one of the two seats, the other was won by the G.N.P. Both candidates were members of the Legislative Council. A third member of the Council, the Hon. T.A. Marryshow, was nominated to the Senate of the West Indies. This necessitated a Legislative Council bye-election to replace the three members who had resigned. A G.U.L.P. candidate won one seat, a G.N.P. candidate the second, while the third was won by an independent. Thus, the balance of power in the Legislative Council after the bye-election remained exactly the same.

[2] Lloyd's reply to this was that responsibility for requesting elections belonged to the Chief Minister, Mr. Blaize so long as he was able to maintain the confidence of the Legislative Council.

effect, the G.N.P. Government announced that elections would be held not later than April, 1961. Gairy was still not eligible to be a candidate, unless his franchise was restored to him by special action.

In January of 1961 Gairy claimed in a public meeting in St. George's that he had petitioned H.M. the Queen asking for the restoration of franchise before the elections, which had now been set for March. He also announced that if he was not allowed to stand Joshua Thorne would hold his seat for him until his franchise was restored. The West Indian of January 11th raised the pro's and con's of restoring the franchise, pointing out that H.M's Government had in certain other colonies commuted or dismissed sentences against political leaders. Notwithstanding these considerations, they concluded that in the final analysis it was a court decision, not a political one. By the end of February it was clear that the Attorney General was not willing to override the court decision, for which Gairy further blamed the Administrator. Gairy now began to re-activate his party. He held large numbers of meetings in all the constituencies, campaigning almost wholly on the issue of his disenfranchisement. He charged that the "upper brackets" were again trying to eliminate him as they had tried to do in 1951, but that the people would vindicate him. Having been out of the Legislative Council over the past four years he did not have a faction ridden party, and was able to select a new crop of candidates who were all committed to him. His disenfranchisement had proved a real blessing in disguise: it gave him a strong issue, and a chance to pick new candidates who had no independent sources of power. He told the voters that once the G.U.L.P. was back in power "Uncle" Gairy would run the government no matter who was officially elected.

Following the recommendations of the Windwards and Leeward Constitutional Conference of 1959 the number of elected members to the Legislative Council under the new Constitution was increased to ten. While the former constituency comprising the two parishes St. John and St. Mark was divided into two along parish boundaries, the only parish that was split into two was that of St. George's, Gairy's stronghold. A Bi-Partisan Commission was responsible for the drawing up of the new constituency boundaries. Despite the fact that this was the first election under the "advanced" Constitution and the controversial nature of the campaign, the relative voting turnout was much lower than in the two preceding island-wide elections, falling to 55%. The Legislative Report on the Election attributed this apparent fall-off primarily to the failure to remove the names of a large number of emigrants from the voting lists. Gairy and his party won the election by a large majority. Not only did they have a popular majority of 53%, they gained eight out of the ten seats, once more losing only the seats for St. George's Town and the island of Carriacou. The G.N.P. polled only 29% of the popular vote. Gairy's seat in the parish of St. George (South) was won by Joshua Thorne, who obtained 65% of the votes cast. The G.U.L.P. also won the St. George (North) seat.

The clear mandate given to Gairy and his party by the electorate placed the Administrator in a dilemma. The Administrator could not ask Gairy to form the cabinet while he was still disenfranchised. On the other hand, he had no real alternative but to choose a member of Gairy's party as Chief Minister, for as he later admitted when he opened the first session of the new Legislative Council:

> Just when the observation 'vox populi, vox Dei' is applicable to any manifestation in the human economy, it is difficult to determine. Yet it must be admitted that the forces which brought this new Government into being have, to say the least, been phenomenal. The people have spoken in no uncertain terms concerning their wishes as to who shall govern them for the term of this Council. 1

In March The West Indian announced first that Mrs. Gairy had been selected to be the Chief Minister. Mrs. Gairy, who had contested a seat for the first time in this election, claimed the distinction of being the first woman elected to the Legislative Council in Grenada. Despite this early rumour, on March 28th it was announced that Attorney George Clyne, a G.U.L.P. legislator, had been asked by the Administrator to become Chief Minister.

Gairy at the same time announced that he had created a new post for himself, "adviser to Government". He continued to hold public meetings night after night in the Market Square, claiming that he had every confidence that he would soon regain his franchise. He openly challenged the Administrator, declaring that when he got into power Lloyd would have to go, since he had been the main stumbling block to his re-enfranchisement. In April Gairy openly challenged Lloyd on a number of issues of public policy. For example, Gairy insisted that one of the nominated seats be kept vacant, as they hoped to give this seat to Joshua Thorne after Gairy regained his franchise. Lloyd was firmly opposed to this, claiming that the Constitution made no provision for such action and that the Administrator alone was supposed to nominate the two members, which he intended to do. He refused to allow the G.U.L.P. to advise on the nominated members,

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[1] Minutes of the Legislative Council of Grenada published June 30th, 1961, Grenada Government.

appointing instead two prominent members of the business community. Another serious clash occurred over the number of Ministers. Gairy had earlier announced that his party would appoint five Ministers with portfolios instead of four, and designated who they would be. When the names of the Ministers were officially announced at the beginning of April only four were named, Gairy's fifth "designate" being made Minister without Portfolio. Gairy immediately announced that he would name the latter as Minister of Housing, Local Government and Labour as soon as the Constitution was changed. This provoked Lloyd in an extraordinary issue of the Government Gazette on April 6th to announce that according to the Constitution the Chief Minister, Clyne, and he alone, was responsible for those portfolios.

From April to June Gairy continued to behave as though he was Chief Minister. His private home came to be considered the real headquarters of the Legislative Council and the Executive Council by his party and by the people of Grenada. He announced plans concerning government policy from the Market Square. In effect he was governing the island. He kept up a steady campaign for his re-enfranchisement, telling his audiences in the Market Square that he could not be kept out of office long, and arguing that there could be no government in Grenada until he was Chief Minister. The Administrator kept publicly silent on this controversial issue.

By this time there was considerable support for the return of Gairy's franchise by a number of respected public figures. The Roman Catholic Church had always been alleged to support Gairy, and Monseigneur Justin Fields, Bishop of St. George's felt that Gairy had suffered enough. Even his long standing opponent, L.C.J. Thomas, who

had been defeated by the G.U.L.P. in the 1961 election, asked that Gairy be re-enfranchised and given a seat in the Legislative Council. The founder of the G.N.P., Mr. Watts, remained strongly opposed to this:

> I am a firm believer in respecting legal procedure, and if we allow the due process of law to break down, you can never tell where it will end.[1]

Attorney Derek Knight argued, however, that the offence had not warranted the severe punishment, and that in any event the electorate had given the G.U.L.P. the mandate so as to return Mr. Gairy to office. Federal Senators Renwick and Norris Hughes also agreed that Gairy should be allowed to take his seat. The newspapers also joined the campaign for Gairy's re-enfranchisement. In an editorial on April 9th The West Indian, comparing Gairy's position to that of Nkrumah in the Ghana election of 1951, went on to say:

> In Grenada the situation is far less serious. Mr. Gairy was found guilty of an election offence - that of walking through a political meeting at the head of a steel band. There was nothing disastrous about it. It was the type of incident that would have been laughed off if it had happened to any other person but Gairy. Now that Mr. Gairy has shown that he is a man in full control we feel every effort should be made as quickly as possible to ensure that he is given back his franchise or else by default the Government (and not Mr. Gairy) would be responsible for an act of criminal negligence.

On June 6th, the British Government announced that the decision regarding Gairy's franchise was in the hands of the Legislative Council. During this period Gairy himself was in London attending the federal talks on independence. Finally, on June 28th the Legislative Council passed an amendment to the 1951 Ordinance which restored his franchise. In record time the bill was seen through all its stages. Gairy returned to Grenada from London as a hero who had once more won a victory against the colonial government and the "upper brackets."

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[1] The West Indian, April 13th, 1961.

Gairy had by this time begun to fall out with his interim Chief Minister, Clyne. In Clyne's maiden speech to the Legislative Council he articulated goals which would have made any colonial administrator happy, though hardly calculated to please Gairy.

> 'We believe that the Constitution is not merely a matter of Political Machinery, but it should be regarded as a way of life. I therefore venture to hope that in the operation of the Constitution we would say nothing in opposition to the spirit of it, nor contrary to the integrity of the Government. [1]

What is perhaps more curious was that he made no reference at all to Gairy or to the whole "franchise" issue. They clashed bitterly during this period in Grenada, in Trinidad and in London, where Clyne had voted against Freedom of Movement within the Federation, which infuriated Gairy. At this stage Gairy asked him for his seat. However, it was finally Joshua Thorne who vacated his seat for Gairy as originally planned.[2] On July 24th a bye-election was held in St. George's South, and Gairy was re-instated as a member of the Grenada Legislative Council after an absence of four years. In August Gairy was proclaimed Chief Minister of Grenada.

Gairy's numerous clashed with the forces of law and order throughout the preceding ten years, culminating in the loss of his franchise, had left him with a singular distrust of these forces in the community. Convinced from personal experience that the law was not "neutral", he was also very conscious that the people continued

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Clyne and Gairy apparently continued to experience difficulties in working together. The West Indian of December 24, 1961, in an article headlined "Clyne Embarrasses the Chief Minister?" stated that after Clyne's "performance" in the Legislative Council several days earlier, people were beginning to wonder where he stood vis-a-vis his Party and his position in the Government.

to suffer under an unjust economic system. Perhaps what rankled most of all was that men like himself were never accepted as social equals by the local and expatriate elites. Even in the political sphere, where originally he had thought he could challenge the order, he felt himself to be constantly frustrated by the rules and regulations of the colonial government. No matter which way he turned he found himself always in difficulty in coming to terms with the law and its operation.

Despite his natural abilities as a political leader, he never understood the importance of building strong organisational links with the mass he depended on. His ability to whip up a large amount of support in 1961 on the issue of his franchise, probably further deluded him into believing that his personality was sufficient to sustain his political power. His party was at best a faction, and he maintained coalitions with individuals only as long as they continued to support him personally and unquestionably. Fortunately for him, in 1961 the opposition was split and badly organised. He was thus able to use the crisis situation created by his disenfranchisement to gain sufficient popular support to be elected. As we shall see in chapter five, once the crisis came to an end, electoral support declined as it had in 1957, when there was no crisis situation. The real weakness in Gairy's position was not primarily his incapacity to maintain a party organisation but the decline in his trade union support. The auditors' reports and estimates of the union officials show a steady decline in membership after 1952. In 1951-2 it was estimated that the Grenada Mental and Manual Workers' Union had almost 6,000 paid and 10,000 unpaid members. By 1958 the respective estimates were 4,500

and 6,000, while for 1959 the estimates were 3,600 paid and 4,100 unpaid members. By 1962 membership was estimated to have fallen to 3,000.

The large increase in migration after 1955, coupled with somewhat improved economic conditions undoubtedly were important factors in the declining strength of Gairy's union. For several years following the 1955 hurricane there was a much increased demand for labour to rehabilitate the fields destroyed by the hurricane, and many workers averaged five days of work weekly. In addition the harvesting of bananas, originally planted as short-term cash crops to fill the gaps in the economy created by the destruction of cocoa and nutmeg trees increased wages significantly for agricultural workers. The period was marked by relative industrial peace. According to the Report of the Labour Department for 1957:

> Once again the Colony was blessed with a period of industrial tranquility and it appears that the once harmonious relationships which existed between agricultural employers and workers and which were split asunder by the 1951 and 1954 strikes is slowly being rebuilt. (p.2)

The Report also noted, in regards to Gairy's union (now the Grenada Trades Union),

> The Grenada Trades Union, with membership open to all workers in all industries, continued to hold the sympathy of a fair percentage of the unskilled working population. The financial membership, however, which was quite high at one time, is believed to be at a comparatively low ebb. Some efforts were seen during the period to restore the Union to a firm footing, but it is doubtful whether much success resulted. (p.6)

An analysis of strikes between 1951 and 1962 revealed that after the period of turbulence between 1951-1954, the next five years were remarkably free of industrial unrest. Between 1955 and 1959 there were only 5 strikes, most of them minor, involving only 31 days of

work lost. None of these strikes were called by Gairy's union. In 1960 there were four strikes, involving 71 days lost by strike, but Gairy's union was responsible for only one of these strikes which lasted three days. In 1961 the number of strikes increased to 13, a number of which were one day strikes called by Gairy's union. They were probably more indicative of the political situation than of real industrial unrest.

Between 1951 and 1961 there was also the large increase in the number of functional trade unions, which had helped to undermine Gairy's position as "the" trade union leader of Grenada. The most powerful combination that emerged was the coalition of urban skilled unions within the Trade Union Council. In 1960 the Seamen and Waterfront Workers, the Commercial and Industrial Workers and the Allied and Technical Workers Unions increased their trade union activities. Membership in these unions had increased significantly from their founding, their respective memberships having grown from 133 to 741, 60 to 450, and 50 to 600. Numbers alone do not reveal their actual strength; more important was their strategic position in the economy.

Gairy was not able to integrate or affiliate his essentially peasant based union with the expanding urban unions. Even if he had wanted to do so, the urban workers gave no indication of desire for closer affiliation with the peasantry. They were aware that they enjoyed a privileged position in the society. Their distance from the peasantry was even more marked than that of skilled workers in industrial societies vis-a-vis the semi-skilled or unskilled. Their interests and attitudes were much closer to the middle classes in many respects than to the unskilled peasants and estate workers. This phenomenon has been noted in other underdeveloped societies.

Equally important in explaining the declining strength of Gairy's union was the growth of state and employer sponsored welfare and co-operative activities. The Grenada Agriculturalists' Union, formed in 1952 by the estate owners to more effectively fight Gairy, reorganised its affiliated society, the Grenada Agricultural Society, in 1962 into a "modern" organisation devoted to revamping the cocoa industry. Its membership in 1962 was 150, of whom 56 were active paid members. Their new policy actively encouraged Farmers' Clubs to join, their aim being to win rank and file support from the small farmers. This organisation was decidedly anti-Gairy and attempted to mobilise opinion against him in the rural areas. On the other hand, the Farmers' Co-operative Council, which represents small farmers (1961 membership: 700) was inclined to have pro-Gairy sympathies. Gairy's greatest problem, however, has been the expansion of the welfare state into the rural areas. The community Development programme and the activities of the Agricultural Extension Services have probably done more to "neutralise" Gairy's support than the counter-organisations formed against him. These quasi-bureaucratic agencies attempt for the most part to inculcate middle class and "modern" values in the rural areas, thus reducing the peasants' dependence on both the union and the political party. For example, the extension Planning Committees, organised by the Department of Agriculture, are ostensibly bureaucratic and neutral, not involved in "politics". They tend to be controlled by the rural elites such as teachers, ministers of religion, doctors, bureaucratic officials and shopkeepers whose values and way of life are predominantly urban and middle class. Among the youth Gairy has lost some of his appeal with the advent of 4H Clubs.

By 1961 there were 36 active clubs with a membership of 1,000.

Not only was Gairy increasingly challenged by new organisations in the countryside and the growing hostility of the urban working and middle classes, within a short period after he became Chief Minister in 1961 he found himself in considerable difficulty with the party and bureaucratic officials. Within one year of obtaining power he was faced with a suspended Constitution and charges of corruption. In the elections that followed at the end of 1962 he once again found himself without sufficient electoral support. The voters deserted Gairy only partially on the corruption issue but more because they were strongly attracted to the possibility of joining with Trinidad in a unitary state, on which Gairy's attitude seemed equivocal.

The political socialisation of Gairy between 1951 and 1961 provides us with an interesting case study of the kind of dilemmas faced by a colonial politician, both in respect to his relationship with the masses and to the power structure. Throughout this period he found himself constantly thwarted in all his attempts to challenge the existing order. His challenge to the economic order in 1951 brought about decided improvements, but his successes did not bring with them the social equality he craved. He was made pointedly aware that neither the government officials nor the white and brown elites would take tea with him or play tennis with him, although he became a good tennis player at the Tanteen Club and developed a cultivated "English" accent. His perpetual difficulties with the forces of law and order have already been recounted, and it is now generally conceded that he was disenfranchised for a minor infaction of the electoral law. In the political sphere, although it appeared that he had at last gained

real political power as Chief Minister in 1961, he soon was made forcibly aware that the economic and colonial elites still had the ultimate power in Grenada, not the elected Government. To understand what happened after 1961 we must now look more closely at the power structure in Grenada.

The Hero and the Power Structure

The study of power in a colonial society, as indeed in all societies, involves a study of the elites, although the application of elite theory to a colonial situation requires considerable modification. For Grenada, we begin by accepting M.G. Smith's notion concerning the basic division of the society:

> We can define the basic cleavage in Grenadian society as that between the majority who are black, mainly rural, ill-housed, ill-educated, poor, of low status, and who have a 'folk culture', and a small majority who are of light or mixed pigment, mainly urban, having fair housing, education, wealth, and so forth. I shall describe the 'illiterate' majority as the 'folk' and the minority as the 'elite'.[1]

Laswell's general formulation of elite categories is particularly useful for our purposes:

> "Since our purpose is to provide a conceptual tool for designating configurations of influence disclosed by empirical research, it is inappropriate to exclude hypothetical contingencies in advance. If influence is equally shared, every participant in the situation belongs to the elite. If sharing is unequal, the most influential are called elite; others are mid-elite and rank-and-file.[2]

There is no doubt that in Grenada income, status, and deference have been in the hands of the few, and that mass participation has been marginal at best. However, the elite-mass relationship in Grenada has

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[1] M.G. Smith, Stratification in Grenada, op. cit., p. 16.

[2] Harold D. Lasswell, Introduction, in Lasswell and Lerner, eds. World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, Mass: the M.I.T. Press, 1965).

begun to change and become somewhat more complex since the granting of universal adult franchise in 1951. This event made possible the emergence of a mid-elite group in Grenada, composed of the political hero, his cohorts and shortly afterwards the counter mid-elite. Thus, after 1951 the power structure can best be described by a series of overlapping circles, with an inverse relation between the number involved and the power wielded, as in Figure 6, page 217.

The diagram emphasises the negligible amount of control the mass can exert over the leaders, since the parties both of the hero and the counter-elites consist of fairly small closed groups. During election campaigns the various parties attempt to mobilise the mass; to use Sig Neumann's phrase, they are parties of only "partial integration". It is crucial to understand that the hero does not have a genuine mass party; he has supporters who are personally committed to following him but who are not "controlled" by him. The degree of political involvement and commitment is partial, not total, and hence liable to wide fluctuations. For the most part, members of the mass do not find the party an institution which provides sustained psychological support for their values, beliefs and attitudes. When they participate in politics they participate as members of a "crowd" rather than as members of a movement.[1] The essential link between the hero and the crowd is the

[1]Electoral politics also provide a form of entertainment for the masses. They tend to view the periodic invasions of the mass leader and the middle-class politicians with a certain amount of humour. It is only at times of crisis that the whole business tends to become serious and meetings lose some of their carnival-like air. However, the entertainment provided by politics does not mean that the people cannot be intensely partisan. Since the political system seems to be so far removed from their day to day problems and their lives, it is somewhat surprising that the people are not especially cynical. The period of disillusionment seems not to occur until after the first flush of independence is over.

FIGURE 6 THE POWER STRUCTURE IN GRENADA



former's ability to mesmerise crowds and canalise their emotions for short periods of time. The hero's control of the mass, then, is through the instrument of the crowd, not the party. This crucial point has not been fully grasped or understood by far too many students of politics who examine the new states. They have been misled by the institutional similarities between totalitarian parties in the western world and those in the new states. They have failed to perceive this vital distinction between total and partial integration. Sig Neumann has brilliantly analysed this tendency towards total integration of members in western totalitarian parties[1], while Franz Neumann in his equally brilliant work, Behemoth, has demonstrated the total bureaucratisation of the personality that takes place in a fascist society.[2]

In a society that is both colonial and agrarian, the political party serves very different functions. A potential hero in these societies must possess the quality of charisma to obtain a following. However, it is charisma of a special kind, capable of mobilising the crowd but not of developing a sustained mass following. The fact that the hero emerges from a social order that is primarily authoritarian is particularly relevant here. This authoritarianism operates on two levels. The state in a colonial society not only has overt control over the life of the colonial; on a more insidious level, the individual has internalised the authoritarian values of the society. Unlike his African and Asian counterparts, the West Indian colonial has no traditional culture to escape into. One consequence of this

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[1] Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolution (New York: Harper and Bros., 1942).

[2] Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942).

type of political socialisation is that the individual finds it very difficult to develop a political value system that differentiates between rational and irrational demands for change. Such an individual does not readily respond to ideologies or ideological values but rather to leaders who can articulate his hostility. The object of his rebelliousness is not clearly focussed; the individual is against the "state", or the economic conditions he suffers under, or just against "them". Electoral politicians, andparticularly the hero, exploit this hostility and provide temporary relief for the mass through crowd catharsis.

It is imperative for the mid-elites that the political parties do not meaningfully politicise the mass, for this would lead to a circulation of elites and the end of their own position as political leaders. They merely propagandize the mass. Accordingly, a high premium is placed on the personal charisma of the leader. However, this charisma is not transformed into charismatic authority, for genuine charismatic movements can and do have ideological content. This is not possible as long as the society remains a colony, and the leaders can take no ultimate decisions, affecting the society. Since they are denied responsibility, there is a strong tendency to irresponsible action and behaviour.[1] This has tragic results, for these leaders are almost inevitably the same leaders who will govern after independence

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[1]One consequence of this is that the politicians lack faith in their own ability to run the Government. During a debate in the Legislative Council in 1961 when Gairy's government announced its plans to nationalise the sugar factory, one opposition elected member, the Hon. member for the town of St. George's said that "it was well known that no Government in the West Indies was capable of running any organisation efficiently." Grenada Minutes of the Legislative Council, Half-Year Ended 31st December, 1961, p. 18.

when they will suddenly be faced with crushing problems demanding a high sense of responsibility. One of the greatest myths perpetuated in recent times has been that people can be prepared for responsibility under colonialism, when they are continually denied ultimate power or responsibility.

In Grenada the hero had a great deal of difficulty in even adopting a populist ideology.[1] Even the basic appeal of nationalism was fraught with special difficulties, as we shall see in chapter five, since the question of community identification was unresolved, thus denying the leader a most potent appeal. He was forced to rely entirely on personal issues or to exploit the grievances of the masses against the planters or the colonial officials. The counter mid-elite faced similar difficulties. Since they were a middle-class movement, they had acquired some of the values of an "international" class and hence what could loosely be termed an ideology. Their ideology was based on their exposure to and internalisation of the values of the metropolitan powers. It was not accidental that the middle-class party, the G.N.P., was organised by a dental surgeon who had spent a good deal of his time in student politics in the U.S. Dr. Watts can better be understood by considering him a member of an international middle-class rather than as a strictly local politician. In 1956 his party offered a comprehensive plan for Grenada's development (Grenada National Party, Plan

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[1] Peter Worsley points out that "The ideology of nationist populism, then, is to a very real extent, not an ideology at all in Marx's sense of the word. Neither is it an 'ideology' in Mannheim's sense of the word; it is, rather, 'utopian' to use his terminology, in so far as it reflects the interests of 'certain oppressed groups.... (which are) ... so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it'". Peter Worsley, The Third World (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964), p. 165.

for Grenada) "to bring back our dear island on an even keel morally, socio-economically, and otherwise". They advocated "modernising" ideas in the sphere of economics and politics, in which respect the movement appeared to stress rationality and modernity[1]. The G.N.P. has attempted to mobilise those elements of the middle-class and urban working class who were strongly attracted to the ideas of rationality and "good government". Unlike the plantocracy, their attitude to the peasantry or the mass is not totally cynical: they want a better break for them, but feel this can be achieved primarily through the slow process of education. One of the main goals of the party as published in their official publication is "The development of both the rich and the poor in Grenada".

Despite their stated rationalistic goals, the middle-class party must also make appeals to the masses to win elections. They soon become aware that to counter the appeal of the hero they must either come up with a hero of their own, or mobilise opinion against the mass hero by themselves adopting the strategy of the "crowd", hence they substitute demagogic appeals for ideology. Once this stage is reached it begins to appear that the pattern of conflict has become routinised. On the one hand there is the peasant based mass movement led by a hero; and on the other hand an urban based movement led by a member or members of the middle-class. Once this stage has been reached the electoral system appears to be working well; there is high participation as

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[1] My colleague, André Béteille of the Delhi School of Economics has developed a very useful distinction between what he calls modernists and modernisers. He argues that a number of individuals holding modernist values are not necessarily modernisers. They are interested primarily in advancing their own careers, although they pay lip service to the need for modernisation. True modernisers, on the other hand, want to implement a "modern" society and thus are interested in structural changes.

gauged by the voting turnout, and both groups of the mid-elites observe the constitutional niceties by giving up their seats of power if defeated electorally.

While the mid-elites are at political play, the power structure does not remain aloof or neutral, although the members of this group like to give this impression publicly. The elites who possess power in the community support both the hero and the middle-class party, when and as the situation demands. The over-riding concern of this elite is to maintain their links with the metropolitan power and the imperial government. Their strategy is to support the political system and to ensure that crisis situations do not result in a breakdown of civil government, despite their preference for a much more autocratic system. The economic elites are not as oriented to concepts of "democracy" as the politicians of the mid-elite. The former are more conservative and indeed still wedded to the type of social structure that existed before the advent of "misfortunes" such as universal adult franchise and trade unions. A number of interviews were administered to both sets of elites (as well as civil service elites) by the author at the height of the 1962 crisis which provide some revealing insights into the attitudes of their members.[1] Of the 39 economic elites interviewed, fully 32 thought the introduction of adult suffrage had been a mistake, and of the latter 25 still advocated the return to a limited franchise based on literacy or educational qualifications. Not only were the masses castigated for illiteracy, they were said to be lacking in intelligence, gullible, easily led (i.e. misled), and, worst of all, "they are in the majority"! By contrast, only two of the 14 legislative elites questioned thought universal suffrage a

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[1] See Appendix I for the background of these interviews.

mistake. This is hardly surprising since they themselves were the chief beneficiaries of the system. However, in their perception of colonial rule the relative extent of differences between the two groups was slight. Asked whether they regarded Crown Colony Government as a good preparation for independence, 29 of the economic elites said yes, as did 8 of the 14 legislative elites. 18 of the 39 business elites preferred for Grenada to remain a Crown Colony rather than to be independent in some form or other, as contrasted to only two of the legislative elites who felt this way. The responses to this last question must be interpreted with great caution, however, given the unclear nature of the alternatives available to Grenada after the break-up of the West Indian Federation.

The basic convervatism of the economic elites was best revealed in their opinions of the political system. Only one respondent out of the 39 thought the ministerial system had been working well in Grenada. The most common reason given for the failure of the system was the lack of experience and education of the Ministers, although they were almost as vexed by what they considered insufficient consultation with economic leaders by the Ministers. Their proposed cures for the "ills" of the system all involved less ministerial power and a concommitant increase of power to the colonial officials. A large number wanted to increase the power of the Administrator, and to remove the control of finance entirely from the Chief Minister. A significant number called for more extreme measures. "The Colonial Office should have full powers to control the activities and legislation of the Government. The powers of the Legislative Council should be cut, and there should be one Minister, i.e. a Chief Minister and no more."

Another wanted to abolish the ministerial system but retain the powers of the Legislative Council. Another man probably expressed what many felt but preferred not to openly state in an interview situation: "Abolish the Ministerial system, and replace it with a Governor and Administrator responsible only to the Colonial Office." One man wistfully harked back to the franchise issue: "If basic changes like a more limited franchise are introduced, then more honest governments would be returned. This would solve the whole matter."

One of the issues that the power elite is most vitally concerned about is the country's external image. Hence their over-riding concern with stability, since this is felt to determine the amount of foreign investment as well as their own economic fortunes. Almost all the economic elites expressed great concern on this issue, giving strong support to the idea of constitutional safeguards which would prevent any elective government carrying out policies detrimental to foreign and local investment. Both the economic elites and the representatives of the colonial government, therefore, become alarmed when there are widespread charges of corruption and civil disorder, the news of which quickly travels abroad. They also fear taxation and labour unrest. One respondent charged that Gairy's party did not inspire confidence and "scared the foreign investors away by strikes and in some cases by taxation." This was a very representative view. The question can be raised as to whether the economic elites did not indeed use the issue of corruption to get at Gairy primarily because of his threatened and actual taxation and economic measures against them, since corruption can be made a very popular political issue.

In the next chapter we will explore more fully how the issue of corruption resulted in the downfall of the hero, which will also enable

us to observe how decisions are made in a colonial society. This means that we must carefully examine the role of the remaining elite group in the society, the bureaucracy. In time of crisis the bureaucracy plays a pivotal political role. The hero particularly faces real opposition when he assumes responsibility for supposedly neutral organisations like the bureaucracy. He immediately finds himself in conflict with the "professionalism" of the bureaucracy. It does not take him long to discover that the bureaucracy is not really politically neutral, and is in fact very hostile and contemptuous of his newly acquired status. In later chapters of this study we argue that the colonial bureaucracy constitutes one of the most serious impediments to social and economic change in the period immediately following independence. While the bureaucracy is likely to be openly hostile, the economic elites will in some cases tolerate the mass hero, supporting him insofar as absolutely necessary to protect their own interests. They prefer working with politicians whom they consider "reasonable" and who do not interfere, and will not hesitate to use all their power to bring down the hero if he goes too far. On the whole, politics is conceived by the power elites in the colony as a game indulged in either by the playboy members of their class, members of the lower middle classes trying to climb the social ladder, or as in Gairy's case, rural rabble rousers. Thus, the hero of the countryside finds the atmosphere in the capital from where he must rule hostile.

It is open to question whether Gairy could have developed a different political style. Both the social structure and the political system encourage demagoguery rather than genuine charismatic leader-

ship. In contrast to many other West Indian political heroes, Gairy had difficulties making accommodations to the system, and utilising the electoral system to maintain himself in power. Other West Indian politicians have been able to develop political machines, which, while "personalist" in character, have an organisational base among the masses.

However, even if the hero succeeds in building an organisation that can maintain him in power, the power structure continues to restrict the scope of his activities within a narrow range. At this stage he has two alternatives: to make things difficult for the elites, which is only likely to result in his own downfall; or he can try to join their clubs, make as much money as possible, and live comfortably in the city suburbs. Before independence, the first alternative is difficult, since the Imperial government will not tolerate any forthright attack on the power elites, Even after independence the mass hero is limited in his actions, for the vested and strategic interests of the international elites continue to set limits on what can be done. In the final analysis the only alternative left for the hero, particularly if he lacks a real mass political party, is to become a junior member of the power structure and concentrate his efforts on electoral politics.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL CONFLICT AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

The political party in a colonial society performs a number of functions, sometimes simultaneously. In some situations it attempts to identify the goals of the new society after independence; while on other occasions, particularly in the earlier stages, it limits itself to obtaining concessions from the colonial authorities. Finally, during the terminal stages of colonial rule it may be in a position to translate the demands of the electorate into public policy by utilising the Legislative and Executive organs of the state. David Apter has identified these functions and treated them as variables in a recent book[1]. He treats the party as an independent variable when it espouses futuristic goals; as a dependent variable when it is concerned primarily with exposing conditions under colonialism; and as an intervening variable when it is in a position to translate public demands into policy.

In our analysis of the political party in Grenada so far we have treated it as a dependent variable. Until 1961 Gairy's party functioned primarily as a protest against the existing order, neither emphasising the cause of independence, nor being in a position to make authoritative decisions. Our hypothesis has been that the combination

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[1]David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 181-182.

of Crown Colony government and a plantation-type economy encouraged a hero-crowd relationship between the leader and the led, rather than a mass political party as such. The classical notion is that the party system is only functional when there is an equilibrium between the demands made upon the party and its capacity to translate these demands into public policy. The peculiar circumstances of Grenada in regard to the question of national identity, particularly after the collapse of the West Indian Federation in 1961, made it very difficult for any of the political parties to develop an ideology that was universal and hence to function as independent variables. No one remotely considered the possibility of Grenada as an independent state (with the exception of the Colonial Office more recently!) However, when Gairy became Chief Minister in 1961 under the ministerial system, his party ceased to function solely as a dependent variable and became an intervening variable. So far we have stressed the influence upon Gairy's party and style of the socio-economic environment, the electoral system, and the power structure. In this chapter we will see how the two other important political institutions in the society, the Legislative-Council and the Executive-Council, also played a decisive role in shaping Gairy and his party. No matter how dependent a role the political party plays, its major aim is control of the major decision making institutions, which is bound to affect the structure and the strategy of the party.

The political system under conditions of terminal colonial rule places the political party in a very difficult position. To get elected, the party behaves during the campaign as though it can and will be able to meet the demands made upon it by its supporters, and

the mass begin to expect that at least some of their demands will be satisfied. In this context the politician is faced with what one recent commentator calls not a rising revolution of expectations but a rising tide of frustrations.[1] The main area in which the politician must try to assert his supremacy when he gains power, therefore, is that of public finance. This is the key to his gaining control of the government and thus the means to satisfy the demands of his supporters. Herein lies the crucial test of his skill, for the domain of public finance is the core of the bureaucracy's power, and heretofore its monopoly. The rural hero is not unnaturally dazzled by the size and nature of the funds he thinks he is gaining control over. The esoteric complexities of budgetry, warrants and accounting procedures appear to him as legalities devised by colonial bureaucrats to prevent him from exercising his rightful power. Since the bureaucracy and the politician in this type of situation often start with diametrically opposed views on the spending of public funds, conflict is highly probable. We must not conclude from this that the colonial politician has no moral code with which to judge the legitimacy of public spending, but that his code is different. It is surprising that even such a peripatetic student of the new states as Ralph Braibanti fails to take this point adequately into consideration when discussing the issue of corruption in these countries.[2] This should not be construed to mean that we are

[1] Daniel Lerner, "Towards a Communication Theory of Modernisation, A Set of Considerations" in Lucien Pye, ed., Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[2] Cf. Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption", Public Administration, Winter, 1962, Vol. 40, pp. 357-375.

arguing that because these two groups start from different value premises that the community is unable to arrive at a moral judgment as to what they think constitutes corruption.

The issue of corruption, which emerged as the ostensible point of the conflict between Gairy on one hand and the Administrator and the civil service on the other in 1961-62, clearly reflected two different sets of values and attitudes, as we shall see. However, this issue cannot be meaningfully analysed until the distinction between corruption and patronage has been made clear. It can and has been argued that political development in industrial societies was marked in the early stages by the distribution of patronage by the parties on a scale that at present day standards would be condemned as corruption.[1] To consolidate their power, these parties had to have at their disposal a sufficient number of jobs to reward the faithful. Patronage was therefore functional in keeping the party machinery going. In another context Merton has examined this problem in relation to the political machine in America.[2] Colonial authorities, on the other hand, do not concede that "jobs for the boys" serve a legitimate political function. The only source of patronage available to the colonial politician is to ensure that his cohorts get government contracts and employ his men. To do this he has to exert his influence on the Tenders Board, which makes him vulnerable to charges of corruption. While the colonial officials may have deliberately closed their eyes to such influence by civil

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[1] Cf. E. Pendleton Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1936) and R. Wraith and E. Simpkins, Corruption in Developing Countries (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963).

[2] Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Rev. ed. (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press of Glencoe Inc., 1957), Chaps. IV, V.

servants and businessmen in the past, they are not so inclined to do this for the politician. In addition he is less likely to approach this delicate task with the discretion of the former. Officials of the Public Works Department resent his encroaching on their preserve, although it is the only agency that can provide jobs for the faithful on any scale in the rural areas. Throughout the West Indies the building and maintenance of roads is a very important source of employment, and has become inextricably tied up with politics.

The moment the colonial politician assumes office he must try to reconcile the demands of two opposing sets of people and prcblems. First, he must come to terms with the complex financial procedures and the personnel of the bureaucracy, and at the same time he must find ways and means to keep his supporters or clients happy by providing services and goods. The latter forces him to spend a good part of his day meeting his clients and proving how invaluable his personal intervention has been for them. Since the coffers of the state in a colony like Grenada are hardly over-flowing, he becomes perpetually involved in finding sources of funds to satisfy his clients. To add to his difficulties, stringent regulations make it hard for him to gain access to even the limited funds that exist. This latter aspect of the difficulties faced by Gairy will be discussed further on in this chapter. The politician is therefore faced with the problem of trying to increase the funds of the state, not only to satisfy the immediate demands of individual clients, but also to try and improve economic conditions. His mass support, after all, is based primarily on his promises to improve their lot. But here he runs into an impossible dilemma: the dependent nature of the economy, producing a limited number of agri-

cultural products over which there is no internal control of prices or marketing, places him at the mercy of the international economy. This severely limits his scope in developing and implementing innovating ideas for economic growth, which in the long run are essential. The very nature of the economy must be altered if people are eventually to attain the higher standard of living they crave and to become less dependent on external forces over which they have no control. The colonial politician can increase taxes on the middle and upper classes only within a narrow range without suffering unfavourable political repercussions and is thus forced to fall back on the economic benevolence of the colonial power. This introduces a third set of personnel and demands which he must attempt to reconcile. The metropolitan government must be convinced of his "reliability" and his adherence to "sound" government as a condition of their financial support. After independence it is not startling that the colonial politician graduates from grant-in-aid politics to the status of "aid-politician", which has become characteristic of so many politicians in the new states.

One aspect of the conflict that is likely to emerge can be characterised as the opposition of the personalistic style of the colonial politician in administration to the professional ethos of the bureaucracy. It would be naive to think that the difference is merely one of style of approach, however: the struggle is one for power, the crucial aspect of which centres around policy making. The colonial constitution automatically assumes a fusion of interests between the politician and the bureaucracy. If both groups share the same basic values about their respective roles, this fusion may take place. If not, as was the case with Gairy and the bureaucracy, a breakdown of

civil government can result.

It is now generally accepted by students of public administration that the old dichotomy between policy and administration was highly arbitrary. Even in complex industrialised societies it is obvious that the bureaucracy engages in policy making as well as policy implementation. In a colony like Grenada, the dichotomy is virtually non-existent. Throughout the period of colonial rule the Governor or Administrator and the bureaucracy have been highly involved in policy making, and they are often openly hostile when these functions are "usurped" by the politician. In a report on the Civil Service of the Eastern Caribbean in 1963, for example, this hostility was apparent, although it was couched in terms of the distinction between policy and administration:

> In the early stages of constitutional development inexperienced politicians sometimes seek to interfere in Civil Service matters, which are no concern of theirs. It must be the first task of the Service Commissions to be on their guard against such interference, and when it occurs, to report it to the Officer Administering the Government with a view to the appropriate action being taken. It is of the utmost importance that politicians should distinguish between their legitimate rights on the one hand to lay down policy and the responsibility for Civil Service administration on the other hand, which does not lie within their prerogative. Only when this is fully understood can the Civil Service pursue its duties efficiently in loyalty to the Government of the day. [1]

Most of the Reports do not come to terms with the basic problems involved but simply chastise the politician for interfering. But the bureaucracy is not a neutral, rational agency in such a society; it is the only organisation with a long history of skill in "manipulating" the local interests in the community. It has built up a special relationship

[1] Report of the Civil Service Commission, Federation of East Caribbean Territories, London, April, 1963.

with its clients, mainly the socio-economic elites, including the plantocracy as well as the commercial elites. More recently, with the increase of welfare functions the bureaucracy has begun to build up a clientele among the peasants and small farmers.

In a very real sense the bureaucracy is a competitor of the politician because of its special relationship with the power structure and more recently the mass. This places civil servants in a pivotal position in the society. When a ministerial system is introduced, the two groups of competitors are apt to become engaged in open conflict for power and control. At this stage a relationship develops between them which can be somewhat dramatically termed one of "terror and sabotage". The politician is sensitive about his newly acquired status and views with considerable skepticism the advice tendered to him by the civil servants; the latter are equally skeptical about the capacity of the politician to direct the government. If the situation deteriorates sufficiently, the politician terrorises the civil servant by attacking him personally in the market place. The civil servant retaliates by hiding files and thus sabotages the politician. This state of affairs makes rational government an impossibility.

This struggle for power between the bureaucracy and the politician is not of course unique to colonies such as Grenada. Max Weber, in tracing the evolution of authority systems in western societies, examined the conflict between charismatic authority and legal domination in those societies. This is essentially the type of relationship we are examining in this chapter: between the rival claims to legitimacy by the political hero and the representatives of the legal domination system. We have already noted that it is important to differentiate

between the possession of charisma and the attributes of charismatic leadership when discussing Gairy. It should also be pointed out that the chief representative of the legal domination system, the Administrator, possessed charisma through his office.

Gairy's reign as Chief Minister of Grenada was short lived, lasting only ten months. On three major issues he found himself immediately in serious trouble after assuming office. The first was his battle with the civil service; the second concerned fiscal control and administration; and the third was the controversy aroused by his budget. All of these issues, which overlapped to a large extent, involved the Administrator and Gairy in open conflict. The struggle between the two became increasingly personal and bitter, which tended to cloud the more basic conflict between the two opposing claims to legitimacy. Although Gairy was in office less than a year, the effect of having to operate within the political confines of the Legislative and Executive Councils was noticeable. However, before he had had sufficient time to master these institutions the machinery had been set in motion for his downfall. Gairy assumed office as Chief Minister in August, 1961. Several months later the Administrator ordered a report from the Principal Auditor, on the basis of which the Administrator recommended a Commission of Enquiry to inquire into all aspects of public expenditure and any related matters of the Gairy administration. The Commission was appointed in January, 1962,[1] but because its validity was challenged,

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[1]The Commission was appointed under the Commissions of Enquiry Ordinance (Cap. 46) as amended by the Commissions of Enquiry (Amendment) Ordinance 1961 and the full terms of reference were as follows: To enquire into the control of public expenditure in the territory of Grenada during the financial year commencing 1st January 1961, and subsequently, having regard to the financial provisions in the Constitution

it was several months before it began to gather information. The Commission finally reported in May. In June, on the advice of the Administrator, the Colonial Secretary suspended Grenada's Constitution, and for over three months the Administrator governed the island on his sole authority. New elections were announced in August, and in the election which was held in September Gairy's party was defeated. In the following chapter we will examine that election and attempt to assess how successful the electoral system was in helping to resolve these rival claims to legitimacy.

The Politician's Weapon: The Use of Terror

Gairy's return to Grenada from the London conference at the end of June, 1961, constituted a major triumph for him over the Administrator: his franchise had been restored, and he was soon to be installed as Chief Minister of Grenada. In his first official speech since 1957 he exuded optimism and declared that "Today I am more the man of action. About four or five years ago, I would have given a long speech, but today I give my heart." When Gairy returned to the House he was saluted by all the members of the council. He replied with characteristic flamboyancy.

> In another place, Mr. Speaker, I was sworn in as Chief Minister of Grenada, Carriacou and Petit Martinique, and today I am sworn in as a Member of the Legislative Council of this territory. The praises are not due me, but are due the Divine Maker, the Divine Architect, who in His divine scheme of things, saw fit to have me come back to the scene.

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of Grenada, the Grenada Finance and Audit Ordinancy, 1961 No. 2), Colonial Regulations, Financial Rules in force in that territory and the specific financial instructions governing the administration of grant-in-aid by the Federal Government and any matters incidental thereto: to report and to make recommendations which they may consider appropriate.

> I am reminded of this divine and equitable law - a law also which lends itself to the maxim that 'cream will always float'.[1]

One of the first necessities facing Gairy was to obtain a good press. The island's major newspaper, The West Indian, at first gave him qualified support but soon became openly hostile. In St. George's he continued to be treated by the social elites as an embarrassment. Gairy was quite sensitive about his "image", and deemed that the only way to project a favourable image was to obtain control of the Government press, a powerful media in a country like Grenada. The Official Newsletter had by this time become The Citizens Weekly. The editor of the paper was a government officer, appointed by the Public Service Commission. The post of Information Officer was originally created in June, 1956; and the advertisement clearly stipulated that the post was a professional one. The intended nature of the job can be appreciated by listing the official duties required of the officer:

> To be official Government spokesman. To distribute information on the activities and policy of Government on local and international affairs to the press and the public. To be responsible in these ways for Government Public Relations. To carry out other appropriate duties which may be assigned by the Administrator.[2]

The Officer was made directly responsible to the Administrator, and even under the new Constitution of 1959 the Administrator retained responsibility for Information. The man chosen for the post was one of Grenada's ablest newspapermen, who was subsequently sent to Great Britain to be trained as Information Officer. From 1956 to 1961 he continued in the post without incident.

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[1] Minutes of the Legislative Council of Grenada, December, 1961.

[2] Grenada Government Gazette, St. George's, June 16, 1956.

Almost immediately after Gairy assumed office he announced that what the Government needed was not an Information Officer but a Public Relations Officer who would be directly responsible to the Chief Minister. The Information Officer was in effect "relieved" from his post by Gairy and his functions taken over by a man picked by Gairy, who was designated as Public Relations Officer. The style of the paper became folksy, and its name was changed to The Star, which was the G.U.L.P's election symbol. It was obvious that Gairy intended to transform the character of the post into a political one and to use the press to openly publicise his own party activities.[1] The professional officer involved found himself in an impossible situation. He had first learned through the local newspaper that he was to be transferred to another post, but received no official communication on the matter. Since the post was a pensionable one it could not be abolished as Gairy had planned. Eventually the officer was placed on indefinite leave, for which Grenadians coined the term "orbiting". One obvious solution to the problem would have been to change the nature of the post to a contractual one, which might have lessened the fears of the civil service of "political intervention". While the Administrator did raise such a solution as a possibility, he insisted that in any case it would have to be dealt with by the Public

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[1] It is very important to note the following extract from the Commission of Enquiry's Report which made clear that Gairy had not been the first to use the government press for his own political purposes. "The second of these two matters concerns the periodical known as "The Star". We understand that the publication and free distribution of political propaganda at public expense was undertaken before the present Government came into power and we wish to record our view that such activity is always open to the strongest objections." (p.11). Report of The Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Public Expenditure in Grenada during 1961 and subsequently, Grenada, The Government Printer, St. George's, 8th May, 1962. Hereafter, this document will be referred to as Report of the Commission of Enquiry.

Service Commission. But by this time Gairy had also attacked the Commission, criticising its membership, and claiming that by Ordinance it was supposed to be selected on the advice of the Chief Minister.

This was the opening battle between Gairy and the Administrator over the issue of the service. However, Gairy had given ample warnings of his attitude towards the service from the time of the election in March, when he had announced that he planned to reshuffle the higher civil service; to bring about a higher standard of efficiency; and to remove the "dead wood" and the "square pegs in round holes".[1] Again in July he had attacked the service, and warned that his government was contemplating a clean sweep which would remove the straw bosses.[2] His major campaign against the service began in September, with his chief weapon The Star. By October no holds were being barred, as the following extract from that paper of October 21st makes clear. In answering its own question as to whether a civil servant should be a servant or the master of the people it replied:

> Of course, servant, anything else is intolerable...An entrenched bureaucracy can be in some ways worse even than a dictatorship. It oppresses not in the grand manner of dictators but by a thousand intolerable pin-pricks; it is sheltered from attack and cannot be overthrown. None the less it must be reformed. The strongest weapons against Civil Servants, be they Permanent Secretaries or postmen, who show signs to become Civil Master are a healthy parliamentary system and a democratic form of local government.

In September Gairy had also begun to hold monthly meetings with the Heads of Departments and Chief Technical Officers. At these meetings he insisted that he was the Head of the Government, not the Administrator. The Star of the 30th September carried the following

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[1] The West Indian, March 29, 1961.

[2] The West Indian, July 13, 1961.

report of one of these meetings.

> The Chief Minister stressed the point that the Ministers of Government - the elected heads - are the ones in control of the Departments, and not the Administrator. Anybody who suggests that the Department Heads are playing up to the Chief Minister and other Ministers will not be accepted as a fact. The said Department Heads are sufficiently intelligent to realise that the elected members are the ones in charge of them.
>
> There must be a good relationship between the Heads and the Ministers for its Ministers they have to please and not the Administrator. That he said, is appreciated by the Colonial Office.

The lines of the battle were becoming increasingly clearly drawn. The West Indian of October 10th headlined a story "Gairy and Lloyd in Tug-of-War over the Civil Service". The article went on to report that the Secretary to the Government, who was the administrative officer responsible for personnel matters in the Service, had been asked to leave a meeting presided over by the Chief Minister. Although this officer was not one of Gairy's main targets, his government announced that it was abolishing the post as part of their efforts "to reduce what we consider top-heavy administration."

Gairy's next encounter was with the Financial Secretary, who was by predisposition an accountant with a strong predilection for detail. He was characterised by one high official as cautious, inflexible and negative in his approach. Gairy later said that he "was and still is, the most unpopular man, not only in the service but throughout Grenada."[1] It was widely agreed in Grenada that a number of senior civil servants were strongly opposed to the Financial Secretary, although in his defence it was claimed that his unpopularity was largely due to his tightening

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[1] Reply of E.M. Gairy, Chief Minister and Minister of Finance to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Public Expenditure in Grenada during 1961 'and subsequently', Grenada, the Government Printing Office, St. George's, 1962, p. 4. This Report will be cited as Reply of Gairy to the Commission of Enquiry.

of controls which had hitherto been lax. Gairy objected to his attending Executive Council meetings, and was seeking to abolish the post and replace the Financial Secretary by a Permanent Secretary. This was opposed by the Administrator, who was upheld by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Since he could not get rid of the man who was supposed to be his chief technical adviser or financial adviser (but who was administratively responsible to the Administrator), Gairy solved the problem in his own way by simply acting without the advice or services of the Financial Secretary. Instead he relied on the advice of a Principal Secretary. The situation reached dramatic and comic proportions when at one stage the Financial Secretary allegedly refused to give the Chief Minister certain important files concerning the Budget on grounds that they were "secret". The latter retaliated by locking the Financial Secretary out of his office. Gairy also became involved in a long drawn out struggle with the Director of Public Works, whom his government also tried to get suspended. However, according to Gairy, the Administrator refused to implement their decision and was upheld by the Secretary of State.[1] Throughout this period Gairy attacked the civil service openly in the market place, charging it with disloyalty. The civil servants could not reply to these attacks and expressed their opposition in a different way.

The Bureaucracy's Response: The Use of Sabotage

The civil servant has a powerful weapon with which to sabotage the politician: he can withhold vital information and technical advice. To understand why he resorts so readily to this weapon we need to look

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[1] Ibid., p. 3.

at the bureaucracy a little more closely. In western societies the emergence of the state bureaucracy has been associated with the movement towards greater egalitarianism and democracy[1]. The bureaucracy was seen as a "modernising" agency in opposition to traditional values and institutions. In a colonial society, however, the bureaucracy has been the citadel of prestige and privilege; to enter the bureaucracy has ensured security, high income and prestige. For a long time the senior posts in the service were the private preserves of expatriates, who ran it as a closed club. In more recent times, as these posts were gradually opened up to the local inhabitants, it has become the dream of every black and brown mother in the society to educate her son well enough to obtain a good post in the service. Perhaps he could even aspire to become the first black Financial Secretary, or preferably the Colonial Secretary! The civil service has remained an elitist class, modernists rather than true modernisers. With some few exceptions they still form one of the most conservative forces in the society, although their personnel has changed from expatriate to local. Popular movements therefore tend to focus their hostility on the bureaucracy.

Some of the more important characteristics and attitudes of highly placed Grenadian civil servants emerged from interviews conducted by the author in 1961 and 1962[2]. The majority of those in the

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[1] Cf. R. Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, op. cit.

[2] The data for this section was obtained on two separate occasions. In March, 1961 a questionnaire was administered to higher civil servants in the Windward and Leeward islands, drawn from members of the service who attended a series of lectures on Public Administration under the auspices of the University of the West Indies. Twenty-two were interviewed from Grenada. In July, 1962, at the height of the crisis, interviews were administered to 17 top civil servants, including Heads of Departments. Permanent Secretaries and Senior Technical Officers. Naturally, some overlapping occurred in the persons interviewed on the

higher levels had some amount of professional training, with all but one of the second group claiming 11 or more years of schooling. The income of the 17 in the second group ranged between $5,000 and $10,000, with the average being approximately $6,500. Again in the second group, over half were classified as brown, although four were black and four were high brown. At this time in Grenada there were only two top ranking civil servants who were white. A majority of this group had been born in an urban area, many in St. George's.

The first group, when asked the most important characteristic of the ideal civil servant, gave the highest number of mentions to integrity and loyalty, followed by devotion to duty. Also mentioned were compliance and ability to work well with people. Only two of the 22 individuals in this group agreed with the statement that the main job of the civil servant is to follow regulations closely. Very few believed that civil servants should actively participate in politics: less than one-fifth of the first group, which was questioned directly as to whether civil servants should join political parties, replied in the affirmative, and only one of the group said they should be active in politics. In both groups the overwhelming majority (all but one in the second group) were emphatically opposed to the proposition that there should be a change in the composition of the senior civil service when parties in power change. The view was widely expressed that they should remain neutral and that there should accordingly be no change in personnel. Despite their expressed political neutrality, it was evident that the political ideology of this group was essentially

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two occasions. The first set of questions dealt with more general questions and attitudes held by civil servants, while the second dealt more specifically with the crisis. See Appendix I for more details on these questionnaires.

a commitment to middle class politics. It should be remembered that in a small society where most of the elites are on a first name basis, there is a high level of interaction between top civil servants and other professionals, including those middle class professionals active in politics. We shall return to the question of scale shortly.

Most of our respondents belonged to one or more of the three most prestigious social clubs in St. George's, maintained large, government provided bungalows and owned motor cars financed through government loans. Even though they were West Indians by birth, they still went regularly on "Home Leave" to England, for which they received full passages and allowances for themselves and their families from government. On the whole, this group had considerable contact with their counterparts in other West Indian islands, and on the average left the island twice a year, either on official business or less frequently on private trips. Ironically, in conversation, many of them complained that the government was doing too much for the "people". They insisted that people must be made to work harder for the sake of the economy, although they conceded a high priority to more education. Most of them expressed criticism of Crown Colony government as a training ground for independence. However, their main complaint in this respect was that Ministers had not been adequately prepared for their responsibilities.[1] In the second

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[1]The Government issued a pamphlet entitled General Directions Under the Ministerial System shortly after the new Constitution came into operation. The pamphlet stressed co-operation between the Administrator and the Ministers, and delineated the functions of Ministers and Heads of Departments, stressing that "ministers will not be responsible for the appointment, discipline, transfer or promotion of members of the Public Service." The Administrator began holding a series of meetings with civil servants on the new system. The important point for our purposes is that the bulk of this educational effort took place before Gairy came to power. The G.N.P. was in power in January, 1960 when the

group, 13 of the 17 expressed the opinion that most of the Ministers were unqualified by experience and education to be in charge of Ministries. One civil servant added that lack of qualifications characterised the Government in general, including civil servants as well as Ministers. While generally complaining that the politicians did not encourage or willingly accept advice from them, all but two felt that as a group they had not been sufficiently forthright in guiding and advising ministers in relation to financial transactions. One respondent added that civil servants often told outsiders of administrative decisions but not the Minister involved. Interestingly enough, almost all of them were quite critical of their colleagues as "yes men" of the Ministers, while convinced that personally they took a strong line with their own Minister!

It was especially revealing to see how they perceived their loyalties to the Administrator and the Chief Minister, particularly in 1962 when the two were in open conflict. In reply to the question as to which one they had considered the head of government before the suspension of the Constitution, over half of the second group named the Administrator, while only two named the Chief Minister. The rest differentiated between the different responsibilities of the two. But when asked to whom they owed their first loyalty as a civil servant, more than half cited the Administrator, a few mentioned the civil service as a profession, and none mentioned the Chief Minister. Only one man assigned his loyalty as a civil servant to his Minister! An

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ministerial system was implemented. Even though the bulk of civil servants were more sympathetic to the middle class politicians of the G.N.P., considerable friction occurred between their Ministers and many top ranking members of the service in this period.

editorial in the Civil Service Bulletin in March, 1963, almost a year after Gairy was out of power, showed that the service was still concerned with this issue.

> Under the present arrangement the Administrator as head of the Civil Service is the sole protector of the civil servant. The ministers are the 'managing directors' of the nation's business. They have as their advisers civil servants who, by virtue of their long experience in operating the governmental machinery, are best equipped to make suggestions and advise the Ministers as to the likely consequences of implementing a particular policy. But it's always the Ministers who are responsible for a decision.

The last sentence appears to have been added to pay lip service to the role of politicians rather than as a firm conviction.

The Impact of Scale on Bureaucratic Behaviour

We have discussed at some length how the socio-political environment, which we can sum up as the "colonial milieu", was basic in shaping the attitudes and behaviour of civil servants in Grenada. Our main purpose was to show how this made them automatically members of the elite and a powerful political force in the community. A second basic factor, which we have thus far only briefly mentioned, must now be added to the analysis. That is the scale of the society.[1] The

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[1] I am particularly grateful to Professor Kenneth Robinson who helped focus my attention on this problem through a series of seminars held at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies during 1963-64. He pointed out that the problem of scale was not unique to British colonies in the twentieth century, and called my attention to this same problem in Canada in the 1850's. I quote in full a memorandum which he sent me on this matter, which was extracted from a book written by the Colonial Secretary at that time defending his administration, because of the striking similarities to the Grenadian situation:

"The system now established in Canada is that of Parliamentary Government, that is to say government by means of parties. This form of government is now working well in that and the neighbouring provinces,

... cont'd.

and is probably on the whole the best plan hitherto adopted of enabling a Colony in an advanced stage of its social progress to exercise the privilege of self-government; it may therefore be regarded as the form which representative institutions, when they acquire their full development, are likely to take in the British Colonies. The experience however of our own Country, in which this system of government has so long flourished, may teach us that its advantages are by no means unmixed, even in communities the best adapted to it, but that there are considerable drawbacks to the benefits we derive from it. We know also that hitherto Parliamentary government has not been carried into successful operation for any considerable time, in any other country in the world but our own, and that it is little more than ten years since it was first attempted in any of our Colonies, while in none of them can it be said to have been brought into full operation until far more recently. Even this short experience of its working in the Colonies, would seem to show that it is suitable only to a community which is not a very small one, to a population in an advanced stage of civilization, which has had the advantage of some training by the working of a free constitution of a simpler kind, and, I should be inclined to add, in which Municipal institutions exist, capable of dividing with the Legislature the very large powers which it would engross, if in the absence of such institutions the representatives of the people had a virtual control over the appointment of the executive officers of the government.

In a small community the successful working of this system of government is rendered difficult, by the necessarily restricted number of members of the Legislature, and of persons qualified by their intelligence and education to fill the principal offices of the government, and at the same time in possession of sufficient means to devote their time to the public service, without adopting such employment as a permanent profession. Where the popular branch of the Legislature necessarily consists of only a small number of members, the increased importance which attaches to individual votes greatly increases the danger of those abuses to which party government is always liable, as will readily be understood by those who have observed the effect produced in this Country by a nearly equal division of parties. Even in the Assembly of Canada, although a numerous body, compared to most Colonial assemblies, it has been remarked that its great inferiority in numbers to the House of Commons has a decided and injurious effect upon its adaptation to the system of government now in force in that Colony. The want of a sufficient number of persons possessing the leisure and competence requisite to enable them to give up their time to the public service without adopting it as a profession, is even a greater difficulty in the way of the adoption in a small society of what has been called in the Colonies "responsible", but what may more properly be termed "party" or "parliamentary" government. Where the persons capable of holding office are very few, party contests have a tendency to run into extreme and dangerous bitterness. It may be questioned whether these considerations have been sufficiently attended to, and whether, in one at least of the North American Colonies, the inhabitants have not required prematurely the establishment of a system of government for which they are not yet sufficiently prepared."

.... cont'd.

bureaucrat in a small society faces considerable difficulties in trying to fulfil the ideal role requirements of the civil servant. In adopting the British model of administration, the society concomitantly accepted the hallowed canons of British administrative practices: anonymity, secrecy and political neutrality, along with the mythical distinction between policy and administration. Numerous training courses have continually stressed and reinforced these values, which the civil servants have often strived valiantly to put into practice. The following editorial in a Bulletin of the Civil Service Association of March, 1963 reveals how uncritically these values have been accepted:

...until they reach an advanced stage in their progress, I believe that the appointment to some of the principal offices in the Colonies of persons not selected from the narrow circle of their own inhabitants, and imbued with the peculiar feelings and opinions which are apt to prevail in such communities, but chosen from among the well-educated gentlemen of the Mother-country, is calculated greatly to improve the tone of Colonial society, and to prevent it from gradually degenerating from the standard of manners and acquirements to which we are accustomed at home. It is also an advantage in small societies, as tending to mitigate the bitterness of that party spirit which is so often their bane, that some of the offices of most importance should be filled up by persons from a distance, not connected with any of the small knots and cliques into which such societies usually become divided.
The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration, Earl Grey (London, 1853), Vol. 1, 33-39.

Dr. Burton Benedict, who also attended these seminars, drew my attention to the sociologist's treatment of the problem of scale. He has recently dealt with some of the theoretical problems involved. Cf. his "Sociological Characteristics of Small Territories and Their Implication for Economic Development" in Michael Banton ed., The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966),

West Indian economists and historians have long been sensitive to this problem. Recently, a further contribution has been made by William Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean, op. cit. I have also benefited greatly from the contributions of Professor Elsa Goveia. (See her article "Past History and Present Planning in the West Indies", New World Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1965, Kingston, Jamaica, pp. 71-79) and Lloyd Best and George Beckford, unpublished papers (University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica).

> The Civil Service of any country, large or small, which subscribes to democratic processes and procedures of the Western World should represent certain characteristics. Our Civil Service is based on the British pattern and any differences can be explained by the peculiar constitutional, political, economic and social framework under which we live...
>
> The civil servant's first duty is service to the public - in fact, the man on the street thinks it is his only duty. The civil servant should therefore be fully conscious of his special and delicate position and conduct his activities in such a way as to demonstrate his recognition and observation of the principles of anonymity, political neutrality and impartiality.

What has been overlooked is that the highly intense and intertwined nature of interpersonal relations in a society of this size make the achievement of these goals highly improbable. A client will usually discover an administrator's attitude in regards to his case with little delay, either through friends in the service or from politicians.[1] Administrative secrecy, that cardinal virtue extolled by publishers of texts on British administration, becomes more a myth than a reality. Perhaps because the myth and the reality are so far apart, a fetish is made of stamping government documents "Confidential" which often reaches absurd proportions. It is possible for citizens to be refused access to materials published for public distribution on grounds that the document has been declared confidential. Not only clients, but politicians not in power who are friendly with civil servants have access to supposedly secret administrative decisions. When Gairy was in power it reached the stage when he and his Ministers were sometimes

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[1] One civil servant related the following, not atypical, incident to the author. At 10.00 a.m. he wrote a secret memo for submission to the Executive Council. That afternoon at lunch the client involved asked him why he had taken such a belligerent attitude towards the client!! In such circumstances it is the more surprising to find that a number of civil servants continue to try to preserve their anonymity and impartiality, often at the cost of unpleasant social sanctions.

the last to find out about decisions that had been taken. Because the society is so small, anonymity hardly exists, and every movement of anyone of importance is closely observed. The civil servant is under constant scrutiny by both the politicians and his clients. If a civil servant is seen associating with a politician, his colleagues are quick to charge him with violating his code of ethics. It is exceedingly difficult for the civil servant to develop a correct relationship with the politician; and he runs the risk of being damned for being too friendly or too hostile by one side or the other. The excessive political partisanship in the society intensifies this problem, particularly since the party system minimises ideological differences and encourages personal politics. The struggle between the civil servant and the politician in these conditions is apt to become highly personal and bitter.

Once the ministerial system has been established, there starts to appear a continuing flood of reports to the effect that civil service morale is low because of excessive political interference. For example, the Commission of Enquiry Report concluded with the following remarks:

> The Executive has deliberately destroyed the morale of the civil service by an undesirable interference with administrative duties and by improper threats against the security of office; the civil service has been induced by this interference and these threats to commit or condone improprieties or irregularities in the expenditure of public funds.[1]

Gairy in his reply to these charges put the blame mostly on the personalities of a number of leading civil servants, and their hostility to him. The pattern of terror and sabotage thrives in a situation where all issues tend to become highly personalised. The struggle is usually intensified after independence, since the colonial authorities in the

[1] Report of the Commission of Enquiry, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

terminal stages of colonialism usually uphold the civil servants when they are involved on constitutional grounds. The politician, however, because he sees the battle as ultimately one for power and control, and not a procedural matter, can only bide his time until the imperial authorities have gone to redress the balance of power in his favour.

Within the civil service itself the pattern of terror and sabotage and the tendency to personalise issues can play havoc. In 1963, after Gairy had been toppled from office the following letter from a top civil servant appeared in the Civil Service Association Bulletin. The author drew attention to the disturbing trend that had developed of vilifying individual civil servants in the local press whenever disciplinary action was taken against a member of their staff, and warned:

> When in October 1962 the Civil Service Association set out to operate on a basis of personalities rather than on principles, those Heads of Departments who aided and abetted that operation must have forgotten the old creole saying 'Stick that beat black dog beat white dog'. Already there are signs of the Stick falling on the other back... (January, 1963, p. 5).

It is also important to point out that Gairy's struggle with the service was primarily with those at the top, as many of the middle and lower levels worked willingly with him. Some people charged that they did this because they wanted to advance their own careers more quickly. This further exacerbated matters.

The struggle between the politician and the civil service and within the service itself is intensified by the scarcity of good jobs in Grenada. Only seven of the 22 civil servants interviewed in 1961 contemplated <u>ever</u> leaving the service. In the same group, ten gave financial considerations as the single most important factor in joining

the service, while another seven listed security. Only two replied that they had joined because of the opportunity to serve. The politician is also affected by the lack of other outlets for his talents. Politics for the colonial politician is a serious vocation, involving not only power but his whole means of livelihood.

To protect his interests and indeed to advance his career the civil servant must try to satisfy the often contradictory claims made by the politician on one side and his clients on the other. This involves him in the policy process, and there is correspondingly a low premium accorded to anonymity, secrecy and neutrality. His political neutrality will be even more severely undermined when he feels directly threatened by politicians like Gairy, and he will be tempted into open partisan politics. This occurred in the 1962 election, when in addition to their fight with Gairy there was also the issue of union with Trinidad, which directly involved the conditions of work and pay of the service. For his part, the politician requires two things from the civil service: he needs their skills, but perhaps even more he requires their loyalty. His own skills are those of manipulation and mobilisation of public opinion. Unless there is at least a partial fusion between his skills and goals and those of the civil servants, civil government will break down. The politician in this type of society must become an "educator" who reasons with the public about the desirability of certain policies if he is to be a responsible politician. The average civil servant, who has contempt for the politician because he is less well educated and experienced, does not concede him this role, but continues to see this as the prerogative of the civil servant. Lacking mutual respect for the different roles and skills that each ideally

could contribute, the two groups engage in competition, with a corresponding confusion of roles. The end result is bitter conflict, which can deteriorate into a situation of constitutional crisis if neither side is willing to compromise.

The Politician and Fiscal Responsibility

Gairy's next battle took place over his economic policy, as revealed in his first major budget in January, 1962. We have mentioned previously that when the West Indian Federation was established, Great Britain turned over the control and supervision of finances of grant-in-aid colonies like Grenada to the Federal Government. Gairy found this control exceedingly galling, and he complained bitterly that the G.N.P. had progressively succeeded in mortgaging Grenada to the Federal Government. Grenada had become a grant-in-aid colony in 1958, the year after the G.N.P. had come into power. Gairy was even more humiliated that he had to go "cap in hand to beg" from a former trade union colleague from an island even smaller than Grenada, Robert Bradshaw from St. Kitts, now Federal Minister of Finance. In his famous budget speech, Gairy said:

> I have never, never experienced in all my life a more excruciating, humiliating exercise as when I went to Trinidad to get grants for this country. Were it not for the people of Grenada I would have walked out ten times. I don't stick nonsense from anybody. When the Federal Officer has to tell me well you can't get this because St. Kitts doesn't have it, and cut that out Mr. Minister you can't get it for Grenada; take out that, Mr. Minister, the people can't get that; what they want with that. By Gosh, Mr. Speaker, it is indeed humiliating. And Grenada has always been able to keep its head above the economic waters. Hurricane Janet passed, met us in command. We were able to give back pay and increased rates of pay to the Civil Servants and still maintain our economic head above the water. As soon as we walked out for a moment - just for a moment - treasury control. This is missing. That is missing... When small people, I call them small in the Federal Government, when small people had to

> talk to me and tell me I couldn't get this for my country after having won an election here by an overwhelming majority. I felt hurt. I felt smaller than a man. [1]

He now deemed it of highest priority that his Government lead the country out from Treasury control. To achieve this desired goal, he was therefore forced to call for stringent measures to increase local revenues. In his budget speech he called for a large battery of new and increased taxes, which The West Indian labelled as a policy of "Taxes like Fire". In one fell swoop Gairy had now succeeded in completely alienating all the elites in the community, for his budget encompassed a purchase tax; a PAYE system for income tax; increased taxes on luxury items; export taxes on the banana, cocoa and nutmeg industries; and an increase in license fees.[2] His Government had also decided to nationalise the sugar industry; although of minor economic importance, this act could not have further inspired the confidence of the socio-economic elites. As though to underline his attack, he gave warning that his Government intended to make sure that

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[1] Chief Minister's Budget Address, 10th January, 1962, published in Grenada, Minutes of the Legislative Council for the Half Year Ended 31st May, 1962, Government Printers, St. George's, 1963, Appendix C, p. 10.

[2] In 1960 the percentage breakdown of sources of government revenue in Grenada was as follows:

	Per cent
Export Duties	9.1
Other custom duties	29.7
Income taxes	13.3
Licences	2.4
Other local revenue	19.5
Grants-in-Aid and other transfers	26.0
Total	100.0

Source: The Report of the Economic Commission 1965, op. cit., p. 5.

all the estate owners and other leading personalities of St. George's paid their back taxes.[1]

The Leader of the Opposition was quick to charge in his reply to the budget speech that all these tax measures were designed solely to meet the extravagant expenditure of Gairy and his Government and not for the public welfare. He likened Gairy to Nkrumah when he had spent millions furnishing and rebuilding his own house. He concluded that the Government was playing with fire, and that their policy should be termed "Tax Afire" rather than "Taxes Like Fire".[2] Mr. Gordon Munro, nominated member of the Legislative Council and "elder statesman" now that Marryshow was dead, gave a more reasoned but equally critical speech in reply.[3] His primary concern was that the proposed taxes would destroy incentives, and that the real problem was not increased taxes but increased productivity, which he claimed the Budget was silent on. He went so far as to predict that not a single scheme propounded in the budget would tend in any way to improve the living standards of the peoples of Grenada. He reiterated his own time-honoured dictum: "Everything good is desirable, but everything desirable is not always attainable". In conjunction with the question of productivity he raised a point that is especially pertinent for our analysis: he estimated that 42 cents out of every dollar from Government revenue was expended on wages and salaries of civil servants,

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[1] The Star of February 10th announced that due to this vigilance over $100,000 in back taxes had been collected.

[2] The West Indian, January 13th, 1962.

[3] Minutes of the Legislative Council ending 31st May, 1962, op. cit.

excluding travel and subsistence and other allowances. It is ironic that Gairy was having to raise such a large part of his controversial budget to pay for the salaries of a group whom he felt had opposed him so consistently. Indeed, his budget was made even higher by the Grossmith award of $450,000 for increased salaries of civil servants, which he had to honour.

The elites were not alone in their opposition to the budget. Strong popular opposition was manifested immediately, organised primarily by the opposition party, though certain interest groups also protested. On the opening day of the budget debate it was reported in the local newspaper, The West Indian, that the "Tax Like Fire" budget

> has caused a wave of dissatisfaction and unrest in the country and a demonstration has been planned for St. George's this afternoon which, according to certain sources, is expected to assume mammoth proportions. Buses which normally keep the lines of communications from the country to the city open have been requested to stay away from town all morning thereby keeping pro-government supporters from thronging the city and York House area while the Chief Minister is delivering his Budget Speech[1].

Gairy felt that the Administrator and the Chief of Police were not playing fair in allowing such a demonstration, though later in the day he retracted the charges he made against them earlier in the day.[2]

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[1] The West Indian, 10th January, 1962.

[2] In the morning he said that the Administrator and the Chief of Police were 'stretching things too far; they are making a mess of the law Mr. Speaker. I am vexed, I am very vexed Mr. Speaker, and I shall take the necessary steps in due course. Where a very important body like this is conducting a meeting and (they) would give permission for a demonstration passing alongside this building. Mr. Speaker, for passing through a meeting, they say, with a steel band, I lost my civil rights for four years." However, in the afternoon he said that neither was guilty of any disloyalty to the Government, and that the Chief of Police was investigating the incident in question, which involved a man with a hearse and a loudspeaker.
Minutes of the Legislative Council ending 31st May, 1962, op. cit., Appendix C.

Reports of the demonstration varied widely. Gairy claimed the next day that most of the crowd he estimated at 3,000 had come not for the purpose of demonstrating, but to listen, and that not more than 10% had gone on to demonstrate at Government House. However, other reports indicated that the demonstration was more effective than Gairy admitted, and included the handing over of petitions from a farmer's delegation and trade union groups protesting against the taxes. Gairy's budget speech lasted two full days; the actual speech itself lasting for a marathon eight hours. He then took a decision which only further added fuel to the flames. Although his entire speech had been broadcast by the Government Radio Station, the Leader of the Opposition, Blaize, was refused permission for his reply to be similarly broadcast. This led to another public protest only two days after the first one, when several city and waterfront business executives, commercial clerks and other employees joined in a work stoppage as a 'mark of protest' and who then went in large numbers to the Legislative Council to hear Blaize deliver his speech in person.

Gairy had clearly not bargained for such widespread opposition to his budget. The Star, more in sorrow than in anger, chastised the "small man" for not seeing that the taxes were designed for his benefit:

> Are we to believe that Grenadians today when called upon to play their part in the recovery of their country are refusing to do so? Are we to believe that our Grenadians are running away from facing up to their required responsibilities .... Must we reluctantly conclude that after 125 years since slavery was abolished we as a people still have the desire to be led and served food from a cauldron in a general way as the pigs in a sty....
>
> It is very unfortunate that some of the same people who this Government is trying to lift from their low state, are joining in this mad affair to try to bring to disgrace the plans and ambitions of Government. Why can't our people be able to distinguish between the liberator and those who have

> dedicated their lives to the return of the days of the whip. But this will never be, of course.[1]

The tone of this letter displays the basic paternalism and authoritarian attitude of colonial political parties, and provides us with the clue to the behaviour of the people in such situations. Many years of agitational politics have resulted in very weak links between the leaders and the masses, so that the leaders are out of touch with the thinking of the people and are unaware of what their reactions are likely to be to measures such as those proposed by Gairy. The leaders are thus surprised and hurt when the masses resist their incantation to sacrifice and hard work in the public interest.

The very essence of colonialism has been the deliberate non-involvement of the people in the political process; and concomitantly a sense of "public interest" has never been encouraged or developed. What the politician fails to realise is that a concern for the public interest cannot be brought about overnight, particularly by incantation or rhetoric. Professor Arthur Lewis has argued that in order to gain the co-operation of its citizens governments rely on persuasion, force and rewards.[2] He is strongly of the opinion that persuasion by itself is inadequate, and can only be an auxiliary measure, although in another part of his book he notes that occasionally a "great democratic leader" can carry his people through a phase of relative privation for the sake of building up the nation.[3] Force is not only distasteful but in any event is purely negative. Thus he claims that the most successful

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[1] The Star, January 13th, 1962.

[2] W. Arthur Lewis, Theory of Economic Growth (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1955), p. 390.

[3] Ibid., p. 401.

measure is reward, by which he means material reward. This view of human nature, which is so characteristic of the economists, does not take fully into account the social-psychological factors that motivate human beings.[1] It would be foolish to deny the importance of self-interest in any type of social, political or economic activity. Nonetheless evidence from other disciplines in the social sciences indicate that man does not respond merely to the highest bidder in all situations, but that his response is rather a result of a complex of considerations, rational and irrational, selfish and unselfish, arising from his whole socialisation. There have been many examples in human history revealing man as capable of weighing the public and private interest, and in many situations of sacrificing his private interest to the public interest. It can, of course, be argued that in reality he is weighing his present self-interest against his future self-interest. People may be willing to make sacrifices in the present if they are convinced that this will enable their children to enjoy privileges that have been denied to them. At this point the argument becomes meaningless, since this is

[1] Smelser has recently separated out four current meanings of economic rationality, some of which are more acceptable than others. He points out that the least acceptable meaning, which has now been discredited, is that as a matter of psychological fact that man chooses rationally only among these material satisfactions. He says that the idea that behaviourally man acts rationally when faced with economic situations is more acceptable, but warns that "the number and kinds of situation in which men economize are extremely variable. He also notes the use of the notion merely as an investigational desire for conceptual simplification, i.e. a provisional set of assumptions which is subject to revision or rejection if it proves unhelpful in analysing the problem. He then concludes "a final way of treating economic rationality is to consider it as an institutionalized value. Rationality now becomes something more than a psychological postulate; it may be a standard of behaviour to which people conform or from which they deviate.... The economic sociologist must retain this social meaning of economic rationality, for it lies at the heart of one of his central variables - social control". The Sociology of Economic Life. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 34.

exactly what is at stake in the new nations: that people must sacrifice some of their present for the sake of the future to achieve economic development. However, because the mass of people under colonialism have never been politicised in any but an exploitative sense and are cynical about the political order, the colonial politician draws the fallacious conclusion that the people are therefore inherently motivated entirely by calculated self-interest and are unable to see beyond the end of their noses.

Since the people still do not feel that they have a genuine stake in the society, they tend to rebel when a Government, even when led by a mass hero like Gairy, tries to impose taxes on them. They are whipped up further by the competing mid-elites in a fairly cynical way. Gairy has not been the only colonial or ex-colonial politician who has miscalculated how much taxation the society will tolerate. In this, the politician is often led further astray by the economists, who, horrified at the chaotic character of public finance in these countries, are wont to recommend drastic measures. These measures are usually based on fiscal measures employed in industrialised societies. At best, the politician appreciates the rationality and the equity of such measures, although he is also apt to be tempted by the sudden and unexpected resources these measures will bring to his Government. Implementation is another matter entirely which can bring the politician serious political difficulties. The so-called "Kaldor" rebellions in British Guiana and Ghana in recent years have revealed the ignorance of the politicians in regard to the reactions of the people. In both cases, sufficient account was not taken of the peculiar political and social configurations in the society, e.g. tribalism or racialism.

Gairy now learned at a high price what most politicians in the new states discover only after independence: that to introduce any far ranging social and economic reforms, the political system must be capable of providing the necessary supports. In a system of in-and-out parties rational calculations and appeals to the public interest become almost impossible. In fact, the electoral system actually encourages considerable irresponsibility on the part of the political parties. To gain office, all parties advocate policies that they know are irrational, and in many cases misleading and incapable of fulfilment. Gairy in his budget gave some indication that he was attempting to deal with at least some of the more pressing problems of Grenada, but he had failed to mobilise the necessary psychological and political support against the day when he would need it. To make political capital, the opposition party, which we noted in the last chapter espoused certain modernist goals themselves, were forced to campaign against the "modernising" policies Gairy was trying to introduce. Basically, both parties could not have failed to understand the necessity for at least some of the measures proposed by Gairy. The political system can almost be said to have a built-in incapacity to either "politicise" the society or to provide for rational government. Since any attempts they might make along these lines prove abortive and politically explosive, all parties cease concerning themselves with structural changes and amuse themselves with the rituals of politics.[1]

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[1] In another context I have discussed this phenomenon in a polemic way, terming this type of politics "Cuckoo Politics". The analogy is with the cuckoo bird in the clock. The politician performs the same ritualistic function as the cuckoo bird, loudly proclaiming his presence, but serving little functional use. Cf. my "Cuckoo Politics", New World Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1965, Kingston, Jamaica.

Patronage, Corruption and Fiscal Control

One of the rituals or substitutes for real policies that comes to assume importance in colonial and post-colonial societies is the perennial issue of corruption. Gairy was attacked for corruption almost from the time he took office, and by the time of his controversial budget these charges had become widespread. Shortly after assuming office Gairy began refurnishing Mount Royal, the official residence of the Chief Minister, the most controversial item of which was the purchase from Government funds of a baby grand piano for the residence. This provoked The West Indian to coin the term "squandermania", which Gairy's Government was subsequently unable to live down. Gairy retaliated that he was only exercising the normal prerogative expected of any Chief Minister, and that it could not be construed as corruption. The issue of corruption provided the bureaucracy and the socio-economic elites with a potent symbol with which to challenge the legitimacy of Gairy. Therefore, we must examine this issue more fully, particularly since it throws a great deal of light on the distribution of power within the community.

In the literature of both political science and law, the dividing line between corruption and patronage remains somewhat indistinct. The primary criteria used to differentiate between them is normative: patronage is acceptable, ocrruption is not. For example, The Dictionary of the Social Sciences defines patronage as "the right vested in a person, official or political party to appoint persons to offices and positions, to award contracts, and to dispose of emoluments."[1] What

[1] The Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Tavistock Publications, 1964) pp. 486-487.

is important in this definition is the notion of patronage as a right. Corruption, on the other hand, is defined as "the use in public life of public power for private profit, preferment, or prestige, or benefit of a group or class in a way that constitutes a breach of the law or standards of high moral conduct."[1] The difficulty arises in attempting to define what constitutes standards of high moral conduct. What it usually comes to mean is accepted administrative practice. In Grenada most of the debate on the corruption of Gairy's government centred around this question of accepted administrative practice, rather than actual breaches of the law, as we shall see.

In trying to discover and clarify what was considered accepted administrative practice in Grenada we started with an examination of the role of the chief financial officer, since it provides one of the keys to the unravelling of this rather complex issue. The chief financial officer in Grenada and other Crown colonies with similar types of constitutions is the Financial Secretary. After the Governor or Administrator, he is the most powerful official in the colonial hierarchy. In Grenada, as elsewhere, this officer has usually been an expatriate, trained as an accountant or bookkeeper, and not usually over-concerned with broad issues of economic policy. In the terminal stage of colonial rule these officers find themselves in an awkward position. The Chief Minister, who is also the Minister of Finance, is apt to quickly discover that the skills and the attitude of the Financial Secretary are at best inadequate for his needs, and more likely to be a positive hindrance. The latter has usually been trained to act in the best Treasury fashion as the "watchdog" over

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[1] Ibid., p. 142.

government expenditures, and tends to grudge every penny spent. At the other end of the continuum the politician is usually quite prepared to undertake "risk" expenditure. In larger colonies the politician may try to set up an independent Department of Economic Planning so that he does not have to depend on the Financial Secretary for technical advice on economic policy matters.[1] In very small territories like Grenada, however, this division is usually not feasible, and planning and financial control functions are normally located in the same Ministry, under the Minister of Finance, whose chief technical adviser is supposed to be the Financial Secretary. Prior to the introduction of an "advanced" constitution, this officer has enjoyed special privileges, the most important of which has been the power to issue special warrants for expenditures not budgeted for. Naturally, when the politician becomes Minister of Finance in the new system, he is anxious to take over this privilege. In Grenada the question of warrants became one of the bitterest issues between Gairy and his Financial Secretary. Both the Minister of Finance and the Administrator were authorised to sign warrants for expenditure provided for by appropriation laws. In regards to special warrants, the Finance and Audit Ordinance extended the warrant control to the Minister of Finance to include expenditure in anticipation of legislative sanction "but at the same time imposed a prudent and necessary check on the powers of the Minister by limiting the amount and the purposes and prescribing the circumstances under which expenditure may be incurred."[2] The

[1] Jamaica provides an interesting example of this. As long as planning remained under the portfolio of the Prime Minister, it enjoyed a special status and a fair amount of autonomy. However, at a later date when it was placed in the hands of a junior Minister, the Ministry of Finance reasserted its power.

[2] Report of the Commission of Enquiry, op. cit., p. 3.

maximum allowed for the use of special warrants was set at $50,000 and Gairy considered this limitation unacceptable.

To determine what constituted accepted administrative practice in Grenada was made even more complicated by the maze of different regulations[1] and officials responsible for finance, which has involved considerable overlapping and engendered confusion. Altogether, four different agencies or officials were responsible in 1961-62 for the control of finances of the colony. At the top level the Colonial Office, responsible to the British Treasury and Parliament, retained ultimate control. With the establishment of Federation, detailed control over the finances of Grenada had passed to the Federal Government, and they had one of their advisers located there. Grenada was required to submit all draft Estimates to the Federal Government for approval before incurring any expenditure. Further restrictions prohibited expenditures exceeding $10,000 under any head without prior approval, or the creation of any new civil service post carrying an initial salary of $4,000 or more. The Administrator was responsible to both the Federal Government and the Colonial Office. Finally, the Minister of Finance had certain responsibilities and control over finance. Basically, however, the Administrator and the Chief Minister were required to share fiscal control and responsibility (see chapter two, page 152). This situation was complicated further after the collapse of the Federation in 1961, which meant the reversion of direct control to the Imperial Treasury.

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[1]The expenditure of public funds during this period was governed by the following regulations: Part VI of the Grenada (Constitution) Order in Council 1959; the Finance and Audit Ordinance 1961 (No. 2); the Financial Stores Rules of the Windward Islands; the General Orders of the Windward Islands; and Colonial Regulations, ibid.

Under these circumstances a certain amount of confusion and conflict was bound to occur. Gairy interpreted his accession to office as giving him the right to exercise almost complete control over Grenada's finances, and he was not always careful to make a distinction between his right to make policy and the necessity to account to the public how funds were being spent. The bureaucracy, on the other hand, conceive it as their clear duty to protect public funds from what they consider illegitimate encroachments by the politician. It is not surprising that colonial politicians on their part are skeptical that the Imperial Government and the local bureaucracy are really trying to preserve and protect the public interest. To complicate matters, the line between economic policy and control and accountability is not always easy to draw although the Commission of Enquiry tried hard to make this distinction in justifying their investigation. They said they were not concerned with challenging the financial policy of Gairy's Government, but rather

> the supervision and management of public funds when being applied to purposes which may form part of the policy of Government.... An example may assist to indicate the distinction which we seek to draw. Government as a matter of policy may decide to build a hospital for which purpose five acres of land are necessary and a sum of $50,000 required. If the appropriate Minister proposed to purchase the land in a swampy or inaccessible area clearly unsuitable for the purpose or at an exorbitant price unrelated to market values, then although the policy of building a hospital is not questioned, the manner and circumstances in which the expenditure is managed becomes a question of financial control and falls within the scope of our enquiry.[1]

In many situations, of course, this distinction tends to blur.

The Commission of Enquiry divided the body of its report under two headings: the operation of controls, and questionable

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[1] Ibid.

expenditure. In respect to the first, they concluded that Gairy's government had violated a number of administrative codes, and particularly the financial controls that were specified in the various ordinances and laws. This they attributed to Gairy's deliberate choice of incompetent financial advisers:

> It is worthy of note that the Minister of Finance, having severed all effective contact with his Financial Secretary, took no steps to obtain proper advice. Instead, he appears to have relied for such financial advice as he thought he might need on a Principal Secretary, ..., who, on his own evidence, had no understanding of the laws and regulations governing expenditure and who, by his demeanour under examination, conveyed a regrettable impression that such matters were in his opinion of no account: and to have relied for the execution of his decision on a comparatively junior officer, ..., who, though claiming to have some knowledge of financial matters, was found on examination to be so ignorant of them that he did not even know whether or not he himself was in control of any vote. With this entourage it would be surprising if any Minister of Finance, acting with the best of intentions, did not find himself falling frequently into error. However, this particular Minister of Finance was apparently bent on error. He made it clear to the Administrator and to others that he would neither welcome nor consider any advice which would have the effect of delaying expenditure until it had been properly examined and authorised.[1]

In his reply to this charge, Gairy stated that the Financial Secretary had deliberately not given him the advice he wanted:

> On my assumption to the office of Chief Minister and Minister of Finance, it came to my attention that ... (the Financial Secretary) was paying to himself certain allowances to which he was not entitled. He was acting as a guilty person and kept completely out of my reach for the entire period since my assumption. (He) paid absolutely no regard to me as Minister of Finance. He was making decisions for my Ministry without any reference to me. He committed Government to the tune of $50,000 in a matter involving debentures without discussing it with me. However, I stopped the transaction as soon as I learned of it. I had every reason for, and became doubtful of (his) honesty and fidelity..... It seems strange that the Report failed to pay any attention whatever to the conduct of (the Financial Secretary) who is the Chief Executive in the Ministry in question.[2] (emphasis mine).

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[1] Ibid., p. 5.

[2] Reply of Gairy to the Commission of Enquiry, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

All the evidence given before the Commission underlined the extent to which sabotage and terror had been resorted to by the Financial Secretary and Gairy, and that no compromise between them was possible.

The other major issue in connection with administrative controls concerned what the Commission called the emasculation of the Tenders Board. Previously, the Director of Public Works had been able to authorise contracts for public works not exceeding $1,500 on his own discretion, and contracts involving less than $200 with no written contract. All amounts over $1,500 were awarded by the Tenders Board. However, in November of 1961 Gairy had curtailed the Director's power to authorise contracts to an upper limit of $25 (later amended to $50). Even more important, the Chairman of the Board was given power to authorise amounts between that limit and $5,000 without consulting the Board, and could authorise contracts over that amount at his own discretion subject to the urgency of the situation and after consultation with the Minister for Communication and Works. Since Gairy's government had earlier removed the Financial Secretary from the chairmanship and replaced him with the Principal Secretary in that Ministry, Gairy had, in effect, gained direct control of the Tenders Board through the Minister. He had also removed the Director of Public Works from the Board! Gairy replied that when the Tenders Board had been reconstituted he had not even been a member of the Legislative Council, let alone Chief Minister. However, since his party was already in power at that time there can be little doubt that the Tenders Board was reconstituted on Gairy's advice.

One other issue raised in the area of controls that is particularly relevant for our analysis was that of giving special honor-

aria to civil servants. It is a common practice in some of the territories to give certain civil servants honoraria for the performance of special tasks. This was not new to Grenada, and Gairy found it a useful device by which to repay those civil servants who were loyal to him when the budget was prepared. The Commission of Enquiry deemed these payments by Gairy "gratuitous and unnecessary".[1] Gairy retorted that although his Government had only paid out $3,020 in honoraria to a total of nine civil servants, the previous Financial Secretary had received $1,200. He claimed this had been brought out in evidence and was supported by minutes of Executive Council.[2]

The second part of the enquiry dealt with what was termed questionable expenditure, the most controversial of which was the purchase of 60 odd acres of the Minorca estate from a nominated member of the Legislative Council. Government wanted the lands for afforestation purposes and protection of a water catchment area. The Commission faulted the Gairy Government on two scores in connection with his purchase: the "exorbitant" price paid, and the manner in which it was paid. The crux of the matter concerned widely differing valuations of the land, Gairy having refused to accept the original evaluations by two civil servants with whom he was on bad terms and had instead had his own evaluation made. The price paid, although less than the asking price, was much higher than the original evaluations made by

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[1] Report of the Commission of Enquiry, op. cit., p. 6.

[2] Reply of Gairy to the Commission of Enquiry, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

the civil servants.[1] The Commission also charged that government had paid half of the total price with indecent haste and by the improper use of special warrant. They claimed that the expenditure had not been urgent in terms of the public interest and should have been financed through regular procedures, not special warrant. The Commission concluded that in this case and that of the purchase of another building by Government there had been a contravention of the financial rules.[2]

The Commission also pointed out that Civil Servants themselves often were ignorant of the rules, which Gairy was quick to pick up in his Reply as substantiating his charges of inefficiency of the Service. The most important point uncovered was the lack of knowledge of financial rules, the Commission admitting that certain financial irregularities had apparently been frequent for some time and that accounting officers had failed to understand fully their responsibilities. The investigation revealed, for instance, that no officer outside the Audit Department recorded the total amount of expenditure authorised by special warrant to ensure that it did not exceed $50,000,

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[1]The Commission blamed Gairy's Government for this as a deliberate act, without taking any account of the consequences of negligible land taxation in such cases. The Grenada Five-Year Development Plan 1964-1968 op. cit., pointed out that: "As land taxation is negligible, speculation is rife as owners can exploit the market without cost to themselves. The large increases in values over the past five years which have accompanied Government expenditure on development remain untaxed and the beneficiaries of these gains enjoy the benefit of such works without making any additional contribution towards their capital cost or maintenance. On sale, the gain becomes an untaxed gift of cash. It is ironical that Government often finds itself in the position of having to acquire lands at inflated values which it has been instrumental in creating." (emphasis mine), p.9.

[2]Report of the Commission of Enquiry, op. cit., p. 8.

the upper limit provided for by law. They also noted that accounting officers had to be made to understand that "a decision taken in Executive Council cannot in itself convey authority whatsoever for the incurring of expenditure".[1] This raises an interesting point, for this requirement placed the accounting officer in the very delicate position of being asked to question the authority of the Executive Council. Since the Administrator was also a member of Executive Council this meant that the accounting officer was not only required to question the politician, which was serious enough, but also the Administrator, who was the head of the Civil Service! In a situation where the Administrator and the Chief Minister were divided over most issues, the accounting officer was put in an intolerable situation. The Commission also emphasised that not only Ministers but civil servants also had failed lamentably in their fundamental duty to record decisions and instructions in writing.

The Commission candidly admitted that irregularities had been frequent for some time before Gairy's regime. This raises the whole issue as to what actions can be deemed corrupt as against actions representing normal administrative procedures. Gairy's defence was that his actions were "normal" practices, and that the Commission was deliberately harsh with him. The Commission, however, discounted Gairy's claim that much of the evidence was activated by political or personal antagonism, though they claimed to have taken this into account.[2] They attempted to explain how Gairy's irregularities differed from those of his predecessors as follows:

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[1] Ibid., p. 10.

[2] Ibid., p. 5.

> Ample evidence was produced to us that in the latter half of 1961 there was some change affecting financial matters which was of such a nature that several witnesses spoke of a breakdown of financial control. The exact nature of this change was not clearly described to us but since it appeared in the course of our enquiry that irregularities of the kind mentioned above were unfortunately not new in the history of Grenada .... we concluded that the changes, if indeed there were any, must be concerned rather with the nature of the expenditure itself or with the circumstances or manner in which it was incurred otherwise than in accordance with the financial regulations.[1] (emphasis mine)

They then went on to explain, not for the first time, that by the nature of the expenditure they did not mean its purpose, but how economically and successfully it had been used in achieving its purpose. In the end, they distinguished Gairy's irregularities from those of his predecessors primarily on grounds that they were premeditated and deliberate:

> Such irregularities as occurred prior to (Gairy's assumption of office) was described by several witnesses as 'normal' and 'usual' and by these epithets they appear to mean irregularities attributable to carelessness, ignorance or apathy.[2]

In other words, it was not so much the irregularities in themselves, but rather that Gairy had deliberately condoned and encouraged irregularities. What is interesting is that a number of these irregularities were considered "normal" and "usual" administrative practice.

Basically, as we have emphasised, the struggle involved two rival claims to legitimacy, and corruption was only a subsidiary issue. The Constitution assumed common values between the politicians in power and the bureaucracy, but this was lacking between Gairy and the Service. Theoretically, the Administrator had a dual role: to be the neutral arbiter above politics, and to share power with the

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[1] Ibid., p. 4

[2] Ibid., pp. 4-5.

Chief Minister in running the Government. However, his first role was made increasingly difficult by the struggle with Gairy. From January, 1962, it became increasingly clear that this struggle was one of establishing legitimacy between two rival sets of actors, led by Gairy on one side and the Administrator on the other side.

The Struggle for Legitimacy: Charisma - Institutional vs. Personal

We have attempted in this chapter to describe the three major conflicts that erupted during Gairy's short lived term of office. Underlying all these issues were the irreconcilable views of Gairy and the Administrator as to what their respective roles should be. Part of this divergence of views was inherent in the nature of the political system they were operating in, since a colonial political system has its legitimacy constantly questioned. Both Gairy and Lloyd sought to establish their claims to legitimacy on constitutional grounds. Thus, it was not surprising that the Administrator employed "constitutional" means to displace Gairy by appointing a Commission of Enquiry, which was his right under the Constitution as the Protector of the Queen's People, while Gairy also constantly referred to the fact that his power was also constitutionally derived. However, their rival claims to legitimacy involved charismatic legitimation. Despite the fact that Gairy's style was "political" as opposed to Lloyd's "constitutional" style, both emphasised their "special" position in the society. The Administrator's "special" position was sanctified by the Constitution and his office possessed what can be described as institutional charisma. Gairy claimed that he possessed "personal" charisma which gave him a special relationship with the mass. This does not necessarily mean that Gairy can

be classified as a charismatic leader.

On January 7th, 1962, James Monteith Lloyd, Her Majesty's Representative in Grenada, formally announced that with the approval of the Secretary of State he felt constitutionally bound to appoint a Commission of Enquiry into the control of public expenditure in Grenada from the first of January, 1961. On January 24th, his chief adversary, Eric Matthew Gairy, retaliated in a special interview with Mr. Reginald Maudling, the Colonial Secretary, who was then in Trinidad. Gairy claimed in an interview that he had told Mr. Maudling that the probe should reveal some interesting information that might convince the Colonial Secretary that Lloyd should go. "I told him either the Administrator or me has to go and I am sure it won't be me".[1] The two adversaries had now reached the point of no return, although Gairy had said in an interview with The West Indian just several weeks earlier that he thought he and Lloyd had reached a workable compromise and could work together and that he was not opposed to Lloyd who was a West Indian. However, in light of all the other evidence, this appears to have been a temporary tactical move on Gairy's part, perhaps in hopes at that time that he could head off the Commission of Enquiry.

Government House in Grenada is significantly located - overlooking the city of St. George's. We must now look at its occupant, the Administrator, more carefully. James Lloyd, a Jamaican, came to Grenada as Administrator in 1957. Born in 1911 Lloyd was a barrister by training (Lincoln's Inn). He came from a prominent Jamaican middle-class family, and his brother, Dr. Ivan Lloyd was a P.N.P. Minister of Government in Jamaica. The future Administrator entered the

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[1] The West Indian, January 24th, 1962.

Colonial Service in Jamaica in 1931 as an assistant in the Registrar General's Department, becoming a second class clerk in 1939 and moving up to first class clerk in 1943. In 1947 he was made Assistant Registrar General. From then on he rose very quickly: Assistant Secretary in 1950, Principal Assistant Secretary in 1953, and in 1956 he was appointed Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. Lloyd was clearly marked for a pivotal administrative role in the new Federation of the West Indies; like many of his class and generation he was an ardent West Indian nationalist.[1] Lloyd was very much a member of the middle strata of Jamaican society that M.G. Smith has carefully described,[2] and shared most of the values of this class. During his stay in Grenada he earned the reputation of being a competent and forthright administrator, and was well liked by both civil servants and the socio-economic elites. Both a student and practitioner of British constitutional practices, Lloyd took seriously his obligation to ensure that there were no violations of established procedure insofar as possible. He knew his General Orders well, and scrupulously tried to obey the injunction not to interfere in politics and not to seek to influence members of the Legislature to obtain concessions, although he must have been aware that many of his subordinates did not take these injunctions as seriously as he did. Gairy was usually careful in his attacks against Lloyd not to charge him with openly favouring the opposition, but rather as a spokesman

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[1]Wendell Bell has discussed this phenomenon in his book, Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation, op. cit.

[2]M.G. Smith, "The Plural Framework of Jamaican Society", The Plural Society in the British West Indies, op. cit., pp. 162-175.

for the "upper brackets", and that he practised passive resistance against Gairy's Government. In his Reply to the Commission of Enquiry, Gairy did charge Lloyd with openly supporting the Opposition, however.

Lloyd's basic philosophy was revealed in an address he presented to the Civil Service Association in 1962, from which we have extracted a few paragraphs which best appear to typify his views:

> The Civil Servant is an officer of one of Her Majesty's Civil Establishments... and holds office at the Queen's pleasure.
>
> The fact that the politician is as changeable as the climate while the civil servant like Tennyson's brook goes on forever, is simply a product of practice or convention.
>
> Up to the 18th Century civil servants were the products of patronage, since they were appointed by the politicians who themselves owed their positions to the patronage of the ruling Monarch. They could appoint their relatives, friends and political supporters, and in fact did so. They could, by using the Crown's power of dismissal make a clean sweep and fill the resulting vacancies with their own men.
>
> It therefore speaks highly for the British system that a Civil Service which grew out of patronage should now have established an unchallenged reputation for honesty and efficiency.[1]

He went on to point out that the Public Service held the key to success or failure of a Government, and listed all the ideal qualities of a civil servant, calling for a high quality of service and personal honesty. Perhaps best exemplifying his belief was the statement that "There is no theory more sacred in Government than the sanctity of the Civil Service from outside influence: it is for you to ensure that this sanctity is not violated."[2] While Lloyd, with his strong professional commitment, was completely sincere in desiring a modern,

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[1]The Civil Service Association, "Addresses Delivered During Civil Service Week", Grenada, Government Printers, St. George's, 1962, pp. 3-4.

[2]Ibid., p. 5.

rational system of Government in Grenada similar to that in England or America, Gairy construed Lloyd's attempts in this direction as deliberate obstructionism to his political goals. Like most other colonial administrators, Lloyd was unrealistic in believing these goals could be easily or successfully implemented in a society like Grenada.

The Enquiry began on February 5th, but its validity was immediately challenged by Gairy's legal representative, and the matter was taken to a court of law. An interlocutory injunction was issued, which delayed the sitting of the Commission until the middle of April, when the Court ruled in favour of the holding of the Commission. Gairy then appealed the case to the Federal Supreme Court, which, however, refused to allow a stay for all matters concerning the Commission. In May they dismissed the application with costs. The Commission took evidence from the middle of April to the second of May, and a number of witnesses had legal representation. Gairy declined a written invitation to give evidence on grounds that he had been advised not to do so by his lawyers, pending the decision of the Federal Court.

Throughout this period Gairy carried on an open campaign against the Administrator. For example, at the end of January, The West Indian headlined a story "Gairy vs. Lloyd - New Flare Up in Cold War", which involved an incident concerning the meeting of the Executive Council. Gairy had failed to appear at a meeting of the Council called by the Administrator because of another meeting. Angered, the Administrator set another meeting for the afternoon, but this time at Government House. Gairy countered that he and his Ministers would not go to Government House, but that he would be

holding a meeting of Executive Council himself that afternoon at the Ministry buildings, and that if the Administrator did not attend, Gairy would preside. In chapter two we pointed out that Constitution required the Administrator, as far as practicable, to attend and preside over Executive Council meetings, but in his absence the Chief Minister should preside. While the Executive Council was not to be summoned except by the authority of the Administrator, he was required to summon a meeting if requested to do so by the Chief Minister, which left the door open to just such an impasse as this. The meeting was finally fixed for the following morning, as a compromise.

The Federal officials, the Colonial officials and the local elites lined up wholeheartedly behind Lloyd. The general tenor of the hearings can be deduced from the types of witnesses who gave evidence. Twenty-three of the 37 witnesses giving evidence were civil servants, the remaining 14 included "businessmen, land surveyors, a planter, an auctioneer and estate accountant who is the Mayor of the Borough of St. George's, the manager of a local hotel, a local estate manager and the managing director of a local insurance company".[1] Apparently no interest groups were represented. Gairy stressed this omission in his Reply:

> It is interesting to note, and of the greatest significance, that not a single representative of any of the recognised organisations in Grenada displayed any interest or took any part in the Enquiry, e.g. Agriculturalists' Union, Chambers of Commerce, Co-operatives, Farmers' Clubs, Trade Union Council, Teachers' Union, Civil Service Association, etc., although an open invitation was extended to all.[2]

Gairy also charged that "rehersals" had been held of witnesses prior to their appearances before the Commission, guided and prepared by the

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[1] Report of the Commission of Enquiry, op. cit., p. 3.

[2] Reply of Gairy to the Commission of Enquiry, op. cit., p.1.

Acting Attorney-General and the Chief of Police.[1]

The conclusions[2] reached by the Commission gave Lloyd all the evidence he needed for his dismissal of the Gairy Government: he called for a suspension of the Constitution. On June 14th, 1962, the Constitution of Grenada was suspended. In the despatch which followed from the Colonial Office, the Secretary of State expressed grave concern over the state of affairs revealed by the Commission's Report, and upheld it in toto:

> The abuses disclosed by the Commission of Enquiry struck at the roots of good Government in that they concerned the control of public expenditure and the morale of the Civil Service.... It cannot too strongly be emphasized that the observance of proper controls over the expenditure of public funds is essential to enable a Government to maintain the confidence of the public both at home and abroad. As I am responsible to Parliament for the proper expenditure of United Kingdom funds provided for Grenada, I have felt obliged to take steps to ensure that I am in a position more effectively to discharge that responsibility.3

The Order suspending the Constitution[4] dissolved the Legislative and Executive Councils of Grenada, and provided for the suspension or modification, until a new election had been held, of provisions relating to the Executive Council and Ministers of Government.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[2] The General Conclusions charged Gairy and his Government with the following: contravention of laws and regulations governing control of expenditure; failure to seek or accept advice of civil servants; deliberate destruction of the morale of the civil service; interference and threats against civil servants to condone improprieties or irregularities of expenditure. Report of the Commission of Enquiry, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

[3] Despatch from the Secretary of State Regarding Report of Commission of Enquiry Into Expenditure in Grenada, Grenada Government Gazette, St. George's, July 28th, 1962.

[4] Statutory Instruments, 1962 No. 1244, Caribbean and North Atlantic Territories, The Grenada (Constitution) Order in Council 1962.

The Administrator assumed all executive power. In his despatch the Secretary of State promised a number of changes in the Constitution when it was restored. The Administrator was to be given the power to appoint a bureaucratic official as Minister of Finance.[1] Finance and audit measures were to be strengthened, and a Public Accounts Committee was to have a permanent place in the machinery of Government. It was also agreed, as the Commission had recommended, that the Administrator would be allowed to appoint members of the Public Service Commission without consulting the Chief Minister, although the Secretary of State pointed out that under the 1959 Constitution the Administrator had not in any case been required to act in accordance with the advice given by the Chief Minister. Further, what had been known as the Governor's reserved powers were to be re-introduced. (See chapter two, p. 126). As a result, from 1962 Grenada had a less "advanced" Constitution than the other non self-governing territories in the Leewards and Windwards.

The suspension was received with unusual calm in Grenada; there were some rumours that another 1951 was in the making, but contrary to expectations there was no prolonged protest. The newspapers and the Opposition party welcomed the action openly; they claimed that it would put an end to squandermania. Our survey of the attitudes of voters in Grenada, most of the data for which appears in the next chapter, revealed that 50% of the electorate supported the Administrator's action, while 35% opposed it. This contrasts with

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[1] The Colonial Office was not really concerned with exercising long term control over Grenada's finances, as revealed by the action of the Administrator in appointing the new Chief Minister (Mr. Blaize), as Minister of Finance after the elections. This clause was clearly added in the eventuality that Gairy was elected again to office.

the much stronger support of the elites for the suspension, not surprisingly. Thirty-three of the 39 economic elites we interviewed favoured the measure, as did 10 of the 17 civil service elites and 7 of the 10 non-G.U.L.P. political elites. Most of those opposed to the measure in all three groups raised the question as to whether the suspension had not been unnecessarily drastic, since they felt that Gairy could have been removed from office by other means. However, there was virtually no public discussion about the constitutional principles involved.[1] Squandermania had become a partisan issue, and Gairy made sure that it would remain so. In speeches throughout the Island he kept repeating the theme that foreigners wanted to destroy him, whom he identified as being located in the Administrator office. This theme had first been proclaimed in The Star of February 17th, 1962.[2]

There was only one serious strike during this period, but it was not politically motivated. The Allied and Technical Workers, a

[1]The only major speech to deal with the constitutional and civil libertarian questions involved was made by the Premier of Barbados, Errol Barrow. The Premier outlined some of the consequences of constitutional set-backs in the area and condemned the actions of the Colonial Office. This speech was unfortunately interpreted in Grenada as supporting Mr. Gairy, and hence did not receive serious attention. I am grateful to the Information Officer in the Government of Barbados for making available to me all the tapes of the debate in the Barbados House of Representatives.

[2]Gairy listed them as follows:
"The Administrator is a Jamaican
The Secretary to Government is a Vincentian
The Adviser - the Acting Attorney General - is a Vincentian
The Assistant Secretary to Government is a Barbadian
Mrs. Norma Fleming is a Vincentian, and even the two drivers are Barbadians, he said.
But something which appears to be rather strange to the Chief Minister, is that Mrs. Joshua Thorne, who is a Grenadian and had been employed at Government House for a long time, has now been transferred.
The Chief Minister smiled and said no more."
All those named were West Indian.

non-Gairy union, called a strike soon after the suspension, which made it impossible for passengers to enter or leave Grenada by any commercial air liner. The seamen went on a sympathy go-slow, thus giving the impressions that Grenada was in a state of siege.[1] Gairy himself made no attempt to call a general strike; some trade unionists in Grenada suggested that he could not have mustered enough support for a successful general strike.

Towards the end of July Gairy sent a cable to the new Colonial Secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys, charging that the recently published Auditor's Report for 1960 when the G.N.P. had been in power had revealed "appalling irregularities". He asked that Mr. Sandys use his good office to direct that copies of the Report be made available to the public, concluding that "his confidence in British fair-play gave him ground to assume that Mr. Sandys will do this."[2] Lloyd issued a release saying that the Report would be released as soon as the Legislative Council was reconstituted and the Report was tabled. The G.U.L.P. gave wide circulation to the rumour that a million dollars had been removed from the Treasury by the G.N.P. in 1960, Lloyd finally retorted that he had already issued a statement proclaiming the rumour false, and that if people wanted to be misled, he couldn't do much about it.[3] He explained that the so-called "missing

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[1] The author was asked by the Administrator to be the Chairman of the Arbitration Board responsible for settling the strike. Emergency sessions were held continuously for two days, and I am grateful to a number of individuals who helped me understand the complexities of labour relations in Grenada. I am especially grateful to Gordon Munro and Derek Knight, the two chief adversaries, who during these long sessions "educated" me about Grenada from two diverse points of view.

[2] The Trinidad Guardian, July 30th, 1962.

[3] The West Indian, August 17th, 1962.

funds" were not missing at all but were the result of the normal practice of Supplementary Appropriation bills being tabled in the following year. No serious disturbances were reported in August, and the Administrator announced that the elections would be held on September 14th. That election forms the basis of the following chapter.

Conclusions

Lloyd had won decisively in his battle with Gairy. During the three months when he ruled Grenada on his sole authority, he held a number of press conferences and spent much time trying to restore the morale of the civil service. He sent the man who had been Gairy's Permanent Secretary on retirement leave, although he was only 38 years old, and suspended two other civil servants who had been close to Gairy and who had been severely criticised by the Commission. Immediately following the September election he suspended yet another civil servant, a newscaster for the Government radio station on grounds of "gross impertinence and subordination". This official was also regarded as having pro-Gairy sympathies, and had clashed with the Administrator at the time of the suspension of the Constitution. Lloyd also began to revamp the fiscal administration of the colony, setting machinery in motion to avoid a similar situation in the future. He skilfully avoided getting involved in the issue of union with Trinidad, which by this time had begun to overshadow the squandermania issue. The West Indian gave him full support, variously describing him as "Superboy", "Powerhouse" or "Top-Boy Administrator". He restored the confidence of the socio-economic elites in the Government; for them he became the hero who had restored sanity to Grenada.

During this period he announced that he had accepted a post of Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister of Jamaica after the election. As a going away present, the Grenadian electorate defeated Gairy and voted the G.N.P. back into power.[1]

Lloyd possessed a great deal of personal charm and was an urbane and sophisticated man; his personal qualities greatly enhanced the charisma inherent in the office he held. What Shils has to say in another context helps explain how both Gairy and Lloyd claimed legitimacy based on differing notions about charisma:

> These rulers have experienced the revelation of nationality. Hence, because the nation is the ultimately significant entity, only those who rule - in the first instance, the politicians and, derivately, the civil servants - are endowed with the charisma of the nation. Those who do not share in this authority and, even more, those who do not affirm with vigour their membership in the national community are thought to share very little of this charisma. [2]

In the case of Lloyd, of course, he did not rule derivately as just an ordinary civil servant, but as the Queen's Representative and Head of the Government, and all of this as a West Indian. Because of the

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[1]The following extract from The Torchlight of October 10th, the G.N.P. newspaper, was typical of the eulogies printed in the press on Lloyd's departure from Grenada:

"In the three centuries of our Colonial History; European Governors and Administrators have played their part - some well, others badly. But James Monteith Lloyd as the first West Indian of African descent, to have represented the Crown in the full capacity of Administrator and Commander in Chief, has emerged from the Crucible, highly pleasing in the sight of the Colonial Office, as well as in the hearts of the thousands of Grenadians of Goodwill, whom he has so ably served. Mr. and Mrs. Lloyd are leaving our shores today comfortably nestled in our hearts - may continued prosperity attend them."

[2]Edward Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma", World Politics, Volume XI, No. 1, October, 1958, p. 4. Although the dissolution of the West Indian Federation posed a seemingly insoluble dilemma for the people of Grenada in their search for national identity, it did not diminish the strong desire for such an identity, no matter how inchoate its expression.

lofty nature of the office of Administrator, he was accorded a role as head of the nation beyond that accorded even to the mass hero. The latter was at a disadvantage because of the necessity to "dirty his hands" with partisan politics. As Shils points out:

> 'The conduct of office and the management of a party machine impose lines of action which are far from identical in spirit with the charismatic disposition. Compromise, manipulation, rational judgement, and acceptance of opportunities for self-aggrandizement are among the inevitable products of the exigencies of leadership in the state and the party. Nonetheless, the preponderance of considerations of nationality is evidence of the persisting sacredness of the nation. The extreme nationalist sensibility of the rulers is not a demagogic mask to conceal self-seeking.'[1]

Both Gairy and Lloyd claimed to be speaking in the national interest. Gairy based his claim to speak for the nation on his election to office by the majority of the people, while Lloyd claimed that he had a higher responsibility to protect all the elements of the society above considerations of politics. Lloyd believed strongly that the Constitution, not the electoral system, was the ultimate source of authority and legitimacy, and that the politician must not be allowed to exceed the powers specifically delegated to him. The ultimate power of the state is assumed by men like Lloyd to be neutral, and its function to service all "interests" in the society in a non-partisan way. Socio-economic interests are not considered to represent partisan or political interests in the community. The collaboration between the civil service and the socio-economic elites is therefore viewed as keeping the system in equilibrium. Both the bureaucracy and the socio-economic elites tend to treat the politicians as mid-elites with carefully circumscribed functions who should not

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[1] Ibid.

meddle with the economic order. When a politician like Gairy refuses to accept this narrow definition of his role, there is a very bitter struggle for power between these elites and the politician. This conflict comes to supersede partisan political conflict.

Since the electoral system was devised primarily to settle rival claims between competing mid-elites, there is no mechanism to settle the more fundamental power conflict between the politicians and the bureaucratic elites as to which has legitimacy to speak for the whole country. The Constitution is incapable of doing this, since it is based on the assumption of a community of interests between the two groups. The bureaucracy, which, if left unchallenged will try to maintain at least a semblance of neutrality and continue with its law and order functions is likely to engage in direct political action if they are threatened although normally they consider their political obligations fulfilled if they ensure that elections are held regularly and conducted fairly.

Perhaps the most unfortunate consequence of this state of affairs is that the citizen is denied the chance to participate in the resolution of these rival claims to legitimacy, or of whether they want to alter the balance of power within the elite structure. The electoral system becomes a facade, where issues of lesser importance are debated. The whole electoral process then tends to be reduced to a question of personalities and factional disputes. Since the political system is incapable of resolving the basic power struggle, the contradictions within the society are only forced underground during the period of terminal colonial rule. After independence, however, the bureaucracy finds itself without its powerful patron, the

Colonial Office, and if the politicians are seriously determined to wrest power from the bureaucracy the struggle erupts into the open and is apt to be bitter and prolonged. Neither group has been realistically prepared for independence, nor for this basic struggle. Ironically, the terminal stage of colonialism, with its "advanced" constitution, usually aggravates the tensions within the community and postpones the inevitable adjustments that will have to take place, but which are now made more difficult by the bitterness engendered in this period. The myth of "preparedness" for independence is dangerous, for it lulls people into believing in easy and unrealistic solutions to problems.

The electoral system usually continues to dominate the energies of the mid-elites for some time after independence, for by this time they have a vested interest in the continuation of the system, as do the socio-economic elites. The mass, as we shall see clearly in the next chapter, remain only partially involved in the political system, although superficially excessive partisanship tends to conceal this. While the system may continue to function for some time after independence, papering over the cracks in the wall, the overthrow of so many governments with this type of electoral system in the Third World demonstrates its fundamental inadequacy. In the meantime, the system provides a pantomime, which in a peasant society serves a very useful entertainment function!

CHAPTER V

THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT - THE ELECTION OF 1962

In a recent essay Sir Arthur Lewis has attempted to resolve the problems of democracy and representation in what he calls plural societies. He argues that the word democracy has two meanings:

> Its primary meaning is that all who are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in making that decision, either directly or through chosen representatives. Its secondary meaning is that the will of the majority shall prevail. [1]

He then goes on to claim that the main purpose of political parties is political warfare, which he says is tolerable in class but not in plural societies. He concludes that

> What is wrong with the parties in new states is not that they exist, but that their inheritance from European political philosophy is the language and tactics of the class war, rather than the language and tactics of groups whose problem is to learn how to live in coalition with each other. [2]

Many of the present day discussions concerning democracy and political science are fast becoming saturated with this type of "slide rule political theory" which assume that somehow the fundamental problems of political conflict can be resolved by

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[1] W. Arthur Lewis Politics in West Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1965), p. 64.

[2] Ibid. p. 69.

formula. In his book The Real World of Democracy C.B. Macpherson, a distinguished student of democracy, has remarked that

> There is a good deal of muddle about democracy. I mean not that democracy itself consists of muddling through (though this could be argued), but that our thinking about democracy is muddled. This is partly due to boredom....At bottom, the muddle about democracy is due to a genuine confusion as to what democracy is supposed to be about. For the word democracy has changed its meaning more than once, and in more than one direction.[1]

This confusion about the meaning of democracy in the minds of the theorists is also reflected in the minds of the practitioners, especially those charged with the responsibility for devising electoral systems for colonies. The latter have responded enthusiastically to any device that appears to resolve the problems of conflict, power and interest configuration. The difficulty in devising electoral systems is that they must take cognisance of the character and nature of the social structure if they are to prove successful. Most framers of colonial constitutions have shown a singular lack of concern for the peculiar social structures that exist in these societies. They normally transplant political goals of the metropolitan society, e.g., liberty, equality, etc., into societies where there is neither consensus nor in some cases a nation. However, gross distinctions such as those suggested by Lewis, i.e. class versus plural societies, do not take us much further in our understanding of the complexities of these societies.

W.J.M. Mackenzie some time ago raised some of the

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[1] C.B. Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966) p. 1.

fundamental questions in respect to representation in plural societies.[1] One of his basic premises is that an electoral system has a precise formal structure which is set within a complex and moving political situation, and that in politics, as in other branches of knowledge, one must fragment in order to gain a point of leverage, either for purposes of action or explanation. Parsons, reflecting a similar view but using a different language, notes that the voting process can be treated as an authentic social system where actions and interactions can be treated in terms of specific modes of interdependence which can be analytically separated.[2]

With the electoral system we now come to the final stage of our analysis. This presents us with considerable analytical difficulties, however, for it immediately raises the boundary problem, particularly in relation to the social system.[3] It therefore may be useful at this juncture if we attempt to show

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[1] W.J. Mackenzie, "The Export of Electoral Systems", Political Studies, Vol. V, No. 3, October 1957, pp. 240-57.

[2] Talcott Parsons "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System" in E. Burdick and A. Brodbeck, American Voting Behaviour (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959).

[3] Smelser has recently attempted to define the concepts of system and sub-systems. Noting that the notion of system is an analytic concept which enables us to talk about the relations among structural units in sociology and to generate propositions about these systems, he points out that "For certain purposes it is permissible to treat one or more social sub-systems as 'closed'; we can inquire into the relations among economic units alone, for instance, without referring to the political sub-system of society. As we shall see, however, there is continuous interaction among sub-systems at their analytic boundaries. Sometimes we cannot ignore this interaction; we cannot understand the internal relation among economic units, for instance, without inquiring into political policies". Neil J. Smelser, The Sociology of Economic Life (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963) p. 37.

the relationship between the electoral system and the other sub-systems of the political system. The electoral system in democratic societies is supposed to perform a legitimising function; it allows the leaders of the other sub-systems - the legislative and the executive - to govern. But in colonial societies, especially during the phase of terminal colonial rule, the electoral system performs a number of contradictory functions simultaneously, partly because the law establishing the electoral system is not autochthonous; it is an alien law imposed on the society. Lipset has argued that legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society. He is careful to point out that legitimacy, in and of itself, may be associated with many different forms of political regimes, including oppressive ones.[1] Thus, the electoral system in a colonial society may come to enjoy legitimacy in spite of the oppressive character of the government, although there is a tendency for it to be continually challenged.

In previous chapters we saw how the two other major sub-systems of the political system, the legislative and executive, were transformed by the participants in politics in Grenada, while at the same time they had begun to internalise the values associated with these institutions. We observed that when the legislative and the executive came into conflict in 1961, they

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[1] Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1960) p. 77.

were both seeking legitimacy on different grounds. By utilizing role analysis we were able to observe how the two institutions began to transform one another, and that this transformation was due not only to the peculiar character of the political system but also because of the peculiar social milieu in which they were located. In the case of the electoral sub-system, the problem becomes more complex, as it performs such a variety of functions and is more directly affected by the social system. In attempting to analyse the role of the electoral system, the heuristic device offered by Parsons and Mackenzie provides us with a partial solution. While it is essential that we must analytically isolate the electoral system, there is still the problem of trying to resolve the boundary problem which plagues all systems analysis.

It is this failure to adequately take into account the interaction between sub-systems and systems and to view the electoral system in isolation that leads Arthur Lewis and to a lesser extent Duverger[1] to misunderstand the problem of coalitions in politics. Lewis, for example, argues that a proportional representation system is more likely to encourage coalition government in plural societies like those in West Africa. It is well known that traditional societies tend to be particularistic, and that this particularism leads to political identifi-

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[1] We shall not attempt to explore the logical contradictions in Duverger's thesis, which has already been done in Colin Leys' brilliant article "Models, Theories, and the Theory of Political Parties", Political Studies, Vol. VII, No. 2, June 1959, pp. 127-146.

fications which reflect this particularism. Lewis argues that it is difficult to achieve coalition government in a first-past-the-post system, since it almost inevitably results in majority rule, and hence in "plural" societies this means rule by the numerically most important communal or racial group. Simmel in an early work argued the reverse proposition: that territorial representation forces the parties to enter into coalitions before they enter the legislature. [1] The crucial question therefore is at what stage compromise is reached: in systems of territorial representation coalition occurs prior to entry into the legislature if at all, whereas under a system of proportional representation coalition is more likely to take place in the legislature. Recent events in many of the new states should caution us against seeing electoral systems as panaceas for more deep-rooted political and social problems. In political analysis this point has led to a great deal of tautological argument. On one hand, it is argued by some scholars that electoral systems do not work because of the peculiar character of the social structure. On the other side there are those who argue that the electoral system merely reflects the peculiarities of the social structure.

Eisendstadthas emphasized that partisan identification in traditional societies is complicated by the fact that the number

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[1] George Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).

of new groups entering the political arena is limited.[1] This is especially the case in small, agrarian societies like Grenada where the lack of economic development makes it difficult for political parties to make new alliances. They are therefore particularly prone to what Michels has so brilliantly described as the general willingness of a political party to "sacrifice its political virginity, by entering into promiscuous relationships with the most heterogeneous political elements".[2] In societies where more rapid social and economic changes are being experienced, the political parties merely sacrifice their virginity, but in static agrarian societies where there is a marked absence of new groups, the political parties more often must resort to rape.

The functions of a political party, then, must be understood not only in relation to the electoral system but also to the social structure. We have already discussed the evolution of a particular kind of political relationship that can develop in certain types of colonial situations, which we have identified as the hero-crowd party. This type of party, we have seen, relies heavily on crisis conditions to mobilise support. Gairy's movement, as we saw in chapter three, emerged out of the crisis of 1951 and thereafter resorted to a crisis strategy to maintain itself electorally. The crisis strategy places a high premium on

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[1] See S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

[2] Quoted in Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964), p. 5.

discussions of "instrumental" questions to the exclusion of the more substantive questions of political, social or economic change. The counter elites also find that unless they respond to this device by developing their own crisis strategy, they are unlikely to obtain mass support. Opinion formation under conditions of crisis requires considerable simplification of issues and emotional identifications with persons or factions. Not only are colonial political parties therefore highly personalistic, but concomitantly anti-intellectual, even though they may use ideological slogans. Having been nurtured in the crisis mentality, they tend to behave in power as though they were still in opposition, an attitude which is re-inforced by their denial of ultimate responsibility under colonialism. As we have observed in Grenada the years of tutelage do not breed responsibility but the reverse. Even if mass heroes like Gairy attempt to become routinised, i.e. "good boys" in the eyes of the Colonial Office, they painfully discover that the socio-economic elites have more power than they do. Even though Gairy tried hard to "reform" and become acceptable to the elites, he was constantly made aware that they would not forget 1951, nor the colour of his skin or his background.

The party of the middle-class counter elite presents the image of a "responsible" party which enjoys the confidence of the colonial officials and the educated section of the local populace, unlike the party of the hero. They tend at the outset to emphasise the importance of the due process of law, and try to mobilise the mass on "rational" grounds. But as we saw earlier, they soon become

aware of the fact that in order to survive, they must adopt the crisis strategy, or, as in the case of Jamaica, come up with a counter-hero.

Nonetheless, if one looks at the electoral system in isolation in these societies, the impression gained is that of a viable two-party system, in which both parties accept the rules of the game, by vacating office if defeated at the polls. This transfer of power takes place under the sympathetic supervision of Her Majesty's representatives. On these occasions the elites and the colonial officials like to congratulate themselves on how successful the electoral system has proved, despite their qualms when men like Gairy get elected. We have argued that in the post-independence period this "success" is often proved spurious. However, at this stage we must turn our attention to the evolution of political parties in Grenada and observe the process of routinisation.

The Pattern of Party Competition and Party Organisation and Finance

Between the granting of universal adult franchise in 1951 and the end of 1961 Grenada experienced five island-wide elections. The electoral laws and practices remained substantially the same throughout this period: with a slightly different procedure being followed in the Federal election in 1958, when three members of the local Legislative Council were either appointed or elected to the Federal Government.

One of the most clearly discernible trends over this period was the emergence of political parties and later their polarisation. In the 1951 election there were 21 candidates

competing for 8 seats, of which Gairy's party won 6. His party, the Grenada United Labour Party (G.U.L.P.) was the only organised party in that election. However, by 1954 the counter mid-elites had begun to enter the political arena, and in the election that year there were 27 candidates for the 8 seats, seven of whom joined some political party after the election. Gairy again won six seats in that election, although one member shortly afterwards defected from the G.U.L.P. By the time of the 1957 election there were four organised political parties, including Gairy's party. The most important of these new parties was the Grenada National Party (G.N.P.) organised in 1955. The other two parties were the People's Democratic Movement, and the Grenada Federal Labour Party. Several independent candidates also ran in 1957. Altogether, 24 candidates stood for election for the eight seats. Gairy's party won two seats, as did the G.N.P. and P.D.M., while the remaining two seats were won by independents. Immediately after that election, one independent member and one member of the P.D.M. joined the G.N.P., thus giving the latter a majority of four. In the 1958 Federal election the other independent member, Marryshow, resigned his seat and joined the Federal Senate, as did one G.U.L.P. member and one G.N.P. member. In the by-election which followed to replace these three, one seat was won by an independent, and one each by the G.U.L.P. and the G.N.P., thus not altering the balance of power.

The trend of events immediately following the 1957 election began to reveal a tendency for the Gairy and non-Gairy forces to become polarised. The members of the minor parties

realised that if they were to beat Gairy they would have to coalesce, for which purpose the G.N.P. appeared as the best standard bearer. The important point to note is that the coalition of 1957 took place after the election, in the Legislature. Gairy thus found himself in the position of a minority leader in the Legislative Council, although his party still retained its popular majority. The G.U.L.P. received 44% of the popular vote in that election, a much higher proportion of the vote than any other single party obtained. From chapter three it will be recalled that Gairy was disenfranchised shortly after the 1957 election for an infringement of the elections law, and was therefore ineligible to lead his party in the Legislative Council in any case.

The interaction between the legislative system and the electoral system in this period was obviously beginning to produce a particular kind of party competition. It may be recalled that after 1955, the Constitution specified that the territory was to be prepared for ministerial government by the creation of a committee system; and therefore from 1956 there were four "Ministers" in the Legislature (one Without Portfolio) who exercised a limited amount of control over certain specified Government Departments. This Committee System with Ministers sitting in the Executive Council required cohesion and co-ordination if they were to enjoy the limited power allowed by the system, thus virtually forcing the various factions into a coalition. The 1959 Constitution which gave more power to the Ministers only further emphasised this need. Therefore by 1960

the demands of the Executive Council and the Legislative Council as laid down by the Constitution had engendered increasing polarisation in the party system.

By the 1961 election, the number of political parties had been reduced to three, the third party being a new party, The People's Progressive Movement (P.P.M.), which ran six candidates. In that election 29 candidates, including four independents, competed for ten seats, of which the G.U.L.P. won 8, the G.N.P. won 2. In respect to the popular vote the G.U.L.P. gained 53%, the G.N.P. 29% while the independents and members of the P.P.M. received 18% of the vote altogether. Finally, in 1962 the election was a straight fight between the two major parties, with only 20 candidates running for the ten seats. However, the seat for Carriacou was unopposed, and in one constituency an independent ran against two candidates of the major parties, but he won only 61 votes. We will be analyzing the results of that particular election in detail later on in this chapter; here our interest is the process by which the party system eventually reduced itself to two major parties by 1962. The following table summarises this trend between 1951 and 1962.

TABLE 8

AVERAGE NUMBERS OF CANDIDATES FOR SEATS IN THE GRENADA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1951-1962

Election	No. of Candidates	No. of Seats Contested	Average No. of Candidates for Each Seat
1951	21	8	2.6
1954	27	8	3.4
1957	24	8	3.0
1961	29	10	2.9
1962	20	10 [a]	2.0

[a]Including one seat unopposed.

In analytically isolating the electoral sub-system, we have had to neglect the influences of the social and economic systems on the political system. To try to trace these influences we must now examine the character of the parties themselves and other interest group configurations to determine what other factors led to this particular kind of political competition.

We will begin with the parties themselves: their organisational structure, campaign strategies and methods of finance. In chapter three we described the rather disdainful attitude of the various elite groups to the political mid-elites, and noted that the upper classes, i.e., the landowners and commercial classes, rarely participate actively in partisan politics, and that only certain sections of the middle classes

participate directly. The attitude most prevalent among members of these groups is that politics is dirty, vulgar and not respectable. Because these groups are numerically small, the political party must base its strategy on mobilising the mass, who are mostly estate labourers and small farmers, or, in many cases, both at the same time, as we saw in chapter one. Hence, the political party must speak to and for the mass, or at least give that impression. The party of the mass hero and that of the middle-class leaders, however, differ in respect to the base of their support; the urban working class more often supports the middle class party; and the rural people the party of the hero, which allows some sort of balance to be struck electorally. Since both parties have a hard core of support in their respective strongholds, at election time they can concentrate on the marginal seats. In Grenada, where there is only one sizeable town, and over 80% of the population is classified as rural, the party of the hero has a decided advantage. Nonetheless, Gairy felt it necessary in the 1961 election campaign to try to attract some of the urban middle class vote by issuing a manifesto calculated to belay their suspicion of his party. [1]

In his speech to the Legislative Council in August 1961,

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[1] In this manifesto the Party pledged as its four main pillars: the basic absolute importance of family life; freedom of religion and the preservation of religious schools; recognition of the right of private ownership; and expansion of the economy. More specifically it promised homes for civil servants, more scholarships for secondary schools, etc.

when he was re-instated, Gairy claimed that "I am somewhat, if not totally responsible for the party system in Grenada". To some extent his claim was justified, in that he had founded the first mass based political party in Grenada in 1951 by fusing two organisations, a party and a trade union, in which the party functionaries could not be distinguished from the union representatives. The manner by which this type of hero maintains his links with the masses is important to understand. Gairy, like most other West Indian politicians who belong to the hero category, developed two strategies to maintain himself in power. The first was the strategy of the crowd; this strategy has been employed primarily by the political party, and involves open air meetings of committed followers where the hero attacks the opposition. Gairy developed a second type of strategy for those meetings where trade union and party business are conducted. It is through these meetings that the routinisation and bureaucratisation of the party has taken place. Because of the use and nature of these two strategies the organisation has remained free of excessive bureaucratism, and has retained its basic personal appeal. It is this peculiar mixture of routinisation and personalism that explains the nature of many West Indian political parties.[1]

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[1] This point is not sufficiently emphasised by observers like Paul Bradley (see his "Mass Parties in Jamaica", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1961, and Ayearst, op. cit.) My own investigations of the J.L.P. and the P.N.P. in Jamaica reveal a similar pattern to that found in Grenada. Cf. my "Parties, Elections and Money in Jamaica" a paper prepared for the International Political Science Association, Comparative Finance Group, Washington, D.C., September, 1965.

In the rural districts Gairy did not try to duplicate the trade union and party organisations; at all levels of the organisation this fusion between roles has been apparent. The following diagram gives some idea as to the nature of the organisation.



The above diagram is somewhat misleading in that it makes the organisation appear far more formally structured than it is in reality. The only important organisational contact takes place at political meetings. While the large mass meetings are held outdoors and are highly informal and emotional, with strong religious overtones, the organisational meetings are more formal and are usually held indoors, in a school house for instance. Gairy arrives for these meetings early and meets people who have specific problems in the constituencies. He then handles all his union and party work, while other speakers address the meeting. For these meetings Gairy dresses formally, usually in a lounge suit, and has an executive style as contrasted with his flamboyant style at public meetings. When he addresses these meetings, his style is also formal, and he talks about the unemployment situation, the road building programme, or similar topics, and concludes by

asking the meeting to pray for his efforts. He rarely jokes at these meetings, nor does he refer to the opposition and their activities. This is a meeting of the "family" as he calls it, and therefore must be conducted with dignity. After this he then discusses the major problems that are worrying the local party workers and the activities of the local leader.

Gairy normally takes a neutral line in factional disputes. "I have come here to listen, and you know that if your Uncle does anything he listens to your troubles. Now - Mr. J. - he is a hard fighter, he stood beside me in '51, in '57 and in the last election when others were leaving Uncle, he stayed, and your Uncle does not forget who stays with him, and those upstarts who come in late and want to be leader of this and that". He never refers to the other faction by name, and concludes by urging all his workers to pull together, but threatening to take drastic action if they fail to do so. He leaves the meeting only after he has tried to have an individual word with all those present. On occasion he goes to the home of the local representative after the meeting where he will take a meal, but no formal business is conducted at these sessions. Quite often these occasions turn into what is known in Grenada as a fete, allowing female constituents to express their affection for the leader by dancing with him. Gairy has always enjoyed a reputation for being attractive to women.

Gairy's political organisation has remained personal even during campaign periods, and he has always commanded more support than the candidates he nominated. There is no functioning

central organisation; Gairy instead maintains personal links with all the constituencies, but not necessarily through the local candidate. A party supporter knows that if he wants action or a decision he must see Mr. Gairy personally; Gairy in his turn is careful to make sure that he is there to meet his people when they come into St. George's. A rural supporter who has come into town knows that if he waits long enough at Number 5, Gairy's headquarters in town, he will be allowed to see the leader. There are a large number of issues that Gairy deals with on a personal basis. He takes up cases of police victimisation immediately. In spite of his own years of troubles with the law, Gairy has considerable support among the lower levels of the police force, particularly the constables. When he was Chief Minister he found that the senior police officials did not take kindly to his direct method of dealing with the members of the force, and he often had open clashes with them. He normally does not hand out money himself in cases of financial hardship but has other members of the union or party staff carry out this function. At Number 5 a market woman from the village or a labourer in town can always count on a drink and a meal. The bulk of his time spent with constituents is dealing with problems involving litigation, especially land disputes. He does not actually handle these cases himself, but sends his supporters on to lawyers who would be sympathetic to his movement.

In marked contrast to the personal style of the G.U.L.P. is the bureaucratic style of the G.N.P. The latter has a constitution which clearly demarcates all the officials and their

functions. It was organised by an American trained dentist, who has held the position of political leader but who has never sought a seat in the Legislative Council. Three types of membership in the party are set down by the constitution: individual, youth, and affiliate membership for organisations; for all these categories membership fees are charged. The party is organised into a number of units. The basic unit of the party at the grass roots level is the party group in each area; at the next level there is one constituency group for each electoral district. The General Council is the governing body of the party, comprised of three members from each constituency group, members of the Legislative Council or the party's candidate in each constituency, plus delegates or candidates from District Boards or the Municipal Council. The Central Executive is elected annually by the General Council, and is comprised of a battery of officials including a political leader, who is not necessarily a candidate or member of the Legislative Council. There is also the General Convention, comprised of delegates from all the various groups, which meets annually and can be convened for Special Conventions.

The elaborate structure of the G.N.P. does not mean that the party in fact is as well organised and structured as it appears on paper. Nonetheless, the style of the party is bureaucratic and it has had considerable difficulty in making contact with the peasantry in Grenada. Essentially a St. George's party, it was only in the election of 1962 that the party was able to effectively mobilise the peasantry on the basis of the union with Trinidad issue. The leadership of the party is dominated by

members of the St. George's middle classes. Party meetings are normally orderly, and there is a strong emphasis on discussing issues. There have been at least two factions within the party. The "Government" faction has been led by Herbert Blaize, Chief Minister in 1960-61 and from 1962 - , a quiet and soft-spoken citizen of the island of Carriacou, which is a serious disadvantage in Grenada since he has thereby been labelled a small island man by the Grenadians![1] He has the reputation of being a reliable, honest politician on the conservative side, with a considerable personal following in Carriacou. In St. George's the political leader, Dr. Watts, enjoys considerable prestige but lacks widespread support.[2] The influential social and economic elites are not normally members of the party as such,

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[1]This sort of scorn for fellow West Indians who come from smaller islands in a sort of pecking order can be seen throughout the West Indies. The Jamaican scorns all the others, the Trinidadian scorns the Barbadians and the Windward and Leeward Islanders, etc., down the line. Fanon has also noted the same phenomenon in the French West Indies, stating that the citizens of Martinique consider the people from Guadeloupe as savages. Cf. "Antillais et Africains" in Pour La Revolution Africaine (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1964), pp. 30-31.

[2]During the 1962 election campaign The West Indian described him as "The former Party Leader now turned backseat driver" in reporting a scathing election speech he made against Gairy, noting further that contrary to beliefs that he had quit the ranks of his brain child organisation the G.N.P. for keeps that he had gone as he said "to preach the gospel of the truth" to the people in the area about the Trinidad issue. The story began "Politico-dentist John Watts stood in the role of a '20th century John the Baptist' last night." September 5, 1962.

except when something like the issue of union with Trinidad brings them out into open support and even membership. However, with the notable exception of one leading near-white family, the majority of establishment families do not actively participate in G.N.P. politics.

Party competition in Grenada, therefore, takes place between these two political parties which differ in respect to organisation, style and type of supporters. Although the pattern of urban support for the G.N.P. and rural support for the G.U.L.P. has become fairly stablished, in the 1962 election the counter mid-elite was able to make an inroad into Gairy's rural support. The pattern of party identification reveals that adherents of the hero's party tend to personalise their support much more than do the G.N.P. supporters. It is well known in rural areas which individuals support which parties, This simplifies the task of the party organisers, for they are well aware of who can and who cannot be canvassed, and their main task is therefore to make sure that people get out and vote. In one area a party-trade union organiser was able to identify the political affiliations of the entire community of 34 families. The participant-observer for our study in that area later found his assessment was accurate.

The differences in party organisation are partially reflected in the nature of party finance. In the case of the G.U.L.P. the fusion between the political party and the trade union has been most marked in this area. Although the party imposes membership fees, this source of finance is relatively

unimportant. However, it could be argued that the G.U.L.P. is a mass party with a well organised due's collecting system if one treats the trade union and the political party as a single organisation. The G.N.P. could in some respects also be characterised as a cadre party with financial support from a few rich contributors providing an important source of funds. This view of political party finance, made popular by Duverger, is somewhat misleading in the case of the West Indies, however, despite superficial resemblances. While both parties exhibit some of the features of mass and cadre parties, there are fundamental differences, as we have seen.

The G.U.L.P. relies heavily on two types of support. Their regular financial support is derived from the trade union, but they also have obtained substantial funds from the "new" planters who have recently become powerful in Grenada. This class of planters, designated as "black" planters (which in Grenada includes East Indians who have achieved this status) have taken out "insurance policies" in the society by their heavy financial support for both political parties. During Gairy's tenure of office as Chief Minister in 1961-62 he was able to increase his financial support from this group.

Despite these more usual sources of party finance , both parties, but particularly the G.U.L.P., derive an important part of their support from "personal services" performed by a number of types of people. A local landowner may provide the food and drink for the fete after a meeting, or he may pay for the rental of loud speakers and cars. In these transactions there is

little money disbursed directly by the party, making it very difficult to "cost" the parties' activities. This informal method of financing party activities with its heavy reliance on personal services further prevents the encroachment of bureaucratisation. The single most heavy campaign expense in Grenada is the transport of supporters: from areas of strength to areas of weakness; from the countryside for mass meetings in the capital; and to the polls on voting day. This expense is often borne by the truck owners, and in some cases by the richer planters. Pamphleteering and the distribution of leaflets takes place mainly during the height of election campaigns, and the cost of printing and postage tends to be minimal. Furthermore, since nature has blessed Grenada with a system of natural air conditioning, the candidates do not have the expenses of hiring halls and meeting places; meetings almost invariably are held out of doors. If rain comes, it usually delays the meeting for only a few hours.

The buying of votes does not appear to be as widespread as often charged though both parties accuse each other of this practice vehemently. Both parties bear their heaviest expense on election day, when each candidate must make sure that his supporters are at the polls. On this occasion, some hired help is used, but many G.U.L.P. candidates are able to rely on the services of the trade union official in their constituencies for this purpose. In 1962 particularly, the G.N.P. had a well organised system of transportation for voters on election day, and taxis were very busy throughout the day.

While it is impossible to estimate the total cost of an election for the parties, in the case of the G.U.L.P. trade union membership offers a starting point. This is probably less true of the membership lists of the G.N.P. for it is generally accepted that they receive a larger share of their funds from well-to-do donors. One fact that is not disputed is that the formal limitation on expenditures by candidates is never taken seriously. Party officials from both parties were unanimous in their opinion that candidates spent far more than the amount allowed.

In small societies partisan identification is not taken lightly; in the 1962 election feelings ran so high that children were warned not to play with children whose families were presumed to be supporting the opposition. This intense partisanship occasionally leads to violence, especially in rum shop discussions and at fetes or parties. The aftermath of such fights is that often families who have been friends for years will have no contact with one another for long periods. This type of political competition tends to destroy the sense of community identification, thus introducing cleavage within the community. It can be argued that this type of political partisanship, since it is almost totally lacking in ideological content, leads to political fanaticism, which does not enable the individual to develop a rational criterion for the organisation and integration of opinions. Political parties in many colonial societies, and particularly in the West Indies, have not served as integrating agencies but have accentuated the funda-

mental schism in the society. Since intense partisanship provides an ideal mechanism for the relief of frustration, and an outlet for rage it helps to keep the political structure from collapsing. However, the relief that it affords is only temporary and is non-creative. Once this factionalism is institutionalised, the political system can continue to "survive" at least for some time, allowing for a circulation of the mid-elites between the party of the hero and the middle-class party.

It is only when we understand the pattern of political socialisation during the colonial period that the dismal history of political parties in the post-colonial phase becomes intelligible. Coleman and his associates have recently identified what they consider to be the staggering burden carried by political parties in the immediate post-colonial period in Africa:

> Two particularly significant aspects of the immediate post-colonial situation are (1) the heavy functional load thrown upon the new policy that state builders are seeking to stabilize and legitimate, and (2) the fact that, initially at least, the party is, or is rationalized as being, the most visible, immediately available, national organization for the performance of many, if not most, of the functions involved. [1]

This staggering burden is placed on the shoulders of men who have been politically socialised to avoid taking responsibility

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[1] James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964) p. 656.

and who have come to concentrate on electoral politics in a framework devoid of issues.

We have already made mention of the problems created when the political parties cannot find new groups in the society with whom to make alliances. In Grenada the only significant new group in the society has been the service oriented working class in the city. Although mainly oriented to the G.N.P. this group in recent years has been courted by both parties, and the competition for its support has further increased partisan identification. The type of fanaticism that is engendered in this type of situation is made worse if there are minority groups or two large different ethnic groups within the society as the system encourages the consolidation of particularistic identifications. In Grenada this has not been as serious a problem as in some of the other territories, particularly Trinidad and Guyana, formerly British Guiana.

As factional politics become institutionalised, party politics become a profession. Professionalisation simply means obtaining a guaranteed income as a legislator. Thus the Legislative Council system has provided the financial underpinning of the party system. Politics then provides an avenue to social mobility and job security, and is especially attractive for lower-class and lower middle-class individuals who would otherwise have little chance of mobility in an essentially static society like Grenada. Middle class individuals take a greater risk in entering politics, for they may sacrifice income opportunities and the security of their previous employment. For middle class

professionals like doctors and lawyers who can maintain an independent source of income, however, politics has proved attractive. Those middle class individuals who are most dependent on politics for their livelihood are more often prone to be fanatical in their partisanship than those with independent incomes. The former are often responsible for those attempts to "modernise" politics by introducing slogans which are then passed off as ideology. As we emphasised in an earlier chapter, the system makes it virtually impossible for genuine ideological politics to develop. The absence of ideology means that the struggle within the party and between the parties will become increasingly dominated by the rituals of office, rather than the maximisation of a set of goals or values. In the final analysis, this pattern of party competition not only encourages divisive elements in the community but also produces parties that are essentially conservative, despite their slogans to the contrary.

The Election of 1962.

The 1962 election campaign revolved around two major issues. During the first part of the campaign interest centered on the squandermania charges against Gairy's dismissed government. From about the middle of the campaign, however, the issue of union with Trinidad began to gain in importance, until by the eve of the election it superseded all other issues. Throughout the campaign, the personality of Eric Matthew Gairy dominated the discussion. Gairy's defeat in that election appeared to resolve the crisis that Grenada had been experiencing, although as we shall see in our conclusion it did not provide a long term

solution to the problems that had created the crisis in the first place.

Apart from these two campaign issues there were several other important factors that undoubtedly hurt Gairy in 1962, although the first one was not a campaign issue. This was the dramatic outflow of Grenadians to Great Britain in this period in their attempt to beat the impending ban on coloured immigration. Between 1960 and 1962 a record number of Grenadians left for Great Britain. [1] As the majority of those who left were from the rural areas, this meant a considerable decline in Gairy's support. In one district of about 200 people that we studied, at least 30 of Gairy's hard core supporters had left. His organisation was particularly hard hit; in some areas he lost his key men and was not able to replace them before the election.

Possibly even more damaging to Gairy was the very large decrease in the number of electors between the 1961 and 1962 elections not accounted for by immigration. While the figures below (footnote 1) disclose that altogether 3,252 Grenadians emigrated to Great Britain in the two years together, the decrease in the number of names on the electoral register in the less than 1½ years elapsing between the elections was 6,465.[2] The

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[1] The Grenada Report for the Years 1961 and 1962, op. cit., gives the number of Grenadians emigrating to Great Britain as 2,502 in 1960; 2,200 in 1961 and 1,052 in 1962.

[2] There were 41,087 names on the voters list in 1961 and 34,622 in 1962. Report of the Legislative Council General Elections for the Year 1962, Grenada, St. George's, the Government Printer, 1963.

Administrator did admit at a press conference at the end of August that some enumerators had done their work carelessly, with the result that many persons had lost their right to vote at the forthcoming elections. He confessed that he was powerless at that date to assist the three thousand voters reported missing from the voters list, but added that the blame lay equally with those who were deprived of their vote since they had taken no steps at the proper time to secure inclusion of their names.[1] The official Report on the elections, while admitting the carelessness of certain enumerators and Supervisors of enumerators charged that in some cases the co-operation of the electorate had been lacking.[2]

It was not unnatural that Gairy immediately saw this as one more conspiracy against him although it is of course impossible to prove that all those left off the lists were Gairy supporters. There are grounds for believing that Gairy was probably more damaged by this than the G.N.P. was. In a speech in Grenville he remarked that "In 1951 they tried to get rid of me by putting me on a British gun boat but the people taught them a lesson, they voted for me, and I stopped the violence. Now in 1962 they appointed a commission to take away the people's right by dismissing my government, and now they have stooped to the lowest, they are taking the people's vote away. I will fight, for I know that God will smite the evil, and reward the righteous".

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[1] The West Indian, August 29, 1962.

[2] Report of the Legislative Council General Elections for the year 1962, op. cit.

Gairy based his campaign squarely on the squandermania charge and his removal from office. He constantly reiterated the point that the British government had not taken away his government but the rights of the Grenadian people. In a conversation with the correspondent of The Trinidad Guardian he struck this note:

> And let me tell you this, I lost my seat and my government on a charge of misusing public funds - you called it squandermania - but my hands are clean. They tried. They hunted high and low. I hear they sent people all over the world trying to find out about me. Now they know nothing is missing. Everything is there. The furniture they talk about, that they made so much fuss about, is in Mt. Royal. It's all there.
>
> And that's what I am fighting this coming election on. I have nothing to hide, nothing to be ashamed of. Don't let anybody fool you and say that this election is Little Eight versus Trinidad. Nonsense. This election is a plain issue. Did I misuse public funds? Squandermania, whatever you want to call it..[1]

During the first part of the campaign the opposition played into Gairy's hands by also making squandermania the main issue, popularising a calypso written by Mighty Zebra of Trinidad called Squandermania:

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[1] By Eric Gairy as told to Pat Chookolingo, The Sunday Guardian (Trinidad) August 12th, 1962, p. 13. Chookolingo was formerly editor of The West Indian, and one of the most controversial figures in Grenada during this period. An astute journalist, Chookolingo had earlier been able to revitalise The West Indian and was a critic both of the St. George's establishment and of Gairy's organisation. However, the best coverage of the Grenada election of 1962 and the issues involved are to be found in his articles on Grenada which appeared in The Trinidad Guardian during this period.

The Chief Minister of Grenada
Spending money like fire
He got a piano for 3000 five
And some Grenadians can't eat enough to stay alive
He run the country into bankruptcy
Spending all tax payers money

Chorus

Oh, Oh Uncle Gairy
What you doing to we
You fooling the Grenadians one by one
And killing them with starvation

When I read the Trinidad Guardian
I said this man must be a mad man
In such a poor and undeveloped island
This man looking like the Queen of England
Big time house, big time limousine
And I hear the Chief Minister love wabine[1]
And when he drinking his grog he does jump and bawl
'Man I paying anything at all'.

Jiminez run away with half of Venezuela
Farouk living nice now on the Riveria
Juan Peron had to leave Argentina
And the Czars had the same experience in Russia
General Fulgencio Baptista had to run with his family from Cuba
So Uncle just take a look at that history
And leave the people money.[2]

This strategy only played further into Gairy's hands. He told his meetings that the opposition was angry because a poor black boy had reached a position where he could buy a piano, not just for himself but for the prestige of his government. He said it was alright with "that crowd" for colonial Governors to have tea parties, but when Uncle had a few drinks with his friends they labelled it squandermania. He invoked the Robin Hood image, claiming that if he stole, he stole from the rich to give to the

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[1] Women.

[2] Printed in the newspaper Torchlight.

poor, and that he would break any rule that did not allow him to improve the lot of the poor. In any case, it was becoming increasingly clear that large numbers of the people had not seen the Report of the Commission with its long list of charges against Gairy's government, though most people were aware of the broad issue of squandermania.[1]

Then, luckily for Gairy, the Auditor's Report of 1960, when the G.N.P. had been in power, was released. Gairy charged that the Report disclosed considerable fiscal discrepancies[2] and that it completely validated his charge of corruption against his opponents. He claimed that the charges against him were minor compared to the losses incurred under the previous administration, and immediately made this his major issue. The G.U.L.P. began

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[1] Our election survey (see Appendix I for full details) revealed that 76% of the electors had not seen the Report, despite its wide dissemination in Grenada. Nonetheless, most people held strong opinions on the matter, 50% of the electorate agreeing that the Constitution should have been suspended, while 35% said it should not have been suspended. 15% were undecided or had no opinion. The attitude towards suspension was highly correlated with party pre-disposition, as the following figures show.

TABLE 9

ATTITUDE TOWARDS SUSPENSION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY PARTY PRE-DISPOSITION

Attitude Towards Suspension of the Constitution	Percent of those pre-disposed to G.U.L.P. and G.N.P. by Attitude to Suspension	
	Pro-G.U.L.P. Percent	Pro-G.N.P. Percent
Agreed with suspension	21	82
Disagreed with suspension	73	13
Not sure or no opinion	6	5
Total	100	100

[2] This Report has not yet been published (1966).

producing pamphlets, which was a rare strategy for them. A typical one read:

BIG, BIG MONEY

- MISSING -

Way de Money Go? Where is the money?
Where is the 1960 Audit Report?

Bring Back our Labour Government.

Now we know why they tried so hard to get rid of the Labour Government. Yes, they wanted to cover up their filth.

"Squandermania" Eh? Any Government that spends money is a good Government, provided that every single cent is properly accounted for, as in the case of the Labour Government. When a Government spends money everybody benefits, every business benefits.

A Government that does not spend money, but cuts down work is a bad Government. A Government under whose Administration nearly one whole MILLION DOLLARS IS MISSING and unaccounted for, is a Dishonest, Dirty, Worthless and Good-for-nothing Government, especially when they are Bold-faced enough to say bad things about honest people. ..

The press began to ask questions about the 1960 report. At a press conference the Administrator stated that the issue was a red herring and explained that the so-called discrepancy had arisen as a result of the practice of tabling Supplementary Appropriation Bills in later years which caused the confusion. Nonetheless, Gairy continued to make political capital out of the issue. As the campaign progressed all constituency reports indicated that Gairy was indeed gaining strength on this issue. By the middle of the campaign Gairy seemed sure of victory, as he seemed to be retaining almost all of his supporters, with very few reports of defectors.

However, by the middle of August The West Indian, reflecting the views of its owner and publisher [1] stepped up its campaign for union with Trinidad as being essential for Grenada's future. Throughout the rural areas the issue of squandermania began to recede in importance as the Trinidad issue gathered momentum. The question of union with Trinidad had first been mooted during the period of Gairy's regime. After the collapse of the West Indian Federation there appeared to be two courses open to Grenada, though neither was more than a hope. One was to join in a Federation with Barbados and the other Leeward and Windward Islands,[2] both Jamaica and Trinidad having opted for independence on their own. The other possibility that appeared on the horizon was to join in a unitary state with Trinidad. Gairy began preliminary discussions with the Premier of Trinidad, Dr. Eric Williams, on this subject in February, 1962, before Williams went to the independence talks in London. The discussions at the Conference suggest that for some of the delegates there was a confusion between unitary state and associated status. Gairy at that time appeared sympathetic to the idea, and Trinidad indicated willingness for Grenada to negotiate separately with the British Government about associated status with Trinidad. Gairy, however, adopted an attitude which was reflected in his campaign in the summer, namely, not to commit Grenada prematurely. He

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[1] J.B. Renwick belongs to one of the old established families in Grenada. He has always displayed a very ambivalent attitude towards Gairy. On occasion his paper has supported Gairy, but on the issue of union with Trinidad it broke completely with him.

[2] This group was popularly known as The Little Eight.

seemed anxious to maintain his contacts with the rest of the Caribbean, perhaps ultimately hoping that Grenada could play the lead in the establishment of a new Caribbean state with Trinidad at the centre.[1]

Gairy's strategy of keeping the Trinidad issue out of the elections was not successful, however. He had told Chookolingo that

> The G.N.P. are saying they are going to the polls on the Trinidad issue. All I can say to that is that Blaize and Co., will embarrass Grenada when they lose. They will in effect be ruining chances of Grenada going to Trinidad.
>
> But I will tell you this. I am not yet prepared to make a statement on where I stand. I will do that after the elections. Let the G.N.P. talk Trinidad all they want. I shall say what I am doing after the elections. There is nothing wrong with this. Dr. Williams refused to comment on the federation issue before the elections. Well, that's good enough for me. [2]

On August 22nd, The West Indian headlined a story that 40,000 Grenadians living in Trinidad wanted a unitary state of Trinidad and Grenada. The opposition stepped up its campaign and began to ridicule the idea of a Federation of the Little Eight. Despite Gairy's desire to stay clear of the issue, the opposition was able to pin the label on him of supporting the Little Eight.

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[1]Gairy has claimed that throughout his tenure of office he never ruled out the possibility of an effective union with Trinidad. His only query at this period was that the enormous political problems involved required prolonged examination before any final agreements could be made. Indeed, he argued that his attitude at the Trinidad conference had been conciliatory and open.

[2]The Sunday Guardian, Trinidad, August 12th, 1962, p. 13.

A Grenadian poet, who called himself 'Eight Hater' penned the following poem which was widely distributed by The West Indian:

UNCLE'S PLAN

Come early or come late
Uncle is for 'Little 8'
But Uncle knows that Trinidad
Is what will make Grenada glad.

'Little 8' is Uncle's pet,
Because that's where he's sure to get
Motor car and house and ting
Plenty cash for him to fling.

So Uncle said in usual style
'My dear people wait a while
After election I will show
Which way Grenada is to go.

Uncle feels he's playing smart
'Little 8' is in his heart
To say so now, he'll be a goat
He wouldn't get a single vote!

But now he finds the pressure hard
The people voting Trinidad
So Uncle said, 'You have to see
Williams will only talk to me.'

But, Uncle been and talk before,
And what happen? What's the score?
Williams and I can't agree
Grenada will lose her identity.

If you see we put Gairy back
That will be his same attack
Make as if for Unitary State
Then sell us out to the 'Little 8'. [1]

The calyponians also got into the act: Lord Pretender of Trinidad composed his Unitary State Calypso, which said that Little Eight meant poverty while Unitary State would bring prosperity, and that 40,000 Grenadians in Trinidad would either have to run back

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[1]Printed in The West Indian, August 29, 1962.

home or become citizens of Trinidad if a Federation of the Little Eight took place. A group of Grenadians living in Trinidad launched a "Friends of Grenada Movement" and began holding mass meetings in Trinidad to whip up support for the idea of unitary state among the Grenadians living there. They also publicised their work in Grenada. On September 6th an"Open Letter to All Grenadians"appeared on the front page of The West Indian which they had written, listing all the advantages to be gained by union with Trinidad.

Nonetheless, as late as the end of August Chookolingo in The Trinidad Guardian suggested that Gairy still had a good chance of winning the election, particularly since the news had been released that Lloyd, the Administrator, was resigning.[1] However, by the first week of September it had become apparent that the "Go Trinidad" movement had made serious inroads into Gairy's support. In the rural areas Trinidad flags were making an appearance, and the American-style campaign device of distributing ties and pins became widespread. On Sunday, September 9, four days before the election, a large rally was organised, addressed by a delegation of the "Friends of Grenada Movement" from Trinidad. A former political leader and founder of the G.N.P., Dr. John Watts, made speeches denouncing union with the Eight, and cited a newspaper report that in Barbados 200 people had recently applied for 10 jobs. A strong anti-Barbadian sentiment was developing, Barbados being the leader of the Eight.

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[1]The Trinidad Guardian, August 27, 1962.

This theme about the poverty of the Eight and the corruption of its leaders was contrasted with the bright lights of Port-of-Spain, the capital of Trinidad, and its intellectual, middle-class leader. Once the issue had been posited along these lines, Gairy was unable to come up with an alternative image. The image of the unjustly treated anti-colonial politician no longer seemed important to the electorate.

On the night before the election Gairy resorted to a campaign device that made him famous throughout the Caribbean. He descended dramatically from a boat in the harbour at St. George's for a political meeting, dressed all in white. The meeting was well organised, with his supporters standing all around the main road circling the small harbour, holding candles and singing hymns. He proclaimed that night that he was the martyr who had been betrayed by the Judas' of St. George's, many of whom were watching this spectacle from their homes on the hillside. The politician is most fortunate in St. George's as the speeches he makes at the Careenage[1] can be heard in homes all around the town. The middle classes can open their windows at

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[1]The town of St. George's is situated on a promontory of land which surrounds the land locked harbour in a horseshoe shape. The harbour is known locally as the Careenage. The town is built on the hillsides surrounding the harbour, the land starting to rise almost immediately from the rim of the harbour, which is circled by a main road. The natural acoustics resulting from this physical setting ensure that political meetings will be heard easily in most of the homes in St. George's situated around the harbour.

night to hear Gairy, but more often they try to drown out the noise from his meetings by turning up their radios.

In the rural areas the candidates were also putting on last minute shows. The opposition was showing films of Trinidad's independence, and giving the impression to the electorate that it was merely a question of time until a majority vote in the Trinidad legislature consumated the devoutly hoped for union. In their rallies, the "Friends of Grenada Movement" claimed that Dr. Williams in Trinidad wouldn't even be hesitant, let alone false or deceitful about accepting Grenada into a Unitary State.[1] Gairy's party was also carrying on a strong last minute campaign in the countryside. In St. George's Parish North, a traditional Gairy stronghold, his candidate, a market vendor, condemned the colonial government harshly for having deprived Uncle of his rightful place, and she pledged that when she entered the Legislative Council she would fight for Uncle to rule Grenada again. In the parish of St. David's Gairy's wife conducted a very systematic campaign, visiting large numbers of her rural constituents. She did not hold many public meetings, but it was clear that she was very popular in the area. She had proved to be a very capable Minister when her husband was in power and because she had held the portfolio of Social Affairs she had considerable contact with the rural people.

The most remarkable campaign was that conducted by a planter of East Indian origin, R.M. Bhola in St. Andrew's South.

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[1] The West Indian, September 9, 1962.

East Indians have never enjoyed a high status in creole societies, and they are usually labelled coolies. However, within recent years in Grenada some East Indians have made dramatic inroads into the upper economic group, and have become large financial contributors to both political parties. Bhola campaigned heavily in favour of union with Trinidad and was fortunate in having a very capable relative who canvassed the entire electorate for him and advised him on strategy. The latter was able to circumvent the "coolie" issue by stressing the virtue of his candidate's business success. Bhola faced a strong opponent in the Gairy camp, Sylvester, who was known as "Teacher David", a Minister in the Gairy government and a very popular figure in the area. For the first time Gairy himself faced a strong opponent in his own constituency. A.M. Cruickshank, "The Barrister" as he was known, carried out a systematic door to door campaign in the constituency, concentrating on the new voters on the list and those who would normally have stayed at home and not voted. He also campaigned heavily on the "Go Trinidad" issue, and made liberal use of the slogan that had become very popular throughout the campaign - that every second person in Grenada had a relative in Trinidad, and it was time to join them. He was able to cut Gairy's majority considerably over the 1961 figure.

The election was held on the 13th of September; when the votes were counted, Gairy had won only four of the ten seats in the Legislative Council. He retained his own seat, but this time by only a small majority of 254 votes, having gained 54% of the votes in his constituency. Mrs. Gairy retained her seat, but also

with a greatly reduced majority. Sylvester was badly beaten by Bhola. The other two successful G.U.L.P. candidates also won by small margins; A.L. Williams, a Gairy man, won by only 81 votes over Gairy's long-time opponent, L.C.J. Thomas, the man who had broken with Gairy in 1954. In the parish of St. John, however, Gairy's candidate lost by only 41 votes.[1] Surprisingly, Gairy's party still managed to win 45.9% of the total vote, contrasted with the 53.7% majority he had in 1961. The following Table shows the swing away from Gairy's party from 1961.

It seems reasonably certain that the Trinidad issue was responsible for Gairy's defeat. We have seen that the opposition was successful in stigmatising Gairy as supporting a Federation of the Little Eight as against Union with Trinidad, and his refusal to take a stand and to come out into the open on this issue cost him dearly in terms of votes. Our survey revealed that only 13% of the electorate favoured a Federation of the Little Eight. Even a fair number of his supporters deserted Gairy on this issue, as our survey clearly disclosed.

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[1]That Gairy could have won this seat if there had not been a decrease in the numbers on the electors list is impossible to ascertain. In that parish there was a decrease of 467 electors from 1961; however, there is no way of determining what percentage of the decrease could be attributed to migration. Even if a rough estimate of 50% could be used, there is still the problem that in that parish there were three candidates, not two. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Gairy would have had to receive a higher percentage of those left off the electoral list (under the "best" of assumptions over 60%) than he received from those voting (47.4%). Of course, this is what Gairy himself claimed - that it was his followers who had been left off the list.

TABLE 10

SWING AWAY FROM GAIRY'S PARTY, THE G.U.L.P. IN 1962 FROM THE 1961 ELECTION

Constituency	Percent of Votes Received in 1961	Percent of Votes Received in 1962	Swing Away From G.U.L.P.
St. George's Town			Percent
G.N.P.	44.7	70.7	
G.U.L.P.	35.1	29.3	
P.P.M.	20.2		-5.8
St. George's (North)			
G.N.P.	4.5	52.3	
G.U.L.P.	54.4	47.7	
P.P.M.	41.1		-6.7
St. George's (South)			
G.N.P.	19.0	44.4	
G.U.L.P.	71.2	55.6	
P.P.M.	9.8		-15.6
St. John			
G.N.P.	21.3	49.5	
G.U.L.P.	59.9	47.4	
P.P.M.	18.8	-	
Independent	-	3.1	-12.5
St. Mark			
G.N.P.	30.4	43.6	
G.U.L.P.	69.6	56.4	-13.2
St. Patrick			
G.N.P.	44.9	62.2	
G.U.L.P.	55.1	37.8	-17.3
St. Andrew (North)			
G.N.P.	8.2	48.4	
G.U.L.P.	60.6	51.6	
Independent	31.2		-9.0
St. Andrew (South)			
G.N.P.	27.7	59.9	
G.U.L.P.	48.7	40.1	
P.P.M.	16.3		
Independent I	5.8		
Independent II	1.5		-8.6
St. David			
G.N.P.	-	46.4	
G.U.L.P.	64.3	53.6	
P.P.M.	35.1		
Independent	.6		-10.7
TOTAL (excluding Carriacou)[a]			
G.U.L.P.	56.5	46.0	
OTHER	43.5	54.0	-10.5

[a](note on following page).

TABLE 11

ATTITUDE IN RELATION TO UNION WITH TRINIDAD OR A FEDERATION WITH THE EIGHT BY PARTY PRE-DISPOSITION

Favourable to Union with Trinidad or the Little Eight	Party Pre-Disposition	
	Pro-G.U.L.P.	Pro-G.N.P.
	Percent	Percent
For Union with Trinidad	27	99
For Federation with Little Eight	40	1
Neither	26	-
Not Certain	7	-
Total	100	100

The table reveals that party pre-disposition still had a strong influence on people's attitude to union with Trinidad versus Federation with the Eight. Most Grenadians mistakenly seemed to believe that by voting for union with Trinidad they had ensured its automatic implementation. The editor of The West Indian, the day following the election predicted that:

> Grenada will be part of Trinidad and 88,000 Grenadians can soon call themselves "Trinidadians" ...

[a]There was no contest in Carriacou in 1962.

The swing away from the G.U.L.P. is simply the difference in the percentage of total votes received by the party in the two elections. In all constituencies there was a decrease in the percent of votes received by the G.U.L.P. in 1962 and an increase in the percent of votes received by the G.N.P. from the votes received by the G.N.P. and P.P.M. combined in 1961. However, the G.N.P. did not run a candidate in St. David in 1961.

> In 2 years time, to judge both from the comments of accountant Blaize and Trinidad's independent P.M. Dr. Eric Williams, Grenada will be safely installed as part of Trinidad and the cult of Gairyism will have died a natural death. [1]

On the same day, the new Chief Minister, Blaise, announced that he planned to have Grenada safely installed as part of Trinidad within one year.[2] Such was the climate of opinion in Grenada immediately following the election, when hopes ran high.

Gairy immediately charged that it had been a "Bogus" election on grounds of the large number of votes left off the electoral rolls in that election, claiming that this had cost him the election. This appears doubtful, however. As we saw in Table 10, there was a wide swing away from Gairy's party in all the constituencies, even his own, in 1962. Gairy announced to a G.U.L.P. meeting that he intended to forward a petition to the Queen asking for new elections. In relation to the Trinidad issue he said

> The G.N.P. big shots came and promised you big things, they told you a lot of lies about how Dr. Williams had agreed to let them join him the day after elections and the result was that instead of being in a Unitary State with Trinidad we found ourselves a unit of Carriacou.[3]

But given the state of euphoria of the populace over what appeared to them the imminent union with Trinidad, it seems unlikely that Gairy's charges were much listened to at this time. Indeed, many

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[1] The West Indian, September 14, 1962.

[2] Ibid., September 15, 1962.

[3] The West Indian. The small island of Carriacou is Mr. Blaize's constituency.

of the elites and the populace seemed to feel that Gairy's political career was at an end. The Torchlight said that "the action of Mr. Eric Gairy, since his defeat at the Polls, can be compared with that of a hungry child, crying with an empty plate before it.... Mr. Gairy has undoubtedly been the supreme architect of his own misfortunes".[1] This probably summed up the prevailing attitude of a large part of the populace at that time. However, events since 1962 indicate that Gairy is still a power to be reckoned with, particularly since in 1966 union with Trinidad is still not a reality. We will return to this question at the end of the chapter, and in Appendix II.

Patterns of Political Participation, Communication and Party Pre-Disposition

Fortunately for the purpose of our study, Grenada experienced five elections in the relatively short period of eleven years between 1951 and 1962, which has enabled us to discern some trends and make some generalisations about certain aspects of voting behaviour and political attitudes in Grenada. In addition, the crisis of 1961-62 furnished us with an ideal opportunity to conduct a survey of the electorate on certain aspects of party pre-disposition and attitudes in more depth. The survey was conducted in August and September of 1962, prior to the election which was held on September 13th. A total of 310 names were randomly selected from the electoral register of persons to be interviewed, of whom 292 were in fact finally interviewed. A team of 12 interviewers were selected and trained for two weeks prior to the

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[1] October 5, 1962.

commencement of the survey. It was felt that precoded questions were essential since the interviewers would have to "translate" the questions in the field. The methodological problems are discussed in Appendix I. In this section we will present and analyse the various data, as well as briefly discussing the patterns of political communication in Grenada.

One of the most striking aspects of voting behaviour in Grenada has been the consistently high turnout of voters in every one of the five elections, as the following figures reveal:

TABLE 12

PERCENT OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS VOTING IN EACH ELECTION IN GRENADA, 1951-1962

Election	Percent Voting
1951	69
1954	67
1957	68
1961	55
1962	73

Report of the Legislative Council General Elections For the Years, 1951, 1954, 1957 1961 and 1962.
St. George's, Grenada, The Government Printer.

As we mentioned in an earlier chapter, the relatively "low" turnout in 1961 partially reflects the failure to remove the names of many emigrants from the voters list. On the other hand, while the very high figures for 1962 undoubtedly was due in most part to the high feelings generated by the Trinidad issue it should be remembered that there was a large decrease in the number

of names on the electoral list between 1961 and 1962, which probably tended to over-inflate the percentage of those voting in 1962 relative to other elections. The results of our survey revealed even more clearly the extent of participation in the electoral process. We asked our respondents how many of the four elections since 1951 they had voted in, and discovered that close to half had voted in all four elections, as Table 13 shows:

TABLE 13

PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS IN SURVEY BY NUMBERS OF TIMES VOTED IN FOUR ELECTIONS IN GRENADA PRIOR TO 1962

Number of elections in which respondents voted	Percent Voting
	Percent
None	11.6
One	11.3
Two	18.1
Three	11.7
Four	47.3
Total	100.0

There was a slight difference in the frequency of voting between those respondents pre-disposed to the G.U.L.P. and those pre-disposed to the G.N.P. at the time of our survey as Table 14 discloses:

TABLE 14

NUMBER OF TIMES VOTED BY RESPONDENTS PRE-DISPOSED TO THE G.U.L.P. AND THE G.N.P.

Number of elections in which respondents voted	Pre-disposed to G.U.L.P.	Pre-disposed to G.N.P.
	Percent voting	Percent voting
None	14.4	7.0
One or two	24.5	29.9
Three or four	61.1	63.1
Total	100.0	100.0

Along with a high level of voting turnout, we found from our survey that the electorate was surprisingly well informed. The respondents were given a political information test to discover the degree of their knowledge about elections, candidates and the constitutional status of Grenada. On the basis of the answers received, we classified only 16% as poorly informed, 40% as having average information, while 42% were well informed.

People did not reveal themselves as particularly cynical about the role of government and the political process. Fifty eight percent disagreed with the proposition that "people like me" have no say in what the government does. Sixty eight percent thought it was still important to vote even if their candidate did not have a chance of winning. However, 45% did agree that government was too complicated for them to understand what was going on, and in respect to politicians themselves, 46% agreed to the proposition that politicians did not really care what people like them felt about politics. Nonetheless, partisanship was obviously important, 62% feeling that it did make a difference as to which party was in power.

This high level of participation and involvement should not necessarily be construed an index of the political stability of such a society, nor does it necessarily mean enduring support for that type of electoral system. In the first flush of enthusiasm after the granting of universal adult franchise, the opportunity to participate for the first time in the political system usually results in a high turnout at the polls in colonial societies. The electorate are hopeful that their participation marks the beginning of a new era for them, an escape from their poverty, low status and alienation in the society. Earlier in this chapter, however, we concluded that the intense partisanship and even fanaticism engendered by the party system in Grenada has tended to intensify the schisms in the society rather than to reduce them, particularly since the political system has been unable to deal effectively with the deep rooted problems of the society and the economy. It is not usually until the post-colonial phase that fundamental disenchantment with the electoral system occurs, at which time other groups may challenge the electoral politicians. Grenada has not yet reached that stage. Throughout the period of the five elections held from 1951 the island remained a colony.

The major media of formal political communication in Grenada are the press, radio and government circulars and organs, but informal means of communication are nearly as important as the formal ones. According to our survey, the most important source of information about government affairs was the radio. The following figures show the replies of our respondents concerning their most important source of information on government

affairs:

TABLE 15

MAJOR SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS FOR RESPONDENTS

Source of Information about Government affairs	Percent of Respondents Listing Sources as Most Important
	Percent
Radio	46
Newspapers	20
Friends and neighbours	14
Political meetings	16
Not ascertained, or uncertain	4
Total	100

As expected, the majority of the population depended on audio communication for their information about government and politics. As the Table discloses, for 30% of our respondents political meetings or informal communication with friends and neighbours were more important than the radio and press. Political meetings are well attended in Grenada and indeed serve as social functions in the community. Grenada's small size must be taken into account in any discussion of political communication, since it obviously facilitates the spread of information at all levels. Because the community is so small, the informal grapevine is very important and "news" travels quickly by word of mouth.

Forty seven percent of our respondents owned radios; news about Grenadian affairs is reported both by Radio Guardian from Trinidad, which is very popular, and the local station, WIBS, the Windward Islands Broadcasting Service. While Trinidad newspapers have a larger circulation than those published in Grenada, the

local papers play a very important role, particularly at election times. The most important local newspaper is The West Indian, first founded by Marryshow, one of Grenada's most revered political leaders, and one of the architects of West Indian Federation. In 1960 the paper took on something of a "Time Magazine" style, and introduced the Grenadian public to such terms as "politico-dentist" and "tough boy" Administrator. In that year the paper increased its circulation to approximately 2,000. The paper has had no consistent political position, and has on occasion supported Gairy, but as we saw in the last section, violently opposed him in the 1962 election when it took a very strong pro-Trinidad line. Since it is the only major newspaper dealing almost solely with local issues, The West Indian has great influence in the capital and is quoted widely. Another organ of some importance during the period of our study was the Torchlight, first established in 1955 by L.C.J. Thomas after he had broken with Gairy. In 1960 it had a circulation of about 600, and in the 1962 election also took a strongly anti-Gairy line. The official Government paper is another important source of information. First known as The Official Newsletter and later The Citizens Weekly, on his assumption to office in 1961 Gairy quickly realised the political potential of the paper, changed its name to The Star, and openly began to use it for political purposes, though the Commission of Enquiry pointed out that this had also been done before Gairy's government came to power (see page 238).

Gairy's support is probably less dependent on published sources of information than the G.N.P. because of the more rural

nature of his support. In all of the five elections in Grenada between 1951 and 1962 Gairy's strongest support has been in the rural areas. The following table contrasts the percent of the vote received by the G.U.L.P. in the capital of St. George's with the support won by Gairy in his own rural constituency in each election:

TABLE 16

PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTE WON BY GAIRY'S PARTY IN THE TOWN OF ST. GEORGE'S, AND IN HIS OWN CONSTITUENCY 1951-1962

Election	Percent of Vote Won by G.U.L.P. in St. George's	Percent of Vote Won by Gairy[a] in his own Constituency
1951	41	74
1954	26	65
1957	27	57
1961	34	65[b]
1962	29	54

[a]In the first three elections the constituency comprised the whole parish of St. George. Following the constitutional changes of 1960 the parish was divided into two constituencies, of which Gairy's constituency was St. George (South).

[b]Seat won by Joshua Thorne standing in for Gairy in that election because he had not yet regained his franchise and was therefore not eligible to run for the seat.

While Gairy has usually received a larger majority in his own constituency than other G.U.L.P. candidates in their constituencies, the same pattern is discernible for most of his candidates in

these elections.

Perhaps the best indication of Gairy's strength is the strong core of support he has maintained of close to half the electorate in all the elections. In his worst year electorally, 1957, he still obtained 44% of the total vote. The relative stability of his share of the popular vote, except for the exceptionally high majority he received at the peak of the 1951 crisis, contrasts with the wider fluctuations in the number of seats in the Legislative Council won by his party at each election, as Table 17 shows:

TABLE 17

PERCENT OF POPULAR VOTE AND PERCENT OF SEATS WON IN THE LEGISLATURE BY GAIRY'S PARTY, 1951-1962

Election	Percent of Popular Vote for G.U.L.P.	Percent of Seats Won in Legislative Council
1951	63	75
1954	46	75
1957	44	25
1961	53	80
1962	46	40

The basic urban-rural differences in patterns of party identification are also partly reflected in the differences in party pre-disposition by occupation.

TABLE 18

PARTY PRE-DISPOSITION BY OCCUATIONAL CATEGORY

Occupational Category	Pre-disposed to G.U.L.P.	Pre-disposed to G.N.P.	Other[a]
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Professional, Supervisory Clerical and Related and Sales Workers	3.3	12.2	10.2
Craftsmen, Technical and Non-professional workers	10.0	19.3	11.4
Manual and Service Workers (Including Small Farmers not employing hired labour)	67.8	40.3	50.0
Housewives	18.9	28.2	28.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a]Includes Independents and Not Certain.

Those pre-disposed to Gairy's party included fewer of the two higher occupational groups and correspondingly a much higher proportion of manual and service workers, including small farmers and agricultural labourers.

The breakdown of party pre-disposition by religion also revealed certain differences. As we pointed out in chapter one, although Roman Catholics form the largest single religious group in Grenada, Anglicanism has traditionally been associated with higher status. This was also reflected in our survey data (see Table 19).

Perhaps more significant than our findings on party pre-disposition, most of which we had anticipated, were the results of our survey in respect to colonialist or anti-colonialist

TABLE 19

PARTY PRE-DISPOSITION BY RELIGION

Religion	Pre-disposed to G.U.L.P.	Pre-disposed to G.N.P.	Other[a]
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Roman Catholic	63.3	57.8	60.2
Anglican	17.8	31.5	18.2
Other[b]	18.9	10.7	21.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a]Includes Independents and Not Certain

[b]Includes: other Christian, including liberal non-conformists and fundamentalists; those holding non-Christian religions; those with no religion, and not ascertained.

attitudes. From the responses to a number of the questions asked we devised a scale by which to classify our respondents as having basically colonialist or anti-colonialist attitudes. On the basis of this scale, over two-thirds of our respondents fell into the colonialist category.

TABLE 20

CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONDENTS BY COLONIALIST OR ANTI-COLONIALIST ATTITUDE

Basic Attitude to Colonialism	Percent of Respondents Classified in Category
	Percent
Colonialist	67.4
Anti-Colonialist	6.5
Not Ascertained	26.1
Total	100.0

The small percentage falling into the anti-colonialist category may be understated, particularly since 26% of our respondents fell into the category "not ascertained". In interpreting these figures it is important to point out that the collapse of the West Indian Federation in 1961 resulted in a great deal of uncertainty as to the political future of Grenada, and that the size of the society seemed to rule out independence for Grenada as a separate nation. This uncertainty as to what were the meaningful possibilities partially account for the large numbers classified as not ascertainable.

There was only a slight difference in basic attitudes to colonialism between those pre-disposed to the G.N.P. and those pre-disposed to the G.U.L.P. as Table 21 shows:

TABLE 21

BASIC ATTITUDE TO COLONIALISM BY PARTY PRE-DISPOSITION

Basic Attitude to Colonialism	Pre-disposed to G.U.L.P.	Pre-disposed to G.N.P.
	Percent	Percent
Colonialist	70.0	64.9
Anti-Colonialist	12.2	5.3
Not ascertained	17.8	29.8
Total	100.0	100.0

The answers to a number of the questions which made up this scale revealed not only the pre-disposition to colonialist attitudes but the very real confusion and bewilderment in the minds of the people on their political future as well as their past. Thus far the political system has demonstrated its

inability to resolve these fundamental questions, as we shall see in the following section.

Conclusion

The 1962 election revealed clearly the crisis of identity in the minds of the Grenadians. As we noted at the end of chapter one, they have been marginal to many political systems, including Trinidad, the West Indies and Great Britain. The hope of unitary state appeared to provide them with a chance to resolve the problem of marginality by becoming part of à larger and more prosperous state like Trinidad.

Events in the years following the 1962 election have tended to validate some of the caution and hesitation displayed by Gairy in relation to union with Trinidad. In spite of the work of a number of commissions in Grenada and Trinidad and their subsequent reports a number of fundamental issues, most of which were apparent as early as the preliminary conference which Gairy attended in February, 1962, have still not been resolved. Trinidad has indicated that it will not consider Unitary State without a firm guarantee from Great Britain for continuing aid to Grenada for some years to come. Grenada is still a grant-in-aid colony, and has had a deficit on current account every year since 1958. At the London Conference on Associated Status for Grenada held in the spring of 1966 the issue continued to remain unsolved. The new proposed status for Grenada as an associated state would not prohibit Grenada from joining with Trinidad, but it is not at all certain that Trinidad for economic or political

reasons will finally consent to a unitary state. One of the more serious problems has been Trinidad's fear that unitary state would bring thousands of Grenadians flocking to Trinidad, which herself continues to experience serious unemployment.

In 1963 an Economic Commission was appointed to examine proposals for association within the framework of a unitary state of the two islands, which published its full report in 1965. (Other commissions have also reported on other aspects of integration, such as the civil service, etc.). The basic recommendation of the Economic Commission was for a phased programme of integration of the two economies which would lead eventually to unitary state:

> Because of the unequal levels of development, of incomes and living standards, we have always been conscious of the basic inequities which would subsist in a Unitary State of 'sudden birth'. This apart, the stresses and strains which would be generated by attempts to force the creation of equal facilities would probably prove intolerable. This was another reason for recommending the adoption of a phased programme - not only to allow for adjustment, but also to permit measures to be introduced which would bring about the elimination, where possible, of some of these inequities.[1]

In regards to continued support for Grenada from Great Britain the Commission was unequivocal:

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[1] Report of the Economic Commission, 1965, op. cit., Introduction.

> Firm commitments for a programmed flow of capital funds from the United Kingdom for an agreed time period is a fundamental pre-requisite, and so too is a commitment to assist in the financing of certain current expenditure . [1] (emphasis in the original).

They also recognised that the question of freedom of movement was "a subject on which feelings run high and no procedure is likely to meet with complete acceptance". [2] (emphasis in original)

Although the terms of reference of the Commission called for them to restrict their investigations within the framework of a Unitary State, their Report pointed out that the two necessary economic conditions for Unitary State, assimilation of the fiscal structure and the integration of the two economies, were also possible outside the political organisation of a Unitary State. At a later stage they stressed that economic development for Grenada would not automatically or primarily take place as a result of economic integration or political or constitutional change of whatever direction, but rather depended on the improvement of the infra-structure and additions to social overhead. They did, however, recognise that political and economic integration could be considered as pre-conditions which would enhance or diminish the possibilities of economic development.

Although much of the discussion on unitary state has centered on the economic factors, particularly freedom of movement, the political difficulties would probably prove far more complex. At the preliminary conference in February, 1962, it was

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[1] Ibid., p. 34

[2] Ibid., p. 30

clear that there was some confusion on both sides as between unitary state and associated status, and one cannot help but be aware of the caution of some politicians on both sides in regards to the political implications of unitary state: whether there would be one common parliament, whether the Grenada Legislature would be phased slowly out of existence and similar perplexing problems. The sudden addition to the population of Trinidad of some 90,000 Grenadians could seriously upset the electoral politics of Trinidad, and is an unknown in the minds of the politicians. The race question in Trinidad, while not as serious as that in Guyana, nonetheless, is significant. The party of the Prime Minister, Dr. Eric Williams, the People's National Movement, has not based its strategy on race, and, indeed, Dr. Williams has been the apostle of integration. However, the opposition party, the D.L.P. is an "Indian" party, and racial politics do exist. If Grenada united with Trinidad, it might upset the coalition that Dr. Williams has been able to maintain. In spite of the victory of the G.N.P. in Grenada in 1962, Gairy has continued to enjoy considerable mass support, and in a joint legislature it is not unlikely that he might try to create counter coalitions. It is even possible that if union did take place, Gairy might conceivably join the Indian opposition. Significantly, he is alleged to have remarked that "It would be wrong to assume that the Grenadian Negro has the same feelings about the Indians as his Trinidadian counterpart". There is the added problem that in Trinidad there is considerable hostility among the working classes towards Grenadians, who compete with

them for scarce jobs and social services.

The continued postponement of unitary state will probably pose considerable difficulties for the G.N.P. in the next election. Gairy has been consistently calling for new elections in the past several years, which are likely to take place after the new instruments are announced, and not after early 1968 at the latest in any case. Gairy is unlikely to deprive himself of the opportunity to attack the G.N.P. on their unfilled promise to bring about unitary state within a year after the 1962 election.

Realistically, the political and economic prospects for Grenada, as indeed for all the remaining small islands in the Windwards and Leewards are bleak. The possibility of a Federation of the Little Eight is completely dead, since the largest unit of the Eight, Barbados, has been promised independence on its own by Great Britain. These small islands have been completely disinherited first by Britain and later by the larger territories in the Caribbean. The economic difficulties of federation and integration appear to us to have been over-emphasised as being responsible for the present political plight of these islands. The constitutional arrangements, and particularly the granting of elaborate ministerial systems to all these small islands have made a viable political solution difficult, if not impossible for them. It looks very much as though all these territories are likely to continue as dependencies of the larger metropolitan powers, and increasingly, the United States.

What Elsa Goveia, the West Indian historian, has written about the Leeward Islands at the end of the eighteenth century

rings as true in 1966 for all the Windward and Leeward islands, including Grenada, as it did then:

> The colonies themselves were divided from each other by their geographical and political insularity. There was no tradition of common action among the separate colonies to sustain them in their struggle against the imperial power. The difficulties of concerted resistance among the scattered territories, in the face of British sea power, were formidable .....
>
> The islands remained colonies long after they had ceased to be slave colonies, because, in spite of all its disadvantages, the maintenance of the British connection still seemed to offer the best guarantee of the survival of the whites .[1]

One needs only change the survival of the whites to read the survival of the present elites, and substitute American for British connection to bring the picture up to date in 1966.

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[1] Elsa V. Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the End of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 102.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: THE COLONIAL CONDITION[1]

The colonial relationship goes much deeper than a dependent political or economic relationship between the native and his metropolitan master; it becomes a deep rooted state of mind. This state of mind is the most lasting "legacy" of a prolonged exposure to colonial institutions, and affects every aspect of life. It is the recognition of this fact that has led to so much emphasis in the third world on the process of decolonization, which often baffles and irritates the citizens and scholars of the "advanced" countries. The latter are often impatient with the countries of the third world, and wonder why they can't simply get on with the task of development and overlook their colonial past. This is due to their failure to understand how pervasive and deep rooted the effects of colonialism have been. Nowhere is this phenomenon more noticeable than in the intellectual tradition of the colony or ex-colony.

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[1] I have drawn freely in the first part of this chapter from the path-breaking article by G. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach (1951)" in I. Wallerstein, ed., Social Change The Colonial Situation (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966). This article should be read with careful attention by all students of the colonial and ex-colonial world. Briefly, he gives the name "colonial situation" to a number of collective circumstances which he summarizes as: (1) the domination imposed by a foreign minority, racially (or ethnically) and culturally different, acting in the name of a .... superiority dogmatically affirmed, and imposed on a population numerically superior but materially inferior to the dominant group; (2) this domination links radically different

It is ironic but not surprising, therefore, that so many colonial scholars have taken refuge in studying subjects that are either esoteric or totally without relevance for their own societies. This has meant that the systematic study of colonial societies has been undertaken almost entirely by scholars from the metropolitan societies. Further, those relatively few colonial scholars who have written about their own societies have tended to adopt, either consciously or unconsciously, the methodological assumptions of the metropolitan scholars. Those native scholars who have consciously striven to disassociate themselves from this metropolitan dominance have usually turned to polemics or the creative arts, such as the novel and poetry, to express their individuality and to dissect the nature of the colonial situation. Both the French and British West Indies, for example, have produced a number of highly talented novelists and poets who have devoted themselves to a searching and often painful assessment of their societies and their heritage.

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civilizations into some form of relationship; (3) a mechanized, industrialized society with a powerful economy, a fast tempo of life, and a Christian background imposes itself on a non-industrialized, "backward" society in which the pace of living is much slower and religious institutions are most definitely"non-Christian"; (4) the fundamentally antagonistic character of the relationship between these two societies resulting from the subservient role to which the colonial people are subjected; and (5) the need,in maintaining this domination, not only to resort to "force", but also to a system of pseudo-justifications and stereotyped behaviors, etc.

Aside from some matters of detail, (arising from the fact that the West Indian colonies were "settled" colonies, where the population was imported as slaves or indentured labourers), his listing of these collective circumstances provides a very useful and inclusive summary of the nature of the colonial situation for our purposes

Perhaps his most valuable contribution to the literature on colonialism is his insistence that the colonial situation be treated as a whole, as a system, and that "this sense of totality is felt at all levels of social reality". (p. 55) We discuss this point in more detail in a later section of the chapter.

The colonial intellectual tradition has been in large part dominated by polemics because most of the intellectuals in these societies have been heavily involved in the struggle for independence, and their writings have been weapons in the political struggle with the Imperial power. These "ideological polemics" have become part and parcel of the colonial intellectual tradition at a crucial stage, and continue to dominate intellectual discourse during the early stages of independence. In many instances polemics have unfortunately become a substitute for analysis[1]. This need to resort to polemics was also in response to the assumptions made by many metropolitan scholars about the capacity (i.e. incapacity) of "the natives" to govern themselves. Debate about the doctrine of preparedness for independence became particularly prominent during the terminal stages of colonial rule. It is important to remember that many of the writings of the metropolitan scholars, while not necessarily of a polemic character, were nonetheless highly biased and were used by the colonial authorities to "rationalize" their policies.

Thus, in evaluating the literature on politics and government in the colonies, we must begin by examining the writings of the metropolitan scholars. When we speak of the metropolitan intellectual tradition it should be understood that we are not implying that there

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[1]Running counter to this general trend in the British West Indies is the body of work produced by a number of West Indian scholars at the University of the West Indies. Particularly in the fields of history, sociology and economics a number of rigorous studies have been carried out, many of them published in the Journal of the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University, Social and Economic Studies. A more recent journal, the New World Quarterly, published in Jamaica, combines analysis and polemics in a provocative and insightful manner.

is a single tradition, as we are well aware of the fact that there are a number of traditions reflecting the emphasis of the particular metropolitan power involved, and the various schools within that tradition. On the other hand, there has been one basic underlying trend shared by almost all metropolitan scholars, which is to view the colony from the point of view of the metropolis, whether the basic point of departure was that of Marxism or the justification of imperialism, for example. In our particular case study we were concerned primarily with the British intellectual tradition, and the schools within that tradition, which we shall concentrate on in our brief review of the major trends in the literature which follows.

The main contributions in the British tradition have been in the areas of economic history, political and constitutional history, and social anthropology. The tendency by historians to treat colonial history primarily as an adjunct to metropolitan history has been underscored by Balandier, who nonetheless has pointed out the invaluable contribution made by the historians:

> The historian examines the various periods of colonization with respect to the colonial power. He enables us to grasp the changes that occur in the existing relationships between that power and its territorial dependencies. He shows us how the isolation of colonial peoples was shattered by a caprice of history over which these peoples had had no control. He evokes the ideologies which, at different times, have been used to justify colonialism and have created the 'role' adopted by the colonial power, and he reveals the discrepancies separating facts from theories. He analyzes the administrative and economic systems which have guaranteed 'colonial peace' and permitted an economic profit (for the metropole) from the colonial enterprise. In short, the historian makes us understand how, in the course of time, the colonial power implanted itself in the heart of its colonial societies. Acting in this manner he furnished the sociologist with his first and indispensable frame of reference. He reminds the sociologist that the history of a colonial people has developed as a result of a

> foreign presence while at the same time he elucidates the different aspects of the latter's role and influence.[1]

The British West Indies has been particularly fortunate in having produced a number of distinguished historians who have analyzed the consequences of colonialism primarily from the point of view of West Indian society. The works of both Eric Williams and Elsa Goveia are perhaps the most outstanding in this respect, among a distinguished field[2].

The economic consequences of colonial domination have been most thoroughly analyzed, and have been heavily influenced by the Marxian tradition. In spite of this orientation, the tendency has often been to view these consequences from the point of view of the imperial society, with less emphasis on the far reaching consequences on the social structure of the colonies. The scholars in this tradition were also hampered by their lack of understanding of the nature of agrarian societies, and their attempt to impose the capitalist-proletariat model of social relations on these societies, with little discrimination. We will not attempt to review the literature in this area, however, as it is outside the domain of our particular concern and competence.

In addition to the contributions of the economic historians, there have been a number of studies by political historians in the British tradition, who were the precursors of the modern political

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[1] G. Balandier, op. cit., p. 36.

[2] Cf. particularly Elsa V. Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the End of the Eighteenth Century, op. cit. and the classic study by Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).

scientists. These political historians have tended to stress the importance of political institutions and the role played by these institutions in the evolution of colonial societies. The most outstanding representatives of this tradition have been Sir Reginald Coupland, Sir Ivor Jennings and Margery Perham[1]. The last named has been responsible for a number of case studies of colonial legislatures, which while providing us with a wealth of data have paid scant attention to the social structures within which these legislatures operated. These studies have reflected the biases of the "constitutional" school, which has on the whole made political development synonymous with constitutional development. This reflects the tendency of British colonial rule to specify the stages of constitutional development in relation to how much power the colony was "prepared" for , in theory at least.[2] Discussions of colonial politics, then, have tended to centre around the "status" of any given colony in relation to other colonies, with the result that even colonial politicians measured their own esteem and success by the standards set by the Colonial Office. This has led to a considerable amount of competition among the various colonies themselves, with local

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[1] In this connection see the series Studies in Colonial Legislatures (London: Faber and Faber) edited by Margery Perham. Cf. also Sir Reginald Coupland's three-volume Report on the Constitutional Problem in India (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), and India - A Restatement (London: Oxford University Press, 1945). Among the many studies by Jennings are The Approaches to Self-Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956) and Constitutional Problems of Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957).

[2] In reality, the "test for preparedness" has had little to do with objective standards such as literacy or experience with limited government, but rather has been almost in inverse relation to the colony's economic and strategic usefulness, and the number of metropolitan settlers in the colony.

politicians stressing the "advanced" character of their societies in relation to more "backward" colonies. Within the British West Indies the uneven course of constitutional development resulted in considerable bitterness and jealousy between the various territories.

Undoubtedly the most sophisticated and sociologically sensitive representative of the "constitutional" school was Sir Ivor Jennings. Jennings recognized the importance of social forces in influencing politics, although by social forces he usually limited himself to the various communal groups in these societies. It is of course obvious that the existence of plural groups has made it difficult for a common "social will" to evolve in many of these societies. It is this apparent absence of "social will" in many of the colonies that has led scholars like Furnivall and M.G. Smith to develop and refine the concept of pluralism and to identify it as one of the major political problems that confronts these societies, i.e., the incapacity of these societies to sustain national institutions because of the fundamental cultural and social schisms within them. In his analysis of Ceylonese society, for example, Jennings pointed out the difficulties of legislative representation because of the existence of these plural groups[1]. While the theory of pluralism has greatly advanced our understanding of colonial societies, this approach has failed to take into account the fact that colonial rule

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[1]It has often been argued that the presence of one dominant group in a "plural" society is more likely to result in the breakdown of civil government and the constitutional order once the Imperial power leaves. We would argue that an even more serious problem is likely to arise when there are two major groups which are more or less evenly matched in numbers. The experience of Guyana, formerly British Guiana, is a good case in point.

itself could produce a "social will", though the extent and strength of this will has varied from colony to colony.

Most of the social anthropologists in the British tradition, on the other hand, have emphasised the importance of group behaviour in their studies, which have centred mainly on different African societies. In most cases this has meant an almost exclusive concern with the family or the tribe. Their major attention was devoted to studying power relations within groups, while the relationships between groups were usually treated in a cursory fashion, if at all. This particular school of anthropology, which was associated with Malinowski, did not pay much attention to colonial political institutions, as on the whole they argued that these institutions were not the true repositories of political authority. They made a distinction between two types of political authority in the colony: native authority and colonial authority. This concept of dual political systems offered a neat methodological as well as theoretical dichotomy, and thus avoided the problem of studying the colony as the meaningful unit of political analysis.

However, this particular theoretical assumption of a dual political system was in essence a conservative political doctrine rather than a well-tested empirical observation[1]. It enabled the

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[1]The general conservative bias of colonial anthropologists has been explained by Balandier "by the greater attention given to cultures rather than to societies and can be attributed to the more or less conscious desire on the part of these anthropologists to avoid questioning the very foundations (and ideology) of the society to which they belong, the society of the colonial power". Op. cit., p. 53. What Balandier has to say of the anthropologists is true for the majority of metropolitan scholars in other disciplines who have written about the colonies.

Imperial representatives to view modernization within the colony as dysfunctional, and therefore to dismiss demands for change by the westernized elites as idiosyncratic. Implicit in this view was the assumption that the introduction of a "modern" economic sector (such as the plantation) by the colonizers would not bring with it far reaching changes in the political and social orders, but rather that this sector could be kept isolated. Exponents of this view also failed to recognize, whether consciously or not, that the removal of effective power from traditional rulers was bound to affect the indigenous power structure and gradually undermine it.

Although our review of the main trends in the colonial literature has had to be very brief and somewhat superficial, it has indicated some of the underlying biases and areas of neglect by the metropolitan scholars in their treatment of the colonies. Some of the more obvious biases and weaknesses in dealing with the colonies have been rectified in recent years, particularly in the more empirical and theoretical studies done by American social scientists. Nonetheless, even these scholars have not usually been able to free themselves entirely from their misconceptions and unconscious biases about colonial societies, and because they have not lived and participated in these societies, they often fail to understand the complexities and under-currents at operation in these societies. In the final analysis, it is primarily those scholars living and working in the third world who will be able to fill this gap, which is one of the prime tasks of the intellectuals in these societies.

The Colony as a Subordinate System[1]

Throughout our case study we have treated the colony as an entity, as a meaningful unit of analysis on its own. This is the essential point of Balandier's article, where he points out that the works of certain scholars "indicate to what extent the colonial population, in its urban as well as its rural aspects, together with the colonial power, form a system, a whole."[2] He neatly poses the problem which has concerned us at every stage of our analysis: that no present day study of 'the colony' can be made without taking into account what he terms the dual reality of 'the colony' as a global society within which the study must situate itself, and the colonial situation created by 'the colony'[3]. Our method of handling this duality was to identify and analyze two basic sets of environmental factors (see Figure I, p. 18), what Easton calls the intra-societal factors and the extra-societal factors. In a colony these extra-environmental factors are critical, since by definition ultimate power and authority is located in these factors. In fact, in the case of a colony it can be argued that these factors are an integral part of the political system. The division of our crucial factors into these two categories, therefore, is justified mainly as an analytical device, as long as it is clearly remembered that they are closely inter-related.

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[1]The argument in this section and the final section on de-colonization follows closely the argument developed in an article by the author written with Vaughn Lewis, "Integration, Domination and the Small-State System: The Caribbean", forthcoming in Caribbean Studies.

[2]Ibid., p. 44.

[3]Ibid., p. 55.

While we have treated the colony as an entity for purposes of analysis, we have throughout the case study stressed the subordinate or dependent nature of the colony in every sphere of life: the economy, the polity and the value system. The important distinction we would like to make here is that we have treated the colony as a subordinate system, not as a sub-system. The colony as a subordinate system requires some amplification. In a subordinate system autonomy is guaranteed by the presence, actual or implied, of external force provided by the metropolitan power. However, after a period of time, a colony may be able to develop certain crucial elements which will maintain "system integration" without relying on the metropolitan power. Whether this capacity to maintain itself is only a short-term phenomenon, or whether the system is genuinely capable of long term autonomy depends on the nature and strength of the crucial elements that have developed during the period of colonial rule. The basic problem in evaluating the possibility of integration in a subordinate system is to identify and isolate these crucial elements. This in essence was one of our major concerns in this analysis. If these crucial elements do develop and demonstrate indications of survival capacity, then it is possible to characterize the system as a subordinate system. A sub-system, on the other hand, does not have such possibilities, since one of the essential characteristics of a sub-system is that it has no potential for becoming a viable system. A subordinate system, then, is a special case of a system in general, as opposed to a sub-system.

Before we summarize our evaluation of the strength of these crucial elements for Grenada we must first distinguish between various

types of coherence or integration. Within a subordinate system there may be structural coherence and social or institutional coherence. Structural coherence involves the inter-action of crucial structural elements, e.g. the interaction of forms of technology or of ideological beliefs. Major change can occur in a subordinate system when there are major changes in the relations of structural patterns. Social or institutional coherence, on the other hand, involves power (political) relationships. To take an analogy from internal nation-state activity, these are forms of 'class' relationships. The same distinctions apply to relations of conflict. Thus in international society, the organized form of power grouping that emerges in 'class' or social conflict is the nation-state or groupings of states such as federations or alliances. Social conflict or integration may also occur between other kinds of institutions, e.g. monetary institutions such as G.A.T.T. or political institutions such as the U.N., or between such institutions and nation-states, e.g. between the O.A.S. and a constituent member.

The structural coherence and social coherence aspects of a system or subordinate system are obviously related, but can be separated for analytical purposes. Social conflicts need not necessarily result in conflict at the structural level, or lead to a change in structural relations. In other words, there may be modification, though not disruption of the structural arrangements. Thus, we use the term 'system', which includes subordinate system, to refer to a pattern or series of patterns of relationships between various elements, of which institutional elements are only one grouping. We distinguish this usage from the concept 'State System' if this is

meant to refer solely to institutional relationships, such as state or alliance relationships. The problem for us in this type of study is therefore to discern to what extent patterns of relations exist within the colony that are of sufficient coherence to be deemed 'systemic' relations. An institutional system may be an important influence on the form of structural relationships, but it is important that this geo-political cum ideological concept be distinguished from the sociological concept, as we have tried to do throughout the case study.

While the concept of systemic integration implies the existence of community, whether cultural or political, the existence of community in a society or an area does not automatically denote the existence of systemic integration. The existence of community is based on the presence among the members of the community of a core of common values which are the result of a common culture or historical tradition. However, this core of values must be reinforced by other structural elements before the state of integration is reached. One of the difficulties that arises is that states of coherence or integration are processes which are at the same time defined constitutionally, which Lindberg, for example, has done[1]. On the other hand Russett, for example, maintains that the existence of community is essentially "a relative matter" which implies certain expectations, such as "an expectation of the peaceful settlement of disputes" and assumes a "sense of shared... interests and a common identity"[2].

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[1] L. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Integration (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.6.

[2] B. Russett, Trends in World Politics (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1965), p. 28.

We would argue that such interests and expectations may also be institutionalized (though not necessarily), but that such institutionalization does not denote systemic integration[1]. Thus the only valid indicator and the necessary prerequisite indicating a propensity for systemic integration is the existence of structural integration and evidence of a capacity for structural adaptation.

We can now turn to what we identified as the crucial elements of our colonial political system. We specified three intra-societal factors: scale and demographic features, the dependent nature of the economy, and the social structure. The extra-societal factors were primarily concerned with the problem of union or integration with larger units. In Figure I (page 18) we attempted to show how these factors were translated into demands on the political system (the inputs) and the feedback from the system in trying to meet these demands (the outputs).

In trying to evaluate whether the political system in Grenada was capable of maintaining itself, we saw that each of these crucial institutional factors was weak in terms of ultimate system integration, and therefore our conclusions were fairly pessimistic. In fact, we observed that the feedback (outputs) increased the contradictions in the society rather than decreasing them. Nonetheless, in dealing with the internalization of certain values associated with colonial rule

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[1]To assume that it does may lead to the unfounded belief that because states in any area share certain values and institutions, political integration between states can therefore easily be developed on this basis. In fact, and the failure of the West Indian Federation is a good example of this, other countervailing 'events' such as the existence of a tradition or sense of insularity or 'independent' existence, may so impose themselves, that the positive or "spill-over" effect of other attributes is nullified.

by the actors, we observed that a fairly large number of values was shared by both the elite and the mass about politics, even though naturally the latter did not possess the same amount of what Lasswell calls "power values". But as we pointed out earlier in this section, a common core of values must be reinforced by other structural elements before the state of integration is reached. Despite the weaknesses of these structural elements in Grenada, their continued existence makes it possible to classify it at least tentatively as a subordinate system, not a sub-system. In general, however, we must conclude that the colonial political system does not necessarily or even usually produce a viable and autonomous political system, despite the presence of certain unifying elements.

We must now turn our attention to the crisis phenomenon, for that was the starting point of our analysis, and some indication of the capacity of the political system to maintain itself is best revealed in a crisis situation.

The Crisis Phenomenon

The understanding of the crisis phenomenon is critical for our understanding of political systems in general, but in the colonial context it is absolutely crucial. Balandier has provided us with a very clear statement on the importance of crisis situations in analyzing the colonial situation:

> .... an approach to the question of colonial societies, concentrating on their specific crises, constitutes 'an unexcelled standpoint for analysis', 'the only point at which one can grasp the evolution of indigenous social structures placed in the colonial situation'. Such crises force re-examination of the society as a whole, its institutions as well as its component groups and symbols; the social dislocations provide opportunities for the analyst to penetrate and explore from within,

> and not merely arrive at some abstract notions of the phenomena arising from the contact between a colonial power and a colonial people.... Each crisis, affecting the global society as a whole, constitutes a point of insight into that society and the relationship it implies[1]. (Italics in the original)

He also notes an important point which our study has amply demonstrated, that crises "also permit in this manner an analysis which takes into account, simultaneously, 'the external milieu' and 'the internal milieu' and takes them into account in terms of existing conditions and relationships, in terms of actual life experiences"[2].

Crisis is inevitable in the colonial situation because of the basic and inevitable antagonism between the colonized and the colonizers which results in constant conflict, although in some periods this is merely latent, while at other times it rises to the surface in the form of a clearly defined crisis of one sort or another. Thus, the crisis phenomenon is inherent in the colonial situation, and is not just a historical accident that takes place in some colonies but not in others. Grenada provided us with an excellent laboratory in which to examine the colonial situation, not because its experience with crises made it unique, but simply because it had several well-marked crises within a very short period of time, and because they occurred in recent years, thus enabling the author to gather first hand data.

Both the crisis of 1951 and the crisis of 1962 revealed quite unmistakably the fundamental contradictions within the colonial polity, and particularly that the very nature of the colonial relationship, with its dominant-subordinate nature, makes it basically

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[1] Balandier, op. cit., p. 52.

[2] Ibid., p. 57.

impossible for the political system to satisfy the demands made upon it. As we saw in chapter one, these contradictions were apparent in all aspects of the environment, in the economic and social systems as well as within the political system. While our examination revealed that there were some crucial elements in the system which enabled the polity to maintain a minimal level of integration at the structural and social levels for certain periods of time, it was clear that they could not prevent the emergence of crises which threatened to destroy the polity. This is because the continuation of the colonial situation, no matter what concessions are granted in the way of local self-government, continues to produce this basic antagonism which only the liquidation of the relationship can remove.

The colonial situation, as we saw in chapter one, produces a personality type that is characterized by anomie, rage, compulsion and withdrawal. The basic pathological nature of the society[1] is thus reflected and reinforced by the pathology in the individual personality structure. One of the most noticeable and wide-spread characteristics resulting from this situation is the considerable amount of hostility that is always latent and often expressed in the society and the polity. Expression of this hostility ranges from the constant "character assassination" that marks colonial life, to violent attacks on individuals, often on prominent individuals. Another form this hostility takes, especially among the most dispossessed groups in the society, is the formation of escapist movements or cults, of which

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[1]As Balandier notes, colonial societies are sick societies to the extent that the colonial power opposes any genuine solutions, because the quest for norms among colonial peoples coincides with the quest for autonomy. Ibid., p. 52.

the Rastafarian movement in Jamaica is probably one of the better known examples. The crisis situation brings this hostility to the surface, and tension is apt to become high during election periods or major strikes. This can result in outbursts which sometimes surprise outside observers (and the local elites) by their intensity, particularly in contrast to the myth of the "happy native" which is constantly propagated by these elites and the colonial authorities to justify their own positions.

Balandier has stressed the point that not only has colonialism divided populations ethnically and religiously, but that it has also brought other divisions which are social in nature, the products of administrative, economic and educational politics. He contends that the most important divisions have been between urban and rural groups, between the proletariat and bourgeoise, and the elites from the masses[1]. We have seen in some detail how deep the divisions are in a colonial society like Grenada between these various social groups. Because of this, at a time of crisis all groups in the society are anxious to find scapegoats for the crisis from within the society, even though the nature of the colonial relationship itself is the root cause of the crisis[2]. Thus, in Grenada, while Gairy often condemned the colonial power, his major efforts were devoted to

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[1] Ibid., p. 51.

[2] This has been particularly true in the British West Indian colonies where the colonial power has appeared more "benevolent" in the last stages of colonialism than it did in many of the African colonies like Kenya for example, where concessions were granted without a violent struggle on the part of the local people in the former.

fighting the Administrator, James Lloyd. Although the latter was the Imperial representative, he was also a fellow West Indian, and we have seen at various times how Gairy stressed the fair play and justice of the English authorities he had to deal with as opposed to the local authorities. Gairy's other main target was the local elites, whom he saw as participating in a grand conspiracy with the Administrator against himself. For their part, the bureaucratic and economic elites blamed the crisis not on the Imperial power, but on the "upstart" politician, Gairy, and on the new, aspiring political mid-elites in general, whom they saw as trying to usurp their power position in the community.

What is interesting is this continual attempt on the part of these groups and individuals in the society to place the blame for a crisis on other individuals or groups <u>within</u> the society, rather than on the Imperial power. One aspect of this phenomenon that is particularly important is the tendency to personalize these conflicts and crises, rather than to deal with the underlying issues. This is only partly accounted for by the small size of the community. We shall return to the wider implications of personalism later in this chapter; at this stage we want to point out that in colonies like Grenada the antagonisms that exist between groups in the society have tended to overshadow the more basic antagonism between the colony and the Imperial power[1]. This antagonism between groups

[1]It is necessary to point out that very small colonies like Grenada and the other Windward and Leeward islands have faced a much more difficult problem in this respect than have larger colonies. With the break-up of the West Indian Federation, and the size of these islands precluding independence for each island on any rational grounds, this "crisis of identity" has been intensified. See Appendix II for a brief summary of events after 1962 in this respect.

that is so marked at times of crisis makes it very difficult to forge cohesiveness and unity in the society, and thus reduces the possibility of systemic integration. As each successive crisis clearly demonstrates, the tendency of the colonial system is always towards dis-equilibrium, as we noted at the outset of our study.

The type of political leader that emerges from a crisis situation in a colony under these conditions of antagonism and hostility is a special kind of leader who has a special kind of relationship with his followers. In the next section we will examine this relationship and its implications for the polity in more detail.

Charisma: The Hero and the Crowd

It is a very strong temptation, to which many scholars have succumbed, to label all leaders who emerge from crisis conditions in colonial or ex-colonial situations as charismatic leaders. Throughout our analysis we have stressed that it is essential to distinguish between the qualities of charisma and the actual possession of these qualities. Weber began by describing charisma as a quality certain individuals possess which evokes an emotional response in others, who then recognize such a person as a leader. Charisma in this sense can be described as the possession of the gift of grace, a quality which is easily recognizable in certain personalities. The nature of this reciprocal relationship between the leader and followers in a colonial setting assumes somewhat different characteristics than it has in Western Europe and America. In colonial societies this "gift of grace" is apt to be perceived by the followers as having a supra-historical quality.

When we go beyond this rather general and superficial definition of charisma, we discover that, as Shils has recently pointed out, the most important quality of charisma is its ordering function:

> A great fundamental identity exists in all societies, and one of the elements of this identity is the presence of the charismatic element. Even if religious belief had died, which it has not, the condition of man in the universe and the exigencies of social life still remain, and the problems to which religious belief has been the solution in most cultures still remain, demanding solution by those who confront them. The solution lies in the construction or discovery of order. The need for order and the fascination of disorder persist, and the charismatic propensity is a function of the need for order[1].

In a colony the political leader does not necessarily or even usually perform the function of trying to provide order, but rather appears to be engaged in destroying order. But as Shils points out in a very important footnote to his article:

> Order-destroying power, great capacity for violence, attracts too, and arouses the charismatic propensity. It does so because it promises in some instance to provide a new and better order, one more harmonious with the more inclusive and deeper order of existence. Order-destroying power also arouses the charismatic propensity because of a profound ambivalence in men's relations to the central things. Order not only gives meaning; it also constricts and derogates[2].

While this "order-destroying" power seems to better characterize the appeal of colonial politicians because of the antagonism inherent in the colonial situation, it is nonetheless not accurate to characterize such leaders automatically as genuine charismatic leaders. More often than not such leaders engage rather in what Shils on another occasion has called rhetorical charisma. Rhetorical charisma

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[1]Edward Shils, "Charisma, Order and Status", American Sociological Review, Vol. 30, No. 2, April, 1965, p. 203

[2]Ibid., p. 204.

is qualitatively different from genuine charisma in that it evokes a different kind of emotion and response among the followers.

One of the fundamental requisites of a genuine charismatic leader is his ability to politicize and mobilize the mass, not merely to propagandize them. To mobilize means to involve the mass to some extent in both the decision making process and the discussion and formulation of issues, so that their commitment is not superficial. In the British West Indian colonies, as in most other colonies, however, universal adult franchise came suddenly during the terminal phases of colonial rule, following years first of slavery and then continuing subjugation under Crown Colony government. At the time of universal adult franchise, the population was not only largely illiterate, but had been denied all responsibility for their own affairs for three centuries. Not only the mass but also the leaders were victims of what we earlier termed "colonizing of the mind". Thus, it is not surprising that many of the leaders who have emerged have fallen back on propagandizing the mass and demagoguery rather than on mobilization. We have termed this type of leader the hero, and his essential relationship with his followers that of the crowd.

This relationship is facilitated by the nature of the political party, which performs quite different functions in a colony than it does in the metropolitan centres. In the former, the political party is not essentially a cadre party; in most of the West Indian territories the party organization does not depend on a strong core of dues paying members, for this function is performed by the trade union. The party is thereby enabled to function with a much looser form of organization, and its strategy is essentially

different from a cadre party. This type of political party depends mainly on a crisis strategy in order to maintain itself in power. In turn the crisis strategy depends for its success on the continuing existence of "the crowd", which inhibits the emergence of a genuine political organization. We must therefore examine the concept of the crowd more carefully.

Canetti, in his classic study of crowds and power distinguishes between two basic types of crowds: in contrast to the open crowd, which he considers the natural type of crowd and which has universal interest because it may spring up anywhere, there is the closed crowd, which "renounces growth and puts the stress on permanence"[1]. The closed crowd comes closer to describing the type of phenomenon we find in colonial political movements:

> The first thing to be noticed about it is that it has a boundary. It establishes itself by accepting its limitation. It creates a space for itself which it will fill..... Once the space is completely filled, no one else is allowed in. Even if there is an overflow, the important thing is always the dense crowd in the closed room; those standing outside do not really belong.
>
> The boundary prevents disorderly increase, but it also makes it more difficult for the crowd to disperse and so postpones its dissolution. In this way the crowd sacrifices its chance of growth, but gains in staying power. It is protected from outside influences which could become hostile and dangerous and it sets its hope on repetition. It is the expectation of reassembly which enables its members to accept each dispersal[2].

What Canetti terms the "crowd crystals" describes the role played by the trade union officials and party officials in the crowd phenomenon:

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[1]Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), pp. 16-17.

[2]Ibid., p. 17.

> Crowd crystals are the small, rigid groups of men, strictly delimited and of great constancy, which serve to precipitate crowds. Their structure is such that they can be comprehended and taken in at a glance. Their unity is more important than their size. Their role must be familiar; people must know what they are there for. Doubt about their function would render them meaningless. They should preferably always appear the same and it should be impossible to confound one with another; a uniform or a definite sphere of operation serves to promote this[1].

In the case of a colony like Grenada, the small size of the society with its corollary of face to face relations makes it easier for the "crowd crystals" to function without the use of outward symbols such as uniforms.

The strategy of crowd mobilization ultimately depends on the hero, who must be able to provide the crowd with some form of political release, or what Canetti terms the discharge, which temporarily relieves the anxiety of the crowd. The anxiety of the colonial man is of a neurotic kind which often incapacitates him from identifying with or participating in associations in the society on a rational basis. This neurotic anxiety makes it easy for him to identify with a hero, and it is this identification with the hero that provides his political and often social sense of belonging. However, this type of identification, instead of liberating the individual, leads to further regression, making it that much more difficult to rationalize political life.

This particular kind of political loyalty of the crowd to the hero is not the same as other types of leader-mass relationship which may appear similar but differ in certain fundamental respects. Nor is the type of leader we are talking about necessarily or even usually a dictator, particularly during the colonial period when this

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[1] Ibid., p. 73.

is not allowed by the Colonial authority, although he bears some resemblance to what Franz Neumann has termed a "Caesarist". This distinction between a Caesarist dictator and a simple dictator is a useful one for us not only in revealing certain characteristics of the hero but also in understanding the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the third world after independence.

> Simple dictatorship usually occurs in countries where the masses of the people lack political awareness, where politics is the affair of small cliques who compete for favors and hope to gain prestige and wealth by association with the dictator. The mass of the people pay taxes and may have to serve in the army, but otherwise have little to do with political life. The only social controls which may be needed are bribery and corruption of a few influential individuals in order to tie them closely to the system.
>
> In the caesaristic dictatorship a new element enters: the need for popular support[1].

He stresses the personalistic nature of such dictatorships:

> In some situations, the dictator may feel compelled to build up popular support, to secure a mass base, either for his rise to power or for the exercise of it, or for both. We may call this type a caesaristic dictatorship, which, as the name indicates, is always personal in form[2].

The hero shares many of the qualities of the caesarist; he rules by resorting to the "magical" qualities he possesses; he appears to be in complete control over all anxiety situations. But he must never attempt to permanently reduce anxiety, or the conditions that give rise to such anxiety, for it is the manipulation of anxiety that enables him to maintain control over his cadres and the mass. While he must be adept at whipping up crowds whenever and wherever necessary, he must not ever allow the crowd to get out of control

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[1]Franz Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), p. 236.

[2]Ibid.

and to degenerate into a mob. The dangers in continually resorting to the crowd strategy are considerable: we saw in chapter three that Gairy was barely able to control the crowds after a certain stage of the 1951 crisis.

The hero-crowd type relationship need not be confined to the rural mass and their leader. In the urban sector the need for a hero is also felt, both by the urban proletariat who share many of the characteristics and needs of the rural mass, and the middle classes. The middle classes in a colonial society, who represent the modern sector by virtue of their education and professional roles and have a disproportionate share of status and material goods, are nonetheless anxiety ridden about their identity. In some ways their anxiety is more acute since they are more conscious of their marginality than the rural mass. This makes them prone to identify with a hero-type leader who also emphasizes personal leadership, despite the lip service they pay to institutional or party leadership. In response to their peculiar needs, the middle-class hero stresses somewhat different qualities and goals than the mass hero. The former is apt to stress his education as qualifying him for leadership, and he often adopts the posture of the saviour who has sacrificed his career and opportunities for this task. His ideology is usually populist; for him the rhetoric if not the content of Marxism or radical socialism fulfills a very useful role by enabling him to sustain the vicissitudes of politics in the light of the sacrifices he has had to make. In Grenada no middle-class hero of the type we have sketched here was prominent during the period with which we were

concerned, as occurred in certain other West Indian territories[1].

One of the important consequences of the hero-crowd type of relationship is that the political party often takes on many of the characteristics of a millenarian movement in order to maintain its electoral appeal. Worsley has listed three types of situations in which millenarian movements arise:

> (They) occur, firstly, among peoples living in the so-called 'stateless' societies, societies which have no overall unity, which lack centralized political institutions, and which may lack specialized political institutions altogether. They have thus no suitable machinery through which they can act politically as a unified force when the occasion arises, except on a temporary, localized or ad hoc basis. They often have no chiefs, no courts of law other than the council of elders or of prominent or wealthy men, no policy, no army and no administrative officials....
>
> The second major type of society in which millenarian cults develop is the agrarian, and especially feudal, State. Such societies, of course, have indeed an elaborate formal hierarchical organization unlike stateless peoples, but the cults arise among the lower orders - peasants and urban plebians - in opposition to the official regimes. These groups, like stateless Melanesians, lack any overall political organization.
>
> There is a third type of social situation in which activist millenarian ideas are likely to flourish. This is when a society with differentiated political institutions is fighting for its existence by quite secular military-political means, but is meeting with defeat after defeat.... Again, when the political structure of a society is smashed by war or other means, or fails to answer the needs of a people who wish to carry on the struggle, then a prophetic, often millenarian, leadership is likely to emerge[2].

To this listing we would add a fourth type of situation, namely the terminal colonial stage, when political movements are constantly frustrated by the pseudo-power obtained by colonial protest movements. The political movement in this case is unable to satisfy

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[1] This phenomenon of the middle-class hero deserves much more careful attention by scholars in the area than it has up to now received.

[2] P.M. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1957), pp. 227-228.

many of the demands made upon it by the suddenly "liberated" masses, since it does not have the power to implement these demands. The colonial politician is then placed in a very difficult position: he must appear to have power so that his followers continue to vote for him, while at the same time he must magnify his grievances against the colonial officials and ensure that they are blamed for all failures to meet the demands of the people. In this situation where tremendous demands are suddenly made on the system, with only meagre opportunities to fulfill them, the political leader is apt to pose millenarian solutions. Since independence is seen as the millenium, this creates acute problems after independence, when expectations far outdistance the ability of the system to meet them[1].

The hero emerges as a leader at a particular stage of colonial evolution, the terminal stage of colonial rule. This period is marked by the advent of universal adult franchise. It is this sudden emergence of the mass into political life that enables a hero to arise, and which at the same time encourages the caesarist tendencies in this new type of leader. As long as the Imperial power remains, however, no matter how much local self-government is granted the hero is not allowed to establish himself as a dictator because the Imperial power continues to guarantee the party system and parliamentary democracy. Thus the hero is faced with a difficult task during this period of terminal colonial rule, for he must pursue a dual and basically incompatible strategy. On one hand he must retain the spontaneous crowd nature of his movement, and continue to depend

[1]For instance, in Jamaica after independence, freedom has often been associated with 'freeness'.

on the crowd strategy, while on the other hand he must simultaneously build up an organization that can sustain him electorally. The hero's dual strategy is facilitated in the West Indies by the close relation between the trade unions and the political parties. Thus, the political party tends to be loosely organized and has a strong element of spontaneity, while the trade union provides the continuity and the active cadres[1]. Nonetheless, the continued necessity to pursue this dual strategy poses a certain danger for the hero: that the routinization of the organization over time may tend to undermine the strength of the hero-crowd relationship, and may eventually replace personal leadership with party or institutional leadership. Whether the hero-crowd type of political relationship will continue after independence and eventually turn into a caesarist type dictatorship (which is a logical extension of this type of relationship), or whether on the other hand personal government will be gradually replaced by party and institutional government depends to a large extent on the degree and extent to which routinization of the party system has taken place and the strength of the other crucial institutional factors we have discussed previously.

While the crisis of 1951 in Grenada appeared to have the potential for totally disrupting the society, the granting of universal adult franchise and parliamentary reforms were able to preserve civil ties in the community. The granting of universal adult franchise was critical in that it ensured that Gairy's movement could be channeled from a potentially disruptive and perhaps revolutionary

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[1]As we have noted, the middle class party in Grenada has tended to be more tightly organized and routinized than the party of the mass hero, Gairy.

movement into an electoral party operating within the system. In both the crisis of 1951 and of 1962 the colonial authorities were able to contain the conflict, and by acting decisively in curtailing violence prevented Gairy's movement from adopting a "Putsch" strategy. Further, in the 1951 crisis they conceded to Gairy his limited demands for trade union representation rights at a critical stage and thereby conferred legitimacy to his movement. While the entry of Gairy's movement into the system as a political party was bound to entail a certain amount of routinization, the absence of a prolonged struggle with the colonial authorities, due at least in part to the policy of the authorities of granting increasing "power" to the local legislature, allowed the newly formed political parties to place their main emphasis on electoral strategy. The parties therefore remained loosely knit electoral parties rather than becoming tightly organized parties engaged in effective political mobilization.

Therefore, the growing emphasis on the "rituals" of politics that we observed in Grenada should not automatically be taken as evidence of genuine routinization. Although the winning of elections and the demands of parliamentary government ensure some amount of routinization, this can be minimal. This addiction to the rituals of government more often than not indicates a concern with the forms of parliamentary government, not the content. In another context we have characterized this type of politics "Cuckoo Politics"[1]. In any case, the hero continues to depend primarily on his messianic or charismatic claims to leadership, as we observed was the case with Gairy, although he also is careful to back this up with his "legitimate",

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[1]See footnote, p. 261.

i.e. electoral, right to rule. The hero must stress repeatedly that electoral reforms and the concessions granted by the colonial authorities are not sufficient; he continually challenges the legitimacy of the system. Because he does not accept the ultimate legitimacy of the colonial authority, he tends to operate "outside" the system as well as inside the system. We saw how Gairy in 1961 carried on the business of government from the market square, acting in all ways as Chief Minister, although the system did not recognize his claims as legitimate because he was still dis-enfranchised. This tendency to operate outside the system lessens the need for routinization of the movement.

To understand this problem of routinization requires a knowledge of the peculiar relations that exist between the authority systems in a colony. In our case study we have tried to explore the relationships between the authority systems that Weber identified[1].

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[1] In order to characterize these authority systems Weber depended on a methodological device that has led to much subsequent confusion. He argued that since the essence of science was generalization, he would abstract from concrete reality a set of hypothetical constructs that would enable scholars to classify diverse types of information about social reality. The ideal type has become the basis of a great deal of controversy. Weber identified a variety of ideal types, each of which was based on the results of particular investigations. These ideal types were not necessarily correlated; they were not mutually exclusive, nor were they logically interrelated. Weber did not arrive at a theory of society which integrated all these diverse elements, although many of the interrelationships were implicit. In fact, careful students of Weber, like Bendix, have been able to identify a number of these relationships. The less resourceful among his followers, however, have drawn only from some aspects of his theory in constructing ideal types, which we have seen multiplying in the social sciences recently. Talcott Parsons has warned us that Weber had two distinct usages for his ideal types. On occasion he dealt with ideal types as abstractions of social institutions and practices, while on other occasions he attempted to deal with abstractions of ideas such as Calvinism, etc.

We were particularly concerned with the relations between the charismatic and legal authority systems in Grenada. At the outset of our discussion we distinguished between Weber's notions about power and authority. Power for Weber basically meant social compliance, while his definition of authority implied an element of probability. Authority in this context involves a specific relationship between the issuing of an order and a capacity to implement that order.

The question of legitimacy, as we have seen, was the crucial, underlying issue at stake in both the crises in Grenada. The critical role of legitimacy was well recognized by Weber, and in fact he derived his authority systems from the types of claims to legitimacy made by different groups in the society:

> ....every such system attempts to establish and cultivate the belief in its 'legitimacy'. But according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will all differ fundamentally .... Hence, it is useful to classify the types of authority according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each[1].

In another context Weber demonstrated how status groups are able to translate their own values into the values of the society and thus dominate the whole life style of the society. In doing this he refined the class concept, emphasizing the struggle for dominance among status groups rather than between classes. The coherence of the system is maintained in the former case because the competing status groups share certain values about the legitimacy of one of their groups to dominate the values of the society. Once a group is able to establish its dominance, its values create the life style

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[1]Quoted from Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed", op. cit., p. 67.

for the majority.

However, in a colonial system, none of the competing status groups (in Grenada the bureaucracy and the political- mid-elites) accept the legitimacy of the other group(s) to rule, which therefore always tends the system towards crisis, and threatens the breakdown of the system. In Grenada, the claim to legitimacy by the bureaucracy[1] was unchallenged until 1951, because the population was disenfranchised and imperial rule prevented any challenges to that legitimacy. Universal adult franchise threw up a new class of men, the political mid-elites, who challenged that legitimacy for the first time. Although the Constitution after 1951 recognized and indeed legitimized the claims of this new class to leadership, it required that the two competing groups share in the exercise of power, but it left ultimate power in the hands of the bureaucracy, as represented by the Administrator. The political history of the colony from 1951, and particularly the crisis of 1961, can be viewed largely as the struggle by the new political mid-elites to establish their legitimacy, in face of the continued attempts by the bureaucracy to deny them this legitimacy. Because the colonial constitution denies the political mid-elites ultimate authority, it is only after independence that they can firmly establish their claims to legitimacy, although even then the bureaucracy is likely to continue to try and

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[1] There is an essential duality in Weber's views about the bureaucracy, which he himself recognized. On occasion he dealt with the bureaucracy as a status group competing for power, while on other occasions he treated it as a manifestation of the rationalization process in Western societies. These dual categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but the essential point Weber seems to be emphasizing is that each authority system has its own typical administrative structure. We have used the term bureaucracy in its first meaning, i.e. as a status group competing for power.

thwart this effort.

In this struggle for legitimation, both groups resort to charismatic appeals or claims, since the constitutional system does not allow for a final resolution of the conflict on "legal" grounds but rather assumes cooperation and dual leadership. Gairy, the mass hero, based his claim largely on personal charisma, while the Administrator made use of the charismatic appeal of his office. While both protagonists used both charismatic and legal claims to authority, Gairy's power was certainly much more dependent on charismatic appeal than was the case with the Administrator, while the power of the latter was more dependent on legal authority than on the claim to charisma. This enabled us to characterize the struggle as essentially that between a charismatic authority system and a legal authority system, although we have not classified Gairy as a genuine charismatic leader.

This struggle for power between these two competing status groups reflected the more basic conflict in the society, between what M.G. Smith characterizes as the two cultures in Grenada. Essentially this is the conflict between the elites on one hand and the mass on the other. In a society like Grenada this dichotomy coincides on the whole with the urban-rural division[1]. This relationship has always been a dominant (urban)-dependent (rural) relationship, despite the numerical superiority of the latter. Until 1951 the rural mass had never been allowed to share in political power;

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[1]The plantocracy for these purposes can be classified as belonging to the urban sector. This urban-metropolitan oriented sector is highly "westernized" and "modern" in orientation.

with the advent of universal adult franchise it was faced with the difficulty of finding leaders. Traditionally the peasant sector has tended to be leary of power and the apparatus of government, viewing all bureaucratic attempts to "help" them as repressive. Whatever "representation" they had previously came from those elites who chose to speak for them on an informal and non-reciprocal basis. In some colonies the rural people continue to rely on these old elites to represent them even after universal adult franchise, although the relationship is now formalized by the electoral system. However, in many of the West Indian territories such as Grenada, a new class of leaders arose, like Gairy, who for the first time spoke legitimately in the name of the rural mass, and who made their presence in the society felt.

The challenge to the system that is posed by men like Gairy, therefore, is not only the threat they pose as a new status group competing within the elite structure, but that potentially they threaten to upset the whole system of social relations within the colony. It is the fear of this possibility that leads the existing elites to fight so fiercely to deny legitimacy to these men and what they represent. Over time, however, the elite structure tends to gradually absorb the new political mid-elites, who then have a vested interest themselves in maintaining the social structure and their place in it. This absorption of the hero and the political mid-elite in general into the power structure has not proceeded as smoothly or rapidly in Grenada as it did in many other territories, which helps account for the greater amount of turmoil and crisis experienced by the former during this period.

Even if the political mid-elites are successfully integrated into the system and the political system thereby appears to have taken root, there is still the larger problem of the genuine socialization and integration of the mass of people into the society and the polity. As we have seen, the hero and the other political mid-elites do not effectively attempt to mobilize and politicize the electorate, but rather to propagandize them. Routinization of the movement is minimal, as the leader continues to emphasize personal government. Under these circumstances we must raise serious questions as to the capacity of political systems of the types that were imposed on societies like Grenada to undertake the arduous tasks of independence.

Decolonization: The Problem of Personal Government

We have seen that personal government is an almost inevitable concomitant of colonial politics. Before we attempt to predict whether this type of government is likely to continue and in what form in the Caribbean, we must first identify and discuss the main characteristics of the four types of government domination that appear to us the most likely possibilities. These four types can be combined into two major categories: Personal Government and Representative Government. Under these headings our four types are:

Personal Government

(1) Personal Revolutionary Government

(2) Personal Non-Revolutionary Government

Representative Government

(3) Mass Representative Government

(4) Devolved or Mediated Representative Government.

The essential feature of Personal Government is that one man is predominately influential in enunciating the goals of government, and that he assumes complete responsibility for the execution of these goals. He also formulates and enunciates the major goals and aims of the society[1]. In Representative Government, on the other hand, the enunciation and execution of goals is basically the result of a process of discussion between cooperating and competing elites. These elites attain the right to partake in this process by virtue of their occupying particular positions in institutions recognized as legitimate parts of the society's structure of decision-making, whether public or private. As with all categories, there is a certain degree of overlap between our four types of government domination. However, each form of government has distinguishing characteristics which differentiates it from the others.

Personal Revolutionary Government is based on a series of 'goals' claimed to be revolutionary; there is a desire on the part of the leadership to spread or internationalize these goals. These goals have overtly moral rather than secular connotations, and they are claimed to be the only worthwhile and possible goals any "good" society can have. There is a continual manipulation of political symbols thought appropriate for maintaining the allegiance of the population for whose benefit the goals are allegedly sought. One of the most important characteristics of this form of government is the lack of alternative and independent elites and of alternative insti-

[1]It is the case in which, to quote de Jouvenel "power is .... concentrated in the hands of a single man", the concern of political thinkers for long having been, as he puts it, "to lessen the share of any ONE in the conduct of public affairs". De Jouvenel, "The Principate", The Political Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1965, p. 21.

tutions not controlled by government. The source of government is the 'leader'.

The goals of Personal Non-Revolutionary Government, on the other hand, are not claimed to be revolutionary or international (universal), rather there is a manipulation of predominantly non-secular, i.e. religious or cultural (kinship), symbols. This type of government can be further subdivided into (a) autocracy in which the goals of the leadership are limited to personal survival, though authority or the right to dominate may have been gained on other grounds, or (b) autocracy in which there are 'mass' goals, but in which there are no indigenous competing elites or institutions. Allowance may be made within the system, however, for the existence of non-indigenous, assisting, or overtly-subservient elites and institutions.

Mass Representative Government is characterized by universal adult suffrage for rule by parliamentary government. While there are competing indigenous political elites, one political elite tends to be predominant. In small countries this political elite is likely to control, or be linked to, all other 'mass' organizations. The predominant elite is dependent on a personality, the "leader", who is able to manipulate significant symbols; mass involvement is important to the predominating elite, which tends to espouse 'radical' goals.

In Devolved or Mediated Representative Government universal suffrage (though this is not a necessary prerequisite) and parliamentary government exist, with "equally powerful" political elites and institutions. In this case leadership potentialities are cosset-

ted by stable institutions and structures. While goals may be 'mass' oriented, their enunciation and execution is restricted by the existence of competing mass goals.

One of the main characteristics of both types of Personal Government is the apparent ease and short notice with which directions of policy can be changed. Such changes may in fact be the result of long conflict within the ruling group, but the secrecy which is characteristic of these types of rule allows changes of policy to appear sudden. This condition may sometimes also characterize Mass Representative Governments, particularly where the predominating party thinks its existence and survival as such is dependent on the versatility of the 'leader' and on his relationship with the population and mass organization. In these three types of government, then, power, authority and influence may be so concentrated in one individual that policy decisions may surprise even those of the ruling group. It should be noted that this 'personal' rule does not include forms of collegial rule, though there is likely to be a member of the collegium more respected than others and who clearly becomes the source of authority. Collegial rule that is composed of leaders of equal esteem and de facto authority tends toward instability, although this is to some extent a general problem of all forms of rule. Of course, the importance of this problem in each type of government varies. As Weber has reminded us, personal rule may after a period of time be institutionalized. Again we should stress that our categories are likely to overlap, and in real life existing governments are often in fact mixtures of the various types, or although they are predominantly of one type possess attributes of one or some of the others.

Both types of Personal Government face particular difficulties over the process of changes of leaders or of ruling groups. This is due mainly to the failure of the personal ruler to allow his rule to be institutionalized, so that there is no procedure, or at least no definitive procedure, for governmental change. At one extreme this may result in civil war; although there is also the possibility that the process of leadership may become institutionalized. In the latter case the leadership group may gain legitimacy; for example, a party may become accepted as the avenue for political leadership, and the difficulties arising from the change in leadership may be confined to the institution where the business of leadership is usually conducted, whether it be the party, party executive, cabinet or parliamentary party. Of course, this problem of predictability is a general problem of all government. What perhaps distinguishes Personal Government from Representative Government in this respect is that the consequences for the loser(s) in a leadership contest are likely to be more serious in the former than in the latter, both in terms of personal physical consequence and the likelihood of remaining within the ruling group.

Irrespective of the probability of the mixture and overlapping of types, we are not postulating that one form of government necessarily leads to another or is the consequence of another. We therefore allow for the existence of different though related species of governments within the same broad type, and at the same time allow for different possibilities of change or transition from one type to another. In our schema, for example, Mass Representative rule can change into Personal Revolutionary Government or the Devolved

Representative type, depending inter alia on the extent of the predominance of the ruling elite, of the leader, or on the solidity of the institutional bases of the various existing elites. The order of our types, is not to be taken as representing a continuum or evolutionary pattern.

However, no matter which of the four types of government we have postulated here as already existing, or as most likely for the Caribbean in the future, in fact evolves in any given colony or ex-colony, the important thing to note is that all types as found in the area are likely to involve continuing personalist forms of government. This became strikingly apparent when we applied our categories to a number of societies in the Caribbean in another context[1] and discovered that all four types as they exist in the area are strongly marked by personalism. While we are not suggesting that this will necessarily continue inevitably into the future, it does raise the crucial, still unanswered, question as to whether the colonial and ex-colonial societies such as exist in the Caribbean are condemned to perpetual personal rule, irrespective of the types of regimes left behind by the colonial powers.

It seems to us that two major factors are responsible for the strength of personal government in the area: what we will summarize as the colonial heritage, and the small size of these territories. This suggests that a number of changes must take place if personal government is to give way to party or institutional govern-

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[1] In the article written with V. Lewis on "Integration, Domination and the Small State System: The Caribbean", op. cit., we applied these categories to both independent states and territories that are still colonies, including non-British as well as British territories.

ment. The first lies in the decolonization of both leaders and the mass of people. This is apt to prove a difficult task, involving changes both in institutions and values within these societies, and will depend largely on the increasing strength of the crucial institutional factors that we have discussed. This will necessitate rapid economic growth and changes in the social structure, in addition to changes in political institutions. The important thing we would like to stress is that we are not postulating a 'cult of personality' theory of politics for the West Indies, but rather pointing out that institutional changes can over time lessen this tendency towards personal government and eventually replace it with party or institutional government. Unless these institutional factors are strengthened, however, there is the danger that the hero, with his caesarist tendencies, will be able to establish a virtual dictatorship, doing away with opposing parties and institutions. As we pointed out previously this is a logical extension of the hero-crowd type of political relationship in the absence of strong external or internal constraints.

Since size is also an important factor in encouraging continued personal rule, it would appear logical to suppose that forming larger units such as federations or unitary states would also tend to lessen this reliance on personal government. However, the prospects for such integration appear quite remote at the present time, on at least two grounds[1]. To begin with, the indigenous social and poli-

[1]It should be noted that we have been speaking here of a Caribbean community, not just of a (British) West Indian community. From one point of view the collapse of the West Indian Federation can be viewed as possibly making the way easier for the eventual establishment of a Caribbean community.

tical systems are themselves likely to inhibit integration, primarily because of the forms of elite-mass relationships in these societies. Since the polities involved have all tended to be "personalistic", rational calculation is made difficult. The second ground for pessimism is that the other significant elites in these territories, the economic and bureaucratic elites, have vested interests in maintaining the present political orders, since these give them dominance in the individual units, while integration would weaken their power positions. Thus, the major decision groups, the political leader(s) and the other critical elites, though they espouse middle-class modernist values, tend to resist attempts at integration.

At the mass level the problem is somewhat different. Here common historical, cultural and economic backgrounds have produced a broad shared experience within the area. Of course, we are fully aware that there are genuine problems in the differences of language, religion and culture. The pluralism of the Caribbean community is a definite barrier, though not necessarily a permanent one. We would argue, however, that since social stratification in the Caribbean reveals a certain uniformity, the prospects for integration are stronger on this score, provided leadership is forthcoming. One other fact that gives rise to some guarded optimism is the recent trend towards a serious examination of the possibilities for economic integration in the area. While it is still too soon to assess the outcome of these developments, they carry with them the promise of increasing regional inter-dependence which may facilitate different forms of political integration.

The hero is a type of leader who arises in response to a certain type of colonial situation, and the prevalence of personal government in the Caribbean and in the third world in general is a logical by-product of colonial rule. One of the major tasks of decolonization is to move away from reliance on the hero, and concomitantly towards a genuine political socialization of the mass of people in the area, which heretofore has been lacking. This implies changes in the social structure and the elite-mass relationship, and in many cases changes or modification in political and governmental forms. It is vital that the societies in the area experiment with a variety of political forms so as to overcome the pitfalls of personal government. The "Westminister model" as it has been indiscriminately imposed on many of these societies has not proved in many cases to be the most suitable in its present form and has produced a very different type of polity in these societies than in the mother country where it was the outcome of a long period of evolution. Genuine decolonization requires changes in forms and institutions, as well as in the attitudes and values of the people of these societies.

APPENDIX I

METHODOLOGY

In the Introduction we set forth the major hypotheses we intended to investigate in our case study. However, at the beginning of each chapter we also stated the major theoretical propositions under consideration in that chapter, drawing together our major conclusions in chapter six. The approach adopted throughout has been recently characterized as the "problem solving" approach, where the hypothesis is formulated as a problem, and the data is marshalled in such a way as to attempt to find some answers to the problem. In adopting the problem solving approach we have undertaken to describe and explain the political phenomena under investigation simultaneously.

Throughout the study we have attempted to generalize from a number of our conclusions beyond the specific case study under investigation. This raises a number of questions as to the validity of this approach. The first question that arises is that even if it is conceded that it is a valid approach to generalize from a single case study, it is not immediately certain that in the case of such a small society as Grenada this approach is still justified. The underlying assumption of this hypothesis is that the larger the unit of analysis, the greater the strength of the generalization arrived at, based partly on the question of the complexity of society. The validity of this assumption of course would vary with the particular proposition being investigated. Throughout our case study we have tried to handle the question of

the scale of the society as explicitly as possible, in fact to the extent that we included scale as one of our variables in the system. And we have tried throughout the study not to generalize to larger units when the question of scale was one of the crucial variables in the particular proposition being analyzed. In such instances, our generalizations have only been to other units of comparable size.

A second, and perhaps more important question that arises from generalizing from a single case study is that of comparability. In general it is assumed that the larger the number of units studied for purposes of comparison, the greater the validity of the generalizations. Our experience indicates that this assumption is unfounded for the investigation of certain types of problems. As we pointed out in the Introduction, we originally conceived of our study as a comparative exercise to examine legislative-executive relations in all the British West Indian territories. In fact, we administered questionnaires to all the senior civil servants in both the Windward and Leeward islands, as well as the larger territories of Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana (then British Guiana) at various times with such a comparative study in mind. The data thus gathered, however, did not appear to us to satisfactorally describe the real nature of the conflict and tension between these two branches of government, in light of our own experience and knowledge. Not only did the respondents avoid expressing hostile or uncomfortable opinions in the interview situation, but as the work progressed we realized that a study in much greater depth was needed if a meaningful and not merely superficial understanding

were to be obtained of this complex and deep rooted problem. We also were convinced that to properly understand this particular problem it was essential to deal with the totality of the colonial situation as far as possible, a point which we developed in some detail in chapter six. From our continued and close observation of the various British West Indian territories, it was apparent that the problems of legislative-executive relations in all territories were basically the same. Further evidence for this point of view was provided by the works of scholars of other colonial and ex-colonial societies. We concluded that what may have been lost by the failure to make this a comparative study has been more than compensated for by the depth and scope made possible by the case study, and that in the final analysis such an approach facilitates comparative research rather than hinders it.

While we feel that the data has fully justified our approach, we were aware throughout our analysis of all the limitations that a single case study approach involves, particularly the distinction Lipset has made between what he calls a particularizing analysis and a generalizing analysis.

> The crucial element which distinguishes these two types of analysis is the way they treat general laws and particular statements about the single case. The first kind of analysis uses general laws or regularities in order to carry out the analysis of the particular case, much as a metallurgist utilizes his knowledge of general chemical properties in analyzing a sample of ore. That is, it uses previously-known generalizations in order to help make particular statements. The second kind of analysis is just the reverse of this: much as a biologist focuses his microscope on a living and growing fruit fly in order to make generalizations about processes of growth, the social scientist in

> this kind of analysis attempts to utilize the particular case in developing general statements. The particular statement and the general law trade places in these two types of analysis. In the former, the law is used to aid in making particular statements; in the second, the particular statements are used to develop the law [1].

In our study, we used primarily the second type of analysis, although we also tried to test our conclusions drawn from the case study against those reached by other scholars wherever they appeared relevant. In our discipline we are still far from having arrived at a set of "general laws", and thus must continue to generalize from the particular. The underlying assumption of those who write case studies is that eventually the data will prove to be cumulative, and that the propositions from these case studies will be drawn together by a synthesizer or grand theorist who will integrate the generalizations and present a general theory.

While many of those who write case studies cautiously avoid the temptation to generalize beyond the particular society under investigation, we feel that there is already a sufficient body of knowledge accumulated in some areas to begin to make at least some tentative generalizations on the nature of political systems in the third world. In our case study we generalized to a number of different universes, from the very specific universe of legislative-executive relations in British colonies in the Caribbean to more general propositions about all British colonies, and where the evidence appeared to warrant it, to the colonial situation in

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[1]. Seymour Lipset, M.A. Trow and J.S. Coleman, Union Democracy (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956), p. 420.

general, depending on the known limitations of the comparability of the data (e.g. scale, type of political system imposed by the metropolitan society, different cultures and histories, etc.) In some instances our conclusions appeared to be valid only for Grenada itself. Of course, the more general our propositions, the more tentative they must be. In any case, such generalizations are always subject to modification or discard as more evidence becomes available.

We feel that it is imperative that social scientists in the third world arrive at a body of general propositions for their various disciplines as rapidly as possible to facilitate the policy makers in these countries. In these societies scholars will have to go further than many of their colleagues in the advanced countries by becoming directly involved in the policy making process, combining analysis with prescriptions. Given the urgency of the problems faced by these societies, there will not be the time available to slowly and cumulatively build up large bodies of data before conclusions are drawn and generalizations arrived at. We would argue, therefore, that it is preferable in these societies that general propositions be attempted even though the evidence appears scanty by the standards of scholars in the advanced countries, for policy makers will be forced to make critical decisions without the help of the social scientists if the latter are excessively cautious. This may be distasteful to many scholars in the "advanced" countries, but the alternatives appear to us to be even more distasteful.

We would add one final justification for an intensive case

study of the type we have attempted (although we feel that the results of our study amply justify this approach) and that is that the colonial polity is a fast disappearing phenomenon. If one accepts the notion that political science is contemporary history, then the need for careful documentation of the present is indispensable. Unfortunately, much of the present research on newly independent nations lacks depth because of the gaps in our knowledge of the political and social institutions in these societies in their pre-independence period. It is hoped that this study will help fill some of these gaps.

Methodological Approaches Employed in the Study

The intensive case study of a political system in its entirety, including a fairly detailed examination of the non-political factors that affect the political system, presented us with a number of problems in respect to methodology. We have discussed elsewhere the boundary problems that such an approach involved. In addition, by choosing a historical sequence of time for our study we were immediately faced with the historian's problem of presenting an accurate narrative. Thus, a number of sources of information and approaches to the study were employed.

Before summarizing and attempting to evaluate the various methodological approaches finally used, it is useful to present briefly the background to this study, as the events leading up to the study as finally conceived are illuminating. During April of

1962, the author, in company with G.E. Mills, Director of Training in Public Administration at the University of the West Indies, visited the various Leeward and Windward islands to conduct training courses for senior civil servants in these islands under the auspices of the Extra-Mural Department of the University. This opportunity was used to administer questionnaires to these senior civil servants on general bureaucratic behaviour in connection with another study in preparation by the author and the Director. Questionnaires were also administered to senior civil servants in Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana (then British Guiana) at other times. One of the basic problems that kept recurring in our discussions with the civil servants in these territories was the tremendous tension that existed between the politicians and the administrators as a result of the new constitutions that had been devised for these territories. In fact, we were asked by both politicans and civil servants in the area to hold training seminars so that some of these problems could be discussed. In some cases representatives of both groups attended the seminars together, and it was suggested more than once that some of the lectures should be made available in printed form for future training seminars, which we undertook to do.

While we were engaged in this task, the news came that the Constitution of one of these territories, Grenada, had been suspended, and that the Administrator had assumed complete control over the colony. This was in June, 1962. As we have seen in the case study, the suspension of Grenada's Constitution was fundamentally a direct result of the tensions that had been brewing between

the civil service and the politicians. This provided us with an unexcelled opportunity to study this problem in its most acute and clear-cut form, as revealed in a crisis situation. Accordingly, Mr. Mills, myself and an economist from the University, Mr. A. McIntyre, drew up a research design for analyzing the crisis, not only in terms of our immediate concern of legislative-executive relations, but also some of the other crucial problems confronting the society that were underscored by the crisis. One week after the suspension of the Constitution the research team, consisting of the three senior researchers, two graduate students, and ten undergraduate students who were to act as participant-observers, arrived in the colony and began the field work.

In collecting the data for this particular case study we decided that three different types of approaches were needed. The first was the collection and collation of all the documentary evidence available. We choose a historical sequence of time for our study, because the crisis of 1951 provided a very useful bench-mark for the events leading to the crisis of 1962. This necessi-tated the collection of a great number of documentary sources. We found that the most useful documents of the 1951 crisis were those available in the Colonial Office Library in London. The author was fortunate in being able to spend the following academic year at Manchester University in England, and the Colonial Office in London graciously made available considerable details concerning the 1951 crisis. These documents were supplemented by interviews with Colonial Office officials who were or had been responsible for Grenada. As much documentary evidence as was available was also

collected in Grenada, supplemented by interviews with local people about the earlier period. Gairy himself provided a great deal of information and his own interpretation of the events of 1951 which proved very illuminating. The documentary evidence that was collected, in conjunction with the interviews of people connected with the events of 1951, led to the particular intepretation of that crisis presented in chapter three. While differing in emphasis, our conclusions were not substantially different from those reached by Rottenberg and M.G. Smith in their pioneering studies of this crisis. Documentary evidence also provided the narrative framework for the other chapters. Considerable documentary evidence was also collected on the economy and earlier history of the island, particularly the constitutional history. We will not discuss in any more detail or attempt to justify our intensive use of documentary evidence, since it is largely self-evident, and was necessitated by the historical nature of much of the narrative.

Our second source of data was from interviews with the elite groups in the society and from a random sample of registered voters. It was felt that interviews with the relevant elites in the society were absolutely essential to understand the nature and problems of legislative-executive relations in the colony. Accordingly, three sets of elite questionnaires were devised: for the senior civil servants, the legislative elites and the socio-economic elites. The questionnaires were jointly constructed by the three senior researchers. The major focus of all the questionnaires was the reasons attributed by these elites for the breakdown of constitutional government, as well as more general questions on their

perceptions of government and constitutional matters, their attitudes to colonialism and to the future of the colony. While there was a common core of questions running through each set of interviews, some of the questions were worded differently. In addition there were some questions that were unique to each of the three questionnaires to provide data for possible additional studies and for general background. The two graduate students assisted with the elite interviewing. The three sets of interviews are attached to this appendix. An assessment of the value and the limitations of this type of elite interviewing will be found in the next section.

Altogether a total of thirty nine interviews were obtained from the socio-economic elites, who were interviewed by the economist on the research team. The criteria used for selecting these elites were: (1) all directors of companies and firms located in Grenada; (2) all land owners possessing over 100 acres; and (3) heads of churches and other voluntary groups. The Public Administrator was responsible for the interviewing of the senior civil servants, including Heads of Departments, Permanent Secretaries and Senior Technical Officers. Seventeen interviews were administered to people in this category. Information obtained from this set of interviews was supplemented with data collected from the interviews that had been administered previously to senior civil servants as part of the earlier study referred to. Twenty two interviews were obtained in Grenada on that occasion. A third set of interviews were administered by the author to the political elites in Grenada, including the elected members of the Legislative

Council, some of whom were also Ministers of Government, the Chief Minister, Leader of the Opposition and members of the Executive of both parties and trade union leaders. A total of fourteen interviews were completed in this category.

We were fortunate in also being able to interview a random sample of the electorate at the height of the crisis, which provided us with a rich source of data. It was apparent from mid-June that the Administrator was not planning to continue his one man rule under a suspended Constitution indefinitely, and plans began to be made to hold a general election early in the fall. In August the Administrator announced that elections would be held on September 13th, and that the voters lists were being prepared. This presented us with an excellent opportunity to conduct an election survey that would also provide us with information on a much wider range of topics germane to our study. The following list gives some indication of the main headings under which we attempted to gain information from the electorate:

(1) The perception of the Grenadian electorate on the meaning of the 1962 election;
(2) Their attitudes toward their political leaders and especially their attitudes about the leadership qualities of Gairy;
(3) The pattern of political identification and the degree of partisanship;
(4) The types of community identification existing in the various strata of the society;
(5) Their attitudes toward a number of local issues, especially their knowledge and understanding of the conflict between the bureaucracy and the legislature.

The full questionnaire will be found on pages 419 to 442 of this appendix.

For this survey a sample was drawn from the voters list with

the help of several statisticians from the University of the West Indies, Dr. A. Kundu and Mr. A. Francis of the Department of Economics. From a total of 34,662 registered voters, a sample of 310 names were randomly selected, of which 292 interviews were finally completed. The sample survey was the sole responsibility of the author. An evaluation of this method of data collection for a country like Grenada will be found in the next section of this appendix.

Our third major methodological approach was the use of participant-observers, which was the task assigned to ten undergraduate students from the University of the West Indies. The participant-observer approach to data collection appeared to us to offer great possibilities in Grenada, where the small size of the society made this feasible. Each of the ten participant-observers was asked to follow the campaign in one of the ten constituencies assigned to him and to record information under a number of headings. We shall return to an assessment of this approach in the next section.

For our study we therefore used the methodological devices employed in three different disciplines to study a political problem: history, sociology and anthropology. Each approach had certain limitations if used by itself, but in combination with the others enabled the study to gain in depth, while the data from each source provided us with a check on data from the other sources. In those cases where the different sets of data were contradictory the author had to use his judgment, based on his professional knowledge and his knowledge of the society. On the whole we found that the three

approaches complemented each other, although in some cases they were contradictory. We can now turn to some of the problems we encountered with these approaches, with some indication as to their potential usefullness and their limitations for other researchers.

Elite interviews: The Career History Approach

While a crisis provides an unexcelled opportunity to see the mechanisms of a system starkly revealed, it does present certain difficulties from the point of view of the researcher. Elite interviewing is particularly difficult under conditions of crisis. The interviewer stands the risk of being accused of interfering, and doubt is apt to be case on the ulterior motives of the researcher, which at the same time casts doubt on the legitimacy of the study. Further, career history interviews by definition imply that the respondent must be willing to divulge detailed information about his private life, which further increases the suspicions of the respondents as to what the interviewer is "up to". Under conditions of crisis, when tensions run high and suspicion is rife, people are understandably reluctant to divulge opinions or information of any kind, as leakages could cause them great difficulties. While elite interviewing under conditions of crisis is apt to be difficult in any type of society, it is particularly difficult in a small society like Grenada with its face to face relations and complete lack of anonymity. Respondents in small societies like this are well aware of every movement of the interviewer. Often this interviewer was

met with the remark "Of course you saw Mr. ..... this morning who no doubt gave you another story."

Because of the fear of the consequences that could result from disclosure of opinions or information, many of those being interviewed will attempt to steer the interviewer away from the questionnaire, especially if a particular question is controversial. In such cases the interviewer has to be very careful that he does not complete the interview without having obtained any of the real information and opinions he wanted to obtain! Another difficulty in intensive interviewing of elites in crisis situations is that many respondents are anxious to convert the interviewer to their point of view. The probe in this context can be misunderstood as meaning agreement or disagreement with the views of the respondent. Particularly in a small society there is the constant danger that people will identify the interviewer with a particular faction or a particular point of view. If this occurs, despite the best efforts of the interviewer to avoid being labelled, then certain respondents may prove reticent about giving information.

The recording of the interview also presented some difficult problems. The senior civil servants especially were quite reluctant when they saw the interviewer take out pen and paper. In some cases it was impossible to record answers or statements, in which case the interviewer had to make field notes after the interview was over, which tended to reduce the accuracy of the interview. However, many civil servants did not mind speaking freely, although they objected to the verbatim transcription of their replies. The economic elites were on the whole the most reticent of all the

elite groups interviewed. They were particularly anxious not to be identified with a partisan policy or party, and they were not particularly forthcoming in their opinions on the issues involved in the crisis, although they did speak more freely on issues not directly concerning political parties or factions, i.e., on the more general questions. The political elites on the other hand posed an entirely different type of problem. While they were particularly frank and co-operative in answering questions, they tended on occasion to turn the interview situation into a press conference and use it as a platform to propound the party line. But, on the whole, they were quite open and anxious that the exact quotation be taken down, and they also readily and graciously made available party documents and took the interviewers to political meetings and party caucuses.

In these circumstances it was found that one interview was hardly satisfactory. Often the interview had to be repeated, and it was only on the second or third interview that satisfactory data was obtained. The greatest problem in the elite interview situation throughout the case study was that of distortion and rationalization, but this is a problem faced generally in elite interviewing and is not unique to Grenada.

However, these difficulties were mainly technical in difficulty, and we were able to overcome most of them because of certain advantages we enjoyed. The first was the therapeutic role often enjoyed by interviewers in situations like this. People are anxious to relieve themselves of some of their opinions to people who are outside the direct fray. On occasion a respondent

would begin by saying "don't quote me, but the real issue here is .....". This type of information, while anecdotal, is particularly useful if the interviewer has a chance to verify it in another interview situation, and often it opens up areas of investigation the interviewer has not thought of. The therapeutic function performed by the interviewer can be quite useful in helping to gain the trust of the respondent and thus facilitates the obtaining of the required data. If the respondent feels that the interviewer is going to respect his confidences, he will often discuss freely a number of vital issues, which although they may not be directly relevant to the questionnaire are nonetheless quite useful. In Grenada the interviewers found the elites in general quite hospitable, and often the interview situation turned into a social occasion.

The interviewer in this particular instance was in a somewhat fortuitous position in regards to his relationship with the society. As a member of the staff of the University of the West Indies (which services these islands) and an ex-colonial himself he was accepted in one sense as an "insider". But since he was not a citizen or resident of this particular island and hence not directly involved in the system he was also an "outsider". This rather unique position on the whole facilitated the interviewing situation, despite the tendency of some respondents to try and draw the interviewer into factional disputes.

Another factor which helped us in the interviewing situation was that each group of elites were interviewed by an individual who had professional competence in the same area as the

elite group being interviewed. Thus, an economist interviewed the economic elites, a public administrator the civil servants and a political scientist the politicians, which also facilitated the task of gaining this confidence.

While we managed to overcome most of the technical problems involved in this interviewing, the elite interview or career history approach raises a more serious substantive problem. While these interviews are useful for narrative purposes, they are not sufficient by themselves for analytical purposes because they stress highly individualistic accounts of events at the expense of the larger social and political forces that are operating in the society. There is a strong tendency for elite groups especially in small societies to view the political process as a series of factional and personal disputes, and to overlook or underrate the importance of organizations and their role in structuring and transforming the behaviour of the individual. This problem, coupled with the common tendency of respondents to give the "correct" answers rather than expressing their own real feelings and opinions, indicates that the career history approach is mainly useful as an adjunct to other methodological approaches, not as the primary or main source of data. One of the weaknesses of Wendell Bell's study on the Jamaican elites,[1] for example, was his heavy reliance on elite interviews. We therefore used the information gained from the

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[1] Cf. Wendell Bell, Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation, op. cit.

elite interviews rather sparingly and in conjunction with the information gained from our other sources. Nonetheless, the career history approach did shed much light on many of the problems under investigation, and for narrative purposes helped provide a feel for the society for the readers.

The Election Survey

One of the by-products of the "importation" of electoral systems by the newer states has been the importation of the methodological devices used to study them. The indiscriminate adoption of these methodological devices is not without serious drawbacks and difficulties, as we quickly discovered at the outset of our survey. Apparent similarities or differences between countries (and particularly between developed and underdeveloped countries) may therefore reflect no real parallels or differences but may simply be the result of using techniques which do not elicit viable data in a different cultural context. While there is a strong need from a comparative point of view for a unified and systematic approach to data collection, this should not blind us to the real difficulties that arise when techniques suitable for the United States, for example, are used in societies like Grenada unless they are suitably modified and adapted.

The first difficulty that arose in connection with our survey was in devising the questionnaire. Our original questionnaire included a number of open-ended questions. Although the pre-test

revealed that while the questionnaire was not difficult to administer, a number of questions were misunderstood by respondents because of the "language" difficulty. Throughout the West Indies the majority of the people speak a form of patois, which in Grenada includes a mixture of French and English patois. This meant that our twelve interviewers (who received two weeks intensive training at the outset of the survey) had to "translate" the questions for a number of the respondents. It was then decided that the error in interpreting the open ended questions was so great that it would be better to substitute closed questions in most instances[1].

The "language" problem plagued the interviewing throughout the survey. Where the mass of the people are not only illiterate, but speak a different form of the language than do the educated (i.e. patois vs. the Queen's English in Grenada) there is much more possibility of error in the interview situation. Another problem in the West Indies is the tendency of the lower class individual to answer "yes" even if he does not understand the question or disagrees with it, as a form of politeness or from fear of angering a member of a higher status group.

A second major problem that we encountered was that in societies like Grenada where there is a paucity of employment opportunities outside of the government sector, politics means jobs.

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[1]For analytical purposes the two main variables we employed were party pre-disposition and attitudes to colonialism. To determine party pre-disposition we used the answers to questions 16(d), 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the public opinion questionnaire, while in determining whether respondents were basically colonialist or anti-colonialist we used the responses to questions 14 and 16(e).

Often an individual's livelihood is determined by his partisan identification. Thus, when a respondent discloses this identification, he runs the risk of losing his job. Because of the strong feelings of partisanship he may also risk retaliation by friends and neighbours if he identifies with the "wrong" party. Political opinions are virtually a matter of life and death in such societies, and however much the interviewer promises anonymity for the views of the respondent, the former is likely to become the target of a certain amount of political hostility. We had asked the interviewers wherever possible to provide us with quotations of the remarks of respondents to help us in interpreting the answers. This was interpreted in some instances as partisan prying on the part of the interviewer. If an interviewer was not known in a particular area, respondents tended either to be evasive or give the interviewer the answer they thought they wanted to hear. This "rural cunning" has fooled many a researcher. On one occasion during our survey we rechecked opinions given by a respondent with the local party organizer. We found that the respondent had given totally false information as to his party affiliation and attitude to Gairy. In fact a strong Gairyite, he left the interviewer with a strongly anti-Gairy impression. If the interviewer was known to the respondent, as is often the case in such small societies, his politics were also known or correctly guessed in most cases and this sometimes colored the response of the respondent.

In the latter type of situation a furthur difficulty arose. In one area where the interviewer was a known political partisan, one of the political parties charged that the interviewers were

campaigning. A careful check of the particular interviewer most involved revealed that he was not campaigning, but had a personal feud with the respondent who had made the charge. The political party making the charge was not satisfied with our investigation and complained to the press that our survey was biased. While our field interviewers reported that most respondents in the rural areas had no knowledge of the charges, the survey did become a matter of considerable controversy in the capital, St. George's. Fortunately, the major part of the interviewing had already been completed before the charge was publicly aired.

In the atmosphere that existed it is not surprising that the election survey became a "political" issue. This undoubtedly affected the results obtained to some degree, though it is impossible to measure the extent of this in any way but it clearly points up one of the very real difficulties of public opinion or election surveys in very small societies. We deliberately did not make known the results of our survey before the election, as it was obvious that this could have influenced the election results. It has been argued that even in larger, more developed countries the results of election surveys can influence the outcome of the election, but in societies like the one under study this danger is considerably increased.

Despite all the difficulties we encountered in our survey, we feel reasonably confident that the responses represented as objective an assessment of public opinion as was possible under the circumstances, and they contributed immensely to our understanding of the problems under investigation. However, as with the elite

interviews, we feel that complete dependence or undue reliance on the survey method in such societies can be dangerous. Even if the information obtained is fairly accurate, it tends to give a rather superficial and often misleading picture of the real issues, particularly if they are complex. This came out clearly when we compared the results of our survey with the information gathered by our participant-observers, which we discuss below. Nonetheless, as long as the proper precautions are observed in interpreting the data, and it is used in conjunction with other methods rather than as the sole source of data, the survey method, properly adapted, can prove a useful tool of analysis for scholars of the third world.

The Participant-Observer Approach

The observations of our participant-observers not only provided a useful check on the survey findings, but they also brought forth a wealth of information that would not otherwise have come to our attention. In many instances the picture of the 1962 elections that emerged from these reports contradicted the survey findings. This discrepancy was particularly marked in relation to mass attitudes to the leadership qualities of Gairy. All participant-observers reported that Gairy's followers attributed supernatural qualities to him, although this was not brought out in the survey, despite the fact that questions 26 to 31 allowed respondents to freely list the "good points" and "bad points" of Gairy.

This raises the perennial problem in survey research as to

what extent the questionnaire pre-conditions and determines the response. One good example in our study that demonstrated this type of problem was the question in the survey relating to people's perception of British rule. We asked respondents whether "On the whole, would you say British rule had been good for Grenada?" in which we allowed for five different pre-coded responses. In devising this question we assumed that the term "British rule" would be more or less uniformly understood by all respondents. However, when we re-interviewed a sub-sample of both urban and rural respondents, but this time on an informal, conversational basis we found that there was a great variety of interpretations as to what people understood by "British rule".[1] This was also borne out by the information collected by the participant-observers.

A number of examples of contradictions in the data collected from the two sources strengthened our conviction that the questionnaire is a very imprecise instrument for attempting to discern more subtle or complex patterns of relationships or attitudes in studies such as ours. The questionnaire threw little light on such matters as the strength of political identification, the perception of authority relations and the sense of community identity, as contrasted with the data collected by the participant-observers. For example, the latter were able to discern clear patterns of

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[1] In the rural areas "British rule" was often interpreted to include the whole way of life of the peasants. Urban respondents, on the other hand, who were more exposed to the mass media and more highly educated, were more likely to perceive of it specifically as meaning alien rule.

differences among the various social classes on the sense of community identification, and that Gairyites perceived of their party as a protest movement against officialdom in general. The participant-observers also found that in a number of communities there was an informal power structure which was not even remotely connected with the official one.

One striking result of our use of participant-observers was the close similarity of the general findings of the ten observers, which indicates that if such an investigation is properly structured, a high degree of reliability can be attained. It is our contention, on the basis of our experience in Grenada, that the data collected by a team of well trained participant-observers is far more useful for the types of problems we were investigating than the survey method. In larger societies, of course, this approach is often ruled out by considerations of expense (although in relation to resources this may be no more costly on a unit basis). We found that the use of students cut down considerably on what might otherwise have proved a prohibitive cost even for such a small society; although this was partly counter-balanced by the lack of experience of the students. In the hands of a skilled interpreter, however, many of the mistakes made by students can be corrected. Part of our success with this method was due to the fact that since the students were West Indians they were familiar with the general nature of the society and the political system, although not with the specific issues and personalities. Nonetheless, despite our strong endorsement of this approach to data collection from our own experience, we are

cognizant that this method may not prove feasible or possible for other types of societies or other types of problems.

It is our firm conviction that despite the usefulness of each of the methods used in this study individually, a much deeper and more meaningful analysis is possible when a number of these approaches are used in conjunction with each other, and that the possibilities of gross errors are greatly minimized by the cross-checks provided by the different sets of data.

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ASKED OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC ELITES

Let us start with some questions about your background.

1. Where were you born?

2. When were you born?

3. Where were you raised (i.e. spent adolesence)

   (a) Rural (b) Urban other than St. George's (c) St. George's

4. Could you tell me how many years of schooling have you completed?

5. What type of work do you do?

6. Does all your income come from this source or do you have supplementary income?

7. Name of Respondent

INTERVIEWER ONLY

8. Colour of Respondent.

   1. Black

   2. High Brown

   3. Brown

   4. Near White

   5. White

9. Estimated Income

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ECONOMIC ELITES

1. What are your views concerning the general economic prospects for Grenada?

2. Which sectors of the economy do you think have the most potential for development?

3. (a) What are your views concerning the prospects for your own business?

   (b) Are you planning any expansion of your business over the next five years?

4. Do you think that Grenadians are contributing enough towards the economic development of the Island?

5. If the answer to the last question was "No", in what ways do you think they could contribute more?

   (a) By working harder?

   (b) By consuming more local products?

   (c) By saving more?

   (d) By investing more at home?

   (e) By making less demands for wage increases?

   (f) Any other ways?

6. (a) Do you think that Grenada can do without grant-in-aid?

   (b) If not, for how long do you think the Island will require grant-in-aid?

   (c) Why have you chosen this period of time?

7. (a) Do you think that the payment of grant-in-aid to Grenada gives the British Government the right to exercise control over the Government of the Island?

   (b) If the United States, Canada or any other country decided to give regular aid to Grenada, would you also feel that they should enjoy similar political rights?

   (If the answer to (b) is "No")

   (c) Why should Britain enjoy this right to exercise control because of the aid she gives and not other countries?

8. If grant-in-aid must be accompanied by "political strings" do you think that steps should be taken to reduce the island's dependence on such aid?

9. If the answer to question eight was "Yes", what measures would you suggest to reduce this dependence?

   (a) Reduction in government expenditure.

   (b) Increase in taxation.

   (c) Some of both.

10. What are the reasons for your answer to question nine?

11. If you favour a reduction in Government expenditure, what type(s) of expenditure should be reduced?

12. If you favour an increase in taxation, what additional types of taxes do you think should be introduced?

13. Do you regard foreign capital and enterprise as a necessary condition for Grenada's economic development?

14. Which of the following propositions do you regard as the most important:

   (a) That Grenadians should choose whatever party or system of Government that they wish?

   (b) That they should choose the party or system of Government which will attract the maximum amount of foreign capital?

   (c) That they should choose the party or system of Government which will encourage the maximum amount of investment by local investors?

15. Since the introduction of the Ministerial system of Government, do you think Grenadians have elected any Government which was unacceptable from the point of view of local and/or foreign investors?

16. If the answer to question fifteen was "Yes", which Government or Governments do you have in mind?

17. Why was that Government(s) unacceptable to investors?

18. Would you support special constitutional safeguards to avert the possibility of electing a Government which wants to carry out policies that are detrimental to investment by local and foreign businessmen?

19. If the answer to question eighteen was "Yes", what safeguards would you suggest?

    (a) Veto powers by the Administrator.

    (b) Veto powers by the Colonial Office.

    (c) Entrenched constitutional provisions with judicial review.

20. Do you think that the Ministerial system has been working well?

21. If the answer to question twenty was "No", what are your reasons?

    (a) That Ministers lack sufficient experience and education.

    (b) That Civil Servants lack sufficient experience and education.

    (c) Insufficient consultation with business and other economic groups.

    (d) Any other reasons?

22. (a) Do you think that the introduction of universal adult suffrage was a mistake?

    (b) What are the reasons for your answer?

    (c) If the answer to (a) was "Yes", would you support the return to a more limited franchise?

23. What in your opinion was the most important contributory factor leading to the suspension of the Constitution?

24. What steps do you think might have been taken to avert the crisis?

25. Do you think the action of the Colonial Office was justifiable?

26. If the answer to question twenty five was "No", what alternative course of action would you have suggested?

27. In order to avoid the recurrence of a similar crisis in the future what modifications would you propose under the following headings?

    (a) Constitutional

    (b) Administrative

28. Do you think the country is ready for Independence?

29. Do you regard Crown Colony Government as a good preparation for Independence?

30. Do you think it would be better for Grenada to continue under a Crown Colony System of Government rather than become Independent?

31. Would you advocate that Grenada should:

    (a) Join the proposed new Federation of the West Indies?

    (b) Join with Trinidad?

32. Could you name and rank no more than six of the individuals outside of the Government who you think have exercised the greatest influence on Government policy.
(Please list in descending order of importance.)

(a) (d)

(b) (e)

(c) (f)

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POLITICAL ELITES

Now let us turn to some questions about politics.

1. When did you first get interested in politics?

   (a) Date.

   (b) Event(s) that first made you interested.

2. What would you say are the main problems facing Grenada today?

Now let us turn to the present situation.

3. What would you say are the factors that led the Colonial Office to suspend the Constitution.

4. Do you believe this action was justified or unjustified?

5. (a) Have you read the Commission of Enquiry's Report?

   Yes No

   (b) Do you agree or disagree with their general conclusions?

   (c) Reason(s) for agreeing or disagreeing.

Now I would like to turn to some structural aspects of Government.

6. (a) Prior to your assumption of office were there any meetings, discussions or talks between Ministers, Civil Servants and the Administrator about the Ministerial System of Government?

   (b) Since Grenada's experience of a Ministerial System is so short, would you say that the traditional British model of relationship between Minister and Civil Servant should be modified?

   (c) If "Yes", in what way?

7. Some people have blamed the Civil Service for this crisis, others have blamed the politicians. Where do you think the fault lies?

8. What would you say were the major problems that you faced when you were in office, as far as the Civil Service was concerned?

9. Do you believe that the Civil Service was loyal to the Government?

10. (a) Did you or other officials that you know of receive any instructions or guidance about the working of a Ministerial System in preparation for introduction of the System?

    (b) If the answer to (a) was "No", do you think the smooth operation of Government suffered by the absence of such guidance?

    (c) As far as you know, did Ministers receive any guidance?

11. Some people have charged that the political leaders in the smaller territories are irresponsible and immature. What is your view of this matter?

12. Some people have suggested that the basic problem in the small territories is due to the fact that the Civil Service consider elected members as being inferior and ignorant. Do you think this view characterizes

    (a) A few?

    (b) A large number?

    (c) The majority?

13. Would you expect relations between the Administrator, Ministers and Civil Servants after the next elections to get -

    (a) Better

    (b) Worse

14. In order to avoid a recurrence of a similar crisis in the future, what modifications would you propose under the following headings?

    (a) Constitutional

    (b) Administrative

    (c) Political

15. Do you regard Crown Colony Government as a good preparation for Independence?

16. Do you think it would be better for Grenada to contrive under a Crown Colony System of Government rather than become independent?

17. Would you advocate that Grenada should:

    (a) Join the proposed new Federation of the West Indies?

    (b) Join with Trinidad?

(c) What would you say were the preferences of the people of Grenada on this issue?

18. Could you name and rank no more than six of the individuals outside of the Government who you think have exercised the greatest influence on Government policy.
(Please list in descending order of importance).

(a) (d)

(b) (e)

(c) (f)

19. Do you believe that the machinery of Government in Grenada would proceed more effectively and smoothly

(a) With a Grenadian Administrator?

(b) If other key officials were all Grenadians?

20. Do you think the country is ready for Independence?

Now let us turn to the party system in Grenada.

21. Would you say that the two party system is working satisfactorally or unsatisfactorally?

(a) Give the reason(s) for your answer.

22. (a) What would you say your party stands for?

(b) What do you think the opposition stands for?

Let us now turn to the leaders of the two parties.

23. (a) What would you say are the positive and negative qualities of Mr. Gairy as a leader?

(i) Positive qualities

(ii) Negative qualities

(b) What do you think are the positive and negative qualities of Mr. Blaize?

(i) Positive qualities

(ii) Negative qualities

(c) What do you think are the positive and negative qualities of Dr. Watts?

(i) Positive qualities

(ii) Negative qualities

(d) What would you say are the positive and negative qualities of Mr. Knight?

(i) Positive qualities

(ii) Negative qualities

24. If elections were held in the near future, which party would you say is likely to win?

25. Why do you think people vote the way they do?

(a) Because they believe in the party?

(b) Because they believe in the leader?

(c) Any other reason(s)?

Let us now turn to some questions about Grenadian Society.

26. Some people say this society is divided by class, while others say it is colour and still others say religion. What is your view on the matter?

27. What class, for example, would you say you belonged to?

28. What percentage of the population would you say belongs to the following classes?

(a) The upper class

(b) The middle class

(c) The lower class

(d) The peasantry

29. (a) Do you think that Grenada can do without grant-in-aid?

(b) If the answer is "No", how long do you think the Island will continue to require grant-in-aid?

(c) Why have you chosen this period of time?

30. (a) Do you think that the payment of grant-in-aid to Grenada gives the British Government the right to exercise control over the Government of the Island?

(b) If the United States, Canada or any other country decided to give regular aid to Grenada would you also feel that they should enjoy similar control?

(c) If the answer to (b) is "No", why should Britain enjoy this right to exercise control because of the aid she gives and not other countries?

31. If grant-in-aid must be accompanied by "political strings" do you think that steps should be taken to reduce the Island's dependence on such aid?

32. If the answer to question thirty-one was "Yes", what measures would you suggest?

(a) Reduction in Government expenditure?

(b) Increase in taxation?

(c) Some of both?

33. What are the reasons for your answer(s) to question thirty-two?

34. If you favour a reduction in Government expenditure, what type(s) of expenditure do you think should be reduced?

35. If you favour an increase in taxation, what additional type(s) of taxes do you think could be introduced?

36. Which do you regard as the most important:

(a) That Grenadians should choose whatever party or system of Government that they wish?

(b) That they should choose the party or system of Government which will attract the maximum amount of foreign capital?

(c) That they should choose the party or system of Government which will encourage the maximum amount of investment by local investors?

37. Would you support constitutional safeguards to avert the possibility of electing a Government which wants to carry out policies that are detrimental to investment by local and foreign businessmen?

38. If the answer to question thirty-seven was "Yes", what safeguards would you suggest?

    (a) Veto powers by the Administrator.

    (b) Veto powers by the Colonial Office.

    (c) Extrenched constitutional provisions with judicial review.

39. (a) Do you think that the introduction of universal adult suffrage was a mistake?

    (b) What are the reasons for your answer?

    (c) If the answer to (a) was "Yes", would you support the return to a more limited franchise?

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BUREAUCRATIC ELITES

1. Career background.

   (a) When did you join the Public Service?

   (b) Present post

   (c) Post held when the Committee System was introduced

   (d) Post held when the Ministerial System was introduced

2. I should like to hear your views on Committee System as it operated in Grenada.

   (a) Do you consider that the Committee System was a success?

   (b) Give the reason(s) for your answer

3. Let us look at the operation of the Ministerial System up to the suspension of the Constitution.

   (a) Did you or other officials receive any instructions or guidance about the working of a Ministerial System in preparation for introduction of the System?

   (b) If the answer is "No", do you think that the smooth operation of Government suffered by the absence of such guidance?

   (c) As far as you know, did Ministers receive any guidance?

   (d) Since Grenada's experience of a Ministerial System is so short, would you say that the traditional British model of relationship between Minister and Civil Servant should be modified?

   (e) If the answer is "Yes", in what way do you think it should be modified?

4. Would you agree with the proposition that Ministers are unqualified by experience and education to be in charge of Ministeries?

5. What proportion of Civil Servants do you think hold the view that Ministers are unqualified for their positions?

   (a) A few. (b) A large number.

   (c) The majority.

6. What problems have you had to face in adjusting to the Ministerial government?

7. If your Minister wished to pursue a line of policy with which you disagreed, what action would you take -

   (a) Accept his instructions without further questions?

   (b) Press your point of view more strongly?

   (c) Take some other course (Please specify).

8. In your opinion, which of these courses of action do you think the majority of civil servants in Grenada would adopt?

9. Who did you regard as the Head of the Government of Grenada before June 18, 1962?

   (a) The Administrator (b) The Chief Minister

10. To whom did you consider that you owed your first loyalty as a Civil Servant?

   (a) The Administrator (b) Your Minister

   (c) The Chief Minister (d) Your profession as a Civil Servant

11. Suppose you were given conflicting instructions on the same matter by the Administrator and by your minister, what course would you take?

   (a) Obey the Minister's instructions.

   (b) Obey the Administrator's instructions.

   (c) Consult the Administrator.

   (d) Other (Please specify).

   Give brief reasons for your answer.

12. When there is a change in the Government, i.e., a change in the ruling party, would you advocate that there should also be a change in the senior Civil Service?

13. When a new Government comes into power, what action would you recommend in relation to a civil servant who has aligned himself with a particular Government?

14. What do you consider the best type of machinery for appointments, promotions, and transfers: a Public Service Commission appointed by the Administrator

    (a) After consultation with the Chief Minister.

    (b) On the advice of the Chief Minister.

    (c) On the advice of both the Chief Minister and Leader of the Opposition.

    (d) At his own discretion.

15. (a) Have you read the Report of the Commission of Enquiry?

    (b) If so, do you agree or disagree with the charges of malpractices?

    Agree Disagree

16. A Government in order to survive has to distribute patronage. Do you think that the previous Government of Grenada was involved primarily

    (a) In distributing patronage (b) In corruption?

17. Would you agree that all patronage should be outlawed?

18. Do you think that most senior Civil Servants understood fully the requirements and procedures for financial control?

19. Suppose the Executive Council approved expenditure on a project. Would you accordingly have felt free to proceed to spend money on this project without further checks or question?

20. Do you consider that Civil Servants have been sufficiently forthright in guiding and advising ministers in relation to financial transactions?

21. What is your view of the operations of the office of Financial Secretary in relation to:

    (a) Ministers, and

    (b) Permanent Secretaries and other Heads of Departments.

22. Do you think that the controls imposed by the late Federal Government were

    (a) too irksome, or

    (b) reasonable

Now we come to the suspension of the Constitution.

23. What in your opinion was the most important contributory factor leading to the suspension of the Constitution?

24. What steps do you think might have been taken to avert the crisis?

25. Do you think the action of the Colonial Office was justifiable?

26. If the answer to question twenty-five was "No", what alternative course of action would you have suggested?

27. Would you expect relations between the Administrator, the Ministers and the Civil Servants after the next elections to get -

    (a) better, or

    (b) worse?

28. In order to avoid recurrence of a similar crisis in the future, what modifications would you propose under the following heads:

    (a) Constitutional

    (b) Administrative

29. Do you regard Crown Colony Government as a good preparation for Independence?

30. Do you think it would be better for Grenada to continue under a Crown Colony System of government rather than to become independent?

31. Would you advocate that Grenada should:

    (a) Join the proposed new Federation of the West Indies, or

    (b) Join with Trinidad?

32. Could you name and rank no more than six of the individuals outside of the Government who you think have exercised the greatest influence on Government policy.
    (Please list in descending order of importance)

    (a) (d)

    (b) (e)

    (c) (f)

33. Do you believe that the machinery of Government in Grenada would proceed more effectively and smoothly:

(a) With a Grenadian Administrator?

(b) If other key officials were all Grenadians?

PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES

(Interviewer: Please read this statement to all respondents before beginning interview)

As you may have noticed in the newspapers or heard on the radio, the University of the West Indies is conducting a survey of public opinion in Grenada. We are interested in getting your opinions on a number of topics, but your name will not appear in any form whatever in any report.

After this interview is completed your opinions will be tabulated and we plan to write a report. The University will be grateful for your co-operation.

Let me start with some questions about your background.

1. Where were you born?
2. In what year were you born?
3. How long have you lived at this address?
4. Do you own the house you are now living in? Yes.....No.....
5. What is your occupation?

   (Interviewer: Get as specific a job description as possible. Include employer as well as actual job. If retired get occupation while employed).

   <u>If farmer</u>:

   (a) How many acres do you own?

   (b) Do you rent land for cultivation?

   If yes, how much?

   (c) What crops do you grow?

Civil Servant:

(d) Rank

(e) Work performed

(f) Ministry, Department, Division.

6. How many years of school have you completed?

Primary..... Secondary.....University.....

7. What is your marital status?

(a) Married

(b) Common Law

(c) Divorced

(d) Widowed

(e) Single

8. How many children do you have?

9. What Church do you belong to?

(get specific name of denomination)

10. What are the organizations you belong to?

(Interviewer: get specific names of the organizations)

(a) Union

(b) Lodges

(c) Church and church related

(d) Other

(e) Political parties

(If not mentioned)

Are you a member of any political party?

Which of the organizations you belong to do you consider most important?

11. /Interviewer: By observation check the type of dwelling unit Respondent lives in:/

Concrete..... Wooden.....

Size of Housing unit:

(a) Dwelling unit with 5 or more rooms

(b) Dwelling unit 2 to 4 rooms

(c) Respondent rents a room

12. Do you own a

(a) Car

(b) Bike

(c) Motor Bicycle

(d) Sewing machine

(e) Livestock. If yes, how many of each type?

13. /Interviewer: By observation check the colour of Respondent. (See instruction sheet)/

(a) White

(b) Near white

(c) Brown

(d) Black

(e) Indian

Now I would like to ask you a few questions about Grenada.

14. On the whole, do you think British rule has been good for Grenada?

(a) Good

(b) Good with qualifications

(c) Equally good and bad

(d) Bad with qualifications

(e) Bad

15. Do you think Independence should be postponed for a while, or would you favour Independence soon?

(a) Immediately

(b) Fairly soon

(c) Not for a while

16. A Commission of Enquiry recently issued a report on the financial activities of the past Government

(a) Have you seen that report?

Yes No

(b) They charged the government with squandermania. Do you agree or disagree with this charge?

Agree Disagree Don't Know

(c) The Chief Minister replied to these charges. Have you seen that report?

Yes No Don't Know

(d) He contended that these charges were unjust. Do you agree or disagree with this contention?

Agree Disagree Don't Know

(e) As a result of all of these charges and counter-charges, the Colonial Office suspended Grenada's Constitution. Do you agree or disagree with this action?

Agree Disagree Don't Know

(f) As you know, there is an election coming up soon. Do you intend to vote in that election?

Yes No Don't Know

17. Who was the elected member from this constituency in the last Legislative Council?

Name

18. Do you happen to remember how many members there were in the last Legislative Council?

Number

19. Do you think that the GULP and the GNP stand for the same things or for different things?

    (a) Same (b) Different

20. What do you think the GULP stands for?

21. What do you think the GNP stands for?

22. All in all, does it make any difference to you whether the GULP or the GNP is in control of the government?

    (a) Yes, it makes a difference

    (b) No, it makes no difference

23. Would you favour Union with Trinidad or Federation with the Little Eight?

    (a) Trinidad

    (b) Little Eight

    (c) Neither (Please specify)

24. How many elections has Grenada had since the granting of universal adult franchise?

25. Which of these elections have you voted in?

    (a) 1951 (c) 1957

    (b) 1954 (d) 1961

26. Who is the leader of the GULP?

27. What are his good points as a leader?

    (a)

    (b)

    (c)

    (d)

28. What are his bad points as a leader?

    (a)

    (b)

    (c)

    (d)

29. Who is the leader of the GNP?

30. What are his good points?

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

31. What are his bad points?

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

32. If you want to know what the Government is doing, what is your main source of information?

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

33. On the whole, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the job done by the Grenada Civil Service?

(a) Satisfied

(b) Dissatisfied

34. If dissatisfied, why?

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

35. Do you subscribe to any newspaper or magazine?

(a) Yes

(b) No

If yes, which one(s)?

36. If you do not subscribe to any newspaper or magazine do you get a chance to read a newspaper or magazine regularly?

(a) Yes (b) No

If yes, which one(s)?

37. What do you rely on mostly for information about politics and elections?

(a) Newspaper

(b) Radio

(c) Friends

(d) Magazines

(e) Political meetings

38. Which of these do you think is most important?

39. Do you own a radio?

If yes, which station(s) do you listen to most?

(Interviewer, list exact names)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

40. What kind of programme do you prefer to listen to?

(a) Political

(b) Farm

(c) Music

(d) Educational

41. Here are some things people tell us when we interview them. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with them. I'll read them one at a time.

(a) First, people like me don't have any say about what the Government does.

Agree Disagree

(b) Even when you know your candidate doesn't have any chance to win, it is important to vote.

Agree Disagree

(c) So many other people vote that it doesn't matter much whether I vote or not.

Agree Disagree

(d) Sometimes politics and Government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

Agree Disagree

(e) Many local elections aren't important enough to bother with.

Agree Disagree

(f) Public officials really care about what people like me think.

Agree Disagree

42. Could you tell me whether your name appeared on the Electoral List this time?

Yes No Don't Know

43. Could you remember whether it appeared on last year's list (1961)?

Yes No Don't Know

APPENDIX II

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN GRENADA AFTER 1962: THE ASSOCIATED STATE

The "crisis of identity" that has historically plagued Grenada and the other small islands of the Windwards and Leewards has been accentuated since 1962. The continuing uncertainty as to the future status and identity of these societies, deriving from their marginality to all the systems they have been bound or associated with, has served to increase the feeling of frustration and tension in these islands. The collapse of the West Indian Federation in 1961 was the most severe blow sustained by these territories in their search for identity in a non-colonial context.

Nonetheless, even after the collapse of the Federation there still appeared to be alternatives that would enable these territories to obtain independence as part of larger West Indian units. In Grenada, as we have seen in chapter five, there were considerable enthusiasm and high hopes in 1962 for the possibility of integration with Trinidad, a larger and more prosperous state. After 1962, however, these hopes gradually dwindled. A number of difficulties soon became apparent to the Government of Trinidad in connection with Unitary State. Most of the difficulties that received public attention were the economic and financial ones. The reports issued by the numerous Commissions that studied various aspects of integration all revealed the painful truth that it was likely to be an expensive proposition for Trinidad, that while most

of the benefits would accrue to Grenada the costs would accrue to Trinidad. Particularly difficult were the problems involved in freedom of movement, which would greatly exacerbate already high levels of unemployment in Trinidad. One of the other major unresolved economic problems was that the British Government was in no mood to arrive at any accommodation that would commit her to financial support for the Unitary State. As we have pointed out, Grenada was heavily dependent on grants-in-aid from the British Government, and Trinidad insisted on firm financial commitments from Britain as a condition of Unitary State.

While the economic difficulties of integration have received the most attention, there is a further consideration that has undoubtedly been responsible for the reluctance shown by the Government of Trinidad for Unitary State: that integration could upset the delicate balance of racial politics in Trinidad. Although there has been a conscious attempt on the part of the Government of Trinidad, and particularly its leader Dr. Williams to avoid racial politics, party politics tends to follow closely the divisions between East Indians and Negroes. That Gairy recognized the political implications of integration is borne out by his alleged statement that "there is no guarantee that the Grenadian Negro shares the same attitude towards the Indians as the Trinidadian Creole". A further political difficulty is that integration could result in the loss of status and possibly jobs for a number of the politicians and civil servants in Grenada. The introduction of a full-scale Ministerial system of government in the 1950's created a new class of politicians, most of whom would understandably be

reluctant to give up their newly found power and position, which Unitary State would undoubtedly entail, to some extent at least.

Unfortunately for Grenada, Trinidad has given no clear answer on the question of Unitary State, and while the prospects for integration now appear slight, the issue has still not been formally resolved. Sir Arthur Lewis, writing in 1965, issued an agonizing plea for some resolution of this issue:

> TRINIDAD OFFERS A UNITARY STATE, BUT WHEN THE OFFER IS ACCEPTED BY GRENADA, STALLS INDEFINITELY.
> Common decency suggests that this poor deluded island should now be released if Trinidad is not prepared to go ahead .[1]

After the Federation broke up, and Jamaica and Trinidad obtained independence on their own in 1962, there was still the possibility that a Federation comprised of Barbados and the Windward and Leeward Islands could be worked out. This was known as the Federation of the Eight, or "The Little Eight". This prospect appeared less attractive to Grenada than it did to the other islands because of the possibility of integration with Trinidad. This prospect for a Federation of the Eight, however, was rudely shattered when Barbados, the largest and most prosperous of the Eight, announced in 1965 that it would formally seek independence on its own. Barbados, like Trinidad and Jamaica before her, had realized that Federation was likely to aid the smaller territories at the expense of the larger, which this time was Barbados. While Arthur Lewis laid a large part of the blame for this breakdown on

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[1] Sir Arthur Lewis, "The Agony of the Eight" (pamphlet), (Barbados: Advocate Commercial Printery, 1965), p. 38.

the insularity and quarrelling among the leaders of the various islands, he emphasized that the biggest obstacle to Federation was the continued silence of the British Treasury, and that London had contributed nothing to federal discussion except a string of irritating pronouncements[1]. Whatever the causes, the whole experience with attempts at Federation in the West Indies have been well summarized in the famous Federation calypso by Sparrow as a case of "dog eat dog and the survival of the fittest". The withdrawal of Barbados from the proposed Federation seems to have ended the possibility of any form of political federation in the area for the present generation at least.

It was amply evident throughout this period that the policy of Britain was to withdraw as quickly as possible from the area at the least possible expense. With the advent of the Labour Government, Britain's attempt to divest herself of her few remaining colonies and to liquidate the Colonial Office was visibly speeded up. The difficulty with this policy has been that most of the colonies remaining to Britain in the 1960's were colonies like those in the West Indies which were so small as to make independence alone meaningless, and that they had almost intractable problems. The cynicism of British policy was perhaps best revealed in the case of Basutoland in 1966, when that hapless territory was given "paper" independence, although it was clear that it was only a question of time before it came under the domination of South Africa. More recently there has been the

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[1] Ibid.

example of Malta. In the case of the remaining West Indian colonies, Britain devised an especially ingenious formula, that of "Associated Status". This grants full internal self-government to these territories, but Britain retains control over her external affairs. Throughout the discussions involving these new constitutions, Britain was at great pains to make it clear that she does not intend to be financially responsible for these states, and that they would have to rely on their own resources, and whatever aid they could obtain from America, to survive. She has also been actively encouraging these states to enter into commercial arrangements with other Commonwealth Caribbean countries.

While the inhabitants of these islands will still retain their United Kingdom passports, they will not have unlimited freedom of entry into the United Kingdom, but will be subject to the same restrictions against coloured immigration as citizens of independent countries within the Commonwealth. To complete this travesty of "Associated Status" without any of the financial or migration benefits that are normally associated with this type of status, (such as Puerto Rico has obtained from the United States, for example) Britain gave these colonies the right to U.D.I.!! Each "Associated State" has the right to declare "independence" unilaterally at any time it wishes. The prospect of seven independent nations in the Leewards and Windwards, each with populations of less than 100,000 and each with a full panoply of Ministerial government, has therefore become a possibility, even though this was previously considered absurd by the British Government. Nonetheless, the proposals were greeted in Britain

as demonstrating her flexibility and ingenuity in ending colonial domination!

In 1965 conferences were held in London with each of the seven territories to discuss these new constitutional proposals. At the conference attended by representatives of the Grenada Government, Gairy, still in the opposition at home, demanded new elections before the granting of Associated Status. He based his argument on the fact that the 1962 election had been fought on the basis of union with Trinidad, and that the fading of this possibility and the new constitutional proposals demanded new elections. He stated that unless elections were held prior to the new constitution coming into effect he could not guarantee political stability in Grenada. Constitutionally, the Government need not now call elections until early 1968. Already Gairy has been proclaiming in the market square that he is in fact the leader in Grenada, and that it is only the continuing connivance of the British Government and "that class of people in Grenada who will do anything to keep the barefoot boy out of office" who are thwarting the true wishes of the people of Grenada for him to be reinstalled as Chief Minister.

The prospects for Grenada, as indeed for all of these small islands, is indeed bleak, whether it be their political or their economic future. It is highly unlikely that "Associated Status" will be able to solve the "crisis of identity" faced by these societies. They remain in a shadow world, where they are neither colonies nor independent states, obtaining the benefits of neither and the drawbacks of both. Ultimately, the only hope for these

islands is in wider groupings in the Caribbean, but that day still appears far off.

The Constitutional Proposals for "Associated Status"

THE CONSTITUTION OF GRENADA (Proposed 1966)

Fundamental Rights and Freedoms

The Constitution will include provision for safeguarding the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, irrespective of race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest. These fundamental rights and freedoms will include the right to life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law; freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association; and protection for the privacy of a person's home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation. Subject to safeguards, derogation from certain of these fundamental rights and freedoms will be permitted in time of war or emergency.

2. Provision will be made in the Constitution for the enforcement by the Courts of the fundamental rights and freedoms. In particular any person who alleges that any of the protective provisions has been, or is being, or is likely to be contravened in relation to him will have a right to apply to the High Court for redress, and there will be a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal

in such cases.

THE GOVERNOR

3. The Governor will be appointed by Her Majesty and hold office during Her Majesty's pleasure. Provision will be made for the appointment of an Acting Governor and of a deputy to the Governor if circumstances require.

THE LEGISLATURE

4. The Legislature of Grenada will consist of Her Majesty, a Senate and a House of Representatives.

The Senate

5. The Senate will consist of nine members appointed by the Governor, five of whom will be appointed on the advice of the Premier, two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, and two on the advice of the Premier after he has consulted such organizations or interests as he considers should be represented. The Senate will elect a President from amongst its own members, but may not elect a member who is a Minister.

The House of Representatives

6. The House of Representatives will consist of ten elected members. The House will elect a Speaker. The Speaker may be elected from among the members of the House who are not Ministers or from outside the House.

Qualifications for membership of the Legislature

7. Subject to disqualifications of the normal type, a person shall be qualified to be nominated for election as a member of the

House of Representatives if he is a British subject of the age of twenty-one years or above, is able to speak the English language with sufficient proficiency, and has either resided in Grenada for twelve months immediately before his nomination for election, or is domiciled and resident in Grenada at that date.

Qualifications for Voters

8. Subject to disqualifications of the normal kind, a person will be qualified to be registered as an elector if he is a British subject of the age of twenty-one years or above, and satisfies such requirements as to residence or domicile in Grenada as may be prescribed by the Legislature. There will be provision under which the Legislature may, after the expiration of five years from the commencement of the Constitution, reduce the voting age by a law passed in accordance with the ordinary processes to another age, not being below eighteen.

Constituencies

9. Provision will be made for a Boundaries Commission, which will consist of the Speaker as Chairman, two members nominated on the advice of the Premier, and two members nominated on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition. The principles upon which the Commission should work will be set out in the Constitution. The Commission will carry out a review at intervals of not less than two, and not more than five years, and make recommendations as to the number of and the boundaries of the constituencies. The number of constituencies or the boundaries of the constituencies will then be alterable by the order of the Governor, approved in

draft by resolution of the House of Representatives, giving effect to recommendations of the Commission with any modifications proposed by the Minister responsible and approved by the House.

Elections

10. Elected members of the House of Representatives will be elected in single member constituencies by secret ballot. The registration of electors and the conduct of elections will be supervised by a Supervisor of Elections who will be independent in the discharge of his functions. The office of Supervisor of Elections will be a public office to which appointments will be made by the Governor in his discretion.

Transitional Provisions

11. Persons who are elected members of the existing Legislative Council immediately before the new Constitution comes into force will be deemed to have been elected as members of the House of Representatives, and the Speaker of the existing Legislative Council will be deemed to have been elected as Speaker of the House. The persons who immediately before the Constitution comes into force are nominated members of the Legislative Council will be deemed to have been nominated to the Senate on the advice of the Premier. The normal five-year life of the first Parliament will be deemed to run from the opening session of the existing Legislative Council.

Sessions and Dissolution of the Legislature

12. The normal life of the Legislature will be five years. The Constitution will require that at least one session of the

Legislature will be held in every year, in such a way that there is not an interval of six months between sessions. In exercise of his power to dissolve the Legislature the Governor will act on the advice of the Premier, but he will have power to dissolve the Legislature in his discretion if the Premier does not either resign or advise a dissolution within a prescribed period after a vote of no confidence in the Government has been passed in the House of Representatives or if there is a vacancy in the office of Premier and the Governor sees no prospect of being able to appoint a successor who commands the support of a majority of the House of Representatives.

Leader of the Opposition

13. There will be provision in the Constitution for the office of Leader of the Opposition. Appointments to the office will be made by the Governor in his discretion and in making his choice he will be guided by the principles set out in the Constitution.

Alteration of the Constitution

14. The Legislature of Grenada will have power to alter any of the provisions of the Constitution.

15. A Bill to alter any provision of the Constitution will be required to be supported at its third reading in the House of Representatives by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members of that House.

16. In addition (but subject to paragraph 17 below) in the case of a Bill to alter any "basic clause" of the Constitution -

(a) a period of three months must elapse between the introduction of the Bill in that House; and

(b) after its passage by both Houses or after its rejection by the Senate for a second time (see paragraph 20 below) the Bill must be submitted to the electors qualified to vote in elections to the House of Representatives and may not be submitted to the Governor for assent unless two-thirds of the valid votes cast by the electors voting on the Bill approve it.

17. There will be no need for a referendum in connection with a Bill for enactment by the Legislature of Grenada that terminates the association between the United Kingdom and Grenada and gives constitutional effect to arrangements under which Grenada (either by itself or together with other territories) joins with an independent Commonwealth country in the Caribbean, whether by uniting or federating with that country or in some other form of constitutional association with that country under which that country would be responsible for the defence and external relations of Grenada.

18. The "basic clauses" will be the provisions of the Constitution relating to the following matters:- fundamental rights and freedoms; the office of Governor; the structure of the Legislature including the composition of the Senate and the House of Representatives (except the number of elected members); the life of the Legislature, the frequency of sessions of the Legislature, dissolution, and the requirement for holding general elections; disqualifications of electors; the Boundaries Commission, its

functions and the interval at which it will discharge them; the Supervisor of Elections and his functions; the alteration of the Constitution; the establishment and composition of the High Court of Appeal; the appointment of judges and their tenure of office; the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court and the right of appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal on constitutional questions; the right of appeal from the Court of Appeal to the Privy Council; the Judicial and Legal Services Commission; the safe-guarding of the emoluments of the holders of certain offices and the safe-guarding of the pension rights of public officers; the method of appointment and removal of magistrates; the establishment of the office of Director of Audit, his appointment, his functions and tenure of office; the establishment and composition of the Public Service Commission, its powers and the tenure of office of its members; financial provisions (see paragraph 32); the suspension of the coming into force of the provision for a separate citizenship.

Relations between the House of Representatives and the Senate

19. If the Senate does not pass a Money Bill, without amendment, within one month of its being sent from the House of Representatives to the Senate (and it would have to be so sent at least one month before the end of the Session) the Bill may be presented to the Governor for assent.

20. If a Bill other than a Money Bill is passed by the House of Representatives in two successive Sessions and is rejected by the Senate in both Sessions, the Bill may be presented to the Governor for assent.

THE EXECUTIVE

21. The executive authority of Grenada will be vested in Her Majesty and exercised on Her behalf by the Governor. The Governor will exercise his functions on the advice of the Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet except where the Constitution or some other law of Grenada otherwise provides.

22. The Governor will appoint as Premier the member of the House of Representatives who in his judgment is best able to command the confidence of the majority of the members of that House. He will appoint other Ministers from among the members of the Senate and the members of the House of Representatives in accordance with the Premier's advice. The Attorney-General may be either a Minister or a public officer.

23. The general direction and control of the Government of Grenada will rest with the Cabinet consisting of the Premier and the other Ministers, and the Cabinet will be collectively responsible to the Legislature.

24. The Constitution will make provision for a Director of Public Prosecutions who will have independent powers in relation to criminal proceedings in the Courts. The Director will be a public officer; at any time when the Attorney-General is a public officer, he may discharge the function of the Director of Public Prosecutions and a separate appointment of a Director will not be necessary.

25. The Prerogative of Mercy will be exercised by the Governor in accordance with the advice of the Premier or such other

Minister as the Premier may designate. There will be an Advisory Committee which will consist of the Premier or such other Minister as he may designate, the Attorney-General and three other members appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier, one of such members being a Senior Medical Officer. Before advising the Governor on the exercise of the Prerogative in relation to a capital case the Minister responsible will be required to consult the Advisory Committee and he may also consult the Committee in any other case, but he will act in his own judgment in tendering his advice.

THE JUDICATURE

26. It was agreed that Grenada will participate in a Regional Supreme Court of Judicature. The provisions summarised in Annex B are provisions relating to such a court which, if acceptable to the other territories concerned outside the Windward Islands would be acceptable to the Government of Grenada.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE

The Public Service Commission

27. The Constitution will provide for a Public Service Commission. The Commission will consist of a Chairman and four other members. The Chairman and two members will be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier and the other two members by the Governor on the advice of the Premier after the Premier has consulted the Grenada Civil Service Association. A member will be appointed for a term not exceeding three years but may be

re-appointed. A member's appointment will be revocable by the Governor only for inability to discharge the functions of his office or for misbehaviour. The Governor will act on the advice of an independent tribunal. No person who is a member of the Legislature or who holds public office shall be a member of the Commission.

Functions of the Commission

28. With certain specified exceptions, the Commission will be responsible for appointments, promotions and transfers to public offices, and for the removal of, and the exercise of disciplinary control over, holders of such offices. The Commission will have authority to delegate its functions. The specified exceptions are the offices of Secretary to the Cabinet, Permanent Secretary and Head and Deputy Head of a Department of Government. No person shall be appointed to any of these offices if the Premier objects to his appointment. The power to transfer Permanent Secretaries will vest in the Governor acting on the advice of the Premier. The Director of Prosecutions or the Director of Audit will be removable by the Governor only for inability to discharge the functions of his office or for misbehaviour; the Governor will act on the advice of an independent tribunal.

29. There will be a Public Service Board of Appeal which will consist of a Chairman appointed by the Governor in his discretion, one member who is or has been an officer in the Grenada Civil Service appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Grenada Civil Service Association and one member appointed on the advice of the Premier. The members of the Board will hold

office for three years and may be re-appointed. A member's appointment will be revocable by the Governor only for inability to discharge the functions of his office or for misbehaviour; the Governor will act on the advice of an independent tribunal. The function of the Board of Appeal will be to hear and determine appeals from decisions of the Public Service Commission in discipline cases.

30. Provision will be made for the protection of pension rights and preventing the refusal, withholding or reduction in the amount of pension benefits without the approval of the appropriate Service Commission.

FINANCE

31. The Constitution will contain provision to secure that there is no expenditure from public funds except when there is statutory authority for such expenditure and unless a prescribed procedure has been compiled with which secures full Parliamentary scrutiny. It will include provisions relating to the procedure for the approval of the annual budget, the authorization of supplementary expenditure during a financial year and the provision of funds to meet contingent expenditure in advance of legislative approval. The Constitution will also contain provision for establishing the office of Director of Audit with responsibility for auditing all public accounts and reporting on them to the Legislature so that the Legislature may satisfy itself that no expenditure has in fact taken place without proper authority.

32. The emoluments of the Governor, judges, members of the

Public Service Commission and the Boundaries Commission, the Director of Audit and the Director of Public Prosecutions will be charged on the funds of Grenada by the Constitution which will also provide that the emoluments and other terms of service of any of those persons shall not be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment.

CITIZENSHIP

33. The Constitution will contain certain basic provisions for the establishment of a separate citizenship of Grenada. It will be provided, however, that these provisions may not be brought into force before the termination of the association, when they may be brought into force by a law of the Legislature of Grenada. Until that time Grenada will continue to share a common citizenship with the United Kingdom and Colonies and accordingly citizenship will continue to be governed by the British Nationality Acts of the United Kingdom. The basic provisions for a separate citizenship will be described in Annex C.

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